[GIT PULL] sound updates for 5.15-rc1 #2
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ammarfaizi2
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Sep 1, 2021
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…o routing" from Hans de Goede <[email protected]>: Changes in v2: - Only set lineout_string if BYT_RT5640_LINEOUT is set, since BYT_RT5640_LINEOUT_AS_HP2 only works if the lineout is enabled in the first place Original cover-letter: The HP Elitepad 1000 G2 has 2 headset jacks: 1. on the dock which uses the output of the codecs built-in HP-amp + the standard IN2 input which is always used with the headset-jack. 2. on the tablet itself, this uses the line-out of the codec, combined with an external HP-amp + IN1 for the headset-mic. This series adds support for this, resolving: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213415 Note this series does not add jack-detect support. I plan to add that with a follow-up series when I can make some time to implement that. Regards, Hans Hans de Goede (6): ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Move "Platform Clock" routes to the maps for the matching in-/output ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add line-out support ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add a byt_rt5640_get_codec_dai() helper ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add support for a second headphones output ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add support for a second headset mic input ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Fix HP ElitePad 1000 G2 quirk sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1
… Bard Liao <[email protected]>: shim base and alh base are platform-dependent. This series suggests to use variables for those bases. It allows us to use different bases for new platforms. v2: - Update the commit message of "soundwire: move intel sdw register definitions to sdw_intel.h" Bard Liao (6): soundwire: move intel sdw register definitions to sdw_intel.h ASoC: SOF: intel: add sdw_shim/alh_base to sof_intel_dsp_desc ASoC: SOF: intel: hda: remove HDA_DSP_REG_SNDW_WAKE_STS definition ASoC: SOF: intel: move sof_intel_dsp_desc() forward ASoC: SOF: intel: add snd_sof_dsp_check_sdw_irq ops soundwire: intel: introduce shim and alh base drivers/soundwire/intel.c | 74 ------------------------ drivers/soundwire/intel_init.c | 14 ++--- include/linux/soundwire/sdw_intel.h | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ sound/soc/sof/intel/cnl.c | 6 ++ sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c | 39 ++++++++----- sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.h | 8 ++- sound/soc/sof/intel/icl.c | 3 + sound/soc/sof/intel/shim.h | 3 + sound/soc/sof/intel/tgl.c | 12 ++++ 9 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1
Don't populate array names_to_check on the stack but instead it
static. Makes the object code smaller by 56 bytes. Also clean
up checkpatch warning by adding extra const for names_to_check
and pointer s.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
103512 34380 0 137892 21aa4 ./sound/usb/mixer.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
103264 34572 0 137836 21a6c ./sound/usb/mixer.o
(gcc version 10.2.0)
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This device has the same audio subsystem as the 0A5E skew (RT711 headset codec, 2 RT1308 amps and RT715 for mic capture) BugLink: thesofproject/linux#3057 Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: FRED OH <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
…iant DMI product name is used to support system variants based on adl_mx98373_rt5682 in current implementation. Replace this DMI search with DMI_OEM_STRING and coreboot(BIOS used in these systems) is setting the needed DMI_OEM_STRING field to uniquely identify these systems. Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: jairaj arava <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
The default SOF topology enables SSP capture and DMICs, even though both of these hardware capabilities are not always available in hardware (specific versions of HiFiberry and DMIC kit needed). For the SSP capture, this leads to annoying "SP5-Codec: ASoC: no backend capture" and "streamSSP5-Codec: ASoC: no users capture at close - state 0" errors. Update the quirks to match what the topology needs, which also allows for the ability to remove SSP capture and DMIC support. BugLink: thesofproject/linux#3061 Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
No need to initialize a variable if the next line overwrites the value. Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Rander Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch cleanups below cppcheck warning.
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:410:30: style: The scope of the variable 'val2' can be reduced. [variableScope]
unsigned int val, val_mask, val2 = 0;
^
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch cleanups below cppcheck warning.
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:576:28: style: The scope of the variable 'mc' can be reduced. [variableScope]
struct soc_mixer_control *mc;
^
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch cleanups below cppcheck warning.
