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touchscreen support for BUSH Windows tablet #3

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@stpf99 stpf99 commented Sep 21, 2023

This commit adds touchscreen support for "BUSH" - "Bush Windows tablet". If it is possible please merge...

akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 21, 2023
Hou Tao says:

====================
Fix the unmatched unit_size of bpf_mem_cache

From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>

Hi,

The patchset aims to fix the reported warning [0] when the unit_size of
bpf_mem_cache is mismatched with the object size of underly slab-cache.

Patch #1 fixes the warning by adjusting size_index according to the
value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE, so bpf_mem_cache with unit_size which is
smaller than KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE or is not aligned with KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE
will be redirected to bpf_mem_cache with bigger unit_size. Patch #2
doesn't do prefill for these redirected bpf_mem_cache to save memory.
Patch #3 adds further error check in bpf_mem_alloc_init() to ensure the
unit_size and object_size are always matched and to prevent potential
issues due to the mismatch.

Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always
welcome.

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 21, 2023
Syzkaller reported a sleep in atomic context bug relating to the HASHCHK
handler logic:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 25040, name: syz-executor
  preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  no locks held by syz-executor/25040.
  irq event stamp: 34
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] prep_irq_for_enabled_exit arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:56 [inline]
  hardirqs last  enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x148/0x600 arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:230
  hardirqs last disabled at (34): [<c00000000003e6a4>] interrupt_enter_prepare+0x144/0x4f0 arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:176
  softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<c000000000281954>] copy_process+0x16e4/0x4750 kernel/fork.c:2436
  softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
  CPU: 15 PID: 25040 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00001-g3ccdff6bb06d #3
  Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1040.00 (NL1040_021) hv:phyp pSeries
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000a8247ce0] [c00000000032b0e4] __might_resched+0x3b4/0x400 kernel/sched/core.c:10189
  [c0000000a8247d80] [c0000000008c7dc8] __might_fault+0xa8/0x170 mm/memory.c:5853
  [c0000000a8247dc0] [c00000000004160c] do_program_check+0x32c/0xb20 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518
  [c0000000a8247e50] [c000000000009b2c] program_check_common_virt+0x3bc/0x3c0

To determine if a trap was caused by a HASHCHK instruction, we inspect
the user instruction that triggered the trap. However this may sleep
if the page needs to be faulted in (get_user_instr() reaches
__get_user(), which calls might_fault() and triggers the bug message).

Move the HASHCHK handler logic to after we allow IRQs, which is fine
because we are only interested in HASHCHK if it's a user space trap.

Fixes: 5bcba4e ("powerpc/dexcr: Handle hashchk exception")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 21, 2023
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says:

====================
net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames.

this is a follow-up to
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
replacing
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a
missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover
HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5).

HSRv0 is (was) not affected.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2023
Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    torvalds#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    torvalds#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    torvalds#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    torvalds#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    torvalds#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    torvalds#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    torvalds#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    torvalds#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    torvalds#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    torvalds#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: He Kuang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 27, 2023
Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer:
```
==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6
    #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2
    #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9
    #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32
    #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6
    #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8
    torvalds#6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8
    torvalds#7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9
    torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8
    torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15
    torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9
    torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8
    torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5
    torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9
    torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11
    torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8
    torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2
    torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3
```

Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 28, 2023
Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the
workqueue without holding the rb_lock.
This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which
we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started.

Lockdep:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted
 [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------
 [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock:
 [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900
 [ 2785.343403 ]
 [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock:
 [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock.
 [ 2785.346273 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ]
 [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
 [ 2785.349003 ]
 [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
 [ 2785.350160 ]        __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0
 [ 2785.350962 ]        delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.352044 ]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
 [ 2785.352879 ]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
 [ 2785.353636 ]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
 [ 2785.354370 ]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 [ 2785.355135 ]
 [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 [ 2785.356515 ]        __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0
 [ 2785.357349 ]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
 [ 2785.358121 ]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
 [ 2785.358852 ]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0
 [ 2785.359711 ]        mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.360781 ]        mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.361969 ]        __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.362960 ]        mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
 [ 2785.363870 ]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 [ 2785.364715 ]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
 [ 2785.365695 ]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
 [ 2785.366525 ]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
 [ 2785.367276 ]        mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.368615 ]        mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.369934 ]        mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.371292 ]        devlink_reload+0x439/0x590
 [ 2785.372075 ]        devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0
 [ 2785.372973 ]        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290
 [ 2785.374011 ]        genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0
 [ 2785.374798 ]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
 [ 2785.375612 ]        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 [ 2785.376295 ]        netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710
 [ 2785.377121 ]        netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0
 [ 2785.377926 ]        sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
 [ 2785.378668 ]        __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290
 [ 2785.379440 ]        __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
 [ 2785.380255 ]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 [ 2785.381031 ]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this:
 [ 2785.381967 ]
 [ 2785.383448 ]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
 [ 2785.383448 ]
 [ 2785.384544 ]        CPU0                    CPU1
 [ 2785.385383 ]        ----                    ----
 [ 2785.386193 ]   lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.386940 ]				lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.388327 ]				lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);
 [ 2785.389425 ]   lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work));
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.390414 ]  *** DEADLOCK ***
 [ 2785.390414 ]
 [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872:
 [ 2785.392341 ]  #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
 [ 2785.393630 ]  #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0
 [ 2785.395324 ]  #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.397322 ]  #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core]
 [ 2785.399231 ]  #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
 [ 2785.400864 ]  #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib]

Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 28, 2023
The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  torvalds#6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2023
Petr Machata says:

====================
mlxsw: Provide enhancements and new feature

Vadim Pasternak writes:

Patch #1 - Optimize transaction size for efficient retrieval of module
           data.
Patch #3 - Enable thermal zone binding with new cooling device.
Patch #4 - Employ standard macros for dividing buffer into the chunks.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 5, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
@akiyks
Copy link
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akiyks commented Oct 9, 2023

Hi @stpf99,
I didn't notice your pull request until now.

This repository is a fork for my personal use only.
I don't accept any pull request from others.

Let me close this now.

Regards.

@akiyks akiyks closed this Oct 9, 2023
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 11, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2023
The smp_processor_id() shouldn't be called from preemptible code.
Instead use get_cpu() and put_cpu() which disables preemption in
addition to getting the processor id. Enable preemption back after
calling schedule_work() to make sure that the work gets scheduled on all
cores other than the current core. We want to avoid a scenario where
current core's stack trace is printed multiple times and one core's
stack trace isn't printed because of scheduling of current task.

This fixes the following bug:

[  119.143590] sysrq: Show backtrace of all active CPUs
[  119.143902] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/873
[  119.144586] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.144827] CPU: 6 PID: 873 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.10.124-dirty #3
[  119.144861] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2023.05-1 07/22/2023
[  119.145053] Call trace:
[  119.145093]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0
[  119.145122]  show_stack+0x18/0x70
[  119.145141]  dump_stack+0xc4/0x11c
[  119.145159]  check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110
[  119.145175]  debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.145195]  sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x20/0xc0
[  119.145211]  __handle_sysrq+0x8c/0x1a0
[  119.145227]  write_sysrq_trigger+0x94/0x12c
[  119.145247]  proc_reg_write+0xa8/0xe4
[  119.145266]  vfs_write+0xec/0x280
[  119.145282]  ksys_write+0x6c/0x100
[  119.145298]  __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
[  119.145315]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e4
[  119.145332]  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x8c
[  119.145348]  el0_svc+0x10/0x20
[  119.145364]  el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x140
[  119.145381]  el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 47cab6a ("debug lockups: Improve lockup detection, fix generic arch fallback")
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2023
Amit Cohen says:

====================
Extend VXLAN driver to support FDB flushing

The merge commit 9271686 ("Merge branch 'br-flush-filtering'") added
support for FDB flushing in bridge driver. Extend VXLAN driver to support
FDB flushing also. Add support for filtering by fields which are relevant
for VXLAN FDBs:
* Source VNI
* Nexthop ID
* 'router' flag
* Destination VNI
* Destination Port
* Destination IP

Without this set, flush for VXLAN device fails:
$ bridge fdb flush dev vx10
RTNETLINK answers: Operation not supported

With this set, such flush works with the relevant arguments, for example:
$ bridge fdb flush dev vx10 vni 5000 dst 193.2.2.1
< flush all vx10 entries with VNI 5000 and destination IP 193.2.2.1>

Some preparations are required, handle them before adding flushing support
in VXLAN driver. See more details in commit messages.

