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nsexec: migrate memfd /proc/self/exe logic to Go code
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This allow us to remove the amount of C code in runc quite
substantially, as well as removing a whole execve(2) from the nsexec
path because we no longer spawn "runc init" only to re-exec "runc init"
after doing the clone.

Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
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cyphar committed Sep 22, 2023
1 parent 321aa20 commit 0e9a335
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Showing 6 changed files with 286 additions and 598 deletions.
74 changes: 54 additions & 20 deletions libcontainer/container_linux.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (

"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/cgroups"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/dmz"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/intelrdt"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -316,6 +317,8 @@ func (c *Container) start(process *Process) (retErr error) {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to create new parent process: %w", err)
}
// We do not need the cloned binaries once the process is spawned.
defer process.closeClonedExes()

logsDone := parent.forwardChildLogs()
if logsDone != nil {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -454,24 +457,30 @@ func (c *Container) newParentProcess(p *Process) (parentProcess, error) {
}
logFilePair := filePair{parentLogPipe, childLogPipe}

cmd := c.commandTemplate(p, childInitPipe, childLogPipe)
if !p.Init {
return c.newSetnsProcess(p, cmd, messageSockPair, logFilePair)
// Make sure we use a new safe copy of /proc/self/exe each time this is
// called, to make sure that if a container manages to overwrite the file
// it cannot affect other containers on the system. For runc, this code
// will only ever be called once, but libcontainer users might call this
// more than once.
p.closeClonedExes()
var (
exePath string
safeExe *os.File
)
if dmz.IsSelfExeCloned() {
// /proc/self/exe is already a cloned binary -- no need to do anything
logrus.Debug("skipping binary cloning -- /proc/self/exe is already cloned!")
exePath = "/proc/self/exe"
} else {
safeExe, err = dmz.CloneSelfExe(c.root)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to create safe /proc/self/exe clone for runc init: %w", err)
}
exePath = "/proc/self/fd/" + strconv.Itoa(int(safeExe.Fd()))
p.clonedExes = append(p.clonedExes, safeExe)
}

// We only set up fifoFd if we're not doing a `runc exec`. The historic
// reason for this is that previously we would pass a dirfd that allowed
// for container rootfs escape (and not doing it in `runc exec` avoided
// that problem), but we no longer do that. However, there's no need to do
// this for `runc exec` so we just keep it this way to be safe.
if err := c.includeExecFifo(cmd); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to setup exec fifo: %w", err)
}
return c.newInitProcess(p, cmd, messageSockPair, logFilePair)
}

func (c *Container) commandTemplate(p *Process, childInitPipe *os.File, childLogPipe *os.File) *exec.Cmd {
cmd := exec.Command("/proc/self/exe", "init")
cmd := exec.Command(exePath, "init")
cmd.Args[0] = os.Args[0]
cmd.Stdin = p.Stdin
cmd.Stdout = p.Stdout
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -501,13 +510,38 @@ func (c *Container) commandTemplate(p *Process, childInitPipe *os.File, childLog
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "_LIBCONTAINER_LOGLEVEL="+p.LogLevel)
}

// NOTE: when running a container with no PID namespace and the parent process spawning the container is
// PID1 the pdeathsig is being delivered to the container's init process by the kernel for some reason
// even with the parent still running.
if safeExe != nil {
// Due to a Go stdlib bug, we need to add safeExe to the set of
// ExtraFiles otherwise it is possible for the stdlib to clobber the fd
// during forkAndExecInChild1 and replace it with some other file that
// might be malicious. This is less than ideal (because the descriptor
// will be non-O_CLOEXEC) however we have protections in "runc init" to
// stop us from leaking extra file descriptors.
//
// See <https://github.com/golang/go/issues/61751>.
cmd.ExtraFiles = append(cmd.ExtraFiles, safeExe)
}

// NOTE: when running a container with no PID namespace and the parent
// process spawning the container is PID1 the pdeathsig is being
// delivered to the container's init process by the kernel for some
// reason even with the parent still running.
if c.config.ParentDeathSignal > 0 {
cmd.SysProcAttr.Pdeathsig = unix.Signal(c.config.ParentDeathSignal)
}
return cmd

if p.Init {
// We only set up fifoFd if we're not doing a `runc exec`. The historic
// reason for this is that previously we would pass a dirfd that allowed
// for container rootfs escape (and not doing it in `runc exec` avoided
// that problem), but we no longer do that. However, there's no need to do
// this for `runc exec` so we just keep it this way to be safe.
if err := c.includeExecFifo(cmd); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to setup exec fifo: %w", err)
}
return c.newInitProcess(p, cmd, messageSockPair, logFilePair)
}
return c.newSetnsProcess(p, cmd, messageSockPair, logFilePair)
}

// shouldSendMountSources says whether the child process must setup bind mounts with
Expand Down
192 changes: 192 additions & 0 deletions libcontainer/dmz/cloned_binary_linux.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
package dmz

import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"

"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"

"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
)

type SealFunc func(**os.File) error

var (
_ SealFunc = sealMemfd
_ SealFunc = sealFile
)

const baseMemfdSeals = unix.F_SEAL_SEAL | unix.F_SEAL_SHRINK | unix.F_SEAL_GROW | unix.F_SEAL_WRITE

func sealMemfd(f **os.File) error {
if err := (*f).Chmod(0o511); err != nil {
return err
}
// Try to set the newer memfd sealing flags, but we ignore
// errors because they are not needed and we want to continue
// to work on older kernels.
fd := (*f).Fd()
// F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE -- Linux 5.1
_, _ = unix.FcntlInt(fd, unix.F_ADD_SEALS, unix.F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)
// F_SEAL_EXEC -- Linux 6.3
const F_SEAL_EXEC = 0x20 //nolint:revive // this matches the unix.* name
_, _ = unix.FcntlInt(fd, unix.F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_EXEC)
// Apply all original memfd seals.
_, err := unix.FcntlInt(fd, unix.F_ADD_SEALS, baseMemfdSeals)
return os.NewSyscallError("fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS)", err)
}

