MSC2241: Key verification in DMs

proposals/2241-e2e-verification-in-dms.md

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+# Key verification in DMs
+
+Currently, key verification is done using `to_device` messages.  However, since
+`to_device` messages are not part of a timeline, there is no user-visible
+record of the key verification.
+
+As well, the current key verification framework does not provide any feedback
+when interacting with clients that do not support it; if a client does not
+support the key verification framework, there is no way for users to discover
+this other than waiting for a while and noticing that nothing is happening.
+
+This proposal will solve both problems.
+
+## Proposal
+
+The current [key verification
+framework](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#key-verification-framework)
+will be replaced by a new framework that uses room messages rather than
+`to_device` messages.  Key verification messages will be sent in a [Direct
+Messaging](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#id185) room.  If
+there is no Direct Messaging room between the two users involved, the client
+that initiates the key verification will create one.
+
+In this proposal, we use "Alice" to denote the user who initiates the key
+verification, and "Bob" to denote the other user involved in the key
+verification.
+
+### General framework
+
+#### Requesting a key verification
+
+To request a key verification, Alice will send an `m.room.message` event with the
+following properties in its contents:
+
+- `body`: a fallback message to alert users that their client does not support
+  the key verification framework, and that they should use a different method
+  to verify keys.  For example, "Alice is requesting to verify keys with you.
+  However, your client does not support this method, so you will need to use
+  the legacy method of key verification."
+
+  Clients that do support the key verification framework should hide the body
+  and instead present the user with an interface to accept or reject the key
+  verification.
+
+  The event may also contain `format` and `formatted_body` properties as
+  described in the [m.room.message
+  msgtypes](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#m-room-message-msgtypes)
+  section of the spec.  Clients that support the key verification should
+  similarly hide these from the user.
+- `msgtype`: `m.key.verification.request`
+- `methods`: the verification methods supported by Alice's client
+- `to`: Bob's Matrix ID.  Users should only respond to verification requests if
+  they are named in this field.  Users who are not named in this field and who
+  did not send this event should ignore all other events that have a
+  `m.reference` relationship with this event.
+- `from_device`: Alice's device ID.  This is required since some verification
+  methods may use the device IDs as part of the verification process.
+
+Key verifications will be identified by the event ID of the key verification
+request event.
+
+Clients should ignore verification requests that have been accepted or
+cancelled, or if they do not belong to the sending or target users.
+
+The way that clients display this event can depend on which user and device the
+client belongs to, and what state the verification is in.  For example:
+
+- If the verification has been completed (there is an `m.key.verification.done`
+  or `m.key.verification.cancel` event), the client can indicate that the
+  verification was successful or had an error.
+- If the verification has been accepted (there is an `m.key.verification.start`
+  event) but has not been completed, the two devices involved can indicate that
+  the verification is in progress and can use this event as a place in the
+  room's timeline to display progress of the key verification and to interact
+  with the user as necessary.  Other devices can indicate that the verification
+  is in progress on other devices.
+- If the verification has not been accepted, clients for the target user can
+  indicate that a verification has been requested and allow the user to accept
+  the verification on that device.  The sending client can indicate that it is
+  waiting for the request to be accepted, and the sending user's other clients
+  can indicate the that a request was initiated on a different device.
+
+Clients may choose to display or not to display events of any other type that
+reference the original request event; but it must not have any effect on the
+verification itself.
+
+#### Accepting a key verification
+
+To accept a key verification, Bob will send an `m.key.verification.start` event
+with the following properties in its contents:
+
+TODO: MSC1849 may use `m.relationship` rather than `m.relates_to`, in which
+case this proposal should follow suit.
+
+- `m.relates_to`: an object with the properties:
+  - `rel_type`: `m.reference`
+  - `event_id`: the event ID of the key verification request that is being
+    accepted
+- `method`: the key verification method that is being used
+- `from_device`: Bob's device ID.  This is required since some verification
+  methods may use the device IDs as part of the verification process.
+
+Clients should ignore `m.key.verification.start` events that correspond to
+verification requests that they did not send.
+
+#### Rejecting a key verification
+
+To reject a key verification, Bob will send an `m.key.verification.cancel`
+event with the following properties in its contents:
+
+- `m.relates_to`: an object with the properties:
+  - `rel_type`: `m.reference`
+  - `event_id`: the event ID of the key verification that is being cancelled
+- `body`: A human readable description of the `code`. The client should only
+  rely on this string if it does not understand the `code`.
+- `code`: The error code for why the process/request was cancelled by the
+  user. The contents are the same as the `code` property of the currently
+  defined [`m.key.verification.cancel` to-device
+  event](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#m-key-verification-cancel),
+  or as defined for specific key verification methods.
+
+This message may be sent at any point in the key verification process.  Any
+subsequent key verification messages relating to the same request are ignored.
+However, this does not undo any verifications that have already been done.