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:814:15: style: The scope of the variable 'regval' can be reduced. [variableScope]
unsigned int regval;
^
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
This patch cleanups below cppcheck warning.
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:859:18: style: The scope of the variable 'regval' can be reduced. [variableScope]
unsigned int i, regval, regmask;
^
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:859:26: style: The scope of the variable 'regmask' can be reduced. [variableScope]
unsigned int i, regval, regmask;
^
sound/soc/soc-ops.c:860:6: style: The scope of the variable 'err' can be reduced. [variableScope]
int err;
^
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
ad193x devices support 96KHz and 192KHz sampling rates, when PLL/MCLK is referenced to 48kHz. Tested on ad1934. Signed-off-by: Codrin Ciubotariu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Don't populate the array div on the stack but instead it static const. Makes the object code smaller by 48 bytes. Before: text data bss dec hex filename 53894 16368 128 70390 112f6 ./sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.o After: text data bss dec hex filename 53750 16464 128 70342 112c6 ./sound/soc/codecs/rt5514.o (gcc version 10.2.0) Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
…uis Bossart <[email protected]>: Two quirks added for Dell XPS 9710 and Intel reference boards, and two minor cleanups. Pierre-Louis Bossart (3): ASoC: Intel: sof_sdw: add quirk for Dell XPS 9710 ASoC: Intel: update sof_pcm512x quirks ASoC: Intel: sof_sdw_max98373: remove useless inits jairaj arava (1): ASoC: SOF: Intel: Use DMI string to search for adl_mx98373_rt5682 variant sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_pcm512x.c | 13 +++++++++++-- sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_sdw.c | 12 ++++++++++++ sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_sdw_max98373.c | 4 ++-- sound/soc/sof/sof-pci-dev.c | 9 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1
…Morimoto <[email protected]>: Hi Mark Now I'm posting audio-graph-card2 patch-set, but it seems it needs longer discussion. Thus I want to post more easy patch first, and reduce my local patches. These are cppcheck warning cleanup patches for soc-ops. Kuninori Morimoto (4): ASoC: soc-ops: cleanup cppcheck warning at snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() ASoC: soc-ops: cleanup cppcheck warning at snd_soc_limit_volume() ASoC: soc-ops: cleanup cppcheck warning at snd_soc_get_xr_sx() ASoC: soc-ops: cleanup cppcheck warning at snd_soc_put_xr_sx() sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1
Simplify the code by using module_platform_driver macro for mt6359-accdet. Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Return the pointer directly from alloc ops instead of setting dmab->area at each place. It simplifies the code a bit. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_UC and SNDRV_DMA_TYPE_DEV_UC_SG are incorrectly named as if they were for the uncached memory, while actually we set the pages as write-combined. Rename them to reflect the right attribute. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
A few drivers want to have rather the exact buffer preallocation at the driver probe time and keep using it for the whole operations without allowing dynamic buffer allocation. For satisfying the demands, this patch extends the managed buffer allocation API slightly. Namely, when 0 is passed to max argument of the allocation helper functions snd_pcm_set_managed_buffer*(), it treats as if the fixed size allocation of the given size. If the pre-allocation fails in this mode, the function returns now -ENOMEM. Otherwise, i.e. max argument is non-zero, the function never returns -ENOMEM but tries to fall back to the smaller chunks and allows the dynamic allocation later -- which is still the default behavior until now. For more intuitive use, also two new helpers are added for handling the fixed size buffer allocation, too: snd_pcm_set_fixed_buffer() and snd_pcm_set_fixed_buffer_all(). Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
There are the generic DMA API calls for allocating and managing the pages with the write-combined attribute. Let's use them for all architectures but x86; x86 still needs the special handling to override the page attributes. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Now with the recent addition of WC buffer allocation support, we can use the standard PCM buffer allocation helpers for pxa2xx drivers. This allows us to remove lots of superfluous code. Cc: Daniel Mack <[email protected]> Cc: Haojian Zhuang <[email protected]> Cc: Robert Jarzmik <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
As the standard buffer allocation helper supports WC pages now, we can convert bcm driver to use that. This allows us to remove lots of superfluous code. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
As the standard buffer allocation helper supports WC pages now, we can convert imx-pcm-fiq driver to use that. This allows us to remove lots of superfluous code. Cc: Nicolin Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Xiubo Li <[email protected]> Cc: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Cc: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
As the standard buffer allocation helper supports WC pages now, we can convert imx-pcm-rpmsg driver to use that. This allows us to remove lots of superfluous code. Cc: Nicolin Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Xiubo Li <[email protected]> Cc: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Cc: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
