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Fd resue race causes runc init can't start due to a go stdlib bug #4294
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CentOS 7 is gone (see #4333), so this one can be closed I guess. |
I saw this once on Ubuntu 24.04 now: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/actions/runs/10823144914/job/30028174423?pr=4358
So it might be a genuine issue with the test case. |
One more, in
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Another failure in
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From https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/actions/runs/11300641540/job/31433805394?pr=4441 (cross-i386):
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In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. But because of we have added safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, then it will cause the original fd closed. (opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 5 or 6 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. But because of we have added safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is than stdio fds count + ExtraFiles count, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, then it will cause the original fd closed. (opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 5 or 6 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. But because of we have added safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is than stdio fds count + ExtraFiles count, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, then it will cause the original fd closed. (opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 5 or 6 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. But because of we have added safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is than stdio fds count + ExtraFiles count, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, then it will cause the original fd closed. (opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 6 or 7 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. But because of we have added safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is not bigger than stdio fds count + ExtraFiles count, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, then it will cause the original fd closed. (opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 6 or 7 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. Because we want to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, or dup3 a other fd to this fd, then it will cause the fd type cmd.Path refers to a random path. (issue: opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
This is really a bug in practice, I can reproduce it in local. |
In opencontainers#3987(0e9a335), we may use a memfd to copy run to start runc init, due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to stop us from leaking extra file descriptors. See <golang/go#61751>. There is a race situation when we are opening this memfd, if the fd 6 or 7 was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by memfd. Because we want to add safeExe to the set of ExtraFiles, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, or dup3 a other fd to this fd, then it will cause the fd type cmd.Path refers to a random path. (issue: opencontainers#4294) Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
Due to a Go stdlib bug, it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. See <golang/go#61751>. It will cause runc init process can't start. (opencontainers#4294) It only occurs when we are using a fd type string, for example: proc/self/fd/7, as a cmd path to start runc init, because there is a fd reuse race, if some small fd closed, the kernel may reuse this fd to refer to runc binary. If this fd num is small than the length of `cmd.ExtraFiles`, it will hit this Go stdlib bug. If we found this situation, we can dup it as a new bigger fd num to avoid. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
Due to a Go stdlib bug, it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. See <golang/go#61751>. It will cause runc init process can't start. (opencontainers#4294) It only occurs when we are using a fd type string, for example: proc/self/fd/7, as a cmd path to start runc init, because there is a fd reuse race, if some small fd closed, the kernel may reuse this fd to refer to runc binary. If this fd num is small than the length of `cmd.ExtraFiles`, it will hit this Go stdlib bug. If we found this situation, we can dup it as a new bigger fd num to avoid. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
Due to a Go stdlib bug, it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that might be malicious. See <golang/go#61751>. It will cause runc init process can't start. (opencontainers#4294) It only occurs when we are using a fd type string, for example: proc/self/fd/7, as a cmd path to start runc init, because there is a fd reuse race, if some small fd closed, the kernel may reuse this fd to refer to runc binary. If this fd num is small than the length of `cmd.ExtraFiles`, it will hit this Go stdlib bug. If we found this situation, we can dup it as a new bigger fd num to avoid. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
There is a race situation when we are opening a file, if there is a small fd was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by safeExe. Because of Go stdlib fds shuffling bug, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, or dup3 a other fd to this fd, then it will cause the fd type cmd.Path refers to a random path, and it can lead to an error "permission denied" when starting the process. Please see opencontainers#4294 and <golang/go#61751>. So we should not use the original fd of safeExe, but use the fd after shuffled by Go stdlib. Because Go stdlib will guarantee this fd refers to the correct file. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
There is a race situation when we are opening a file, if there is a small fd was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by safeExe. Because of Go stdlib fds shuffling bug, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, or dup3 a other fd to this fd, then it will cause the fd type cmd.Path refers to a random path, and it can lead to an error "permission denied" when starting the process. Please see opencontainers#4294 and <golang/go#61751>. So we should not use the original fd of safeExe, but use the fd after shuffled by Go stdlib. Because Go stdlib will guarantee this fd refers to the correct file. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
There is a race situation when we are opening a file, if there is a small fd was closed at that time, maybe it will be reused by safeExe. Because of Go stdlib fds shuffling bug, if the fd of safeExe is too small, go stdlib will dup3 it to another fd, or dup3 a other fd to this fd, then it will cause the fd type cmd.Path refers to a random path, and it can lead to an error "permission denied" when starting the process. Please see opencontainers#4294 and <golang/go#61751>. So we should not use the original fd of safeExe, but use the fd after shuffled by Go stdlib. Because Go stdlib will guarantee this fd refers to the correct file. Signed-off-by: lfbzhm <[email protected]>
Description
From https://cirrus-ci.com/task/6471857094787072:
I've only seen it happen once. Filing for visibility.
EDIT:
It's not a flaky test, but a really bug in practice.
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