+
+#### Concluding a key verification
+
+When the other user's key is verified and no more messages are expected, each
+party will send an `m.key.verification.done` event with the following
+properties in its contents:
+
+- `m.relates_to`: an object with the properties:
+  - `rel_type`: `m.reference`
+  - `event_id`: the event ID of the key verification that is being cancelled
+
+This provides a record within the room of the result of the verification.
+
+Any subsequent key verification messages relating to the same request are ignored.
+
+#### Other events
+
+Key verification methods may define their own event types, or extensions to the
+above event types.  All events sent as part of a key verification process
+should have an `m.relates_to` property as defined for
+`m.key.verification.accept` or `m.key.verification.cancel` events.
+
+Clients should ignore events with an `m.relates_to` that have a `rel_type` of
+`m.reference` that refer to a verification where it is not the requester
+nor the accepter.
+
+Clients should not redact or edit verification messages.  A client may ignore
+redactions or edits of key verification messages, or may cancel the
+verification with a `code` of `m.unexpected_message` when it receives a
+redaction or edit.
+
+### SAS verification
+
+The messages used in SAS verification are the same as those currently defined,
+except that instead of the `transaction_id` property, an `m.relates_to`
+property, as defined above, is used instead.
+
+If the key verification messages are encrypted, the hash commitment sent in the
+`m.key.verification.accept` message MUST be based on the decrypted
+`m.key.verification.start` message contents, and include the `m.relates_to`
+field, even if the decrypted message contents do not include that field.  For
+example, if Alice sends a message to start the SAS verification:
+
+```json
+{
+  "content": {
+    "algorithm": "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2",
+    "ciphertext": "ABCDEFG...",
+    "device_id": "Dynabook",
+    "sender_key": "alice+sender+key",
+    "session_id": "session+id",
+    "m.relates_to": {
+      "rel_type": "m.reference",
+      "event_id": "$verification_request_event"
+    }
+  },
+  "event_id": "$event_id",
+  "origin_server_ts": 1234567890,
+  "sender": "@alice:example.org",
+  "type": "m.room.encrypted",
+  "room_id": "!room_id:example.org"
+}
+```
+
+which, when decrypted, yields:
+
+```json
+{
+  "room_id": "!room_id:example.org",
+  "type": "m.key.verification.start",
+  "content": {
+    "from_device": "Dynabook",
+    "hashes": [
+      "sha256"
+    ],
+    "key_agreement_protocols": [
+        "curve25519"
+    ],
+    "message_authentication_codes": [
+        "hkdf-hmac-sha256"
+    ],
+    "method": "m.sas.v1",
+    "short_authentication_string": [
+        "decimal",
+        "emoji"
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+then the hash commitment will be based on the message contents:
+
+```json
+{
+  "from_device": "Dynabook",
+  "hashes": [
+    "sha256"
+  ],
+  "key_agreement_protocols": [
+      "curve25519"
+  ],
+  "message_authentication_codes": [
+      "hkdf-hmac-sha256"
+  ],
+  "method": "m.sas.v1",
+  "short_authentication_string": [
+      "decimal",
+      "emoji"
+  ],
+  "m.relates_to": {
+    "rel_type": "m.reference",
+    "event_id": "$verification_request_event"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Alternatives
+
+Messages sent by the verification methods, after the initial key verification
+request message, could be sent as to-device messages.  The
+`m.key.verification.start`, `m.key.verification.cancel`, and
+`m.key.verification.done` messages must be still be sent in the room, as the
+`m.key.verification.start` notifies the sender's other devices that the request
+has been acknowledged, and the `m.key.verification.cancel` and
+`m.key.verification.done` provide a record of the status of the key
+verification.
+
+## Potential issues
+
+If a user wants to verify their own device, this will require the creation of a
+Direct Messaging room with themselves.  Instead, clients may use the current
+`to_device` messages for verifying the user's other devices.
+
+Direct Messaging rooms could have end-to-end encryption enabled, and some
+clients can be configured to only send decryption keys to verified devices.
+Key verification messages should be granted an exception to this (so that
+decryption keys are sent to all of the target user's devices), or should be
+sent unencrypted, so that unverified devices will be able to be verified.
+
+Users might have multiple Direct Messaging rooms with other users.  In this
+case, clients will need to prompt the user to select the room in which they
+want to perform the verification.
+
+## Security considerations
+
+Key verification is subject to the room's visibility settings, and may be
+visible to other users in the room.  However, key verification does not rely on
+secrecy, so this will no affect the security of the key verification.  This may
+reveal to others in the room that Alice and Bob know each other, but this is
+already revealed by the fact that they share a Direct Messaging room.
+
+This framework allows users to see what key verifications they have performed
+in the past.  However, since key verification messages are not secured, this
+should not be considered as authoritative.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+By using room messages to perform key verification rather than `to_device`
+messages, the user experience of key verification can be improved.