- #637

orhanerday · 2018-12-29T21:59:04Z

No description provided.

KernelPRBot · 2018-12-29T21:59:18Z

Hi @orhan55555!

Thanks for your contribution to the Linux kernel!

Linux kernel development happens on mailing lists, rather than on GitHub - this GitHub repository is a read-only mirror that isn't used for accepting contributions. So that your change can become part of Linux, please email it to us as a patch.

Sending patches isn't quite as simple as sending a pull request, but fortunately it is a well documented process.

Here's what to do:

Format your contribution according to kernel requirements
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The Linux kernel community is notoriously picky about how contributions are formatted and sent. Fortunately, they have documented their expectations.

Firstly, all contributions need to be formatted as patches. A patch is a plain text document showing the change you want to make to the code, and documenting why it is a good idea.

You can create patches with git format-patch.

Secondly, patches need 'commit messages', which is the human-friendly documentation explaining what the change is and why it's necessary.

Thirdly, changes have some technical requirements. There is a Linux kernel coding style, and there are licensing requirements you need to comply with.

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Use git send-email, which will ensure that your patches are formatted in the standard manner. In order to use git send-email, you'll need to configure git to use your SMTP email server.

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I sent my patch - now what?

You wait.

You can check that your email has been received by checking the mailing list archives for the mailing list you sent your patch to. Messages may not be received instantly, so be patient. Kernel developers are generally very busy people, so it may take a few weeks before your patch is looked at.

Then, you keep waiting. Three things may happen:

You might get a response to your email. Often these will be comments, which may require you to make changes to your patch, or explain why your way is the best way. You should respond to these comments, and you may need to submit another revision of your patch to address the issues raised.
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Further information

Working with the kernel development community - the official documentation for new kernel contributors

Happy hacking!

This message was posted by a bot - if you have any questions or suggestions, please talk to my owners, @ajdlinux and @daxtens, or raise an issue at https://github.com/ajdlinux/KernelPRBot.

ghost · 2019-01-08T01:13:45Z

Nice fix. Should be pulled.

cioccarellia · 2019-01-08T21:32:40Z

What's the point of this

bigodines · 2019-01-09T00:38:54Z

"kernel contributor" in his resumé ?

cioccarellia · 2019-01-12T16:27:14Z

Again, what's the point of this? :)

legiorange · 2019-02-13T04:12:29Z

how dare you do that?

Trumeet · 2019-02-13T05:38:44Z

lol 😂😂

Mervin1024 · 2019-02-13T06:10:46Z

You are great！

gs666 · 2019-02-13T06:46:15Z

WTF？

imzf · 2019-02-13T06:57:07Z

how old are you

phariel · 2019-02-13T07:19:47Z

Are you insane?

geminate · 2019-02-13T07:31:01Z

lol

ansonsiva

insane...

nickdine · 2019-02-13T07:31:44Z

insane man

xpiaoyu · 2019-02-13T07:45:56Z

Good job, pal!

zhangguanzhang · 2019-02-13T08:08:55Z

强势围观

AwadYoo · 2019-02-13T08:15:59Z

这也太秀了

Liam0205 · 2019-02-13T08:19:01Z

Please consider to lock this conversion.

BaiBaiRTC · 2019-02-13T09:55:32Z

It's a tough guy.

monkey-soft · 2019-02-13T09:58:51Z

Are you serious？

Ted-Zhang · 2019-02-13T09:59:36Z

Well done. nice comment. thanks for helping me to understand the Linux code...

0x750 · 2019-02-13T10:03:44Z

i was here

tennessine · 2019-02-13T10:08:01Z

You're on the blacklist.