As the standard buffer allocation helper supports WC pages now, we can convert imx-pcm-rpmsg driver to use that. This allows us to remove lots of superfluous code. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This patch simplifies the buffer pre-allocation code of fsl_asrc_dma driver with the standard managed buffer helper. It uses the newly introduced fixed-size buffer allocation helper. Cc: Nicolin Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Xiubo Li <[email protected]> Cc: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Cc: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This patch simplifies the buffer pre-allocation code of fsl_dma driver with the standard managed buffer helper. It uses the newly introduced fixed-size buffer allocation helper. Cc: Nicolin Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Xiubo Li <[email protected]> Cc: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Cc: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This patch simplifies the buffer pre-allocation code of fsl mpc5200 driver with the standard managed buffer helper. It uses the newly introduced fixed-size buffer allocation helper. Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This patch simplifies the buffer pre-allocation code of qcom lpass driver with the standard managed buffer helper. It uses the newly introduced fixed-size buffer allocation helper. Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Cc: Banajit Goswami <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
This patch simplifies the buffer pre-allocation code of qcom qdsp6 driver with the standard managed buffer helper. It uses the newly introduced fixed-size buffer allocation helper. Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Cc: Banajit Goswami <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Tested-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
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Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak host kernel addresses to the guest. Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters() stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc. Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if the guest requested a basic record. Note, KVM will also enable adaptive PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero, i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records. Bug #3 is in perf. intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE either. I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what KVM requests. Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER. Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries" records. Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels. Note! This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS, let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't support PEBS in any capacity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Fixes: c59a1f1 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Like Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Zhang Xiong <[email protected]> Cc: Lv Zhiyuan <[email protected]> Cc: Dapeng Mi <[email protected]> Cc: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Acked-by: Like Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
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…"RESET" Set the enable bits for general purpose counters in IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL when refreshing the PMU to emulate the MSR's architecturally defined post-RESET behavior. Per Intel's SDM: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. and Where "n" is the number of general-purpose counters available in the processor. AMD also documents this behavior for PerfMonV2 CPUs in one of AMD's many PPRs. Do not set any PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL bits if there are no general purpose counters, although a literal reading of the SDM would require the CPU to set either bits 63:0 or 31:0. The intent of the behavior is to globally enable all GP counters; honor the intent, if not the letter of the law. Leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0' effectively breaks PMU usage in guests that haven't been updated to work with PMUs that support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. This bug was recently exposed when KVM added supported for AMD's PerfMonV2, i.e. when KVM started exposing a vPMU with PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL to guest software that only knew how to program v1 PMUs (that don't support PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL). Failure to emulate the post-RESET behavior results in such guests unknowingly leaving all general purpose counters globally disabled (the entire reason the post-RESET value sets the GP counter enable bits is to maintain backwards compatibility). The bug has likely gone unnoticed because PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL has been supported on Intel CPUs for as long as KVM has existed, i.e. hardly anyone is running guest software that isn't aware of PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on Intel PMUs. And because up until v6.0, KVM _did_ emulate the behavior for Intel CPUs, although the old behavior was likely dumb luck. Because (a) that old code was also broken in its own way (the history of this code is a comedy of errors), and (b) PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL was documented as having a value of '0' post-RESET in all SDMs before March 2023. Initial vPMU support in commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests") *almost* got it right (again likely by dumb luck), but for some reason only set the bits if the guest PMU was advertised as v1: if (pmu->version == 1) { pmu->global_ctrl = (1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1; return; } Commit f19a0c2 ("KVM: PMU emulation: GLOBAL_CTRL MSR should be enabled on reset") then tried to remedy that goof, presumably because guest PMUs were leaving PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL '0', i.e. weren't enabling counters. pmu->global_ctrl = ((1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) | (((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) - 1) << X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED); pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~pmu->global_ctrl; That was KVM's behavior up until commit c49467a ("KVM: x86/pmu: Don't overwrite the pmu->global_ctrl when refreshing") removed *everything*. However, it did so based on the behavior defined by the SDM , which at the time stated that "Global Perf Counter Controls" is '0' at Power-Up and RESET. But then the March 2023 SDM (325462-079US), stealthily changed its "IA-32 and Intel 64 Processor States Following Power-up, Reset, or INIT" table to say: IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: Sets bits n-1:0 and clears the upper bits. Note, kvm_pmu_refresh() can be invoked multiple times, i.e. it's not a "pure" RESET flow. But it can only be called prior to the first KVM_RUN, i.e. the guest will only ever observe the final value. Note #2, KVM has always cleared global_ctrl during refresh (see commit f5132b0 ("KVM: Expose a version 2 architectural PMU to a guests")), i.e. there is no danger of breaking existing setups by clobbering a value set by userspace. Reported-by: Babu Moger <[email protected]> Cc: Sandipan Das <[email protected]> Cc: Like Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Dapeng Mi <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dapeng Mi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
