undefined reference to `fiq_fix_enable' #112
Comments
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Configuration: (Because I can't see how to attach a file to an issue!) |
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I think you will have to build with CONFIG_USB_DWCOTG=y. |
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Yup, you're right! It this intentional (in which case I guess Kconfig should be updated so that USB_DWCOTG is a binary option) or should this work as a module? |
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In the former situation, here's a patch: --- drivers/usb/host/Kconfig 2012-09-17 20:14:02.125129888 +0100
+++ drivers/usb/host/Kconfig 2012-09-17 20:17:03.445617876 +0100
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ config USB_HWA_HCD
will be called "hwa-hc".
config USB_DWCOTG
- tristate "Synopsis DWC host support"
+ bool "Synopsis DWC host support"
depends on USB
help
The Synopsis DWC controller is a dual-role
@@ -566,9 +566,6 @@ config USB_DWCOTG
Enable this option to support this IP in host controller mode.
If unsure, say N.
- To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the
- modules built will be called dwc_otg and dwc_common_port.
-
config USB_IMX21_HCD
tristate "i.MX21 HCD support"
depends on USB && ARM && ARCH_MXC |
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Changing this from a tristate to a bool is not a soloution. In order for the current code to compile successfully the DWC_OTG driver must be compiled in. If it's built as a module or if it is not built at all then you will get this failure. |
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kernel 3.8.4 arch/arm/mach-bcm2708/built-in.o: In function reason : Had CONFIG_USB_DWCOTG=m but get not warned that this been not possible |
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This should be fixed in 3.6 kernel. |
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Set disconnected flag in struct usbhid when a usb device is removed. Check for disconnected flag before sending urb requests. This prevents a kernel panic when a hid driver calls hid_hw_request() after removing a usb device. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 IP: [<ffffffff8161746f>] hid_submit_ctrl+0x7f/0x290 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 39 Comm: khubd Tainted: G IO 3.16.0-rc5+ #112 Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Surface Pro 2/Surface Pro 2, BIOS 2.03.0250 09/06/2013 task: ffff880118aba6e0 ti: ffff8800daf80000 task.ti: ffff8800daf80000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8161746f>] [<ffffffff8161746f>] hid_submit_ctrl+0x7f/0x290 RSP: 0018:ffff8800daf83750 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000080000300 RBX: ffff88003f60c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880117f78000 RBP: ffff8800daf83788 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880117f78000 R13: ffff88003f11a290 R14: 000000000000000c R15: ffff880091cb3ab8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000001c11000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 Stack: ffff880117f3dcd0 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f60c000 ffff880117f78000 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f11a290 0000000000000000 ffff8800daf837b0 ffffffff81617707 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f60c000 0000000000000013 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81617707>] usbhid_restart_ctrl_queue+0x87/0x140 [<ffffffff81617a88>] usbhid_submit_report+0x2c8/0x370 [<ffffffff81617b4a>] usbhid_request+0x1a/0x30 [<ffffffffa020edfb>] sensor_hub_set_feature+0x8b/0xd0 [hid_sensor_hub] [<ffffffffa02d9084>] hid_sensor_power_state+0x84/0x110 [hid_sensor_trigger] [<ffffffffa02d9129>] hid_sensor_data_rdy_trigger_set_state+0x19/0x20 [hid_sensor_trigger] [<ffffffffa034d5b7>] iio_triggered_buffer_predisable+0xa7/0xb0 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa034cc4a>] iio_disable_all_buffers+0x3a/0xc0 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa03487d3>] iio_device_unregister+0x53/0x80 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa026c06a>] hid_accel_3d_remove+0x2a/0x50 [hid_sensor_accel_3d] [<ffffffff814f433d>] platform_drv_remove+0x1d/0x40 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81512190>] ? mfd_cell_disable+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff814f41d1>] platform_device_del+0x21/0xc0 [<ffffffff814f4282>] platform_device_unregister+0x12/0x30 [<ffffffff815121d3>] mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x43/0x50 [<ffffffff814ed3e3>] device_for_each_child+0x43/0x70 [<ffffffff81512105>] mfd_remove_devices+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffffa020ebd7>] sensor_hub_remove+0x87/0x140 [hid_sensor_hub] [<ffffffff81607c5b>] hid_device_remove+0x6b/0xd0 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81607d47>] hid_destroy_device+0x27/0x60 [<ffffffff81616972>] usbhid_disconnect+0x22/0x50 [<ffffffff81568597>] usb_unbind_interface+0x77/0x2b0 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81565cd1>] usb_disable_device+0x91/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8155b046>] usb_disconnect+0x96/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8155d74a>] hub_thread+0xb5a/0x1840 Signed-off-by: Reyad Attiyat <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
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commit 46df9de upstream. Set disconnected flag in struct usbhid when a usb device is removed. Check for disconnected flag before sending urb requests. This prevents a kernel panic when a hid driver calls hid_hw_request() after removing a usb device. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 IP: [<ffffffff8161746f>] hid_submit_ctrl+0x7f/0x290 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 39 Comm: khubd Tainted: G IO 3.16.0-rc5+ #112 Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Surface Pro 2/Surface Pro 2, BIOS 2.03.0250 09/06/2013 task: ffff880118aba6e0 ti: ffff8800daf80000 task.ti: ffff8800daf80000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8161746f>] [<ffffffff8161746f>] hid_submit_ctrl+0x7f/0x290 RSP: 0018:ffff8800daf83750 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000080000300 RBX: ffff88003f60c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880117f78000 RBP: ffff8800daf83788 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880117f78000 R13: ffff88003f11a290 R14: 000000000000000c R15: ffff880091cb3ab8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000001c11000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 Stack: ffff880117f3dcd0 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f60c000 ffff880117f78000 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f11a290 0000000000000000 ffff8800daf837b0 ffffffff81617707 ffff880117f78000 ffff88003f60c000 0000000000000013 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81617707>] usbhid_restart_ctrl_queue+0x87/0x140 [<ffffffff81617a88>] usbhid_submit_report+0x2c8/0x370 [<ffffffff81617b4a>] usbhid_request+0x1a/0x30 [<ffffffffa020edfb>] sensor_hub_set_feature+0x8b/0xd0 [hid_sensor_hub] [<ffffffffa02d9084>] hid_sensor_power_state+0x84/0x110 [hid_sensor_trigger] [<ffffffffa02d9129>] hid_sensor_data_rdy_trigger_set_state+0x19/0x20 [hid_sensor_trigger] [<ffffffffa034d5b7>] iio_triggered_buffer_predisable+0xa7/0xb0 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa034cc4a>] iio_disable_all_buffers+0x3a/0xc0 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa03487d3>] iio_device_unregister+0x53/0x80 [industrialio] [<ffffffffa026c06a>] hid_accel_3d_remove+0x2a/0x50 [hid_sensor_accel_3d] [<ffffffff814f433d>] platform_drv_remove+0x1d/0x40 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81512190>] ? mfd_cell_disable+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff814f41d1>] platform_device_del+0x21/0xc0 [<ffffffff814f4282>] platform_device_unregister+0x12/0x30 [<ffffffff815121d3>] mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x43/0x50 [<ffffffff814ed3e3>] device_for_each_child+0x43/0x70 [<ffffffff81512105>] mfd_remove_devices+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffffa020ebd7>] sensor_hub_remove+0x87/0x140 [hid_sensor_hub] [<ffffffff81607c5b>] hid_device_remove+0x6b/0xd0 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81607d47>] hid_destroy_device+0x27/0x60 [<ffffffff81616972>] usbhid_disconnect+0x22/0x50 [<ffffffff81568597>] usb_unbind_interface+0x77/0x2b0 [<ffffffff814f18bf>] __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1955>] device_release_driver+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff814f121c>] bus_remove_device+0x11c/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814ed7d6>] device_del+0x136/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81565cd1>] usb_disable_device+0x91/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8155b046>] usb_disconnect+0x96/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8155d74a>] hub_thread+0xb5a/0x1840 Signed-off-by: Reyad Attiyat <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
