net/ncsi: Fix possible deadlock caught with lockdep #55

cyrilbur-ibm · 2016-02-25T03:18:37Z

Should fix #8 and #54

Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur [email protected]

This change is

Bringing the interfaces down with ifdown -a directly after boot causes a lockdep warning. It appears that a network interrupt would result in an attempt to acquire that lock again. The solution is to soft disable interrupts. ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.3.6 #1 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. ip/934 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&ndp->ndp_package_lock)->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<c03b0c9c>] ncsi_stop_dev+0x14/0x50 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [<c03bbdf8>] _raw_spin_lock+0x28/0x38 [<c03b08b0>] ncsi_add_package+0x64/0xf0 [<c03af978>] ncsi_rsp_handler_sp+0x80/0xe0 [<c03afb4c>] ncsi_rcv_rsp+0xd4/0x104 [<c0308204>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x6c4/0x808 [<c0309d8c>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0xb4/0x138 [<c030a664>] napi_gro_receive+0x48/0x9c [<c026d784>] ftgmac100_poll+0x360/0x59c [<c030ad48>] net_rx_action+0xe8/0x2a0 [<c001a524>] __do_softirq+0x108/0x26c [<c001a728>] do_softirq+0x48/0x70 [<c001a818>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0x104 [<c030d120>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x654/0x6c4 [<c03ae648>] ncsi_xmit_cmd+0x1d4/0x208 [<c03b01e0>] ncsi_dev_start+0xd0/0x3c0 [<c03b0c44>] ncsi_dev_work+0x1b8/0x1fc [<c002c7a4>] process_one_work+0x228/0x3cc [<c002d5e0>] worker_thread+0x2a4/0x3d8 [<c0031ba0>] kthread+0xc4/0xd8 [<c000a3ac>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 irq event stamp: 2009 hardirqs last enabled at (2009): [<c001a834>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xe4/0x104 hardirqs last disabled at (2007): [<c001a7b4>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x104 softirqs last enabled at (2008): [<c0326a44>] dev_deactivate_many+0x270/0x2ac softirqs last disabled at (2006): [<c0326a28>] dev_deactivate_many+0x254/0x2ac other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&ndp->ndp_package_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&ndp->ndp_package_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by ip/934: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c036d0c8>] devinet_ioctl+0x15c/0x6c8 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 934 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.3.6 #1 Hardware name: ASpeed SoC [<c000fa2c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c000d5fc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c000d5fc>] (show_stack) from [<c0072a88>] (print_usage_bug.part.11+0x220/0x288) [<c0072a88>] (print_usage_bug.part.11) from [<c0040394>] (mark_lock+0x400/0x678) [<c0040394>] (mark_lock) from [<c004293c>] (__lock_acquire+0xa0c/0x1a9c) [<c004293c>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c0043dc4>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0xbc) [<c0043dc4>] (lock_acquire) from [<c03bbdf8>] (_raw_spin_lock+0x28/0x38) [<c03bbdf8>] (_raw_spin_lock) from [<c03b0c9c>] (ncsi_stop_dev+0x14/0x50) [<c03b0c9c>] (ncsi_stop_dev) from [<c026cfa0>] (ftgmac100_stop+0x1c/0x28) [<c026cfa0>] (ftgmac100_stop) from [<c0306cb0>] (__dev_close_many+0xa0/0xc8) [<c0306cb0>] (__dev_close_many) from [<c0306dc8>] (__dev_close+0x20/0x34) [<c0306dc8>] (__dev_close) from [<c030da50>] (__dev_change_flags+0x8c/0x138) [<c030da50>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c030db14>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [<c030db14>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c036d298>] (devinet_ioctl+0x32c/0x6c8) [<c036d298>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c02f42b0>] (sock_ioctl+0x26c/0x2d0) [<c02f42b0>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c00b5804>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x588/0x67c) [<c00b5804>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c00b592c>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [<c00b592c>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000a320>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>

