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removed zstd-20 to zstd-22 as they are not supported #1

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Jun 9, 2019
Merged

removed zstd-20 to zstd-22 as they are not supported #1

merged 1 commit into from
Jun 9, 2019

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dan-and
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@dan-and dan-and commented Jun 8, 2019

Removed non-supported zstd-20 to zstd-22 compression values from the zfs-tests configuration.

Motivation and Context

The default zfs-test configuration file included zstd compression values which are not implemented. To test the implemented features, I have removed these test cases.

Description

In two files (properties.shlib and libtest.shlib) every compression type is listed. I removed the ones which are not included in the current code.

How Has This Been Tested?

I rerun the zfs-tests to ensure it works.

Types of changes

  • Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
  • New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
  • Performance enhancement (non-breaking change which improves efficiency)
  • Code cleanup (non-breaking change which makes code smaller or more readable)
  • Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change)
  • Documentation (a change to man pages or other documentation)

Checklist:

@BrainSlayer
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thank you for finding this. the 20 - 22 modes had been removed a while ago due the very high memory consumption if these modes

@BrainSlayer BrainSlayer merged commit ccb0839 into BrainSlayer:master Jun 9, 2019
@dan-and
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dan-and commented Jun 9, 2019

You are welcome.
I'm running tests and several zpools with zstd to check it's stability and performance.
So far so good! Hopefully it will be added to zol soon.

@BrainSlayer
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@dan-and as far as i know they are willing todo so. but they are also lazy in reviewing the code. i'm running this code now since a long time in productive environment (with backups of course), practice is the best test

BrainSlayer pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2019
lockdep reports a possible recursive lock in dbuf_destroy.

It is true that dbuf_destroy is acquiring the dn_dbufs_mtx
on one dnode while holding it on another dnode.  However,
it is impossible for these to be the same dnode because,
among other things,dbuf_destroy checks MUTEX_HELD before
acquiring the mutex.

This fix defines a class NESTED_SINGLE == 1 and changes
that lock to call mutex_enter_nested with a subclass of
NESTED_SINGLE.

In order to make the userspace code compile,
include/sys/zfs_context.h now defines mutex_enter_nested and
NESTED_SINGLE.

This is the lockdep report:

[  122.950921] ============================================
[  122.950921] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  122.950921] 4.19.29-4.19.0-debug-d69edad5368c1166 #1 Tainted: G           O
[  122.950921] --------------------------------------------
[  122.950921] dbu_evict/1457 is trying to acquire lock:
[  122.950921] 0000000083e9cbcf (&dn->dn_dbufs_mtx){+.+.}, at: dbuf_destroy+0x3c0/0xdb0 [zfs]
[  122.950921]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  122.950921] 0000000055523987 (&dn->dn_dbufs_mtx){+.+.}, at: dnode_evict_dbufs+0x90/0x740 [zfs]
[  122.950921]
               other info that might help us debug this:
[  122.950921]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  122.950921]        CPU0
[  122.950921]        ----
[  122.950921]   lock(&dn->dn_dbufs_mtx);
[  122.950921]   lock(&dn->dn_dbufs_mtx);
[  122.950921]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  122.950921]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[  122.950921] 1 lock held by dbu_evict/1457:
[  122.950921]  #0: 0000000055523987 (&dn->dn_dbufs_mtx){+.+.}, at: dnode_evict_dbufs+0x90/0x740 [zfs]
[  122.950921]
               stack backtrace:
[  122.950921] CPU: 0 PID: 1457 Comm: dbu_evict Tainted: G           O      4.19.29-4.19.0-debug-d69edad5368c1166 #1
[  122.950921] Hardware name: Supermicro H8SSL-I2/H8SSL-I2, BIOS 080011  03/13/2009
[  122.950921] Call Trace:
[  122.950921]  dump_stack+0x91/0xeb
[  122.950921]  __lock_acquire+0x2ca7/0x4f10
[  122.950921]  lock_acquire+0x153/0x330
[  122.950921]  dbuf_destroy+0x3c0/0xdb0 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  dbuf_evict_one+0x1cc/0x3d0 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  dbuf_rele_and_unlock+0xb84/0xd60 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  dnode_evict_dbufs+0x3a6/0x740 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  dmu_objset_evict+0x7a/0x500 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  dsl_dataset_evict_async+0x70/0x480 [zfs]
[  122.950921]  taskq_thread+0x979/0x1480 [spl]
[  122.950921]  kthread+0x2e7/0x3e0
[  122.950921]  ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

Reviewed-by: Tony Hutter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#8984
BrainSlayer pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 12, 2019
After spa_vdev_remove_aux() is called, the config nvlist is no longer
valid, as it's been replaced by the new one (with the specified device
removed).  Therefore any pointers into the nvlist are no longer valid.
So we can't save the result of
`fnvlist_lookup_string(nv, ZPOOL_CONFIG_PATH)` (in vd_path) across the
call to spa_vdev_remove_aux().