Patch set overview:
Patch #1 prepares flush policy to be used by VXLAN driver
Patches #2-#3 are preparations in VXLAN driver
Patch #4 adds an initial support for flushing in VXLAN driver
Patches #5-torvalds#9 add support for filtering by several attributes
Patch torvalds#10 adds a test for FDB flush with VXLAN
Patch torvalds#11 extends the test to check FDB flush with bridge
====================

Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2023
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
This patch set fixes ambiguity in BPF verifier log output of SCALAR register
in the parts that emit umin/umax, smin/smax, etc ranges. See patch #4 for
details.

Also, patch #5 fixes an issue with verifier log missing instruction context
(state) output for conditionals that trigger precision marking. See details in
the patch.

First two patches are just improvements to two selftests that are very flaky
locally when run in parallel mode.

Patch #3 changes 'align' selftest to be less strict about exact verifier log
output (which patch #4 changes, breaking lots of align tests as written). Now
test does more of a register substate checks, mostly around expected var_off()
values. This 'align' selftests is one of the more brittle ones and requires
constant adjustment when verifier log output changes, without really catching
any new issues. So hopefully these changes can minimize future support efforts
for this specific set of tests.
====================

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 18, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2023
Lockdep reports following issue:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
devlink/8191 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88813f32c250 (&devlink->lock_key#14){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_rel_devlink_handle_put+0x11e/0x2d0

                           but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8511eca8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20

                           which lock already depends on the new lock.

                           the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

                           -> #3 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       register_netdevice_notifier_net+0x13/0x30
       mlx5_lag_add_mdev+0x51c/0xa00 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_load+0x222/0xc70 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x4a0/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one+0x3b/0x60 [mlx5_core]
       probe_one+0x786/0xd00 [mlx5_core]
       local_pci_probe+0xd7/0x180
       pci_device_probe+0x231/0x720
       really_probe+0x1e4/0xb60
       __driver_probe_device+0x261/0x470
       driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130
       __driver_attach+0x215/0x4c0
       bus_for_each_dev+0xf0/0x170
       bus_add_driver+0x21d/0x590
       driver_register+0x133/0x460
       vdpa_match_remove+0x89/0xc0 [vdpa]
       do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x360
       do_init_module+0x22d/0x760
       load_module+0x51d7/0x6750
       init_module_from_file+0xd2/0x130
       idempotent_init_module+0x326/0x5a0
       __x64_sys_finit_module+0xc1/0x130
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #2 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       mlx5_register_device+0x3e/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x8fa/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_reload_up+0x147/0x170 [mlx5_core]
       devlink_reload+0x203/0x380
       devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xb84/0x10e0
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #1 (&dev->lock_key#8){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x45/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_reload_up+0x147/0x170 [mlx5_core]
       devlink_reload+0x203/0x380
       devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xb84/0x10e0
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #0 (&devlink->lock_key#14){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add+0x1af/0x2300
       __lock_acquire+0x31d7/0x4eb0
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       devlink_rel_devlink_handle_put+0x11e/0x2d0
       devlink_nl_port_fill+0xddf/0x1b00
       devlink_port_notify+0xb5/0x220
       __devlink_port_type_set+0x151/0x510
       devlink_port_netdevice_event+0x17c/0x220
       notifier_call_chain+0x97/0x240
       unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x876/0x1790
       unregister_netdevice_queue+0x274/0x350
       unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20
       mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0xc5/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
       __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xd8/0x130 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_unload+0x52/0x70 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x85/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_eswitch_unload_sf_vport+0x41/0x90 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_sf_port_del+0x120/0x280 [mlx5_core]
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
                             &devlink->lock_key#14 --> mlx5_intf_mutex --> rtnl_mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(mlx5_intf_mutex);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
  lock(&devlink->lock_key#14);

Problem is taking the devlink instance lock of nested instance when RTNL
is already held.

To fix this, don't take the devlink instance lock when putting nested
handle. Instead, rely on the preparations done by previous two patches
to be able to access device pointer and obtain netns id without devlink
instance lock held.

Fixes: c137743 ("devlink: introduce object and nested devlink relationship infra")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2023
Jiri Pirko says:

====================
devlink: fix a deadlock when taking devlink instance lock while holding RTNL lock

devlink_port_fill() may be called sometimes with RTNL lock held.
When putting the nested port function devlink instance attrs,
current code takes nested devlink instance lock. In that case lock
ordering is wrong.

Patch #1 is a dependency of patch #2.
Patch #2 converts the peernet2id_alloc() call to rely in RCU so it could
         called without devlink instance lock.
Patch #3 takes device reference for devlink instance making sure that
         device does not disappear before devlink_release() is called.
Patch #4 benefits from the preparations done in patches #2 and #3 and
         removes the problematic nested devlink lock aquisition.
Patched #5-torvalds#7 improve documentation to reflect this issue so it is
              avoided in the future.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2023
Patch series "mm/rmap: convert page_move_anon_rmap() to
folio_move_anon_rmap()".

Convert page_move_anon_rmap() to folio_move_anon_rmap(), letting the
callers handle PageAnonExclusive.  I'm including cleanup patch #3 because
it fits into the picture and can be done cleaner by the conversion.


This patch (of 3):

Let's move it into the caller: there is a difference between whether an
anon folio can only be mapped by one process (e.g., into one VMA), and
whether it is truly exclusive (e.g., no references -- including GUP --
from other processes).

Further, for large folios the page might not actually be pointing at the
head page of the folio, so it better be handled in the caller.  This is a
preparation for converting page_move_anon_rmap() to consume a folio.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 24, 2023
A thread started via eg. user_mode_thread() runs in the kernel to begin
with and then may later return to userspace. While it's running in the
kernel it has a pt_regs at the base of its kernel stack, but that
pt_regs is all zeroes.

If the thread oopses in that state, it leads to an ugly stack trace with
a big block of zero GPRs, as reported by Joel:

  Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0)
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty #3
  Hardware name: IBM PowerNV (emulated by qemu) POWER9 0x4e1200 opal:v7.0 PowerNV
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000036afb00] [c0000000010dd058] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable)
  [c0000000036afb30] [c00000000013c524] panic+0x178/0x424
  [c0000000036afbd0] [c000000002005100] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324
  [c0000000036afca0] [c0000000020057d0] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344
  [c0000000036afd20] [c0000000020049c0] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac
  [c0000000036afdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0
  [c0000000036afe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
  --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0
  NIP:  0000000000000000 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c0000000036afe80 TRAP: 0000   Not tainted  (6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty)
  MSR:  0000000000000000 <>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: 0000000000000000 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  NIP [0000000000000000] 0x0
  LR [0000000000000000] 0x0
  --- interrupt: 0

The all-zero pt_regs looks ugly and conveys no useful information, other
than its presence. So detect that case and just show the presence of the
frame by printing the interrupt marker, eg:

  Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0)
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00126-g18e9506562a0-dirty torvalds#301
  Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
  Call Trace:
  [c000000003aabb00] [c000000001143db8] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable)
  [c000000003aabb30] [c00000000014c624] panic+0x178/0x424
  [c000000003aabbd0] [c0000000020050fc] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324
  [c000000003aabca0] [c0000000020057cc] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344
  [c000000003aabd20] [c0000000020049bc] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac
  [c000000003aabdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0
  [c000000003aabe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
  --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0

To avoid ever suppressing a valid pt_regs make sure the pt_regs has a
zero MSR and TRAP value, and is located at the very base of the stack.