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…git/netfilter/nf netfilter pull request 24-04-11 Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patches #1 and #2 add missing rcu read side lock when iterating over expression and object type list which could race with module removal. Patch #3 prevents promisc packet from visiting the bridge/input hook to amend a recent fix to address conntrack confirmation race in br_netfilter and nf_conntrack_bridge. Patch #4 adds and uses iterate decorator type to fetch the current pipapo set backend datastructure view when netlink dumps the set elements. Patch #5 fixes removal of duplicate elements in the pipapo set backend. Patch #6 flowtable validates pppoe header before accessing it. Patch #7 fixes flowtable datapath for pppoe packets, otherwise lookup fails and pppoe packets follow classic path. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [[email protected]: extend comment per Oscar] [[email protected]: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 amends a missing spot where the set iterator type is unset. This is fixing a issue in the previous pull request. Patch #2 fixes the delete set command abort path by restoring state of the elements. Reverse logic for the activate (abort) case otherwise element state is not restored, this requires to move the check for active/inactive elements to the set iterator callback. From the deactivate path, toggle the next generation bit and from the activate (abort) path, clear the next generation bitmask. Patch #3 skips elements already restored by delete set command from the abort path in case there is a previous delete element command in the batch. Check for the next generation bit just like it is done via set iteration to restore maps. netfilter pull request 24-04-18 * tag 'nf-24-04-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: fix memleak in map from abort path netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails netfilter: nf_tables: missing iterator type in lookup walk ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes This patchset fixes the following issues: - During driver de-initialization the driver unregisters the EMAD response trap by setting its action to DISCARD. However the manual only permits TRAP and FORWARD, and future firmware versions will enforce this. In patch #1, suppress the error message by aligning the driver to the manual and use a FORWARD (NOP) action when unregistering the trap. - The driver queries the Management Capabilities Mask (MCAM) register during initialization to understand if certain features are supported. However, not all firmware versions support this register, leading to the driver failing to load. Patches #2 and #3 fix this issue by treating an error in the register query as an indication that the feature is not supported. v2: - Patch #2: - Make mlxsw_env_max_module_eeprom_len_query() void ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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… update The rule activity update delayed work periodically traverses the list of configured rules and queries their activity from the device. As part of this task it accesses the entry pointed by 'ventry->entry', but this entry can be changed concurrently by the rehash delayed work, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by closing the race and perform the activity query under the 'vregion->lock' mutex. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054ed808 by task kworker/0:18/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-custom-00781-gd5ab772d32f7 #2 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019 Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120 print_report+0xce/0x670 kasan_report+0xd7/0x110 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_flower_rule_activity_get+0x121/0x140 mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x219/0x400 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc+0x19c/0x360 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x7b/0x1f0 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x30d/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 1039: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 poison_slab_object+0x102/0x170 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 kfree+0xc1/0x290 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x3d7/0xb50 mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x157/0x1300 process_one_work+0x8eb/0x19b0 worker_thread+0x6c9/0xf70 kthread+0x2c9/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 2bffc53 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Don't take mutex in mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work()") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexander Zubkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1fcce0a60b231ebeb2515d91022284ba7b4ffe7a.1713797103.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf(). The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of the VF configuration lock. If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the LAG mutex. Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then removing 2 VF: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock: ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] but task is already holding lock: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice] ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771: #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice] #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] stack backtrace: CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 #54 Hardware name: Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held. Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <[email protected]> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…nix_gc().
syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().
One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.
So, the splat is false-positive.
Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.
Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.
[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
__do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
__do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
__se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 26, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets, from Ismael Luceno. Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible double hook unregistration. * tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
__might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
</TASK>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by
releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to
avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock.
[ 75.307983] ======================================================
[ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ #22 Not tainted
[ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO)
at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308021]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock)
at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308053]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 75.308054]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 75.308055]
-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50
[ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60
[ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90
[ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 75.308098]
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0
[ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
[ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90
[ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740
[ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0
[ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120
[ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
[ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 75.308263]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1
[ 75.308265] ---- ----
[ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock-
AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[ 75.308270]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623:
[ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740
[ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)),
at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740
[ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}
at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2},
at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth]
Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Jan 14, 2025
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking
iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released
before calling a function that locks hdev.
[ 561.670344] ======================================================
[ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ #26 Not tainted
[ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670405]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670450]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 561.670452]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 561.670453]
-> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610
[ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170
[ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0
[ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0
[ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 561.670567]
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130
[ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190
[ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 561.670632]
-> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0
[ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360
[ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0
[ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth]
[ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240
[ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470
[ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30
[ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250
[ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0
[ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0
[ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 561.670744]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 561.670745] Chain exists of:
&hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH
[ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1
[ 561.670754] ---- ----
[ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock
AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 561.670767]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
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Jan 14, 2025
Aishwarya reports that warnings are sometimes seen when running the ftrace kselftests, e.g. | WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2066 at arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:141 arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0 | Modules linked in: | CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2066 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2 #2 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0 | lr : arch_stack_walk+0x248/0x4c0 | sp : ffff800083643d20 | x29: ffff800083643dd0 x28: ffff00007b891400 x27: ffff00007b891928 | x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 00000000000000c0 x24: ffff800082f39d80 | x23: ffff80008003ee8c x22: ffff80008004baa8 x21: ffff8000800533e0 | x20: ffff800083643e10 x19: ffff80008003eec8 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800083640000 x15: 0000000000000000 | x14: 02a37a802bbb8a92 x13: 00000000000001a9 x12: 0000000000000001 | x11: ffff800082ffad60 x10: ffff800083643d20 x9 : ffff80008003eed0 | x8 : ffff80008004baa8 x7 : ffff800086f2be80 x6 : ffff0000057cf000 | x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800086f2b690 | x2 : ffff80008004baa8 x1 : ffff80008004baa8 x0 : ffff80008004baa8 | Call trace: | arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0 (P) | arch_stack_walk+0x248/0x4c0 (L) | profile_pc+0x44/0x80 | profile_tick+0x50/0x80 (F) | tick_nohz_handler+0xcc/0x160 (F) | __hrtimer_run_queues+0x2ac/0x340 (F) | hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x268 (F) | arch_timer_handler_virt+0x34/0x60 (F) | handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x88/0x220 (F) | generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x60 (F) | gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x140 (F) | call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58 (F) | do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98 | el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68 (F) | el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28 | el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70 | queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x78/0x460 (P) The warning in question is: WARN_ON_ONCE(state->common.pc == orig_pc)) ... in kunwind_recover_return_address(), which is triggered when return_to_handler() is encountered in the trace, but ftrace_graph_ret_addr() cannot find a corresponding original return address on the fgraph return stack. This happens because the stacktrace code encounters an exception boundary where the LR was not live at the time of the exception, but the LR happens to contain return_to_handler(); either because the task recently returned there, or due to unfortunate usage of the LR at a scratch register. In such cases attempts to recover the return address via ftrace_graph_ret_addr() may fail, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() above and aborting the unwind (hence the stacktrace terminating after reporting the PC at the time of the exception). Handling unreliable LR values in these cases is likely to require some larger rework, so for the moment avoid this problem by restoring the old behaviour of skipping the LR at exception boundaries, which the stacktrace code did prior to commit: c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries") This commit is effectively a partial revert, keeping the structures and logic to explicitly identify exception boundaries while still skipping reporting of the LR. The logic to explicitly identify exception boundaries is still useful for general robustness and as a building block for future support for RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. Fixes: c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
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Jan 14, 2025
The arm64 stacktrace code has a few error conditions where a
WARN_ON_ONCE() is triggered before the stacktrace is terminated and an
error is returned to the caller. The conditions shouldn't be triggered
when unwinding the current task, but it is possible to trigger these
when unwinding another task which is not blocked, as the stack of that
task is concurrently modified. Kent reports that these warnings can be
triggered while running filesystem tests on bcachefs, which calls the
stacktrace code directly.