// Memfd creates a sealable executable memfd (supported since Linux 3.17).
func Memfd(comment string) (*os.File, SealFunc, error) {
file, err := system.ExecutableMemfd("runc_cloned:"+comment, unix.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING|unix.MFD_CLOEXEC)
return file, sealMemfd, err
}

func sealFile(f **os.File) error {
if err := (*f).Chmod(0o511); err != nil {
return err
}
// When sealing an O_TMPFILE-style descriptor we need to
// re-open the path as O_PATH to clear the existing write
// handle we have.
opath, err := os.OpenFile(fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", (*f).Fd()), unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reopen tmpfile: %w", err)
}
_ = (*f).Close()
*f = opath
return nil
}

// otmpfile creates an open(O_TMPFILE) file in the given directory (supported
// since Linux 3.11).
func otmpfile(dir string) (*os.File, SealFunc, error) {
file, err := os.OpenFile(dir, unix.O_TMPFILE|unix.O_RDWR|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0o700)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("O_TMPFILE creation failed: %w", err)
}
// Make sure we actually got an unlinked O_TMPFILE descriptor.
var stat unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstat(int(file.Fd()), &stat); err != nil {
file.Close()
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot fstat O_TMPFILE fd: %w", err)
} else if stat.Nlink != 0 {
file.Close()
return nil, nil, errors.New("O_TMPFILE has non-zero nlink")
}
return file, sealFile, err
}

// mktemp creates a classic unlinked file in the given directory.
func mktemp(dir string) (*os.File, SealFunc, error) {
file, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, "runc.")
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// Unlink the file and verify it was unlinked.
if err := os.Remove(file.Name()); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unlinking classic tmpfile: %w", err)
}
var stat unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstat(int(file.Fd()), &stat); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot fstat classic tmpfile: %w", err)
} else if stat.Nlink != 0 {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("classic tmpfile %s has non-zero nlink after unlink", file.Name())
}
return file, sealFile, err
}

func getSealableFile(comment, tmpDir string) (file *os.File, sealFn SealFunc, err error) {
// First, try an executable memfd (supported since Linux 3.17).
file, sealFn, err = Memfd(comment)
if err == nil {
return
}
logrus.Debugf("memfd cloned binary failed, falling back to O_TMPFILE: %v", err)
// Try to fallback to O_TMPFILE (supported since Linux 3.11).
file, sealFn, err = otmpfile(tmpDir)
if err == nil {
return
}
logrus.Debugf("O_TMPFILE cloned binary failed, falling back to mktemp(): %v", err)
// Finally, try a classic unlinked temporary file.
file, sealFn, err = mktemp(tmpDir)
if err == nil {
return
}
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("could not create sealable file for cloned binary: %w", err)
}

// CloneBinary creates a "sealed" clone of a given binary, which can be used to
// thwart attempts by the container process to gain access to host binaries
// through procfs magic-link shenanigans. For more details on why this is
// necessary, see CVE-2019-5736.
func CloneBinary(src io.Reader, size int64, name, tmpDir string) (*os.File, error) {
logrus.Debugf("cloning %s binary (%d bytes)", name, size)
file, sealFn, err := getSealableFile(name, tmpDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
copied, err := io.Copy(file, src)
if err != nil {
file.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("copy binary: %w", err)
} else if copied != size {
file.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("copied binary size mismatch: %d != %d", copied, size)
}
if err := sealFn(&file); err != nil {
file.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not seal fd: %w", err)
}
return file, nil
}

// IsCloned returns whether the given file can be guaranteed to be a safe exe.
func IsCloned(exe *os.File) bool {
seals, err := unix.FcntlInt(exe.Fd(), unix.F_GET_SEALS, 0)
if err != nil {
// /proc/self/exe is probably not a memfd
logrus.Debugf("F_GET_SEALS on %s failed: %v", exe.Name(), err)
return false
}
// The memfd must have all of the base seals applied.
logrus.Debugf("checking %s memfd seals: 0x%x", exe.Name(), seals)
return seals&baseMemfdSeals == baseMemfdSeals
}

// CloneSelfExe makes a clone of the current process's binary (through
// /proc/self/exe). This binary can then be used for "runc init" in order to
// make sure the container process can never resolve the original runc binary.
// For more details on why this is necessary, see CVE-2019-5736.
func CloneSelfExe(tmpDir string) (*os.File, error) {
selfExe, err := os.Open("/proc/self/exe")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening current binary: %w", err)
}
defer selfExe.Close()

stat, err := selfExe.Stat()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("checking /proc/self/exe size: %w", err)
}
size := stat.Size()

return CloneBinary(selfExe, size, "/proc/self/exe", tmpDir)
}

// IsSelfExeCloned returns whether /proc/self/exe is a cloned binary that can
// be guaranteed to be safe. This means that it must be a sealed memfd. Other
// types of clones cannot be completely verified as safe.
func IsSelfExeCloned() bool {
selfExe, err := os.Open("/proc/self/exe")
if err != nil {
logrus.Debugf("open /proc/self/exe failed: %v", err)
return false
}
defer selfExe.Close()
return IsCloned(selfExe)
}
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