Instead, use spa_strdup() to save a copy of the string before calling
spa_vdev_remove_aux.

Found by AddressSanitizer:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address ...
READ of size 34 at 0x608000a1fcd0 thread T686
    #0 0x7fe88b0c166d  (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5166d)
    #1 0x7fe88a5acd6e in spa_strdup spa_misc.c:1447
    #2 0x7fe88a688034 in spa_vdev_remove vdev_removal.c:2259
    #3 0x55ffbc7748f8 in ztest_vdev_aux_add_remove ztest.c:3229
    #4 0x55ffbc769fba in ztest_execute ztest.c:6714
    #5 0x55ffbc779a90 in ztest_thread ztest.c:6761
    #6 0x7fe889cbc6da in start_thread
    openzfs#7 0x7fe8899e588e in __clone

0x608000a1fcd0 is located 48 bytes inside of 88-byte region
freed by thread T686 here:
    #0 0x7fe88b14e7b8 in __interceptor_free
    #1 0x7fe88ae541c5 in nvlist_free nvpair.c:874
    #2 0x7fe88ae543ba in nvpair_free nvpair.c:844
    #3 0x7fe88ae57400 in nvlist_remove_nvpair nvpair.c:978
    #4 0x7fe88a683c81 in spa_vdev_remove_aux vdev_removal.c:185
    #5 0x7fe88a68857c in spa_vdev_remove vdev_removal.c:2221
    #6 0x55ffbc7748f8 in ztest_vdev_aux_add_remove ztest.c:3229
    openzfs#7 0x55ffbc769fba in ztest_execute ztest.c:6714
    openzfs#8 0x55ffbc779a90 in ztest_thread ztest.c:6761
    openzfs#9 0x7fe889cbc6da in start_thread

Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#9706
BrainSlayer pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 29, 2021
`zpool_do_import()` passes `argv[0]`, (optionally) `argv[1]`, and
`pool_specified` to `import_pools()`.  If `pool_specified==FALSE`, the
`argv[]` arguments are not used.  However, these values may be off the
end of the `argv[]` array, so loading them could dereference unmapped
memory.  This error is reported by the asan build:

```
=================================================================
==6003==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 8 at 0x6030000004a8 thread T0
    #0 0x562a078b50eb in zpool_do_import zpool_main.c:3796
    #1 0x562a078858c5 in main zpool_main.c:10709
    #2 0x7f5115231bf6 in __libc_start_main
    #3 0x562a07885eb9 in _start

0x6030000004a8 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7f5116ac6b40 in __interceptor_malloc
    #1 0x562a07885770 in main zpool_main.c:10699
    #2 0x7f5115231bf6 in __libc_start_main
```

This commit passes NULL for these arguments if they are off the end
of the `argv[]` array.

Reviewed-by: George Wilson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Kennedy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Allan Jude <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#12339
BrainSlayer pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2022
Before this patch, in zfs_domount, if zfs_root or d_make_root fails, we
leave zfsvfs != NULL. This will lead to execution of the error handling
`if` statement at the `out` label, and hence to a call to
dmu_objset_disown and zfsvfs_free.

However, zfs_umount, which we call upon failure of zfs_root and
d_make_root already does dmu_objset_disown and zfsvfs_free.

I suppose this patch rather adds to the brittleness of this part of the
code base, but I don't want to invest more time in this right now.
To add a regression test, we'd need some kind of fault injection
facility for zfs_root or d_make_root, which doesn't exist right now.
And even then, I think that regression test would be too closely tied
to the implementation.

