[Sanitizer] Support -fwrapv with -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow (#…

…82432)

Clang has a `signed-integer-overflow` sanitizer to catch arithmetic
overflow; however, most of its instrumentation [fails to
apply](https://godbolt.org/z/ee41rE8o6) when `-fwrapv` is enabled; this
is by design.

The Linux kernel enables `-fno-strict-overflow` which implies `-fwrapv`.
This means we are [currently unable to detect signed-integer
wrap-around](KSPP/linux#26). All the while,
the root cause of many security vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel is
[arithmetic overflow](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html).

To work around this and enhance the functionality of
`-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow`, we instrument signed arithmetic
even if the signed overflow behavior is defined.

Co-authored-by: Justin Stitt <[email protected]>

clang/docs/ReleaseNotes.rst

@@ -408,6 +408,14 @@ Moved checkers
 Sanitizers
 ----------
 
+- ``-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow`` now instruments signed arithmetic even
+  when ``-fwrapv`` is enabled. Previously, only division checks were enabled.
+
+  Users with ``-fwrapv`` as well as a sanitizer group like
+  ``-fsanitize=undefined`` or ``-fsanitize=integer`` enabled may want to
+  manually disable potentially noisy signed integer overflow checks with
+  ``-fno-sanitize=signed-integer-overflow``
+
 Python Binding Changes
 ----------------------
 

clang/docs/UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer.rst

@@ -190,10 +190,11 @@ Available checks are:
   -  ``-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow``: Signed integer overflow, where the
      result of a signed integer computation cannot be represented in its type.
      This includes all the checks covered by ``-ftrapv``, as well as checks for
-     signed division overflow (``INT_MIN/-1``), but not checks for
-     lossy implicit conversions performed before the computation
-     (see ``-fsanitize=implicit-conversion``). Both of these two issues are
-     handled by ``-fsanitize=implicit-conversion`` group of checks.
+     signed division overflow (``INT_MIN/-1``). Note that checks are still
+     added even when ``-fwrapv`` is enabled. This sanitizer does not check for
+     lossy implicit conversions performed before the computation (see
+     ``-fsanitize=implicit-conversion``). Both of these two issues are handled
+     by ``-fsanitize=implicit-conversion`` group of checks.
   -  ``-fsanitize=unreachable``: If control flow reaches an unreachable
      program point.
   -  ``-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow``: Unsigned integer overflow, where

clang/lib/CodeGen/CGExprScalar.cpp

@@ -723,7 +723,9 @@ class ScalarExprEmitter
     if (Ops.Ty->isSignedIntegerOrEnumerationType()) {
       switch (CGF.getLangOpts().getSignedOverflowBehavior()) {
       case LangOptions::SOB_Defined:
-        return Builder.CreateMul(Ops.LHS, Ops.RHS, "mul");
+        if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
+          return Builder.CreateMul(Ops.LHS, Ops.RHS, "mul");
+        [[fallthrough]];
       case LangOptions::SOB_Undefined:
         if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
           return Builder.CreateNSWMul(Ops.LHS, Ops.RHS, "mul");
@@ -2568,7 +2570,9 @@ llvm::Value *ScalarExprEmitter::EmitIncDecConsiderOverflowBehavior(
   StringRef Name = IsInc ? "inc" : "dec";
   switch (CGF.getLangOpts().getSignedOverflowBehavior()) {
   case LangOptions::SOB_Defined:
-    return Builder.CreateAdd(InVal, Amount, Name);
+    if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
+      return Builder.CreateAdd(InVal, Amount, Name);
+    [[fallthrough]];
   case LangOptions::SOB_Undefined:
     if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
       return Builder.CreateNSWAdd(InVal, Amount, Name);
@@ -3913,7 +3917,9 @@ Value *ScalarExprEmitter::EmitAdd(const BinOpInfo &op) {
   if (op.Ty->isSignedIntegerOrEnumerationType()) {
     switch (CGF.getLangOpts().getSignedOverflowBehavior()) {
     case LangOptions::SOB_Defined:
-      return Builder.CreateAdd(op.LHS, op.RHS, "add");
+      if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
+        return Builder.CreateAdd(op.LHS, op.RHS, "add");
+      [[fallthrough]];
     case LangOptions::SOB_Undefined:
       if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
         return Builder.CreateNSWAdd(op.LHS, op.RHS, "add");
@@ -4067,7 +4073,9 @@ Value *ScalarExprEmitter::EmitSub(const BinOpInfo &op) {
     if (op.Ty->isSignedIntegerOrEnumerationType()) {
       switch (CGF.getLangOpts().getSignedOverflowBehavior()) {
       case LangOptions::SOB_Defined:
-        return Builder.CreateSub(op.LHS, op.RHS, "sub");
+        if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
+          return Builder.CreateSub(op.LHS, op.RHS, "sub");
+        [[fallthrough]];
       case LangOptions::SOB_Undefined:
         if (!CGF.SanOpts.has(SanitizerKind::SignedIntegerOverflow))
           return Builder.CreateNSWSub(op.LHS, op.RHS, "sub");

clang/test/CodeGen/integer-overflow.c

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 // RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=DEFAULT
 // RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -fwrapv | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=WRAPV
 // RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -ftrapv | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=TRAPV
-// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=CATCH_UB
+// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow | FileCheck %s --check-prefixes=CATCH_UB,CATCH_UB_POINTER
+// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow -fwrapv | FileCheck %s --check-prefixes=CATCH_UB,NOCATCH_UB_POINTER
 // RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple x86_64-apple-darwin %s -emit-llvm -o - -ftrapv -ftrapv-handler foo | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=TRAPV_HANDLER
 
 
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@ void test1(void) {
   // DEFAULT: getelementptr inbounds i32, ptr
   // WRAPV: getelementptr i32, ptr
   // TRAPV: getelementptr inbounds i32, ptr
-  // CATCH_UB: getelementptr inbounds i32, ptr
+  // CATCH_UB_POINTER: getelementptr inbounds i32, ptr
+  // NOCATCH_UB_POINTER: getelementptr i32, ptr
 
   // PR9350: char pre-increment never overflows.
   extern volatile signed char PR9350_char_inc;