Add execname support

.github/workflows/ci-test-ginkgo.yml

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
         os: [ubuntu-20.04]
-        runtime: ["docker", "containerd", "crio"]
+        runtime: ["containerd", "crio"]
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
         with:

KubeArmor/BPF/enforcer.bpf.c

@@ -152,6 +152,20 @@ int BPF_PROG(enforce_proc, struct linux_binprm *bprm, int ret) {
     goto decision;
   }
 
+
+  // match exec name
+  struct qstr d_name;
+  d_name = BPF_CORE_READ(f_path.dentry,d_name);
+  bpf_map_update_elem(&bufk, &two, z, BPF_ANY);
+  bpf_probe_read_str(pk->path, MAX_STRING_SIZE, d_name.name);
+
+  val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner, pk);
+
+  if (val && (val->processmask & RULE_EXEC)) {
+    match = true;
+    goto decision;
+  }
+
   recursivebuthint = false;
 
 #pragma unroll
@@ -311,31 +325,30 @@ static inline int match_net_rules(int type, int protocol, u32 eventID) {
     fromSourceCheck = false;
 
   void *ptr = &src_buf->buf[*src_offset];
-  
+
   if (type == SOCK_STREAM && (protocol == IPPROTO_TCP || protocol == 0)) {
-      p0 = sock_proto;
-      p1 = IPPROTO_TCP;
-    } else if (type == SOCK_DGRAM &&
-               (protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || protocol == 0)) {
-      p0 = sock_proto;
-      p1 = IPPROTO_UDP;
-    } else if (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP &&
-               (type == SOCK_DGRAM || type == SOCK_RAW)) {
-      p0 = sock_proto;
-      p1 = IPPROTO_ICMP;
-    } else if (type == SOCK_RAW && protocol == 0) {
-      p0 = sock_type;
-      p1 = SOCK_RAW;
-    } else {
-      p0 = sock_proto;
-      p1 = protocol;
-    }
+    p0 = sock_proto;
+    p1 = IPPROTO_TCP;
+  } else if (type == SOCK_DGRAM && (protocol == IPPROTO_UDP || protocol == 0)) {
+    p0 = sock_proto;
+    p1 = IPPROTO_UDP;
+  } else if (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP &&
+             (type == SOCK_DGRAM || type == SOCK_RAW)) {
+    p0 = sock_proto;
+    p1 = IPPROTO_ICMP;
+  } else if (type == SOCK_RAW && protocol == 0) {
+    p0 = sock_type;
+    p1 = SOCK_RAW;
+  } else {
+    p0 = sock_proto;
+    p1 = protocol;
+  }
 
-  if (fromSourceCheck) { 
+  if (fromSourceCheck) {
     bpf_probe_read_str(p->source, MAX_STRING_SIZE, ptr);
     p->path[0] = p0;
     p->path[1] = p1;
-    bpf_probe_read_str(store->source, MAX_STRING_SIZE, p->source);      
+    bpf_probe_read_str(store->source, MAX_STRING_SIZE, p->source);
     val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner, p);
     if (val) {
       match = true;
@@ -346,7 +359,7 @@ static inline int match_net_rules(int type, int protocol, u32 eventID) {
   bpf_map_update_elem(&bufk, &one, z, BPF_ANY);
   p->path[0] = p0;
   p->path[1] = p1;
-  
+
   val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner, p);
 
   if (val) {
@@ -364,12 +377,11 @@ static inline int match_net_rules(int type, int protocol, u32 eventID) {
     }
   }
 
-  bpf_map_update_elem(&bufk, &one, z, BPF_ANY);  
-  p->path[0] = dnet ;
+  bpf_map_update_elem(&bufk, &one, z, BPF_ANY);
+  p->path[0] = dnet;
 
   struct data_t *allow = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner, p);
 
-
   if (allow) {
     if (!match) {
       if (allow->processmask == BLOCK_POSTURE) {
@@ -437,7 +449,8 @@ int BPF_PROG(enforce_file_perm, struct file *file, int mask) {
   return match_and_enforce_path_hooks(&f_path, dfilewrite, _FILE_PERMISSION);
 }
 SEC("lsm/capable")
-int BPF_PROG(enforce_cap,  const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns ,int cap, int ret){
+int BPF_PROG(enforce_cap, const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+             int cap, int ret) {
 
   event *task_info;
   int retval = 0;
@@ -493,20 +506,20 @@ int BPF_PROG(enforce_cap,  const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns ,i
   void *ptr = &src_buf->buf[*src_offset];
   p0 = CAPABLE_KEY;
   p1 = cap;
-  
+
   if (fromSourceCheck) {
     bpf_probe_read_str(p->source, MAX_STRING_SIZE, ptr);
     bpf_probe_read_str(store->source, MAX_STRING_SIZE, p->source);
-    p->path[0] = p0 ;
-    p->path[1] = p1 ;
+    p->path[0] = p0;
+    p->path[1] = p1;
     val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner, p);
 
     if (val) {
       match = true;
       goto decision;
     }
   }
-    
+
   bpf_map_update_elem(&bufk, &one, z, BPF_ANY);
   // check for rules without fromsource
   p->path[0] = p0;
@@ -518,7 +531,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(enforce_cap,  const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns ,i
     match = true;
     goto decision;
   }
- 
+
 decision:
   bpf_probe_read_str(store->path, MAX_STRING_SIZE, p->path);
   if (match) {
@@ -561,5 +574,4 @@ int BPF_PROG(enforce_cap,  const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns ,i
   task_info->retval = retval;
   bpf_ringbuf_submit(task_info, 0);
   return retval;
-
 }