To repro the double-disown / double-free, do the following:
1. patch zfs_root to always return an error
2. mount a ZFS filesystem

Here's the stack trace you would see then:

  VERIFY3(ds->ds_owner == tag) failed (0000000000000000 == ffff9142361e8000)
  PANIC at dsl_dataset.c:1003:dsl_dataset_disown()
  Showing stack for process 28332
  CPU: 2 PID: 28332 Comm: zpool Tainted: G           O      5.10.103-1.nutanix.el7.x86_64 #1
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x74/0x92
   spl_dumpstack+0x29/0x2b [spl]
   spl_panic+0xd4/0xfc [spl]
   dsl_dataset_disown+0xe9/0x150 [zfs]
   dmu_objset_disown+0xd6/0x150 [zfs]
   zfs_domount+0x17b/0x4b0 [zfs]
   zpl_mount+0x174/0x220 [zfs]
   legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0
   path_mount+0x2fa/0xa70
   do_mount+0x7c/0xa0
   __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0x50
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reviewed-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Christian Schwarz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Schwarz <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#14025
BrainSlayer pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 28, 2023
Under certain loads, the following panic is hit:

    panic: page fault
    KDB: stack backtrace:
    #0 0xffffffff805db025 at kdb_backtrace+0x65
    #1 0xffffffff8058e86f at vpanic+0x17f
    #2 0xffffffff8058e6e3 at panic+0x43
    #3 0xffffffff808adc15 at trap_fatal+0x385
    #4 0xffffffff808adc6f at trap_pfault+0x4f
    #5 0xffffffff80886da8 at calltrap+0x8
    #6 0xffffffff80669186 at vgonel+0x186
    openzfs#7 0xffffffff80669841 at vgone+0x31
    openzfs#8 0xffffffff8065806d at vfs_hash_insert+0x26d
    openzfs#9 0xffffffff81a39069 at sfs_vgetx+0x149
    openzfs#10 0xffffffff81a39c54 at zfsctl_snapdir_lookup+0x1e4
    openzfs#11 0xffffffff8065a28c at lookup+0x45c
    openzfs#12 0xffffffff806594b9 at namei+0x259
    openzfs#13 0xffffffff80676a33 at kern_statat+0xf3
    openzfs#14 0xffffffff8067712f at sys_fstatat+0x2f
    openzfs#15 0xffffffff808ae50c at amd64_syscall+0x10c
    openzfs#16 0xffffffff808876bb at fast_syscall_common+0xf8

The page fault occurs because vgonel() will call VOP_CLOSE() for active
vnodes. For this reason, define vop_close for zfsctl_ops_snapshot. While
here, define vop_open for consistency.

After adding the necessary vop, the bug progresses to the following
panic:

    panic: VERIFY3(vrecycle(vp) == 1) failed (0 == 1)
    cpuid = 17
    KDB: stack backtrace:
    #0 0xffffffff805e29c5 at kdb_backtrace+0x65
    #1 0xffffffff8059620f at vpanic+0x17f
    #2 0xffffffff81a27f4a at spl_panic+0x3a
    #3 0xffffffff81a3a4d0 at zfsctl_snapshot_inactive+0x40
    #4 0xffffffff8066fdee at vinactivef+0xde
    #5 0xffffffff80670b8a at vgonel+0x1ea
    #6 0xffffffff806711e1 at vgone+0x31
    openzfs#7 0xffffffff8065fa0d at vfs_hash_insert+0x26d
    openzfs#8 0xffffffff81a39069 at sfs_vgetx+0x149
    openzfs#9 0xffffffff81a39c54 at zfsctl_snapdir_lookup+0x1e4
    openzfs#10 0xffffffff80661c2c at lookup+0x45c
    openzfs#11 0xffffffff80660e59 at namei+0x259
    openzfs#12 0xffffffff8067e3d3 at kern_statat+0xf3
    openzfs#13 0xffffffff8067eacf at sys_fstatat+0x2f
    openzfs#14 0xffffffff808b5ecc at amd64_syscall+0x10c
    openzfs#15 0xffffffff8088f07b at fast_syscall_common+0xf8

This is caused by a race condition that can occur when allocating a new
vnode and adding that vnode to the vfs hash. If the newly created vnode
loses the race when being inserted into the vfs hash, it will not be
recycled as its usecount is greater than zero, hitting the above
assertion.

Fix this by dropping the assertion.

FreeBSD-issue: https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=252700
Reviewed-by: Andriy Gapon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rob Wing <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Rob Wing <[email protected]>
Submitted-by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored-by: rsync.net
Closes openzfs#14501
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2 participants