added composer installer signature check according to official composer docs #91
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
You can never be too careful.
This PR replaces the portion of the Dockefiles RUN statement, which deals with installing composer, with a more secure version, which also checks the SHA384 checksum of the downloaded installer against a SHA384 checksum obtained from the official git repository of the composer project.
The intention is to provide one additional layer of secruity against man-in-the-middle / spoofing attacks.
It is possible that someone might capture or redirect https://getcomposer.org/installer during docker build and replace the composer install file with a malicous version, which, in turn, would install malicous composer packages.
I would consider it to be less likely that someone might capture both https://getcomposer.org/installer and https://composer.github.io/installer.sig at the same time, thus increasing security.
added composer installer signature check according to official composer docs : https://getcomposer.org/doc/faqs/how-to-install-composer-programmatically.md