Fixes: 6895dfc ("powerpc: copy_thread fill in interrupt frame marker and back chain")
Reported-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 24, 2023
Running smb2.rename test from Samba smbtorture suite against a kernel built
with lockdep triggers a "possible recursive locking detected" warning.

This is because mnt_want_write() is called twice with no mnt_drop_write()
in between:
  -> ksmbd_vfs_mkdir()
    -> ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_create()
       -> kern_path_create()
          -> filename_create()
            -> mnt_want_write()
       -> mnt_want_write()

Fix this by removing the mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write calls from vfs
helpers that call kern_path_create().

Full lockdep trace below:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.6.0-rc5 torvalds#775 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
kworker/1:1/32 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_mkdir+0xe1/0x410

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(sb_writers#5);
  lock(sb_writers#5);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by kworker/1:1/32:
 #0: ffff8880064e4138 ((wq_completion)ksmbd-io){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
 #1: ffff888005b0fdd0 ((work_completion)(&work->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
 #2: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260
 #3: ffff8880057ce760 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#3/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x123/0x260

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions")
Signed-off-by: Marios Makassikis <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 25, 2023
Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks

Iterator convergence logic in is_state_visited() uses state_equals()
for states with branches counter > 0 to check if iterator based loop
converges. This is not fully correct because state_equals() relies on
presence of read and precision marks on registers. These marks are not
guaranteed to be finalized while state has branches.
Commit message for patch #3 describes a program that exhibits such
behavior.

This patch-set aims to fix iterator convergence logic by adding notion
of exact states comparison. Exact comparison does not rely on presence
of read or precision marks and thus is more strict.
As explained in commit message for patch #3 exact comparisons require
addition of speculative register bounds widening. The end result for
BPF verifier users could be summarized as follows:

(!) After this update verifier would reject programs that conjure an
    imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise
    on the second (for iterator based loops).

I urge people to at least skim over the commit message for patch #3.

Patches are organized as follows:
- patches #1,2: moving/extracting utility functions;
- patch #3: introduces exact mode for states comparison and adds
  widening heuristic;
- patch #4: adds test-cases that demonstrate why the series is
  necessary;
- patch #5: extends patch #3 with a notion of state loop entries,
  these entries have to be tracked to correctly identify that
  different verifier states belong to the same states loop;
- patch torvalds#6: adds a test-case that demonstrates a program
  which requires loop entry tracking for correct verification;
- patch torvalds#7: just adds a few debug prints.

The following actions are planned as a followup for this patch-set:
- implementation has to be adapted for callbacks handling logic as a
  part of a fix for [1];
- it is necessary to explore ways to improve widening heuristic to
  handle iters_task_vma test w/o need to insert barrier_var() calls;
- explored states eviction logic on cache miss has to be extended
  to either:
  - allow eviction of checkpoint states -or-
  - be sped up in case if there are many active checkpoints associated
    with the same instruction.

The patch-set is a followup for mailing list discussion [1].

Changelog:
- V2 [3] -> V3:
  - correct check for stack spills in widen_imprecise_scalars(),
    added test case progs/iters.c:widen_spill to check the behavior
    (suggested by Andrii);
  - allow eviction of checkpoint states in is_state_visited() to avoid
    pathological verifier performance when iterator based loop does not
    converge (discussion with Alexei).
- V1 [2] -> V2, applied changes suggested by Alexei offlist:
  - __explored_state() function removed;
  - same_callsites() function is now used in clean_live_states();
  - patches #1,2 are added as preparatory code movement;
  - in process_iter_next_call() a safeguard is added to verify that
    cur_st->parent exists and has expected insn index / call sites.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 1, 2023
Chuyi Zhou says:

====================
Add Open-coded task, css_task and css iters

This is version 6 of task, css_task and css iters support.

--- Changelog ---

v5 -> v6:

Patch #3:
 * In bpf_iter_task_next, return pos rather than goto out. (Andrii)
Patch #2, #3, #4:
 * Add the missing __diag_ignore_all to avoid kernel build warning
Patch #5, torvalds#6, torvalds#7:
 * Add Andrii's ack

Patch torvalds#8:
 * In BPF prog iter_css_task_for_each, return -EPERM rather than 0, and
   ensure stack_mprotect() in iters.c not success. If not, it would cause
   the subsequent 'test_lsm' fail, since the 'is_stack' check in
   test_int_hook(lsm.c) would not be guaranteed.
   (https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/6489662214/job/17624665086?pr=5790)

v4 -> v5:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Patch 3~4:
 * Relax the BUILD_BUG_ON check in bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new to avoid
   netdev/build_32bit CI error.
   (https://netdev.bots.linux.dev/static/nipa/790929/13412333/build_32bit/stderr)
Patch 8:
 * Initialize skel pointer to fix the LLVM-16 build CI error
   (https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/6462875618/job/17545170863)

v3 -> v4:https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

* Address all the comments from Andrii in patch-3 ~ patch-6
* Collect Tejun's ack
* Add a extra patch to rename bpf_iter_task.c to bpf_iter_tasks.c
* Seperate three BPF program files for selftests (iters_task.c iters_css_task.c iters_css.c)

v2 -> v3:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Patch 1 (cgroup: Prepare for using css_task_iter_*() in BPF)
  * Add tj's ack and Alexei's suggest-by.
Patch 2 (bpf: Introduce css_task open-coded iterator kfuncs)
  * Use bpf_mem_alloc/bpf_mem_free rather than kzalloc()
  * Add KF_TRUSTED_ARGS for bpf_iter_css_task_new (Alexei)
  * Move bpf_iter_css_task's definition from uapi/linux/bpf.h to
    kernel/bpf/task_iter.c and we can use it from vmlinux.h
  * Move bpf_iter_css_task_XXX's declaration from bpf_helpers.h to
    bpf_experimental.h
Patch 3 (Introduce task open coded iterator kfuncs)
  * Change th API design keep consistent with SEC("iter/task"), support
    iterating all threads(BPF_TASK_ITERATE_ALL) and threads of a
    specific task (BPF_TASK_ITERATE_THREAD).(Andrii)
  * Move bpf_iter_task's definition from uapi/linux/bpf.h to
    kernel/bpf/task_iter.c and we can use it from vmlinux.h
  * Move bpf_iter_task_XXX's declaration from bpf_helpers.h to
    bpf_experimental.h
Patch 4 (Introduce css open-coded iterator kfuncs)
  * Change th API design keep consistent with cgroup_iters, reuse
    BPF_CGROUP_ITER_DESCENDANTS_PRE/BPF_CGROUP_ITER_DESCENDANTS_POST
    /BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP(Andrii)
  * Add KF_TRUSTED_ARGS for bpf_iter_css_new
  * Move bpf_iter_css's definition from uapi/linux/bpf.h to
    kernel/bpf/task_iter.c and we can use it from vmlinux.h
  * Move bpf_iter_css_XXX's declaration from bpf_helpers.h to
    bpf_experimental.h
Patch 5 (teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS)
  * Add KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED to maintain kfuncs which need RCU CS.(Andrii)
  * Consider STACK_ITER when using bpf_for_each_spilled_reg.
Patch 6 (Let bpf_iter_task_new accept null task ptr)
  * Add this extra patch to let bpf_iter_task_new accept a 'nullable'
  * task pointer(Andrii)
Patch 7 (selftests/bpf: Add tests for open-coded task and css iter)
  * Add failure testcase(Alexei)

Changes from v1(https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/):
- Add a pre-patch to make some preparations before supporting css_task
  iters.(Alexei)
- Add an allowlist for css_task iters(Alexei)
- Let bpf progs do explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() when using process
  iters and css_descendant iters.(Alexei)
---------------------

In some BPF usage scenarios, it will be useful to iterate the process and
css directly in the BPF program. One of the expected scenarios is
customizable OOM victim selection via BPF[1].

