feat(protocol): enable permissionless block-proposing (#17303)

Signed-off-by: snoppy <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Snoppy <[email protected]>

packages/protocol/contracts/L1/TaikoErrors.sol

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ abstract contract TaikoErrors {
     error L1_TOO_MANY_BLOCKS();
     error L1_TRANSITION_ID_ZERO();
     error L1_TRANSITION_NOT_FOUND();
-    error L1_UNAUTHORIZED();
     error L1_UNEXPECTED_PARENT();
     error L1_UNEXPECTED_TRANSITION_ID();
 }

packages/protocol/contracts/L1/libs/LibProposing.sol

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ library LibProposing {
     error L1_INVALID_SIG();
     error L1_LIVENESS_BOND_NOT_RECEIVED();
     error L1_TOO_MANY_BLOCKS();
-    error L1_UNAUTHORIZED();
     error L1_UNEXPECTED_PARENT();
 
     /// @dev Proposes a Taiko L2 block.
@@ -74,11 +73,7 @@ library LibProposing {
         }
 
         // Taiko, as a Based Rollup, enables permissionless block proposals.
-        // However, if the "proposer" address is set to a non-zero value, we
-        // ensure that only that specific address has the authority to propose
-        // blocks.
         TaikoData.SlotB memory b = _state.slotB;
-        if (!_isProposerPermitted(b, _resolver)) revert L1_UNAUTHORIZED();
 
         // It's essential to ensure that the ring buffer for proposed blocks
         // still has space for at least one more block.
@@ -137,7 +132,7 @@ library LibProposing {
             // We cannot rely on `msg.sender != tx.origin` for EOA check, as it will break after EIP
             // 7645: Alias ORIGIN to SENDER
             if (
-                _checkEOAForCalldataDA && meta_.id != 1
+                _checkEOAForCalldataDA
                     && ECDSA.recover(meta_.blobHash, params.signature) != msg.sender
             ) {
                 revert L1_INVALID_SIG();
@@ -226,24 +221,4 @@ library LibProposing {
             depositsProcessed: deposits_
         });
     }
-
-    function _isProposerPermitted(
-        TaikoData.SlotB memory _slotB,
-        IAddressResolver _resolver
-    )
-        private
-        view
-        returns (bool)
-    {
-        if (_slotB.numBlocks == 1) {
-            // Only proposer_one can propose the first block after genesis
-            address proposerOne = _resolver.resolve(LibStrings.B_PROPOSER_ONE, true);
-            if (proposerOne != address(0)) {
-                return msg.sender == proposerOne;
-            }
-        }
-
-        address proposer = _resolver.resolve(LibStrings.B_PROPOSER, true);
-        return proposer == address(0) || msg.sender == proposer;
-    }
 }

packages/protocol/contracts/automata-attestation/lib/PEMCertChainLib.sol

@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ contract PEMCertChainLib is IPEMCertChainLib {
         pure
         returns (bool success, uint256 pcesvn, uint256[] memory cpusvns)
     {
-        // sibiling of tcbOid
+        // sibling of tcbOid
         uint256 tcbPtr = der.nextSiblingOf(oidPtr);
         // get the first svn object in the sequence
         uint256 svnParentPtr = der.firstChildOf(tcbPtr);

packages/protocol/contracts/bridge/Bridge.sol

@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ contract Bridge is EssentialContract, IBridge {
     /// @dev Considering that the watchdog is a hot wallet, in case its private key is leaked, we
     /// only allow watchdog to pause the bridge, but does not allow it to unpause the bridge.
     function _authorizePause(address addr, bool toPause) internal view override {
-        // Owenr and chain_pauser can pause/unpause the bridge.
+        // Owner and chain_pauser can pause/unpause the bridge.
         if (addr == owner() || addr == resolve(LibStrings.B_CHAIN_WATCHDOG, true)) return;
 
         // bridge_watchdog can pause the bridge, but cannot unpause it.

packages/protocol/contracts/common/LibStrings.sol

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ library LibStrings {
     bytes32 internal constant B_ERC1155_VAULT = bytes32("erc1155_vault");
     bytes32 internal constant B_ERC20_VAULT = bytes32("erc20_vault");
     bytes32 internal constant B_ERC721_VAULT = bytes32("erc721_vault");
-    bytes32 internal constant B_PROPOSER = bytes32("proposer");
-    bytes32 internal constant B_PROPOSER_ONE = bytes32("proposer_one");
     bytes32 internal constant B_PROVER_ASSIGNMENT = bytes32("PROVER_ASSIGNMENT");
     bytes32 internal constant B_PROVER_SET = bytes32("prover_set");
     bytes32 internal constant B_QUOTA_MANAGER = bytes32("quota_manager");

packages/protocol/deployments/mainnet-contract-logs-L1.md

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
   - unpaused on 27 May, 2024 @tx`0x71ce1e61f1e42e34c9a51f5671ac260f2ac398e016ae645f2661f074e7f230ce`
   - upgraded from `0x02F21B4C3d4dbfF70cE851741175a727c8D782Be` to `0x71c2f41AEDe913AAEf2c62596E03702E348D6Cd0.` @commit`` in @tx`0x8a380a25d03a740d9535dfc3e2fc4f6960e22d49ad88b8d85f59af4013aedf87`
   - upgrade impl to `0x951B7Ae1bB26d12dB37f01748e8fB62FEf45A8B5` @commit`1bd3285` @tx`0xf21f6bf720767db3bc9b63ef69cacb20340bdedfb6589e6a4d11fe082dfa7bd6`
+- todo:
+  - upgrade bridge for improvements based on OZ's feedback.
 
 #### quota_manager
 
@@ -173,6 +175,8 @@
   - register `prover_set` to `0x34f2B21107AfE3584949c184A1E6236FFDAC4f6F` @tx`0x252cd7fcb6e02a71c0770d00f2f2476d5dd469a4fb5df622fe7bf6280d8a4100`
   - register `prover_set` to `0x500735343372Dd6c9B84dBc7a75babf4479742B9` @commit`fa481c1` @tx`0x02ed558762eae5f0a930ba4a1047a02d4a793ea48890268c32df04e882f138ff`
   - Upgraded from `0xF1cA1F1A068468E1dcF90dA6add185467de80943` to `0x8Af4669E3068Bae96b92cD73603f5D86beD07a9a` @commit`e79a367ad` @tx`0xe1ef58455de0b0331228e487d54720290ed8a73f709d2146bd43330d4a360bd3`
+- todo:
+  - register "tier_router" and remove "tier_provider"
 
 #### taikoL1
 
@@ -188,6 +192,9 @@
   - `resetGenesisHash()` called to reset genesis block hash to `0x90bc60466882de9637e269e87abab53c9108cf9113188bc4f80bcfcb10e489b9` on May 22 @tx`0x5a60c5815947a199cc84e1bc75539e01a202597b20c1f87bd9d02f8be6453abd`
   - Upgraded from `0xe0A5D394878723CEAEC8B993e04756DF1f4B44eF` to `0xa200c2268d77737a8Fd2CA1698dA6eeab2a85CEb` on May 27 @commit`06f97d6` @tx`0x187cc99e9bcf2a94f723cf52d85b74b79bdb3872681e2a3808cadbbc3ba301e2`
   - Upgraded from `0xa200c2268d77737a8Fd2CA1698dA6eeab2a85CEb` to `0x3505a0700DB72dEc7AbFF1aF231BB5D87aBF2944` on May 28 @commit`b335b70` @tx`0xa603b6d55457e64e18ddae684bfd14948452cdd7b927dd22bf0b83045e8fd028`
+  - todo:
+    - upgrade to enable permissionless block-proposing
+    - upgrade to use "tier_router"
 
 #### assignment_hook
 

packages/protocol/deployments/mainnet-contract-logs-L2.md

@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
   - upgraded from `0xf961854D68368cFFc86d90AEe8a19E9781dACA3e` to `0x98C5De7670aA7d47C6c0551fAD27Bfe464A6751a..` @commit`` in @tx`0x0b5d6acc9c5b8ef193920246081ec5ce7268111acfc1dce1f058bea06f3953c7`
   - changed owner to `0xCa5b76Cc7A38b86Db11E5aE5B1fc9740c3bA3DE8` @tx`0xf68861171c602e3e75ca69e950957fcb908c7949c6df9a9ea3026c238ebb1e9c`
   - upgrade impl to `0x0893c8821Fa358D5f3630695Ce062204814359A1` @commit`1bd3285` @tx`0x4605c4ce594e996bdbdb532a9aefe4fab1ea36f7e2ef63eef56a7e8033810df3`
+- todo:
+  - upgrade bridge for improvements based on OZ's feedback.
 
 #### erc20_vault
 

packages/protocol/script/DeployOnL1.s.sol

@@ -105,16 +105,6 @@ contract DeployOnL1 is DeployCapability {
             console2.log("- chainId       : ", block.chainid);
         }
 
-        address proposer = vm.envAddress("PROPOSER");
-        if (proposer != address(0)) {
-            register(rollupAddressManager, "proposer", proposer);
-        }
-
-        address proposerOne = vm.envAddress("PROPOSER_ONE");
-        if (proposerOne != address(0)) {
-            register(rollupAddressManager, "proposer_one", proposerOne);
-        }
-
         // ---------------------------------------------------------------
         // Register L2 addresses
         register(rollupAddressManager, "taiko", vm.envAddress("TAIKO_L2_ADDRESS"), l2ChainId);

packages/protocol/test/bridge/Bridge2_processMessage.t.sol

@@ -451,7 +451,6 @@ contract BridgeTest2_processMessage is BridgeTest2 {
         message.destOwner = Alice;
         message.to = address(bridge);
         message.data = abi.encodeWithSignature("sendSignal(bytes32)", hashOfMaliciousMessage);
-        uint256 davidBalance = David.balance;
 
         vm.prank(Alice);
         vm.expectRevert(Bridge.B_OUT_OF_ETH_QUOTA.selector);