To produce a meaningful stacktrace of another task, the task in question
should be blocked, but the stacktrace code is expected to be robust to
cases where it is not blocked. Note that this is purely about not
unuduly scaring the user and/or crashing the kernel; stacktraces in such
cases are meaningless and may leak kernel secrets from the stack of the
task being unwound.
Ideally we'd pin the task in a blocked state during the unwind, as we do
for /proc/${PID}/wchan since commit:
42a20f8 ("sched: Add wrapper for get_wchan() to keep task blocked")
... but a bunch of places don't do that, notably /proc/${PID}/stack,
where we don't pin the task in a blocked state, but do restrict the
output to privileged users since commit:
f8a00ce ("proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root")
... and so it's possible to trigger these warnings accidentally, e.g. by
reading /proc/*/stack (as root):
| for n in $(seq 1 10); do
| while true; do cat /proc/*/stack > /dev/null 2>&1; done &
| done
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 166 at arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:207 arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 166 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-00003-g3dafa7a7925d #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 81400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370
| lr : arch_stack_walk+0x1b0/0x370
| sp : ffff800080773890
| x29: ffff800080773930 x28: fff0000005c44500 x27: fff00000058fa038
| x26: 000000007ffff000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: ffffa35a8d9600ec x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fff00000043a33c0
| x20: ffff800080773970 x19: ffffa35a8d960168 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
| x8 : ffff8000807738e0 x7 : ffff8000806e3800 x6 : ffff8000806e3818
| x5 : ffff800080773920 x4 : ffff8000806e4000 x3 : ffff8000807738e0
| x2 : 0000000000000018 x1 : ffff8000806e3800 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370 (P)
| stack_trace_save_tsk+0x8c/0x108
| proc_pid_stack+0xb0/0x134
| proc_single_show+0x60/0x120
| seq_read_iter+0x104/0x438
| seq_read+0xf8/0x140
| vfs_read+0xc4/0x31c
| ksys_read+0x70/0x108
| __arm64_sys_read+0x1c/0x28
| invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
| do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
| el0_svc+0x30/0xcc
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
| el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this by only warning when unwinding the current task. When unwinding
another task the error conditions will be handled by returning an error
without producing a warning.