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Enable ssd1351 screen rotation
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Commit e8d975e ("fixing infinite OPEN loop in 4.0 stateid recovery") introduced access to state after it was just potentially freed by nfs4_put_open_state leading to a random data corruption somewhere. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88004941ee40 IP: [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740 PGD 3501067 PUD 3504067 PMD 6ff37067 PTE 800000004941e060 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis joydev i2c_piix4 pcspkr tpm virtio_console nfsd ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops floppy serio_raw virtio_blk drm CPU: 6 PID: 2161 Comm: 192.168.10.253- Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #112 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8800463dcd00 ti: ffff88003ff48000 task.ti: ffff88003ff48000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813baf01>] [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ff4bd68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff81a49900 RCX: 00000000000000e8 RDX: 00000000000000e8 RSI: ffff8800418b9930 RDI: ffff880040c96c88 RBP: ffff88003ff4bdf8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880040c96c98 R13: ffff88004941ee20 R14: ffff88004941ee40 R15: ffff88004941ee00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff88004941ee40 CR3: 0000000060b0b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff813baad5 ffff8800463dcd00 ffff880000000001 ffffffff810e6b68 ffff880043ddbc88 ffff8800418b9800 ffff8800418b98c8 ffff88004941ee48 ffff880040c96c90 ffff880040c96c00 ffff880040c96c20 ffff880040c96c40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813baad5>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x35/0x740 [<ffffffff810e6b68>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x128/0x1b0 [<ffffffff813bb7cd>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x5ed/0xa40 [<ffffffff813bb1e0>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x740/0x740 [<ffffffff813bb1e0>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x740/0x740 [<ffffffff810af0d1>] kthread+0x101/0x120 [<ffffffff810e6b68>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x128/0x1b0 [<ffffffff818843af>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [<ffffffff810aefd0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x250/0x250 Code: 65 80 4c 8b b5 78 ff ff ff e8 fc 88 4c 00 48 8b 7d 88 e8 13 67 d2 ff 49 8b 47 40 a8 02 0f 84 d3 01 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 7f f9 ff ff <f0> 41 80 26 7f 48 8b 7d c8 e8 b1 84 4c 00 e9 39 fd ff ff 3d e6 RIP [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740 RSP <ffff88003ff4bd68> CR2: ffff88004941ee40 Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
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Shubham was recently asking on netdev why in arm64 JIT we don't multiply
the index for accessing the tail call map by 8. That led me into testing
out arm64 JIT wrt tail calls and it turned out I got a NULL pointer
dereference on the tail call.
The buggy access is at:
prog = array->ptrs[index];
if (prog == NULL)
goto out;
[...]
00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112
00000064: f86a682a ldr x10, [x1,x10]
00000068: f862694b ldr x11, [x10,x2]
0000006c: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000080
[...]
The code triggering the crash is f862694b. x1 at the time contains the
address of the bpf array, x10 offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs). Meaning,
above we load the pointer to the program at map slot 0 into x10. x10
can then be NULL if the slot is not occupied, which we later on try to
access with a user given offset in x2 that is the map index.
Fix this by emitting the following instead:
[...]
00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112
00000064: 8b0a002a add x10, x1, x10
00000068: d37df04b lsl x11, x2, #3
0000006c: f86b694b ldr x11, [x10,x11]
00000070: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000084
[...]
This basically adds the offset to ptrs to the base address of the bpf
array we got and we later on access the map with an index * 8 offset
relative to that. The tail call map itself is basically one large area
with meta data at the head followed by the array of prog pointers.
This makes tail calls working again, tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8.