Inspired by Dave's task_vma iter[2], this patchset adds three types of
open-coded iterator kfuncs:

1. bpf_task_iters. It can be used to
1) iterate all process in the system, like for_each_forcess() in kernel.
2) iterate all threads in the system.
3) iterate all threads of a specific task

2. bpf_css_iters. It works like css_task_iter_{start, next, end} and would
be used to iterating tasks/threads under a css.

3. css_iters. It works like css_next_descendant_{pre, post} to iterating all
descendant css.

BPF programs can use these kfuncs directly or through bpf_for_each macro.

link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
link[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2024
Ran Xiaokai reports that with a KCSAN-enabled PREEMPT_RT kernel, we can see
splats like:

| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
| preempt_count: 10002, expected: 0
| RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
| no locks held by swapper/1/0.
| irq event stamp: 156674
| hardirqs last  enabled at (156673): [<ffffffff81130bd9>] do_idle+0x1f9/0x240
| hardirqs last disabled at (156674): [<ffffffff82254f84>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14/0xc0
| softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81099f47>] copy_process+0xfc7/0x4b60
| softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
| Preemption disabled at:
| [<ffffffff814a3e2a>] paint_ptr+0x2a/0x90
| CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.11.0+ #3
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
| Call Trace:
|  <IRQ>
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
|  dump_stack+0x1d/0x30
|  __might_resched+0x1a2/0x270
|  rt_spin_lock+0x68/0x170
|  kcsan_skip_report_debugfs+0x43/0xe0
|  print_report+0xb5/0x590
|  kcsan_report_known_origin+0x1b1/0x1d0
|  kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x348/0x650
|  __tsan_unaligned_write1+0x16d/0x1d0
|  hrtimer_interrupt+0x3d6/0x430
|  __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe8/0x3a0
|  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
|  </IRQ>

On a detected data race, KCSAN's reporting logic checks if it should
filter the report. That list is protected by the report_filterlist_lock
*non-raw* spinlock which may sleep on RT kernels.

Since KCSAN may report data races in any context, convert it to a
raw_spinlock.

This requires being careful about when to allocate memory for the filter
list itself which can be done via KCSAN's debugfs interface. Concurrent
modification of the filter list via debugfs should be rare: the chosen
strategy is to optimistically pre-allocate memory before the critical
section and discard if unused.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Reported-by: Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2024
nx842_remove() call of_reconfig_notifier_unregister while holding the
devdata_spinlock. This could lead to an invalid wait context error during
kexec reboot, as of_reconfig_notifier_unregister tries to acquire a read-write
semaphore (check logs) while holding a spinlock.

Move the of_reconfig_notifier_unregister() call before acquiring the
spinlock to prevent this race condition invalid wait contexts during system
shutdown or kexec operations.

Log:

[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.11.0-test2-10547-g684a64bf32b6-dirty torvalds#79 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kexec/61926 is trying to lock:
c000000002d8b590 ((of_reconfig_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_chain_unregister+0x44/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
4 locks held by kexec/61926:
 #0: c000000002926c70 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __do_sys_reboot+0xf8/0x2e0
 #1: c00000000291af30 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0x160/0x310
 #2: c000000051011938 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0x174/0x310
 #3: c000000002d88070 (devdata_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: nx842_remove+0xac/0x1bc
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 61926 Comm: kexec Not tainted 6.11.0-test2-10547-g684a64bf32b6-dirty torvalds#79
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_012) hv:phyp pSeries
Call Trace:
[c0000000bb577400] [c000000001239704] dump_stack_lvl+0xc8/0x130 (unreliable)
[c0000000bb577440] [c000000000248398] __lock_acquire+0xb68/0xf00
[c0000000bb577550] [c000000000248820] lock_acquire.part.0+0xf0/0x2a0
[c0000000bb577670] [c00000000127faa0] down_write+0x70/0x1e0
[c0000000bb5776b0] [c0000000001acea4] blocking_notifier_chain_unregister+0x44/0xa0
[c0000000bb5776e0] [c000000000e2312c] of_reconfig_notifier_unregister+0x2c/0x40
[c0000000bb577700] [c000000000ded24c] nx842_remove+0x148/0x1bc
[c0000000bb577790] [c00000000011a114] vio_bus_remove+0x54/0xc0
[c0000000bb5777c0] [c000000000c1a44c] device_shutdown+0x20c/0x310
[c0000000bb577850] [c0000000001b0ab4] kernel_restart_prepare+0x54/0x70
[c0000000bb577870] [c000000000308718] kernel_kexec+0xa8/0x110
[c0000000bb5778e0] [c0000000001b1144] __do_sys_reboot+0x214/0x2e0
[c0000000bb577a40] [c000000000032f98] system_call_exception+0x148/0x310
[c0000000bb577e50] [c00000000000cedc] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
--- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fffa07e7df8
NIP:  00007fffa07e7df8 LR: 00007fffa07e7df8 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000bb577e80 TRAP: 3000   Not tainted  (6.11.0-test2-10547-g684a64bf32b6-dirty)
MSR:  800000000280f033   CR: 48022484  XER: 00000000
IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000058 00007ffff961f1e0 00007fffa08f7100 fffffffffee1dead
GPR04: 0000000028121969 0000000045584543 0000000000000000 0000000000000003
GPR08: 0000000000000003 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fffa0a9b360 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000001 0000000000000002 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 000000011710f520 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
GPR24: 0000000129be0480 0000000000000003 0000000000000003 00007ffff961f2b0
GPR28: 00000001170f2d30 00000001170f2d28 00007fffa08f18d0 0000000129be04a0
NIP [00007fffa07e7df8] 0x7fffa07e7df8
LR [00007fffa07e7df8] 0x7fffa07e7df8
--- interrupt: 3000

Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2024
Lockdep gives a false positive splat as it can't distinguish the lock
which is taken by different IRQ descriptors from different IRQ chips
that are organized in a way of a hierarchy:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.12.0-rc5-next-20241101-00148-g9fabf8160b53 torvalds#562 Tainted: G        W
   ------------------------------------------------------
   modprobe/141 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff899446947868 (intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc:502:(&bxtwc_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: regmap_update_bits_base+0x33/0x90

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff899446947c68 (&d->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0x682/0x790

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   -> #3 (&d->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
   -> #2 (&desc->request_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
   -> #1 (ipclock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
   -> #0 (intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc:502:(&bxtwc_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:

   Chain exists of:
     intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc:502:(&bxtwc_regmap_config)->lock --> &desc->request_mutex --> &d->lock

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(&d->lock);
                                  lock(&desc->request_mutex);
                                  lock(&d->lock);
     lock(intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc:502:(&bxtwc_regmap_config)->lock);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   3 locks held by modprobe/141:
    #0: ffff8994419368f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xf6/0x250
    #1: ffff89944690b250 (&desc->request_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0x1a2/0x790
    #2: ffff899446947c68 (&d->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0x682/0x790

Set a lockdep class when we map the IRQ so that it doesn't warn about
a lockdep bug that doesn't exist.

Fixes: 4af8be6 ("regmap: Convert regmap_irq to use irq_domain")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2024
…dfl()

When getting an LLC CPU mask in the default CPU selection policy,
scx_select_cpu_dfl(), a pointer to the sched_domain is dereferenced
using rcu_read_lock() without holding rcu_read_lock(). Such an unprotected
dereference often causes the following warning and can cause an invalid
memory access in the worst case.

Therefore, protect dereference of a sched_domain pointer using a pair
of rcu_read_lock() and unlock().