The two warnings in kunwind_next_frame_record_meta() were added recently
as part of commit:
c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")
The warning when recovering the fgraph return address has changed form
many times, but was originally introduced back in commit:
9f41631 ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing")
Fixes: c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")
Fixes: 9f41631 ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
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The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS, leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically, CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition. This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590 ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250 intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40 intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160 __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1] Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix it. Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
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…s_lock For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c #20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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Guangguan Wang says: ==================== net: several fixes for smc v1 -> v2: rewrite patch #2 suggested by Paolo. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration. The KASAN report shows: [16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928 [16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2 [16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries [16386.255181] Call Trace: [16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable) [16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764 [16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8 [16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0 [16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc [16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4 ... [16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s: [16386.256149] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256163] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256175] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74 [16386.256196] __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc [16386.256209] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0 [16386.256225] vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150 [16386.256245] mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4 [16386.256265] do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750 [16386.256277] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c [16386.256292] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348 [16386.256303] sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160 ... [16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s: [16386.256363] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256374] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256384] kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c [16386.256396] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204 [16386.256415] kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450 [16386.256428] vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8 [16386.256441] rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0 [16386.256458] rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4 [16386.256473] handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c [16386.256495] do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88 [16386.256509] do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88 [16386.256521] __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c [16386.256533] irq_exit+0x20/0x38 [16386.256544] interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c ... [16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation: [16386.256729] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256741] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c [16386.256753] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04 [16386.256766] vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c [16386.256778] remove_vma+0xf4/0x114 [16386.256797] do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870 [16386.256811] __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8 [16386.256821] sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c [16386.256830] system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0 [16386.256841] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec [16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670 which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168 [16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718) [16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81 [16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001 [16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) [16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) [16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001 [16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001 [16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window mmap_mutex. Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler") Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
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Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned atomic read: [ 72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c [ 72.131036] Mem abort info: [ 72.131213] ESR = 0x0000000096000021 [ 72.131446] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 72.132209] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 72.133216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 72.134080] FSC = 0x21: alignment fault [ 72.135593] Data abort info: [ 72.137194] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 72.142351] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 72.145989] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000 [ 72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403, +pte=0068000102bb7707 [ 72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP [...] [ 72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G E 6.13.0-rc3+ #2 [ 72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023 [ 72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables] [ 72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] [ 72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables] [ 72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0 [ 72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038 [ 72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78 [ 72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78 [ 72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978 [ 72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0 [ 72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000 [ 72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004 [ 72.176207] Call trace: [ 72.176316] nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P) [ 72.176653] process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0 [ 72.176831] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0 [ 72.176995] kthread+0xe8/0xf8 [ 72.177130] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f) [ 72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and documentation it. pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64. Fixes: 7ffc748 ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now)
raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock:
ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094:
#0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0
#1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0
#2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180
#3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180
#4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
#5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work
Call trace:
show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C)
__dump_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
dump_stack+0x14/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8
lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0
eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108
io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430
__io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270
io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288
io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180
io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388
io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550
process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0
worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80
kthread+0x24c/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside
the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the
raw timeout spinlock.
Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock,
split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work
for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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…le_direct_reclaim() The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we
must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking.
This fixes the following lockdep splat:
[ 5.349336] =============================
[ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 Tainted: G W
[ 5.363031] -----------------------------
[ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock:
[ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 5.385138] context-{5:5}
[ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44:
[ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204)
[ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205)
[ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006)
[ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596)
[ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614)
[ 5.436472] stack backtrace:
[ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ #69
[ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 5.461699] Call trace:
[ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C
[ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
[ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176)
[ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814)
[ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345)
[ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250)
[ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270)
[ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807)
[ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208)
Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd38336d5fd49214f0e4e6495e658e3ab44) Cc: [email protected]
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Jan 21, 2025
syz reports an out of bounds read: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline] ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078 ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981 ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003 ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline] path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984 do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014 do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000 </TASK> ================================================================== And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert: ================================================================== loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768 JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280 Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00 e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088 do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000103 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2dafda3a99 RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09: 000055555a6784c0 R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe336a6680 R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007f2dafdec03b </TASK> ================================================================== The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero. Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/[email protected]/T/#u Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/ Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 21, 2025
Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.
The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.
However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.
The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).
To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.
[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.620270]
[ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.622045]
[ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 213.622778]
[ 213.623465] CPU0
[ 213.623815] ----
[ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 213.625805]
[ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.631185]
[ 213.631185] stack backtrace:
[ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1
[ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 213.633785] Call Trace:
[ 213.634099]
[ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
[ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
00007fa179b0737b
[ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
[ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
0000000000000002
[ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffd2e6d487c
[ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
00007ffd2e6d4f70
Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
ammarfaizi2
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 21, 2025
Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after
definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers()
always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow
below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash:
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
mlx5_lag_create_definers()
mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 1
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
mlx5_lag_create_definers()
mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 0
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00
[0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0+ #2
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core]
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
sp : ffff800085fafb00
x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000
x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c
x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190
x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000
Call trace:
mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0
kthread+0x11c/0x128
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG")
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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