CVE-2015-9097: prevent SMTP command injection via To/From addresses #1097
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jeremy
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Validate addresses passed as SMTP command arguments to prevent injection of other SMTP commands. Disallow line breaks and very long addresses which may cause overflows on some old SMTP servers. Ruby 2.4 Net::SMTP already disallows addresses that contain newlines. Enforce this validation in Mail to cover older Ruby versions and other SMTP implementations that don't validate input. SMTP injection whitepaper: http://www.mbsd.jp/Whitepaper/smtpi.pdf Ruby security report: https://hackerone.com/reports/137631 OSVDB entry: https://rubysec.com/advisories/mail-OSVDB-131677
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This was referenced May 9, 2017
This was referenced May 9, 2017
buren
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May 10, 2017
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@jeremy when might we expect an official 2.6.6 release for this? Currently I only see a |
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@jordan-brough Expect an official 2.6.6 after RC1 has had a fair number of installs to shake out regressions. Note than 2.6.x is (coincidentally) not vulnerable to this issue, thanks to #505 stripping CRLF from header values. |
amatriain
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May 15, 2017
This fixes a vulnerability that allows users to send spam from any form that allows email input (e.g. signup). For more about the vulnerability see: mikel/mail#1097 When implicit dependency resolution in Gemfile.lock resolves to a released mail version that includes the fix, the explicit dependency in Gemfile will be removed.
drewda
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Jun 1, 2017
see mikel/mail#1097 TODO: remove once mikel/mail#1116 is addressed
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eviltrout
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One month and >10,000 downloads for 2.6.6.rc1. |
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Jun 9, 2017
jeremyolliver
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Jun 12, 2017
As per comment mikel/mail#1097 (comment) versions 2.5.5 and 2.6.6 include patches for this issue, 2.6.0 to 2.6.5 do not mikel/mail 2-6-stable branch fixes in commit 37908c37dfb26ea262d0fa7916cd9bbee3750e63 mikel/mail 2-5-stable branch fixes in commit f4239e4cc03d982219a6fa58e059d8758bbd2d8f
jeremy
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ulferts
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Jun 13, 2017
OP is not affected by the vulnerability as: * We limit the length of mail fields * 2.6.x is not vulnerable at all (mikel/mail#1097 (comment)) But gemnasium complains and this produces a red badge which looks bad. The rc has been around for some time now, so it should be stable enough. I expect to bump the version once the official 2.6.6 has been released.
oliverguenther
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Jun 14, 2017
OP is not affected by the vulnerability as: * We limit the length of mail fields * 2.6.x is not vulnerable at all (mikel/mail#1097 (comment)) But gemnasium complains and this produces a red badge which looks bad. The rc has been around for some time now, so it should be stable enough. I expect to bump the version once the official 2.6.6 has been released. [ci skip]
boltronics
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Oct 10, 2017
thegcat
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Jan 26, 2018
Mail 2.6.6 Security: * mikel#1097 – SMTP security: prevent command injection via To/From addresses. (jeremy) Bugs: * mikel#689 - Fix Exim delivery method broken by mikel#477 in 2.5.4. (jethrogb)
This was referenced Mar 12, 2021
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Validate addresses passed as SMTP command arguments to prevent
injection of other SMTP commands. Disallow line breaks and very
long addresses which may cause overflows on some old SMTP servers.
Ruby 2.4 Net::SMTP already disallows addresses that contain newlines.
Enforce this validation in Mail to cover older Ruby versions and
other SMTP implementations that don't validate input.
SMTP injection whitepaper: http://www.mbsd.jp/Whitepaper/smtpi.pdf
Ruby security report: https://hackerone.com/reports/137631
OSVDB entry: https://rubysec.com/advisories/mail-OSVDB-131677