[   20.996135] =============================
[   20.996345] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   20.996563] 6.11.0-virtme torvalds#17 Tainted: G        W
[   20.996576] -----------------------------
[   20.996576] kernel/sched/ext.c:3323 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[   20.996576]
[   20.996576] other info that might help us debug this:
[   20.996576]
[   20.996576]
[   20.996576] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[   20.996576] 4 locks held by kworker/8:1/140:
[   20.996576]  #0: ffff8b18c00dd348 ((wq_completion)pm){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4a0/0x590
[   20.996576]  #1: ffffb3da01f67e58 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ba/0x590
[   20.996576]  #2: ffffffffa316f9f0 (&rcu_state.gp_wq){..-.}-{2:2}, at: swake_up_one+0x15/0x60
[   20.996576]  #3: ffff8b1880398a60 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: try_to_wake_up+0x59/0x7d0
[   20.996576]
[   20.996576] stack backtrace:
[   20.996576] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/8:1 Tainted: G        W          6.11.0-virtme torvalds#17
[   20.996576] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   20.996576] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[   20.996576] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
[   20.996576] Sched_ext: simple (disabling+all), task: runnable_at=-6ms
[   20.996576] Call Trace:
[   20.996576]  <IRQ>
[   20.996576]  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
[   20.996576]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0x96
[   20.996576]  scx_select_cpu_dfl+0x234/0x260
[   20.996576]  select_task_rq_scx+0xfb/0x190
[   20.996576]  select_task_rq+0x47/0x110
[   20.996576]  try_to_wake_up+0x110/0x7d0
[   20.996576]  swake_up_one+0x39/0x60
[   20.996576]  rcu_core+0xb08/0xe50
[   20.996576]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[   20.996576]  ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70
[   20.996576]  handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x410
[   20.996576]  irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0
[   20.996576]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x73/0x80
[   20.996576]  </IRQ>
[   20.996576]  <TASK>
[   20.996576]  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
[   20.996576] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x70
[   20.996576] Code: f5 53 48 8b 74 24 10 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 18 e8 11 b4 36 ff 48 89 df e8 99 0d 37 ff f7 c5 00 02 00 00 75 17 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2b <65> ff 0d 5b 55 3c 5e 74 16 5b 5d e9 95 8e 28 00 e8 a5 ee 44 ff 9c
[   20.996576] RSP: 0018:ffffb3da01f67d20 EFLAGS: 00000246
[   20.996576] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffffa4640220 RCX: 0000000000000040
[   20.996576] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1c7b27b
[   20.996576] RBP: 0000000000000246 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   20.996576] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000021c R12: 0000000000000246
[   20.996576] R13: ffff8b1881363958 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b1881363800
[   20.996576]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x70
[   20.996576]  serial_port_runtime_resume+0xd4/0x1a0
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  __rpm_callback+0x44/0x170
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  rpm_callback+0x55/0x60
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  rpm_resume+0x582/0x7b0
[   20.996576]  pm_runtime_work+0x7c/0xb0
[   20.996576]  process_one_work+0x1fb/0x590
[   20.996576]  worker_thread+0x18e/0x350
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  kthread+0xe2/0x110
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[   20.996576]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   20.996576]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   20.996576]  </TASK>
[   21.056592] sched_ext: BPF scheduler "simple" disabled (unregistered from user space)

Signed-off-by: Changwoo Min <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2024
Patch series "page allocation tag compression", v4.

This patchset implements several improvements:

1. Gracefully handles module unloading while there are used
   allocations allocated from that module;

2. Provides an option to store page allocation tag references in the
   page flags, removing dependency on page extensions and eliminating the
   memory overhead from storing page allocation references (~0.2% of total
   system memory).  This also improves page allocation performance when
   CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING is enabled by eliminating page extension
   lookup.  Page allocation performance overhead is reduced from 41% to
   5.5%.

Patch #1 introduces mas_for_each_rev() helper function.

Patch #2 introduces shutdown_mem_profiling() helper function to be used
when disabling memory allocation profiling.

Patch #3 copies module tags into virtually contiguous memory which
serves two purposes:

- Lets us deal with the situation when module is unloaded while there
  are still live allocations from that module.  Since we are using a copy
  version of the tags we can safely unload the module.  Space and gaps in
  this contiguous memory are managed using a maple tree.

- Enables simple indexing of the tags in the later patches.

Patch #4 changes the way we allocate virtually contiguous memory for
module tags to reserve only vitrual area and populate physical pages only
as needed at module load time.

Patch #5 abstracts page allocation tag reference to simplify later
changes.

Patch torvalds#6 adds compression option to the sysctl.vm.mem_profiling boot
parameter for storing page allocation tag references inside page flags if
they fit.  If the number of available page flag bits is insufficient to
address all kernel allocations, memory allocation profiling gets disabled
with an appropriate warning.


This patch (of 6):

Add mas_for_each_rev() function to iterate maple tree nodes in reverse
order.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Gomez <[email protected]>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Hubbard <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
Cc: Sourav Panda <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Xiongwei Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2024
LTP reported a NULL pointer dereference as followed:

 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #3
 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
 lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram]
 sp : ffff800088b93b90
 x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0
 x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 0000000000000000
 x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900
 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9 : ffff80007b3cb280
 x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c
 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
  comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram]
  dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80
  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140
  kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48
  seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
  kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x40/0x58
  new_sync_read+0x9c/0x168
  vfs_read+0x1a8/0x1f8
  ksys_read+0x74/0x108
  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
  el0_svc+0x38/0x138
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

The zram->comp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] can be NULL in zram_add() if
comp_algorithm_set() has not been called.  User can access the zram device
by sysfs after device_add_disk(), so there is a time window to trigger the
NULL pointer dereference.  Move it ahead device_add_disk() to make sure
when user can access the zram device, it is ready.  comp_algorithm_set()
is protected by zram->init_lock in other places and no such problem.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 7ac07a2 ("zram: preparation for multi-zcomp support")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 2, 2024
The function blk_revalidate_disk_zones() calls the function
disk_update_zone_resources() after freezing the device queue. In turn,
disk_update_zone_resources() calls queue_limits_start_update() which
takes a queue limits mutex lock, resulting in the ordering:
q->q_usage_counter check -> q->limits_lock. However, the usual ordering
is to always take a queue limit lock before freezing the queue to commit
the limits updates, e.g., the code pattern:

lim = queue_limits_start_update(q);
...
blk_mq_freeze_queue(q);
ret = queue_limits_commit_update(q, &lim);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q);

Thus, blk_revalidate_disk_zones() introduces a potential circular
locking dependency deadlock that lockdep sometimes catches with the
splat:

[   51.934109] ======================================================
[   51.935916] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   51.937561] 6.12.0+ #2107 Not tainted
[   51.938648] ------------------------------------------------------
[   51.940351] kworker/u16:4/157 is trying to acquire lock:
[   51.941805] ffff9fff0aa0bea8 (&q->limits_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: disk_update_zone_resources+0x86/0x170
[   51.944314]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   51.945688] ffff9fff0aa0b890 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_revalidate_disk_zones+0x15f/0x340
[   51.948527]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   51.951296]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   51.953708]
               -> #1 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}:
[   51.956131]        blk_queue_enter+0x1c9/0x1e0
[   51.957290]        blk_mq_alloc_request+0x187/0x2a0
[   51.958365]        scsi_execute_cmd+0x78/0x490 [scsi_mod]
[   51.959514]        read_capacity_16+0x111/0x410 [sd_mod]
[   51.960693]        sd_revalidate_disk.isra.0+0x872/0x3240 [sd_mod]
[   51.962004]        sd_probe+0x2d7/0x520 [sd_mod]
[   51.962993]        really_probe+0xd5/0x330
[   51.963898]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   51.964925]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   51.965916]        __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xe0
[   51.967017]        async_run_entry_fn+0x2e/0x140
[   51.968004]        process_one_work+0x21f/0x5a0
[   51.968987]        worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[   51.969868]        kthread+0xe0/0x110
[   51.970377]        ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[   51.970983]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[   51.971587]
               -> #0 (&q->limits_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   51.972479]        __lock_acquire+0x1337/0x2130
[   51.973133]        lock_acquire+0xc5/0x2d0
[   51.973691]        __mutex_lock+0xda/0xcf0
[   51.974300]        disk_update_zone_resources+0x86/0x170
[   51.975032]        blk_revalidate_disk_zones+0x16c/0x340
[   51.975740]        sd_zbc_revalidate_zones+0x73/0x160 [sd_mod]
[   51.976524]        sd_revalidate_disk.isra.0+0x465/0x3240 [sd_mod]
[   51.977824]        sd_probe+0x2d7/0x520 [sd_mod]
[   51.978917]        really_probe+0xd5/0x330
[   51.979915]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   51.981047]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   51.982143]        __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xe0
[   51.983282]        async_run_entry_fn+0x2e/0x140
[   51.984319]        process_one_work+0x21f/0x5a0
[   51.985873]        worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[   51.987289]        kthread+0xe0/0x110
[   51.988546]        ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[   51.989926]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[   51.991376]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   51.994127]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   51.995651]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   51.996694]        ----                    ----
[   51.997716]   lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3);
[   51.998817]                                lock(&q->limits_lock);
[   52.000043]                                lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3);
[   52.001638]   lock(&q->limits_lock);
[   52.002485]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