shenki · 2016-03-29T05:00:29Z

This was merged into dev-4.3 as 35d2cfb, and is present in dev-4.4 as f3c9a34

…age_cache_page() commit 22f2ac5 upstream. Antonio reports the following crash when using fuse under memory pressure: kernel BUG at /build/linux-a2WvEb/linux-4.4.0/mm/workingset.c:346! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: all of them CPU: 2 PID: 63 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 4.4.0-36-generic #55-Ubuntu Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8H67-M PRO, BIOS 3904 04/27/2013 task: ffff88040cae6040 ti: ffff880407488000 task.ti: ffff880407488000 RIP: shadow_lru_isolate+0x181/0x190 Call Trace: __list_lru_walk_one.isra.3+0x8f/0x130 list_lru_walk_one+0x23/0x30 scan_shadow_nodes+0x34/0x50 shrink_slab.part.40+0x1ed/0x3d0 shrink_zone+0x2ca/0x2e0 kswapd+0x51e/0x990 kthread+0xd8/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 which corresponds to the following sanity check in the shadow node tracking: BUG_ON(node->count & RADIX_TREE_COUNT_MASK); The workingset code tracks radix tree nodes that exclusively contain shadow entries of evicted pages in them, and this (somewhat obscure) line checks whether there are real pages left that would interfere with reclaim of the radix tree node under memory pressure. While discussing ways how fuse might sneak pages into the radix tree past the workingset code, Miklos pointed to replace_page_cache_page(), and indeed there is a problem there: it properly accounts for the old page being removed - __delete_from_page_cache() does that - but then does a raw raw radix_tree_insert(), not accounting for the replacement page. Eventually the page count bits in node->count underflow while leaving the node incorrectly linked to the shadow node LRU. To address this, make sure replace_page_cache_page() uses the tracked page insertion code, page_cache_tree_insert(). This fixes the page accounting and makes sure page-containing nodes are properly unlinked from the shadow node LRU again. Also, make the sanity checks a bit less obscure by using the helpers for checking the number of pages and shadows in a radix tree node. [[email protected]: backport for 4.4] Fixes: 449dd69 ("mm: keep page cache radix tree nodes in check") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Reported-by: Antonio SJ Musumeci <[email protected]> Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b0ff89 ] While the driver is probing the adapter, an error may occur before the netdev structure is allocated and attached to pci_dev. In this case, not only netdev isn't available, but the tg3 private structure is also not available as it is just math from the NULL pointer, so dereferences must be skipped. The following trace is seen when the error is triggered: [1.402247] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00001a99 [1.402410] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000007e33f8 [1.402450] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [1.402481] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV [1.402513] Modules linked in: [1.402545] CPU: 0 PID: 651 Comm: eehd Not tainted 4.4.0-36-generic #55-Ubuntu [1.402591] task: c000001fe4e42a20 ti: c000001fe4e88000 task.ti: c000001fe4e88000 [1.402742] NIP: c0000000007e33f8 LR: c0000000007e3164 CTR: c000000000595ea0 [1.402787] REGS: c000001fe4e8b790 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.4.0-36-generic) [1.402832] MSR: 9000000100009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000422 XER: 20000000 [1.403058] CFAR: c000000000008468 DAR: 0000000000001a99 DSISR: 42000000 SOFTE: 1 GPR00: c0000000007e3164 c000001fe4e8ba10 c0000000015c5e00 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000039 0000000000000299 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 c000001fe4e88000 0000000000000006 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000000fb40000 c0000000000e6558 c000003ca1bffd00 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000000d52768 GPR24: c000000000d52740 0000000000000100 c000003ca1b52000 0000000000000002 GPR28: 0000000000000900 0000000000000000 c00000000152a0c0 c000003ca1b52000 [1.404226] NIP [c0000000007e33f8] tg3_io_error_detected+0x308/0x340 [1.404265] LR [c0000000007e3164] tg3_io_error_detected+0x74/0x340 This patch avoids the NULL pointer dereference by moving the access after the netdev NULL pointer check on tg3_io_error_detected(). Also, we add a check for netdev being NULL on tg3_io_resume() [suggested by Michael Chan]. Fixes: 0486a06 ("tg3: prevent ifup/ifdown during PCI error recovery") Fixes: dfc8f37 ("net/tg3: Release IRQs on permanent error") Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

When the controller supports the Read LE Resolv List size feature, the maximum list size are read and now stored. Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 17.979791 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 17.980629 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 17.980786 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 17.981627 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 17.981786 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#60 [hci0] 17.982636 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 13.338168 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 13.338842 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 13.339029 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 13.339939 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 13.340152 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 13.340952 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 13.341180 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#62 [hci0] 13.341898 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 Signed-off-by: Ankit Navik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>

Check for Resolv list supported by controller. So check the supported commmand first before issuing this command i.e.,HCI_OP_LE_CLEAR_RESOLV_LIST Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 13.338168 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 13.338842 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 13.339029 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 13.339939 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 13.340152 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 13.340952 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 13.341180 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#62 [hci0] 13.341898 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 28.919131 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 28.920016 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 28.920164 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 28.920873 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 28.921109 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 28.922016 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear Resolving... (0x08|0x0029) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 28.922166 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#62 [hci0] 28.922872 LE Clear Resolving List (0x08|0x0029) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#63 [hci0] 28.923117 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#64 [hci0] 28.924030 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 Signed-off-by: Ankit Navik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7acfda5 ] When element of verdict map is deleted, the delete routine should release chain. however, flush element of verdict map routine doesn't release chain. test commands: %nft add table ip filter %nft add chain ip filter c1 %nft add map ip filter map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict \; } %nft add element ip filter map1 { 1 : jump c1 } %nft flush map ip filter map1 %nft flush ruleset splat looks like: [ 4895.170899] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1415! [ 4895.178114] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 4895.178880] CPU: 0 PID: 1670 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.18.0+ #55 [ 4895.178880] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.28+0x39/0x220 [nf_tables] [ 4895.178880] Code: fc ff df 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 50 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 09 3c 03 7f 05 e8 3e 4c 25 e1 8b 43 50 85 c0 74 02 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 [ 4895.228342] RSP: 0018:ffff88010b98f4c0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 4895.234841] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8801131c6968 RCX: ffff8801146585b0 [ 4895.234841] RDX: 1ffff10022638d37 RSI: ffff8801191a9348 RDI: ffff8801131c69b8 [ 4895.234841] RBP: ffff8801146585a8 R08: 1ffff1002323526a R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4895.234841] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dead000000000200 [ 4895.234841] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffa3638af8 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 4895.234841] FS: 00007f6d188e6700(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4895.234841] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4895.234841] CR2: 00007ffe72b8df88 CR3: 000000010e2d4000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 [ 4895.234841] Call Trace: [ 4895.234841] nf_tables_commit+0x2704/0x2c70 [nf_tables] [ 4895.234841] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa4f/0x11b0 [nfnetlink] [ 4895.234841] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.48+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 4895.323824] ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130 [ 4895.323824] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40 [ 4895.333299] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xc0 [ 4895.333299] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c0/0x310 [ 4895.333299] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa4f/0x11b0 [nfnetlink] [ 4895.333299] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xdb9/0x11b0 [nfnetlink] [ 4895.333299] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 4895.333299] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x150/0x150 [nfnetlink] [ 4895.333299] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe5/0x170 [ 4895.333299] ? sched_clock_local+0xff/0x130 [ 4895.333299] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe5/0x170 [ 4895.333299] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 4895.333299] ? sched_clock_local+0xff/0x130 [ 4895.333299] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 [ 4895.333299] ? nla_parse+0x33/0x260 [ 4895.333299] ? ns_capable_common+0x6e/0x110 [ 4895.333299] nfnetlink_rcv+0x2c0/0x310 [nfnetlink] [ ... ] Fixes: 5910544 ("netfilter: nf_tables: revisit chain/object refcounting from elements") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4117992 ] KASAN does not play well with the page poisoning (CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING). It triggers false positives in the allocation path: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881f800000 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #54 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330 kernel_poison_pages+0x103/0x3d5 get_page_from_freelist+0x15e7/0x4d90 because KASAN has not yet unpoisoned the shadow page for allocation before it checks memchr_inv() but only found a stale poison pattern. Also, false positives in free path, BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8888112cc000 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #55 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5 check_memory_region+0x22d/0x250 memset+0x28/0x40 kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5 __free_pages_ok+0x75f/0x13e0 due to KASAN adds poisoned redzones around slab objects, but the page poisoning needs to poison the whole page. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 205d300 upstream. We have a number of "uart.port->desc.lock vs desc.lock->uart.port" lockdep reports coming from 8250 driver; this causes a bit of trouble to people, so let's fix it. The problem is reverse lock order in two different call paths: chain #1: serial8250_do_startup() spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock); disable_irq_nosync(port->irq); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock) chain #2: __report_bad_irq() raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock) for_each_action_of_desc() printk() spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock); Fix this by changing the order of locks in serial8250_do_startup(): do disable_irq_nosync() first, which grabs desc->lock, and grab uart->port after that, so that chain #1 and chain #2 have same lock order. Full lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.4.39 #55 Not tainted ====================================================== swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffab65b6c0 (console_owner){-...}, at: console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57 but task is already holding lock: ffff88810a8e34c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __report_bad_irq+0x5b/0xba which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x61/0x8d __irq_get_desc_lock+0x65/0x89 __disable_irq_nosync+0x3b/0x93 serial8250_do_startup+0x451/0x75c uart_startup+0x1b4/0x2ff uart_port_activate+0x73/0xa0 tty_port_open+0xae/0x10a uart_open+0x1b/0x26 tty_open+0x24d/0x3a0 chrdev_open+0xd5/0x1cc do_dentry_open+0x299/0x3c8 path_openat+0x434/0x1100 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x10a do_sys_open+0x15f/0x3d7 kernel_init_freeable+0x157/0x1dd kernel_init+0xe/0x105 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x61/0x8d serial8250_console_write+0xa7/0x2a0 console_unlock+0x3b7/0x528 vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f printk+0x59/0x73 register_console+0x336/0x3a4 uart_add_one_port+0x51b/0x5be serial8250_register_8250_port+0x454/0x55e dw8250_probe+0x4dc/0x5b9 platform_drv_probe+0x67/0x8b really_probe+0x14a/0x422 driver_probe_device+0x66/0x130 device_driver_attach+0x42/0x5b __driver_attach+0xca/0x139 bus_for_each_dev+0x97/0xc9 bus_add_driver+0x12b/0x228 driver_register+0x64/0xed do_one_initcall+0x20c/0x4a6 do_initcall_level+0xb5/0xc5 do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x58 kernel_init_freeable+0x13f/0x1dd kernel_init+0xe/0x105 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 -> #0 (console_owner){-...}: __lock_acquire+0x118d/0x2714 lock_acquire+0x203/0x258 console_lock_spinning_enable+0x51/0x57 console_unlock+0x25d/0x528 vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f printk+0x59/0x73 __report_bad_irq+0xa3/0xba note_interrupt+0x19a/0x1d6 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x57/0x79 handle_irq_event+0x36/0x55 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc2/0x18a do_IRQ+0xb3/0x157 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d cpuidle_enter_state+0x12f/0x1fd cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x3d do_idle+0x1ce/0x2ce cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x1f start_kernel+0x406/0x46a secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &irq_desc_lock_class Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: ffff88810a8e34c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __report_bad_irq+0x5b/0xba #1: ffffffffab65b5c0 (console_lock){+.+.}, at: console_trylock_spinning+0x20/0x181 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.39 #55 Hardware name: XXXXXX Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0xbf/0x133 ? print_circular_bug+0xd6/0xe9 check_noncircular+0x1b9/0x1c3 __lock_acquire+0x118d/0x2714 lock_acquire+0x203/0x258 ? console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57 console_lock_spinning_enable+0x51/0x57 ? console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57 console_unlock+0x25d/0x528 ? console_trylock+0x18/0x4e vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f ? lock_acquire+0x203/0x258 printk+0x59/0x73 __report_bad_irq+0xa3/0xba note_interrupt+0x19a/0x1d6 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x57/0x79 handle_irq_event+0x36/0x55 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc2/0x18a do_IRQ+0xb3/0x157 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf </IRQ> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Fixes: 768aec0 ("serial: 8250: fix shared interrupts issues with SMP and RT kernels") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Reported-by: Raul Rangel <[email protected]> BugLink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1114800 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHQZ30BnfX+gxjPm1DUd5psOTqbyDh4EJE=2=VAMW_VDafctkA@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 059a47f ] After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT. When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer (tx_queue->buffer). But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues). So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized tx_queue->buffer. A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels() to handle only xdp queues. Splat looks like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G D 5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80 RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297 RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc] RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0 RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80 CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297 PKRU: 55555554 RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700 RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] __efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] ? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550 efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] Fixes: 3990a8f ("sfc: allocate channels for XDP tx queues") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbc153f ] A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced by following steps: - run nginx/wrk test: smc_run nginx smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL> - continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel: watch -n 1 'smcss -D' BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430 ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170 smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag] smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag] netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320 __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300 smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag] ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110 sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420 __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160 ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0 __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 It is possible that the connection is in process of being established when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump. Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support") Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…_bind returns err [ Upstream commit 36684e9 ] The pointer need to be set to NULL, otherwise KASAN complains about use-after-free. Because in mtk_drm_bind, all private's drm are set as follows. private->all_drm_private[i]->drm = drm; And drm will be released by drm_dev_put in case mtk_drm_kms_init returns failure. However, the shutdown path still accesses the previous allocated memory in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown. [ 84.874820] watchdog: watchdog0: watchdog did not stop! [ 86.512054] ================================================================== [ 86.513162] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378 [ 86.514258] Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d46fc068 by task shutdown/1 [ 86.515213] [ 86.515455] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: shutdown Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-mtk+gfa1a78e5d24b-dirty #55 [ 86.516752] Hardware name: Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2022.10 10/01/2022 [ 86.517960] Call trace: [ 86.518333] show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C) [ 86.518891] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 [ 86.519443] print_report+0xf8/0x5b0 [ 86.519985] kasan_report+0xb4/0x100 [ 86.520526] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30 [ 86.521240] drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378 [ 86.521966] mtk_drm_shutdown+0x54/0x80 [ 86.522546] platform_shutdown+0x64/0x90 [ 86.523137] device_shutdown+0x260/0x5b8 [ 86.523728] kernel_restart+0x78/0xf0 [ 86.524282] __do_sys_reboot+0x258/0x2f0 [ 86.524871] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x90/0xd8 [ 86.525473] invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268 [ 86.526041] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x240 [ 86.526751] do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70 [ 86.527251] el0_svc+0x4c/0xc0 [ 86.527719] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168 [ 86.528367] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 [ 86.528920] [ 86.529157] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 86.529972] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff0000d46fd4d0 pfn:0x1146fc [ 86.531319] flags: 0xbfffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff) [ 86.532267] raw: 0bfffc0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 86.533390] raw: ffff0000d46fd4d0 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 86.534511] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 86.535323] [ 86.535559] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 86.536265] ffff0000d46fbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 86.537314] ffff0000d46fbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 86.538363] >ffff0000d46fc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 86.544733] ^ [ 86.551057] ffff0000d46fc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 86.557510] ffff0000d46fc100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 86.563928] ================================================================== [ 86.571093] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 86.577642] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address e0e9c0920000000b [ 86.581834] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0752049000000058-0x075204900000005f] ... Fixes: 1ef7ed4 ("drm/mediatek: Modify mediatek-drm for mt8195 multi mmsys support") Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/dri-devel/patch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

cyrilbur-ibm force-pushed the fix_ncsi branch from bada8be to 8ff8934 Compare February 26, 2016 06:08

shenki closed this Mar 29, 2016

cyrilbur-ibm deleted the fix_ncsi branch June 29, 2016 05:17

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

net/ncsi: Fix possible deadlock caught with lockdep #55

net/ncsi: Fix possible deadlock caught with lockdep #55

cyrilbur-ibm commented Feb 25, 2016

shenki commented Mar 29, 2016

net/ncsi: Fix possible deadlock caught with lockdep #55

net/ncsi: Fix possible deadlock caught with lockdep #55

Conversation

cyrilbur-ibm commented Feb 25, 2016

shenki commented Mar 29, 2016