Fix critical bug: Assert valid padding #168
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LGTM |
Divide-By-0
approved these changes
Feb 3, 2024
0xSachinK
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Bug
A malicious prover can insert a forged body hash in the padding. The current regex circuits will extract both the correct body hash and the forged body hash. The signature verification would still be performed on the correct body hash; thus the sig check would pass. But, the sha256 hash of the body would be compared to the forged body hash. This allows the malicious prover to fake the entire email body! The padding bug also allows a malicious prover to insert invalid body substrings in the body padding, thus forging parts of the body.
Fix
Asserts that input padded header AND body only contain 0's.