Prevent this issue by moving the calls to blk_mq_freeze_queue() and
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue() around the call to queue_limits_commit_update()
in disk_update_zone_resources(). In case of revalidation failure, the
call to disk_free_zone_resources() in blk_revalidate_disk_zones()
is still done with the queue frozen as before.

Fixes: 843283e ("block: Fake max open zones limit when there is no limit")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
Konstantin Shkolnyy says:

====================
vsock/test: fix wrong setsockopt() parameters

Parameters were created using wrong C types, which caused them to be of
wrong size on some architectures, causing problems.

The problem with SO_RCVLOWAT was found on s390 (big endian), while x86-64
didn't show it. After the fix, all tests pass on s390.
Then Stefano Garzarella pointed out that SO_VM_SOCKETS_* calls might have
a similar problem, which turned out to be true, hence, the second patch.

Changes for v8:
- Fix whitespace warnings from "checkpatch.pl --strict"
- Add maintainers to Cc:
Changes for v7:
- Rebase on top of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git
- Add the "net" tags to the subjects
Changes for v6:
- rework the patch #3 to avoid creating a new file for new functions,
and exclude vsock_perf from calling the new functions.
- add "Reviewed-by:" to the patch #2.
Changes for v5:
- in the patch #2 replace the introduced uint64_t with unsigned long long
to match documentation
- add a patch #3 that verifies every setsockopt() call.
Changes for v4:
- add "Reviewed-by:" to the first patch, and add a second patch fixing
SO_VM_SOCKETS_* calls, which depends on the first one (hence, it's now
a patch series.)
Changes for v3:
- fix the same problem in vsock_perf and update commit message
Changes for v2:
- add "Fixes:" lines to the commit message
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2024
Hou Tao says:

====================
This patch set fixes several issues for LPM trie. These issues were
found during adding new test cases or were reported by syzbot.

The patch set is structured as follows:

Patch #1~#2 are clean-ups for lpm_trie_update_elem().
Patch #3 handles BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST correctly for LPM trie.
Patch #4 fixes the accounting of n_entries when doing in-place update.
Patch #5 fixes the exact match condition in trie_get_next_key() and it
may skip keys when the passed key is not found in the map.
Patch torvalds#6~torvalds#7 switch from kmalloc() to bpf memory allocator for LPM trie
to fix several lock order warnings reported by syzbot. It also enables
raw_spinlock_t for LPM trie again. After these changes, the LPM trie will
be closer to being usable in any context (though the reentrance check of
trie->lock is still missing, but it is on my todo list).
Patch torvalds#8: move test_lpm_map to map_tests to make it run regularly.
Patch torvalds#9: add test cases for the issues fixed by patch #3~#5.

Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always
welcome.

Change Log:
v3:
  * patch #2: remove the unnecessary NULL-init for im_node
  * patch torvalds#6: alloc the leaf node before disabling IRQ to low
    the possibility of -ENOMEM when leaf_size is large; Free
    these nodes outside the trie lock (Suggested by Alexei)
  * collect review and ack tags (Thanks for Toke & Daniel)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
  * collect review tags (Thanks for Toke)
  * drop "Add bpf_mem_cache_is_mergeable() helper" patch
  * patch #3~#4: add fix tag
  * patch #4: rename the helper to trie_check_add_elem() and increase
    n_entries in it.
  * patch torvalds#6: use one bpf mem allocator and update commit message to
    clarify that using bpf mem allocator is more appropriate.
  * patch torvalds#7: update commit message to add the possible max running time
    for update operation.
  * patch torvalds#9: update commit message to specify the purpose of these test
    cases.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2024
Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such
as following calltrace:

PID: 23644    TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0  CPU: 2    COMMAND: "nvme"
 #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15
 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014
 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1
 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a
 #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006
 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce
 torvalds#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced
 torvalds#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b
 torvalds#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362
 torvalds#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25
    RIP: 00007fda7891d574  RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958  RFLAGS: 00000202
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 000055e8122a4d90  RCX: 00007fda7891d574
    RDX: 000000000000012b  RSI: 000055e8122a4d90  RDI: 0000000000000004
    RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0   R8: 000000000000012b   R9: 000055e8122a4d90
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: 0000000000000004
    R13: 000055e8122923c0  R14: 000000000000012b  R15: 00007fda78a54500
    ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot
to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the
pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here
try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and
simplify the code.

Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection")
Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 13, 2024
This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
 hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
 </TASK>

Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 13, 2024
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by
releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to
avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock.

[   75.307983] ======================================================
[   75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#22 Not tainted
[   75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------
[   75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock:
[   75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO)
               at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[   75.308021]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock)
               at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308053]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   75.308054]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   75.308055]
               -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   75.308057]        __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50
[   75.308061]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[   75.308063]        iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308085]        __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60
[   75.308088]        __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90
[   75.308090]        x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[   75.308092]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[   75.308095]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   75.308098]
               -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[   75.308100]        __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0
[   75.308103]        lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
[   75.308105]        lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90
[   75.308107]        iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[   75.308128]        hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth]
[   75.308155]        hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308180]        hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth]
[   75.308206]        hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308230]        hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth]
[   75.308254]        process_one_work+0x212/0x740
[   75.308256]        worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0
[   75.308258]        kthread+0xe4/0x120
[   75.308259]        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
[   75.308261]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   75.308263]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   75.308264]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   75.308264]        CPU0                CPU1
[   75.308265]        ----                ----
[   75.308265]   lock(&hdev->lock);
[   75.308267]                            lock(sk_lock-
                                                AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[   75.308268]                            lock(&hdev->lock);
[   75.308269]   lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[   75.308270]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623:
[   75.308272]  #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
                at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740
[   75.308276]  #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)),
                at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740
[   75.308280]  #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}
                at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308304]  #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2},
                at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth]

Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 13, 2024
Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.

The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().