Fixes: ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper")
Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit d8b5411 ] Shubham was recently asking on netdev why in arm64 JIT we don't multiply the index for accessing the tail call map by 8. That led me into testing out arm64 JIT wrt tail calls and it turned out I got a NULL pointer dereference on the tail call. The buggy access is at: prog = array->ptrs[index]; if (prog == NULL) goto out; [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: f86a682a ldr x10, [x1,x10] 00000068: f862694b ldr x11, [x10,x2] 0000006c: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000080 [...] The code triggering the crash is f862694b. x1 at the time contains the address of the bpf array, x10 offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs). Meaning, above we load the pointer to the program at map slot 0 into x10. x10 can then be NULL if the slot is not occupied, which we later on try to access with a user given offset in x2 that is the map index. Fix this by emitting the following instead: [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: 8b0a002a add x10, x1, x10 00000068: d37df04b lsl x11, x2, #3 0000006c: f86b694b ldr x11, [x10,x11] 00000070: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000084 [...] This basically adds the offset to ptrs to the base address of the bpf array we got and we later on access the map with an index * 8 offset relative to that. The tail call map itself is basically one large area with meta data at the head followed by the array of prog pointers. This makes tail calls working again, tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. Fixes: ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit d8b5411 ] Shubham was recently asking on netdev why in arm64 JIT we don't multiply the index for accessing the tail call map by 8. That led me into testing out arm64 JIT wrt tail calls and it turned out I got a NULL pointer dereference on the tail call. The buggy access is at: prog = array->ptrs[index]; if (prog == NULL) goto out; [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: f86a682a ldr x10, [x1,x10] 00000068: f862694b ldr x11, [x10,x2] 0000006c: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000080 [...] The code triggering the crash is f862694b. x1 at the time contains the address of the bpf array, x10 offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs). Meaning, above we load the pointer to the program at map slot 0 into x10. x10 can then be NULL if the slot is not occupied, which we later on try to access with a user given offset in x2 that is the map index. Fix this by emitting the following instead: [...] 00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112 00000064: 8b0a002a add x10, x1, x10 00000068: d37df04b lsl x11, x2, #3 0000006c: f86b694b ldr x11, [x10,x11] 00000070: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000084 [...] This basically adds the offset to ptrs to the base address of the bpf array we got and we later on access the map with an index * 8 offset relative to that. The tail call map itself is basically one large area with meta data at the head followed by the array of prog pointers. This makes tail calls working again, tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. Fixes: ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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On fast hosts or malicious bots, we trigger a DCCP_BUG() which seems excessive. syzbot reported : BUG: delta (-6195) <= 0 at net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628/ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback() CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #112 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628 [inline] ccid3_hc_rx_packet_recv.cold.16+0x38/0x71 net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:793 ccid_hc_rx_packet_recv net/dccp/ccid.h:185 [inline] dccp_deliver_input_to_ccids+0xf0/0x280 net/dccp/input.c:180 dccp_rcv_established+0x87/0xb0 net/dccp/input.c:378 dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x153/0x180 net/dccp/ipv4.c:654 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:914 [inline] __sk_receive_skb+0x3ba/0xd80 net/core/sock.c:517 dccp_v4_rcv+0x10f9/0x1f58 net/dccp/ipv4.c:875 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2eb/0xda0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:215 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x750 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:256 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x823/0x2220 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_rcv+0xa18/0x1284 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:492 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2488/0x3680 net/core/dev.c:4628 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4693 process_backlog+0x219/0x760 net/core/dev.c:5373 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5771 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7da/0x1980 net/core/dev.c:5837 __do_softirq+0x2e8/0xb17 kernel/softirq.c:284 run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:645 smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Gerrit Renker <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 74174fe ] On fast hosts or malicious bots, we trigger a DCCP_BUG() which seems excessive. syzbot reported : BUG: delta (-6195) <= 0 at net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628/ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback() CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #112 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628 [inline] ccid3_hc_rx_packet_recv.cold.16+0x38/0x71 net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:793 ccid_hc_rx_packet_recv net/dccp/ccid.h:185 [inline] dccp_deliver_input_to_ccids+0xf0/0x280 net/dccp/input.c:180 dccp_rcv_established+0x87/0xb0 net/dccp/input.c:378 dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x153/0x180 net/dccp/ipv4.c:654 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:914 [inline] __sk_receive_skb+0x3ba/0xd80 net/core/sock.c:517 dccp_v4_rcv+0x10f9/0x1f58 net/dccp/ipv4.c:875 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2eb/0xda0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:215 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x750 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:256 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x823/0x2220 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_rcv+0xa18/0x1284 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:492 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2488/0x3680 net/core/dev.c:4628 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4693 process_backlog+0x219/0x760 net/core/dev.c:5373 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5771 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7da/0x1980 net/core/dev.c:5837 __do_softirq+0x2e8/0xb17 kernel/softirq.c:284 run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:645 smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Gerrit Renker <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
popcornmix
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[ Upstream commit 74174fe ] On fast hosts or malicious bots, we trigger a DCCP_BUG() which seems excessive. syzbot reported : BUG: delta (-6195) <= 0 at net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628/ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback() CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #112 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:628 [inline] ccid3_hc_rx_packet_recv.cold.16+0x38/0x71 net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c:793 ccid_hc_rx_packet_recv net/dccp/ccid.h:185 [inline] dccp_deliver_input_to_ccids+0xf0/0x280 net/dccp/input.c:180 dccp_rcv_established+0x87/0xb0 net/dccp/input.c:378 dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x153/0x180 net/dccp/ipv4.c:654 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:914 [inline] __sk_receive_skb+0x3ba/0xd80 net/core/sock.c:517 dccp_v4_rcv+0x10f9/0x1f58 net/dccp/ipv4.c:875 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2eb/0xda0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:215 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x750 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:256 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x823/0x2220 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:287 [inline] ip_rcv+0xa18/0x1284 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:492 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2488/0x3680 net/core/dev.c:4628 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4693 process_backlog+0x219/0x760 net/core/dev.c:5373 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5771 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7da/0x1980 net/core/dev.c:5837 __do_softirq+0x2e8/0xb17 kernel/softirq.c:284 run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:645 smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Gerrit Renker <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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It can make sure that trace_hardirqs_off/trace_hardirqs_on can get a correct return address by frame pointer through __builtin_return_address() in this fix. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffc pgd = 3c42e9cf [fffffffc] *pgd=02a9c000 Internal error: Oops: 1 [#1] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PC is at trace_hardirqs_off+0x78/0xec LP is at common_exception_handler+0xda/0xf4 pc : [<b23ea5a4>] lp : [<b2352eba>] Tainted: G W sp : ada60ab0 fp : efcaff48 gp : 3a020490 r25: efcb0000 r24: 00000000 r23: 00000000 r22: 00000000 r21: 00000000 r20: 000700c1 r19: 000700ca r18: 3a21b018 r17: 00000001 r16: 00000002 r15: 00000001 r14: 0000002a r13: 3a00a804 r12: ada60ab0 r11: 3a113af8 r10: 3a01c530 r9 : 3a124404 r8 : 00120f9c r7 : b2352eba r6 : 00000000 r5 : 3a126b58 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 3a1726a8 r2 : b2921000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 00000000 IRQs off Segment user Process init (pid: 1, stack limit = 0x069d7f15) Stack: (0xada60ab0 to 0xada61000) Stack: 0aa0: 00000000 00000003 3a110000 0011f000 Stack: 0ac0: 00000005 00000000 00000000 00000000 ada60b10 3a01fe68 ada60b0c ada60b08 Stack: 0ae0: 00000000 ada60ab8 ada60b30 3a020550 00000000 00000001 3a11c2f8 3a01c6e8 Stack: 0b00: 3a01cb80 fffffba8 3a113af8 3a21b018 3a122c28 00003ec4 00000165 00000000 Stack: 0b20: 3a126aec 0000006c 00000000 00000001 3a01fe68 00000000 00000003 00000000 Stack: 0b40: 00000001 000003f8 3a020930 3a01c530 00000008 ada60c18 3a020490 3a003120 Stack: 0b60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0b80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffff8000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0ba0: 00000000 00000001 3a020550 00000000 3a01d020 00000000 fffff000 fffff000 Stack: 0bc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ada60f2c 00000000 00000001 00000000 Stack: 0be0: 00000000 00000000 3a01fe68 fffffab0 00008034 00000008 3a0010cc 3a01fe68 Stack: 0c00: 00000000 00000000 00000001 ada60c88 3a020490 3a0139d4 0009dc6f 00000000 Stack: 0c20: 00000000 00000000 ada60fce fffff000 00000000 0000ebe0 3a020038 3a020550 Stack: 0c40: ada60f20 ada60c90 3a0007f0 3a0002a8 ada60c8c 00000000 00000000 ada60c88 Stack: 0c60: 3a020490 3a004570 00000000 00000000 ada60f20 3a0007f0 3a000000 00000000 Stack: 0c80: 3a020490 3a004850 00000000 3a013f24 3a000000 00000000 3a01ff44 00000000 Stack: 0ca0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3a01ff84 3a01ff7c Stack: 0cc0: 3a01ff4c 3a01ff5c 3a01ff64 3a01ff9c 3a01ffa4 3a01ffac 3a01ff6c 3a01ff74 Stack: 0ce0: 00000000 00000000 3a01ff44 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0d00: 3a01ff8c 00000000 00000000 3a01ff94 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0d20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0d40: 3a01ffbc 3a01ffb4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0d60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3a01ffc4 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0d80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0da0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0dc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3a01ff54 Stack: 0de0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0e00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0e20: 00000000 00000004 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0e40: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0e60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0e80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0ea0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0ec0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0ee0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ada60f20 00000000 00000000 00000000 Stack: 0f00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3a020490 3a000b24 Stack: 0f20: 00000001 ada60fde 00000000 ada60fe4 ada60feb 00000000 00000021 3a038000 Stack: 0f40: 00000010 0009dc6f 00000006 00001000 00000011 00000064 00000003 00008034 Stack: 0f60: 00000004 00000020 00000005 00000008 00000007 3a000000 00000008 00000000 Stack: 0f80: 00000009 0000ebe0 0000000b 00000000 0000000c 00000000 0000000d 00000000 Stack: 0fa0: 0000000e 00000000 00000017 00000000 00000019 ada60fce 0000001f ada60ff6 Stack: 0fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 b5010000 fa839914 23b5dd89 a2aea540 692fc82e Stack: 0fe0: 0074696e 454d4f48 54002f3d 3d4d5245 756e696c 692f0078 0074696e 00000000 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G W 4.18.0-00015-g1888b64a2558-dirty #112 Hardware name: andestech,ae3xx (DT) Call Trace: [<b27a8e34>] dump_stack+0x2c/0x38 [<b2354874>] die+0x128/0x18c [<b2356f4c>] do_page_fault+0x3b8/0x4e0 [<b2352ed4>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x10 [<b2352eba>] common_exception_handler+0xda/0xf4 Signed-off-by: Greentime Hu <[email protected]>
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commit f38278e upstream. serial core expects the spinlock to be initialized by the controller driver for serial console, this patch makes sure the spinlock is initialized, fixing the below issue: [ 0.865928] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, swapper/0/1 [ 0.865945] lock: sci_ports+0x0/0x4c80, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 0.865955] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1+ #112 [ 0.865961] Hardware name: HopeRun HiHope RZ/G2H with sub board (DT) [ 0.865968] Call trace: [ 0.865979] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d8 [ 0.865985] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [ 0.865996] dump_stack+0xe8/0x130 [ 0.866006] spin_dump+0x6c/0x88 [ 0.866012] do_raw_spin_lock+0xb0/0xf8 [ 0.866023] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x80/0xa0 [ 0.866032] uart_add_one_port+0x3a4/0x4e0 [ 0.866039] sci_probe+0x504/0x7c8 [ 0.866048] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0 [ 0.866059] really_probe+0xdc/0x330 [ 0.866066] driver_probe_device+0x58/0xb8 [ 0.866072] device_driver_attach+0x6c/0x90 [ 0.866078] __driver_attach+0x88/0xd0 [ 0.866085] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8 [ 0.866091] driver_attach+0x20/0x28 [ 0.866098] bus_add_driver+0x14c/0x1f8 [ 0.866104] driver_register+0x60/0x110 [ 0.866109] __platform_driver_register+0x40/0x48 [ 0.866119] sci_init+0x2c/0x34 [ 0.866127] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x428 [ 0.866137] kernel_init_freeable+0x2c0/0x328 [ 0.866143] kernel_init+0x10/0x108 [ 0.866150] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Biju Das <[email protected]> Fixes: a3cb39d ("serial: core: Allow detach and attach serial device for console") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1593618100-2151-1-git-send-email-prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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May 9, 2022
The BPF STX/LDX instruction uses offset relative to the FP to address
stack space. Since the BPF_FP locates at the top of the frame, the offset
is usually a negative number. However, arm64 str/ldr immediate instruction
requires that offset be a positive number. Therefore, this patch tries to
convert the offsets.
The method is to find the negative offset furthest from the FP firstly.
Then add it to the FP, calculate a bottom position, called FPB, and then
adjust the offsets in other STR/LDX instructions relative to FPB.
FPB is saved using the callee-saved register x27 of arm64 which is not
used yet.
Before adjusting the offset, the patch checks every instruction to ensure
that the FP does not change in run-time. If the FP may change, no offset
is adjusted.
For example, for the following bpftrace command:
bpftrace -e 'kprobe:do_sys_open { printf("opening: %s\n", str(arg1)); }'
Without this patch, jited code(fragment):
0: bti c
4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
8: mov x29, sp
c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
18: mov x25, sp
1c: mov x26, #0x0 // #0
20: bti j
24: sub sp, sp, #0x90
28: add x19, x0, #0x0
2c: mov x0, #0x0 // #0
30: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff78 // #-136
34: str x0, [x25, x10]
38: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff80 // #-128
3c: str x0, [x25, x10]
40: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff88 // #-120
44: str x0, [x25, x10]
48: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff90 // #-112
4c: str x0, [x25, x10]
50: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff98 // #-104
54: str x0, [x25, x10]
58: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa0 // #-96
5c: str x0, [x25, x10]
60: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa8 // #-88
64: str x0, [x25, x10]
68: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb0 // #-80
6c: str x0, [x25, x10]
70: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb8 // #-72
74: str x0, [x25, x10]
78: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc0 // #-64
7c: str x0, [x25, x10]
80: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc8 // #-56
84: str x0, [x25, x10]
88: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd0 // #-48
8c: str x0, [x25, x10]
90: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40
94: str x0, [x25, x10]
98: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe0 // #-32
9c: str x0, [x25, x10]
a0: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe8 // #-24
a4: str x0, [x25, x10]
a8: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff0 // #-16
ac: str x0, [x25, x10]
b0: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff8 // #-8
b4: str x0, [x25, x10]
b8: mov x10, #0x8 // raspberrypi#8
bc: ldr x2, [x19, x10]
[...]
With this patch, jited code(fragment):
0: bti c
4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
8: mov x29, sp
c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
18: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
1c: mov x25, sp
20: sub x27, x25, #0x88
24: mov x26, #0x0 // #0
28: bti j
2c: sub sp, sp, #0x90
30: add x19, x0, #0x0
34: mov x0, #0x0 // #0
38: str x0, [x27]
3c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#8]
40: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#16]
44: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#24]
48: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#32]
4c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#40]
50: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#48]
54: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#56]
58: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#64]
5c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#72]
60: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#80]
64: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#88]
68: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#96]
6c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#104]
70: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#112]
74: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#120]
78: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#128]
7c: ldr x2, [x19, raspberrypi#8]
[...]
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
0lxb
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popcornmix
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Feb 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit b16904f ] With latest upstream llvm18, the following test cases failed: $ ./test_progs -j #13/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:FAIL #13/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:FAIL #13 bpf_cookie:FAIL #77 fentry_fexit:FAIL #78/1 fentry_test/fentry:FAIL #78 fentry_test:FAIL #82/1 fexit_test/fexit:FAIL #82 fexit_test:FAIL #112/1 kprobe_multi_test/skel_api:FAIL #112/2 kprobe_multi_test/link_api_addrs:FAIL [...] #112 kprobe_multi_test:FAIL #356/17 test_global_funcs/global_func17:FAIL #356 test_global_funcs:FAIL Further analysis shows llvm upstream patch [1] is responsible for the above failures. For example, for function bpf_fentry_test7() in net/bpf/test_run.c, without [1], the asm code is: 0000000000000400 <bpf_fentry_test7>: 400: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 404: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x409 <bpf_fentry_test7+0x9> 409: 48 89 f8 movq %rdi, %rax 40c: c3 retq 40d: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) ... and with [1], the asm code is: 0000000000005d20 <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1>: 5d20: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x5d25 <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1+0x5> 5d25: c3 retq ... and <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1> is called instead of <bpf_fentry_test7> and this caused test failures for #13/#77 etc. except #356. For test case #356/17, with [1] (progs/test_global_func17.c)), the main prog looks like: 0000000000000000 <global_func17>: 0: b4 00 00 00 2a 00 00 00 w0 = 0x2a 1: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit ... which passed verification while the test itself expects a verification failure. Let us add 'barrier_var' style asm code in both places to prevent function specialization which caused selftests failure. [1] llvm/llvm-project#72903 Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix
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[ Upstream commit b16904f ] With latest upstream llvm18, the following test cases failed: $ ./test_progs -j #13/2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:FAIL #13/3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:FAIL #13 bpf_cookie:FAIL #77 fentry_fexit:FAIL #78/1 fentry_test/fentry:FAIL #78 fentry_test:FAIL #82/1 fexit_test/fexit:FAIL #82 fexit_test:FAIL #112/1 kprobe_multi_test/skel_api:FAIL #112/2 kprobe_multi_test/link_api_addrs:FAIL [...] #112 kprobe_multi_test:FAIL #356/17 test_global_funcs/global_func17:FAIL #356 test_global_funcs:FAIL Further analysis shows llvm upstream patch [1] is responsible for the above failures. For example, for function bpf_fentry_test7() in net/bpf/test_run.c, without [1], the asm code is: 0000000000000400 <bpf_fentry_test7>: 400: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 404: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x409 <bpf_fentry_test7+0x9> 409: 48 89 f8 movq %rdi, %rax 40c: c3 retq 40d: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) ... and with [1], the asm code is: 0000000000005d20 <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1>: 5d20: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x5d25 <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1+0x5> 5d25: c3 retq ... and <bpf_fentry_test7.specialized.1> is called instead of <bpf_fentry_test7> and this caused test failures for #13/#77 etc. except #356. For test case #356/17, with [1] (progs/test_global_func17.c)), the main prog looks like: 0000000000000000 <global_func17>: 0: b4 00 00 00 2a 00 00 00 w0 = 0x2a 1: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit ... which passed verification while the test itself expects a verification failure. Let us add 'barrier_var' style asm code in both places to prevent function specialization which caused selftests failure. [1] llvm/llvm-project#72903 Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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When building with a custom config, the kernel build-process fails with:
... and has done for several weeks now. The standard RPi configurations do still build correctly, however, so it must be due some code-path the custom configuration (below) adds or leaves out.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: