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listxattr() may return EFAULT #4150
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@nedbass |
SELinux is disabled on my system as well. |
Actually, I found a different bug with your script. If I execute this script 2 times in a roll with a same file name. And I would get this:
It seems the listxattr logic will see both spill block and dir, and return each entry twice. Or so I guessed. |
It may depend on which kernel is running. I can reproduce the EFAULT error on a RHEL 6.7 VM (ami-5b8a781f on Amazon EC2) with the EPEL packages. But on my Ubuntu 12.04 desktop I get the behavior you see. It could be the same underlying bug. @behlendorf pointed out that |
@nedbass For example:
|
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to disk. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on-disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, which is consistent practice with other callers. Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to disk. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on-disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, which is consistent practice with other callers. Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
It seems the cached inode survives drop_caches on the Ubuntu kernels, so the getxattr request is serviced from the unpacked nvlist that hangs off the znode. That's why we don't see the problem there until the cached copy is dropped, for example when the filesystem is remounted. |
@nedbass that makes sense. The reclaim code is slightly different due to the different kernels and is in both bases simply best effort. The heart of the fix looks good to me but I've posted some review comments. |
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Fixes openzfs#4150 Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]>
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes openzfs#4150
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes openzfs#4150
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes openzfs#4150
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes openzfs#4150
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes #4150
The function sa_update() accepts a 32-bit length parameter and assigns it to a 16-bit field in sa_bulk_attr_t, potentially truncating the passed-in value. This could lead to corrupt system attribute (SA) records getting written to the pool. Add a VERIFY to sa_update() to detect cases where overflow would occur. The SA length is limited to 16-bit values by the on-disk format defined by sa_hdr_phys_t. The function zfs_sa_set_xattr() is vulnerable to this bug if the unpacked nvlist of xattrs is less than 64k in size but the packed size is greater than 64k. Fix this by appropriately checking the size of the packed nvlist before calling sa_update(). Add error handling to zpl_xattr_set_sa() to keep the cached list of SA-based xattrs consistent with the data on disk. Lastly, zfs_sa_set_xattr() calls dmu_tx_abort() on an assigned transaction if sa_update() returns an error, but the DMU only allows unassigned transactions to be aborted. Wrap the sa_update() call in a VERIFY0, remove the transaction abort, and call dmu_tx_commit() unconditionally. This is consistent practice with other callers of sa_update(). Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <[email protected]> Closes openzfs#4150
I'm seeing a similar issue here with running gluster atop 0.6.5.6. The issue first manifested itself when we saw a full filesystem on a df even though there were hardly any files there : [root@gridcell-pri dist_vol]# df -h . Then an ls -l on that dataset returned this : [root@gridcell-pri dist_vol]# ls -l /frzpool/normal/dist_vol/ [root@gridcell-pri dist_vol]# ls -di VMware-viclient-all-6.0.0-3016447.exe [root@gridcell-pri dist_vol]# zdb -dddd frzpool/normal/dist_vol 17
So I'm beginning to wonder if its a manifestation of issue https://github.com/zfsonlinux/zfs/issues/2700 or am I completely off track?! |
On a dataset with
xattr=sa
, storing xattr values with certain lengths causes the xattr data to be stored in a corrupted nvlist on disk. This makes the xattr data inaccessible as system calls such aslistxattr()
andlgetxattr()
return EFAULT. I have traced the return code to the functionnvs_xdr_nvpair()
. The lengths in the script below were determined through experimentation and reproduce the problem reliably.Here is output from an example run of the above script.
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