Germey · 2019-02-13T10:14:31Z

@orhan55555 牛逼了！

cavin2012 · 2019-02-13T11:25:59Z

so new bee ！！！

cioccarellia · 2019-02-13T11:51:34Z

@orhan55555 Neither code, I see

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. v4: - fix build when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is unset (thanks kernel test robot) v3: - rename variable to 'sk_locked' (thanks Paul Moore) - keep rcu_replace_pointer() open-coded and re-add NULL check of 'old', these two changes will be posted in another patch (thanks Paul Moore) v2: - pass lockdep_sock_is_held() through a boolean variable in the stack (thanks Eric Dumazet, Paul Moore, Casey Schaufler) - use rcu_replace_pointer() instead of rcu_dereference_protected() + rcu_assign_pointer() - remove NULL check of 'old' before kfree_rcu() Fixes: f6d8bd0 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. v5: - fix kernel-doc - adjust #idfefs around prototype of netlbl_sk_lock_check() (thanks Paul Moore) v4: - fix build when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is unset (thanks kernel test robot) v3: - rename variable to 'sk_locked' (thanks Paul Moore) - keep rcu_replace_pointer() open-coded and re-add NULL check of 'old', these two changes will be posted in another patch (thanks Paul Moore) v2: - pass lockdep_sock_is_held() through a boolean variable in the stack (thanks Eric Dumazet, Paul Moore, Casey Schaufler) - use rcu_replace_pointer() instead of rcu_dereference_protected() + rcu_assign_pointer() - remove NULL check of 'old' before kfree_rcu() Fixes: f6d8bd0 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. v5: - fix kernel-doc - adjust #idfefs around prototype of netlbl_sk_lock_check() (thanks Paul Moore) v4: - fix build when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is unset (thanks kernel test robot) v3: - rename variable to 'sk_locked' (thanks Paul Moore) - keep rcu_replace_pointer() open-coded and re-add NULL check of 'old', these two changes will be posted in another patch (thanks Paul Moore) v2: - pass lockdep_sock_is_held() through a boolean variable in the stack (thanks Eric Dumazet, Paul Moore, Casey Schaufler) - use rcu_replace_pointer() instead of rcu_dereference_protected() + rcu_assign_pointer() - remove NULL check of 'old' before kfree_rcu() Fixes: f6d8bd0 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. v5: - fix kernel-doc - adjust #idfefs around prototype of netlbl_sk_lock_check() (thanks Paul Moore) v4: - fix build when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is unset (thanks kernel test robot) v3: - rename variable to 'sk_locked' (thanks Paul Moore) - keep rcu_replace_pointer() open-coded and re-add NULL check of 'old', these two changes will be posted in another patch (thanks Paul Moore) v2: - pass lockdep_sock_is_held() through a boolean variable in the stack (thanks Eric Dumazet, Paul Moore, Casey Schaufler) - use rcu_replace_pointer() instead of rcu_dereference_protected() + rcu_assign_pointer() - remove NULL check of 'old' before kfree_rcu() Fixes: f6d8bd0 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ torvalds#637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. Fixes: f6d8bd0 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4260d000a3a55b9e8b6a3b4e3fffc7da9f82d41.1715359817.git.dcaratti@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Fixed Bugs.

24e5961

ansonsiva reviewed Feb 13, 2019

View reviewed changes

orhanerday changed the title ~~Fixed Bugs.~~ Not Fixed Bugs. Feb 13, 2019

Delete core_tsunami.c

723fd46

orhanerday closed this Feb 13, 2019

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- #637

- #637

orhanerday commented Dec 29, 2018

KernelPRBot commented Dec 29, 2018

ghost commented Jan 8, 2019

cioccarellia commented Jan 8, 2019

bigodines commented Jan 9, 2019

cioccarellia commented Jan 12, 2019

legiorange commented Feb 13, 2019

Trumeet commented Feb 13, 2019

Mervin1024 commented Feb 13, 2019

gs666 commented Feb 13, 2019

imzf commented Feb 13, 2019

phariel commented Feb 13, 2019

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ansonsiva left a comment

nickdine commented Feb 13, 2019

xpiaoyu commented Feb 13, 2019

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AwadYoo commented Feb 13, 2019

Liam0205 commented Feb 13, 2019

BaiBaiRTC commented Feb 13, 2019

monkey-soft commented Feb 13, 2019

Ted-Zhang commented Feb 13, 2019

0x750 commented Feb 13, 2019

tennessine commented Feb 13, 2019

Germey commented Feb 13, 2019

cavin2012 commented Feb 13, 2019

cioccarellia commented Feb 13, 2019

- #637

- #637

Conversation

orhanerday commented Dec 29, 2018

KernelPRBot commented Dec 29, 2018

How do I format my contribution?

Who do I send my contribution to?

How do I send my contribution?

How do I get help if I'm stuck?

I sent my patch - now what?

Further information

ghost commented Jan 8, 2019

cioccarellia commented Jan 8, 2019

bigodines commented Jan 9, 2019

cioccarellia commented Jan 12, 2019

legiorange commented Feb 13, 2019

Trumeet commented Feb 13, 2019

Mervin1024 commented Feb 13, 2019

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