Before the patch:

  (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
  <SNIP>
   Summary of events:

   gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     pselect6               1      0     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000      0.00%

   GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     poll                   1      0     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000      0.00%
  <SNIP>
  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
  478		if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
  #1  0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
  #2  0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
  #3  0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
  #4  0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
  #5  0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
  torvalds#6  0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
  torvalds#7  0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
  torvalds#8  0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
  torvalds#9  0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
  (gdb)

After:

  root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
  <SNIP>
     pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     epoll_wait           188      0   983.428     0.000     5.231    15.595      8.68%
     ioctl                 94      0     0.811     0.004     0.009     0.016      2.82%
     read                 188      0     0.322     0.001     0.002     0.006      5.15%
     write                141      0     0.280     0.001     0.002     0.018      8.39%
     timerfd_settime       94      0     0.138     0.001     0.001     0.007      6.47%

   gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     poll                 222      0   959.577     0.000     4.322    21.414     11.40%
     recvmsg              150      0     0.539     0.001     0.004     0.013      5.12%
     write                300      0     0.442     0.001     0.001     0.007      3.29%
     read                 150      0     0.183     0.001     0.001     0.009      5.53%
     getpid               102      0     0.101     0.000     0.001     0.008      7.82%

  root@number:~#

Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2024
…s_lock

For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function
first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire
->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to
acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering
causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always
simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command:

[   57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c torvalds#20 Tainted: G        W
[   57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------
[   57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock:
[   57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0
[   57.597200]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4
[   57.597226]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   57.597233]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   57.597241]
               -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597255]        down_write+0x6c/0x18c
[   57.597264]        start_creating+0xb4/0x24c
[   57.597274]        debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8
[   57.597283]        blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294
[   57.597292]        add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548
[   57.597302]        brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338
[   57.597309]        brd_init+0x100/0x178
[   57.597317]        do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4
[   57.597326]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0
[   57.597334]        kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc
[   57.597342]        ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
[   57.597350]
               -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   57.597362]        __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0
[   57.597370]        blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294
[   57.597379]        add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548
[   57.597388]        brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338
[   57.597395]        brd_init+0x100/0x178
[   57.597402]        do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4
[   57.597410]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0
[   57.597418]        kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc
[   57.597426]        ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
[   57.597434]
               -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   57.597446]        __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0
[   57.597454]        queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110
[   57.597462]        sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0
[   57.597471]        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac
[   57.597480]        vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8
[   57.597488]        ksys_write+0x84/0x140
[   57.597495]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597504]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597516]
               -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)torvalds#21){++++}-{0:0}:
[   57.597530]        __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828
[   57.597538]        submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0
[   57.597547]        iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448
[   57.597556]        xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c
[   57.597564]        read_pages+0x88/0x41c
[   57.597571]        page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8
[   57.597580]        filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984
[   57.597588]        filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc
[   57.597596]        xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c
[   57.597605]        xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158
[   57.597614]        vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4
[   57.597622]        ksys_read+0x84/0x144
[   57.597629]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597637]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597647]
               -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597661]        down_read+0x6c/0x220
[   57.597669]        filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c
[   57.597677]        xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c
[   57.597684]        __do_fault+0x64/0x164
[   57.597693]        __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac
[   57.597702]        handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484
[   57.597711]        ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c
[   57.597719]        hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68
[   57.597727]        do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c
[   57.597736]        data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220
[   57.597745]        _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c
[   57.597754]        sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54
[   57.597762]        vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8
[   57.597769]        ksys_write+0x84/0x140
[   57.597777]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597785]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597794]
               -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597806]        __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330
[   57.597814]        lock_acquire+0x138/0x400
[   57.597822]        __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0
[   57.597830]        filldir64+0xe8/0x390
[   57.597839]        dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4
[   57.597846]        iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4
[   57.597855]        sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4
[   57.597864]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597872]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597881]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   57.597888] Chain exists of:
                 &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3

[   57.597905]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   57.597911]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   57.597917]        ----                    ----
[   57.597922]   rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
[   57.597932]                                lock(&q->debugfs_mutex);
[   57.597940]                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
[   57.597950]   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
[   57.597958]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605:
[   57.597971]  #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154
[   57.597989]  #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4

Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before
freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store
function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_
hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock.
So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues
function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock
ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/

Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store")
Tested-by: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 4, 2025
syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now)
raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking:

=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock:
ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094:
 #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0
 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0
 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180
 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180
 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work
Call trace:
 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C)
 __dump_stack+0x24/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8
 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0
 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108
 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430
 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270
 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288
 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180
 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388
 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550
 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0
 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80
 kthread+0x24c/0x300
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside
the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the
raw timeout spinlock.

Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock,
split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work
for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim()

The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.  

 #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
 #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
 #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
 #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
 torvalds#6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
 torvalds#7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
 torvalds#8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
 torvalds#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4

At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 0  ADDR: ffff00817fffe540  NAME: "DMA32"
          SIZE: 20480  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 1  ADDR: ffff00817fffec00  NAME: "Normal"
          SIZE: 8454144  PRESENT: 98304  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.  

Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.

        crash> p nr_swap_pages
        nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
          counter = 0
        }

As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.

The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.

        crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
        $1935 = 0x0

This is because the node deemed balanced.  The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively.  If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced.  This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.


The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages).  This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable.  By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.


The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL.  This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file-
backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient
free pages to be skipped.

The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored
during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones.  Consequently,
pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback
mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an
infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim().

This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist.  This ensures zones
with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and
reclaim behavior.

[[email protected]: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations")
Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2025
…nt message

Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from
invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under
specific conditions:
- CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y
- Set SELinux as the LSM for the system
- Set kptr_restrict to 1
- kmemleak buffer contains at least one item

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
6 locks held by cat/136:
 #0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30
 #1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128
 #3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
 #4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0
 #5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0
irq event stamp: 136660
hardirqs last  enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8
hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G            E      6.11.0-rt7+ torvalds#34
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
 show_stack+0x1c/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198
 dump_stack+0x18/0x20
 rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8
 avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150
 cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218
 selinux_capable+0x50/0x80
 security_capable+0x7c/0xd0
 has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0
 has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30
 restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0
 pointer+0x298/0x760
 vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70
 seq_printf+0x178/0x218
 print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0
 kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0
 seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30
 seq_read+0x250/0x378
 full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148
 vfs_read+0x190/0x918
 ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0
 __arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8
 el0_svc+0x50/0x158
 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180

%pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void
%pK service in certain contexts.

%pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot
resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding
the original intent behind the %pK.

Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through
the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid
context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an
atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs.

This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the
sleeping function warning without any loss of information.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 3a6f33d ("mm/kmemleak: use %pK to display kernel pointers in backtrace")
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Clément Léger <[email protected]>
Cc: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Chanudet <[email protected]>
Cc: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2025
We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system.  The
reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving
multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet
order problem.

We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the
mctp_i3c_read function.

According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed
in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be
discarded and wait for the next SOM.
For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM.

Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the
mctp_i3c_read function.  Before the modification, when a command
requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an
error usually occurs within 100 loops.  After the mutex, it can go
through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well.

Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver")
Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
[[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 11, 2025
If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to
do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says,
it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the
_early() suffix.

Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are
initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging:

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged.
	...
	BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
	#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
	#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G     U  W          6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3
	Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
	Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022
	RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe]

This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a
signature failure. There will still be an extra message,

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100

but that's better than a NULL ptr deref.

Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956
Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device")
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 5001ef3)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 13, 2025
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 changes for 6.13, part #3

 - Always check page state in hyp_ack_unshare()

 - Align set_id_regs selftest with the fact that ASIDBITS field is RO

 - Various vPMU fixes for bugs that only affect nested virt
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.

The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.

However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.

The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).

To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.

[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[  213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.620270]
[  213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[  213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.622045]
[  213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[  213.622778]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  213.622778]
[  213.623465]        CPU0
[  213.623815]        ----
[  213.624148]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.624615]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.625071]
[  213.625071]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  213.625071]
[  213.625805]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  213.625805]
[  213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[  213.627019]  #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
                at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.628088]  #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.629094]  #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.630106]  #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.631185]
[  213.631185] stack backtrace:
[  213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
               6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1
[  213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
               rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  213.633785] Call Trace:
[  213.634099]
[  213.634393]  dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[  213.634806]  print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[  213.635265]  __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[  213.635712]  lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.636120]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.636722]  ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.637277]  __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[  213.637697]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638305]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638902]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[  213.639400]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640016]  mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640615]  set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.641144]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[  213.641586]  mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.642145]  ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.642679]  ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
                [ib_uverbs]
[  213.643426]  ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[  213.643878]  ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.644426]  ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
               [ib_uverbs]
[  213.645213]  ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[  213.645675]  ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.646101]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.646625]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[  213.647102]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[  213.647586]  ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648102]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648632]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[  213.649060]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[  213.649528]  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[  213.649947]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[  213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[  213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
               89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
               10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
               7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
               0000000000000010
[  213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
               00007fa179b0737b
[  213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
               0000000000000003
[  213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
               0000000000000002
[  213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
               00007ffd2e6d487c
[  213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
               00007ffd2e6d4f70

Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2025
irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we
must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking.