KubeArmor/core/kubeUpdate.go

@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@
 				new := true
 				for _, policy := range endPoint.SecurityPolicies {
 					if policy.Metadata["namespaceName"] == secPolicy.Metadata["namespaceName"] && policy.Metadata["policyName"] == secPolicy.Metadata["policyName"] {
 						new = false
 						break
 					}
 				}
@@ -1568,7 +1568,9 @@
 				}
 			}
 		}
-	} else if len(secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchDirectories) > 0 {
+	}
+
+	if len(secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchDirectories) > 0 {
 		for idx, dir := range secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchDirectories {
 			if dir.Severity == 0 {
 				if secPolicy.Spec.Process.Severity != 0 {
@@ -1602,7 +1604,9 @@
 				}
 			}
 		}
-	} else if len(secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchPatterns) > 0 {
+	}
+
+	if len(secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchPatterns) > 0 {
 		for idx, pat := range secPolicy.Spec.Process.MatchPatterns {
 			if pat.Severity == 0 {
 				if secPolicy.Spec.Process.Severity != 0 {

KubeArmor/core/unorchestratedUpdates.go

@@ -677,21 +677,21 @@ func (dm *KubeArmorDaemon) restoreKubeArmorPolicies() {
 					}
 
 				} else { // HostSecurityPolicy
-					var hostPolicy tp.HostSecurityPolicy
+					var hostPolicy tp.K8sKubeArmorHostPolicy
 					if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &hostPolicy); err == nil {
-						dm.HostSecurityPolicies = append(dm.HostSecurityPolicies, hostPolicy)
+						hostPolicy.Metadata.Name = k.Metadata["policyName"]
+						dm.ParseAndUpdateHostSecurityPolicy(tp.K8sKubeArmorHostPolicyEvent{
+							Type:   "ADDED",
+							Object: hostPolicy,
+						})
 					} else {
 						kg.Errf("Failed to unmarshal host policy: %v", err)
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
 
-		if len(policyFiles) != 0 {
-			if len(dm.HostSecurityPolicies) != 0 {
-				dm.UpdateHostSecurityPolicies()
-			}
-		} else {
+		if len(policyFiles) == 0 {
 			kg.Warn("No policies found for restoration")
 		}
 	}

KubeArmor/enforcer/appArmorHostProfile.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 // AllowedHostProcessMatchPaths Function
 func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) AllowedHostProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType, fromSources map[string][]string) {
 	if len(path.FromSource) == 0 {
+		// TODO: Why are we not handling whitelist rules without fromsource
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -212,13 +213,24 @@ func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) AllowedHostCapabilitiesMatchCapabilities(cap tp.Capa
 
 // BlockedHostProcessMatchPaths Function
 func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) BlockedHostProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType, processBlackList *[]string, fromSources map[string][]string) {
+	proc := ""
+	if len(path.ExecName) > 0 {
+		proc = "/**/" + path.ExecName
+	} else {
+		proc = path.Path
+	}
+
+	if proc == "" {
+		return
+	}
+
 	if len(path.FromSource) == 0 {
 		line := ""
 
 		if path.OwnerOnly {
-			line = fmt.Sprintf("  owner %s ix,\n  deny other %s x,\n", path.Path, path.Path)
+			line = fmt.Sprintf("  owner %s ix,\n  deny other %s x,\n", proc, proc)
 		} else { // !path.OwnerOnly
-			line = fmt.Sprintf("  deny %s x,\n", path.Path)
+			line = fmt.Sprintf("  deny %s x,\n", proc)
 		}
 
 		if !kl.ContainsElement(*processBlackList, line) {
@@ -241,9 +253,9 @@ func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) BlockedHostProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType
 		}
 
 		if path.OwnerOnly {
-			line = fmt.Sprintf("  owner %s ix,\n  deny other %s x,\n", path.Path, path.Path)
+			line = fmt.Sprintf("  owner %s ix,\n  deny other %s x,\n", proc, proc)
 		} else { // !path.OwnerOnly
-			line = fmt.Sprintf("  deny %s x,\n", path.Path)
+			line = fmt.Sprintf("  deny %s x,\n", proc)
 		}
 
 		if !kl.ContainsElement(fromSources[source], line) {

KubeArmor/enforcer/appArmorProfile.go

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) ResolvedProcessWhiteListConflicts(prof *Profile) {
 
