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Supply Chain Examples

These are just a few examples and demos to show how certain supply chain attacks might manifest and how different tools and approaches can help mitigate them.

Monitoring build with eBPF

The set of examples under build_with_ebpf are a few examples of how without the right preventive controls around your supply chain you will have to rely on detective controls. It is still good practice from a defense in depth approach to still apply monitoring like this on the builds to still detect anomalous behaviors or when your preventive controls fail for any reason.

Threats

The threats these examples emulate are the following:

  • Injecting unknown build tools into a container - DONE
  • Injecting unknown source code into shared drive - NOT DONE
  • Build scripts attempting to call out to internet - NOT DONE
  • Approved build tools performing suspicious activities like injecting binaries into memory and executing directly - DONE

Pre-Requisites

In order to run these examples, you'll need a system with the following

  • Rust & Cargo
    • Ensure you have x86_64-unknown-linux-musl target installed for static linking rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
  • Nix

Setup

TODO: Publish artifacts of binaries + containers

cd build_with_ebpf/bad_cargo
./build.sh

Emulating Attacks

Build on Host

Normal Build:

cd build_with_ebpf/real_project
cargo build --release

Build that hijacks the source files:

cd build_with_ebpf/real_project
../bad_cargo/target/release/bad_cargo_inputs build --release

Build that hijacks the output:

cd build_with_ebpf/real_project
../bad_cargo/target/release/bad_cargo_outputs build --release

Once you have run any of the above you can test it via:

./target/release/real_project

You should get a "Goodbye, World" output on the hijacked ones.

Build in Container

Normal Build:

cd containers/real_project
nix-build default.nix
docker load < result
docker run --rm -v <outputs_dir>:/src/target:z -v `pwd`/../../real_project:/src:z real_project:<hash>

Build that hijacks the source files:

cd container/hijack_inputs_build
nix-build default.nix
docker load < result
docker run --rm -v <outputs_dir>:/src/target:z -v `pwd`/../../real_project:/src:z real_project:<hash>

Build that hijacks the output:

cd container/hijack_outputs_build
nix-build default.nix
docker load < result
docker run --rm -v <outputs_dir>:/src/target:z -v `pwd`/../../real_project:/src:z real_project:<hash>

Once you have run any of the above you can test it via:

<outputs_dir>/target/release/real_project

How to detect compromise

TODO: Flesh this out

  • You can use a tool like Falco or Tracee to monitor for memfd creations and execve's against the memfds and capture the memfds.
  • You can also capture the executed tools, inputs and outputs and their hashes and compare it to known good hashes.
    • Compare captured cargo that is run against the build against cargo inputs
    • Compare source inputs with upstream sources
    • You can debug captured suspicious binaries in sandboxed environments

Kubernetes Demos

These showcase how to leverage Kubernetes, especialy using Tekton, to improve the security of the supply chain.

The scripts provided help provisioning and configuring environments quickly, either for an investigation purpose, either for demonstration.

You could find more details in the README.md of the dedicated folder.

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