This fixes the following lockdep splat:

[    5.349336] =============================
[    5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[    5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 Tainted: G        W
[    5.363031] -----------------------------
[    5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock:
[    5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.380079] other info that might help us debug this:
[    5.385138] context-{5:5}
[    5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44:
[    5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204)
[    5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205)
[    5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006)
[    5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596)
[    5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614)
[    5.436472] stack backtrace:
[    5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69
[    5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[    5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[    5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[    5.461699] Call trace:
[    5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C
[    5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[    5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
[    5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176)
[    5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814)
[    5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[    5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[    5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345)
[    5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250)
[    5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270)
[    5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807)
[    5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208)

Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd)
Cc: [email protected]
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 22, 2025
If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to
do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says,
it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the
_early() suffix.

Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are
initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging:

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed
	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged.
	...
	BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
	#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
	#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G     U  W          6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3
	Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
	Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022
	RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe]

This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a
signature failure. There will still be an extra message,

	xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100

but that's better than a NULL ptr deref.

Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956
Fixes: 7dbe8af ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device")
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 24, 2025
Hou Tao says:

====================
The use of migrate_{disable|enable} pair in BPF is mainly due to the
introduction of bpf memory allocator and the use of per-CPU data struct
in its internal implementation. The caller needs to disable migration
before invoking the alloc or free APIs of bpf memory allocator, and
enable migration after the invocation.

The main users of bpf memory allocator are various kind of bpf maps in
which the map values or the special fields in the map values are
allocated by using bpf memory allocator.

At present, the running context for bpf program has already disabled
migration explictly or implictly, therefore, when these maps are
manipulated in bpf program, it is OK to not invoke migrate_disable()
and migrate_enable() pair. Howevers, it is not always the case when
these maps are manipulated through bpf syscall, therefore many
migrate_{disable|enable} pairs are added when the map can either be
manipulated by BPF program or BPF syscall.

The initial idea of reducing the use of migrate_{disable|enable} comes
from Alexei [1]. I turned it into a patch set that archives the goals
through the following three methods:

1. remove unnecessary migrate_{disable|enable} pair
when the BPF syscall path also disables migration, it is OK to remove
the pair. Patch #1~#3 fall into this category, while patch #4~#5 are
partially included.

2. move the migrate_{disable|enable} pair from inner callee to outer
   caller
Instead of invoking migrate_disable() in the inner callee, invoking
migrate_disable() in the outer caller to simplify reasoning about when
migrate_disable() is needed. Patch #4~#5 and patch torvalds#6~torvalds#19 belongs to
this category.

3. add cant_migrate() check in the inner callee
Add cant_migrate() check in the inner callee to ensure the guarantee
that migration is disabled is not broken. Patch #1~#5, torvalds#13, torvalds#16~torvalds#19 also
belong to this category.

Please check the individual patches for more details. Comments are
always welcome.

Change Log:
v2:
  * sqaush the ->map_free related patches (torvalds#10~torvalds#12, torvalds#15) into one patch
  * remove unnecessary cant_migrate() checks.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 24, 2025
Hou Tao says:

====================
The patch set continues the previous work [1] to move all the freeings
of htab elements out of bucket lock. One motivation for the patch set is
the locking problem reported by Sebastian [2]: the freeing of bpf_timer
under PREEMPT_RT may acquire a spin-lock (namely softirq_expiry_lock).
However the freeing procedure for htab element has already held a
raw-spin-lock (namely bucket lock), and it will trigger the warning:
"BUG: scheduling while atomic" as demonstrated by the selftests patch.
Another motivation is to reduce the locked scope of bucket lock.

However, the patch set doesn't move all freeing of htab element out of
bucket lock, it still keep the free of special fields in pre-allocated
hash map under the protect of bucket lock in htab_map_update_elem(). The
patch set is structured as follows:

* Patch #1 moves the element freeing out of bucket lock for
  htab_lru_map_delete_node(). However the freeing is still in the locked
  scope of LRU raw spin lock.
* Patch #2~#3 move the element freeing out of bucket lock for
  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
* Patch #4 cancels the bpf_timer in two steps to fix the locking
  problem in htab_map_update_elem() for PREEMPT_PRT.
* Patch #5 adds a selftest for the locking problem

Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always
welcome.
---

v3:
 * patch #1: update the commit message to state that the freeing of
   special field is still in the locked scope of LRU raw spin lock
 * patch #4: cancel the bpf_timer in two steps only for PREEMPT_RT
   (suggested by Alexei)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
  * cancels the bpf timer in two steps instead of breaking the reuse
    the refill of per-cpu ->extra_elems into two steps

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 25, 2025
When kernel is built without debuginfo, running 'perf record' with
--off-cpu results in segfault as below:

   ./perf record --off-cpu -e dummy sleep 1
   libbpf: kernel BTF is missing at '/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux', was CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF enabled?
   libbpf: failed to find '.BTF' ELF section in /lib/modules/6.13.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux
   libbpf: failed to find valid kernel BTF
   Segmentation fault (core dumped)

The backtrace pointed to:

   #0  0x00000000100fb17c in btf.type_cnt ()
   #1  0x00000000100fc1a8 in btf_find_by_name_kind ()
   #2  0x00000000100fc38c in btf.find_by_name_kind ()
   #3  0x00000000102ee3ac in off_cpu_prepare ()
   #4  0x000000001002f78c in cmd_record ()
   #5  0x00000000100aee78 in run_builtin ()
   torvalds#6  0x00000000100af3e4 in handle_internal_command ()
   torvalds#7  0x000000001001004c in main ()

Code sequence is:

   static void check_sched_switch_args(void)
   {
        struct btf *btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf();
        const struct btf_type *t1, *t2, *t3;
        u32 type_id;

        type_id = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "btf_trace_sched_switch",
                                         BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF);

btf__load_vmlinux_btf() fails when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not enabled.

Here bpf__find_by_name_kind() calls btf__type_cnt() with NULL btf value
and results in segfault.

To fix this, add a check to see if btf is not NULL before invoking
bpf__find_by_name_kind().

Reviewed-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Disha Goel <[email protected]>
Cc: Hari Bathini <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2025
Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM
core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed
at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack.

However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward),
that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered
to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set.

The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case:

 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up
 mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up
 Initializing XFRM netlink socket
 IPsec XFRM device driver
 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  ? show_regs+0x63/0x70
  ? __die_body+0x20/0x60
  ? __die+0x2b/0x40
  ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
  mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core]
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0
  sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0
  ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0
  ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70
  ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0
  neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0
  __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50
  neigh_update+0x14/0x20
  arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0
  ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70
  arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0
  ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0
  napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0
  mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core]
  __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0
  net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370
  ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50
  ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core]
  handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0
  ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60
  irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100
  common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0
  </IRQ>
  <TASK>
  asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40
 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22
 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb
40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8
 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680
 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4
 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70
 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8
  ? default_idle+0x9/0x20
  arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10
  default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0
  do_idle+0x1f2/0x240
  cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30
  rest_init+0xe7/0x100
  start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90
  x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
  x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110
  ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130
  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface
xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc
intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw
qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc
scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456
async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx
libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3
sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample
virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf
 RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00
 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00
 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
 Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
akiyks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2025
libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    torvalds#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    torvalds#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    torvalds#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    torvalds#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    torvalds#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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