 // SetProcessMatchPaths Function
 func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) SetProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType, prof *Profile, deny bool, head bool) {
-	if deny == false {
+	if !deny {
 		prof.File = head
 	}
 	rule := RuleConfig{}
@@ -41,8 +41,11 @@ func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) SetProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType, prof *
 	rule.OwnerOnly = path.OwnerOnly
 
 	if len(path.FromSource) == 0 {
+		if len(path.ExecName) > 0 {
+			addRuletoMap(rule, "/**/"+path.ExecName, prof.ProcessPaths)
+			return
+		}
 		addRuletoMap(rule, path.Path, prof.ProcessPaths)
-
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -58,12 +61,16 @@ func (ae *AppArmorEnforcer) SetProcessMatchPaths(path tp.ProcessPathType, prof *
 			fromsource.Rules.Init()
 			prof.FromSource[source] = fromsource
 		}
-		if deny == false {
+		if !deny {
 			if val, ok := prof.FromSource[source]; ok {
 				val.File = head
 				prof.FromSource[source] = val
 			}
 		}
+		if len(path.ExecName) > 0 {
+			addRuletoMap(rule, "/**/"+path.ExecName, prof.FromSource[source].ProcessPaths)
+			continue
+		}
 		addRuletoMap(rule, path.Path, prof.FromSource[source].ProcessPaths)
 	}
 }

KubeArmor/enforcer/bpflsm/rulesHandling.go

@@ -115,24 +115,29 @@ func (be *BPFEnforcer) UpdateContainerRules(id string, securityPolicies []tp.Sec
 			}
 			if len(path.FromSource) == 0 {
 				var key InnerKey
-				copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.Path))
+				if len(path.ExecName) > 0 {
+					copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.ExecName))
+				} else {
+					copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.Path))
+				}
 				if path.Action == "Allow" {
 					newrules.ProcWhiteListPosture = true
 					newrules.ProcessRuleList[key] = val
-
 				} else if path.Action == "Block" {
 					val[PROCESS] = val[PROCESS] | DENY
 					newrules.ProcessRuleList[key] = val
 				}
 			} else {
 				for _, src := range path.FromSource {
 					var key InnerKey
-					copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.Path))
+					if len(path.ExecName) > 0 {
+						copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.ExecName))
+					} else {
+						copy(key.Path[:], []byte(path.Path))
+					}
 					copy(key.Source[:], []byte(src.Path))
 					if path.Action == "Allow" {
-
 						newrules.ProcWhiteListPosture = true
-
 						newrules.ProcessRuleList[key] = val
 					} else if path.Action == "Block" {
 						val[PROCESS] = val[PROCESS] | DENY

KubeArmor/feeder/policyMatcher.go

@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ func (fd *Feeder) newMatchPolicy(policyEnabled int, policyName, src string, mp i
 		match.Message = ppt.Message
 
 		match.Operation = "Process"
-		match.Resource = ppt.Path
-		match.ResourceType = "Path"
+		if len(ppt.ExecName) > 0 {
+			match.Resource = ppt.ExecName
+			match.ResourceType = "ExecName"
+		} else {
+			match.Resource = ppt.Path
+			match.ResourceType = "Path"
+		}
 
 		match.OwnerOnly = ppt.OwnerOnly
 
@@ -1023,6 +1028,8 @@ func (fd *Feeder) UpdateMatchedPolicy(log tp.Log) tp.Log {
 							procMatch := secPolicy.Regexp.MatchString(log.ProcessName) // pattern (secPolicy.Resource) -> string (log.Resource)
 							matchedRegex = fileMatch || procMatch
 						}
+					case "ExecName":
+						matchedRegex = strings.HasSuffix(log.ProcessName, "/"+secPolicy.Resource) // processpath = */execname
 					}
 
 					// match resources

KubeArmor/types/types.go

@@ -333,7 +333,8 @@ type MatchSourceType struct {
 
 // ProcessPathType Structure
 type ProcessPathType struct {
-	Path       string            `json:"path"`
+	Path       string            `json:"path,omitempty"`
+	ExecName   string            `json:"execname,omitempty"`
 	OwnerOnly  bool              `json:"ownerOnly,omitempty"`
 	FromSource []MatchSourceType `json:"fromSource,omitempty"`
 

deployments/CRD/KubeArmorHostPolicy.yaml

@@ -345,6 +345,9 @@ spec:
                           - Audit
                           - Block
                           type: string
+                        execname:
+                          pattern: ^[^\/]+$
+                          type: string
                         fromSource:
                           items:
                             properties:
@@ -368,8 +371,6 @@ spec:
                           items:
                             type: string
                           type: array
-                      required:
-                      - path
                       type: object
                     type: array
                   matchPatterns: