doc update - address @avsm review

pk/mirage_crypto_pk.mli

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ module Rsa : sig
       {{!well_formed}[well_formed]}.
 
       Messages are checked not to exceed the key size, and this is signalled via
-      the [Insufficient_key] exception.
+      the {!Insufficient_key} exception.
 
       Private-key operations are optionally protected through RSA blinding. *)
 
@@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ module Rsa : sig
       result is correct. This is to counter Chinese remainder theorem attacks to
       factorize primes. If the computed signature is incorrect, it is again
       computed in the classical way (c ^ d mod n) without the Chinese remainder
-      theorem optimization. The deterministic PKCS1 signing, which is at danger,
-      uses [true] as default.
+      theorem optimization. The deterministic {{!PKCS1.sign}PKCS1 signing},
+      which is at danger, uses [true] as default.
 
       [~mask] defaults to [`Yes].
 

rng/mirage_crypto_rng.mli

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ val strict : g option -> bool
 {[let rec f1 ?g ~n i =
   if i < 1 then [] else Rng.generate ?g n :: f1 ?g ~n (i - 1)]}
 
-    Generating a [Z.t] smaller than [10]]:
+    Generating a [Z.t] smaller than [10]:
 {[let f2 ?g () = Mirage_crypto_pk.Z_extra.gen ?g Z.(~$10)]}
 
     Creating a local Fortuna instance and using it as a key-derivation function: