Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Surface3-OEMB: add quirk for Surface 3 with broken DMI table #29

Merged
merged 2 commits into from
Jan 13, 2020

Conversation

kitakar5525
Copy link
Member

@kitakar5525 kitakar5525 commented Jan 11, 2020

As a request from a person who is also suffering from "OEMB" issue on IRC channel.
Please port this into also 4.19 and 5.4 kernels when approved this PR, should apply with no conflicts.

The first patch (ASoC) is from Android-x86 project. The second patch is made by me referring to the first patch (they don't have a similar patch for surface3-wmi, so I made it).
I credited the first patch author in commit message.

Fixes broken Sound and surface3-wmi driver probe on the affected systems.


On some Surface 3, DMI table gets corrupted for unknown reasons
and breaks existing DMI matching used for device-specific quirks.

This PR adds the (broken) DMI info for the affected systems.

On the affected systems, dmidecode will look like this:

        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: American Megatrends Inc.
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: OEMB
            Product Name: OEMB
        [...]

Expected:

        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: (???, I think something like "Microsoft Corporation")
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
            Product Name: Surface 3
        [...]

@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

kitakar5525 commented Jan 12, 2020

I used my github name as author name in the first commit (ASoC) because I didn't want to bother the original author with github notifications.
(I've already credited the original author name in its commit message.)

And now I learned a bit about how everyone treats the author name on git.
In general, the author name should remain original author name (even when I modified some lines).

git commit --amend --author='Author Name <[email protected]>'

So, I'll change back the author name of the first commit to the original author name by force-pushing

(I feel I need to learn git)

@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

Changing back the author name done.

cwhuang and others added 2 commits January 13, 2020 02:01
Some Microsoft Surface 3 owners including me encountered a strange issue
when play Android-x86 on the tablet. The DMI table was erased due to
unknown reason and sound doesn't work in Android-x86 (but it's normal
in Windows). See more details:

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/android-x86/z6GDuvV2oWk/mzyg0RQiCAAJ

Since the DMI table is incorrect, kernel won't enable quirk for it.
To workaround such an issue, add quirk for the bad data "OEMB".
It should not affect any product with correct DMI data.

===
(Commit message from kitakar5525 <[email protected]>)

(am from http://git.osdn.net/view?p=android-x86/kernel.git;a=commitdiff;h=18e2e857c57633b25b3b4120f212224a108cd883)
(author: Chih-Wei Huang <[email protected]> Tue, 18 Sep 2018 03:01:37 +0000 (11:01 +0800))
(Changed commit title from "ASoC: add quirk for Surface 3 with bad DMI table")

On some Surface 3, DMI table gets corrupted for unknown reasons
and breaks existing DMI matching used for device-specific quirks.

This commit adds the (broken) DMI info for the affected Surface 3.
Fixes Sound feature on Surface 3 with broken DMI table.

Note here that this issue will not necessarily happen after playing
around with Android-x86. I heard a report from a person on the IRC
channel that on the affected system, only Manjaro was used.

On affected systems, dmidecode will look like this:
        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: American Megatrends Inc.
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: OEMB
            Product Name: OEMB
        [...]

Expected:
        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: (???, I think something like "Microsoft Corporation")
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
            Product Name: Surface 3
        [...]
…table

(made referring to http://git.osdn.net/view?p=android-x86/kernel.git;a=commitdiff;h=18e2e857c57633b25b3b4120f212224a108cd883)

On some Surface 3, DMI table gets corrupted for unknown reasons
and breaks existing DMI matching used for device-specific quirks.

This commit adds the (broken) DMI info for the affected Surface 3.
Fixes surface3-wmi probe on Surface 3 with broken DMI table.

Note here that this issue will not necessarily happen after playing
around with Android-x86. I heard a report from a person on the IRC
channel that on the affected system, only Manjaro was used.

On affected systems, dmidecode will look like this:
        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: American Megatrends Inc.
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: OEMB
            Product Name: OEMB
        [...]

Expected:
        $ sudo dmidecode
        [...]
        BIOS Information
            Vendor: (???, I think something like "Microsoft Corporation")
        [...]
        System Information
            Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
            Product Name: Surface 3
        [...]
@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

kitakar5525 commented Jan 12, 2020

(And improved commit messages, ready to be reviewed now)

@qzed
Copy link
Member

qzed commented Jan 13, 2020

Thanks! Any idea if this is being pushed upstream?

@qzed qzed merged commit 9933f3c into linux-surface:v5.3-surface-devel Jan 13, 2020
@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

Any idea if this is being pushed upstream?

I should definitly try now (and also surface3-spi DMA issue: 6c196de), although repairing the broken DMI is the best idea if possible.

I don't know where is the right place to discuss. Bugzilla?

@qzed
Copy link
Member

qzed commented Jan 13, 2020

You should probably ask the original author if he intends of pushing this upstream. I'm not sure if the DMI can be repaired. Also if it can be repaired, it might not be the best option for users. As a note: If you want to get this upstream you may need to change the match a bit as I think American Megatrends Inc. and OEMB may be too generic (but they'll tell you then what they want to have changed specifically).

Apart from that, I'm not quite sure where this should go, to be honest. Both, bugzilla and mailing list should work. You'll probably get quicker results on the list, but which category. Platform-drivers-x86 probably isn't the right place for DMI in general, but as it affects driver quirks maybe there? Linux-efi maybe as DMI is provided by firmware?

Running ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c only gives

Jean Delvare <[email protected]> (maintainer:DMI/SMBIOS SUPPORT)
[email protected] (open list)

but maybe that's a starting point figuring out where to go from there.

@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

Thank you. I'll first contact the author.

kitakar5525 added a commit to kitakar5525/linux-surface-patches that referenced this pull request Jan 15, 2020
Update existing patches.

Will be available soon on linux-surface/linux-surface patchset.
PR already merged into linux-surface/kernel: linux-surface/kernel#29
@kitakar5525 kitakar5525 deleted the Surface3-OEMB branch January 15, 2020 23:57
kitakar5525 referenced this pull request Jan 18, 2020
On Arch Linux kernel at least after 4.19, touch input is broken after suspend
(s2idle).

        kern  :err   : [  +0.203408] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: SPI transfer timed out

On recent stable Arch Linux kernel (at least after 5.1), touch input will
crash after the first touch.

        kern  :err   : [  +0.203592] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: SPI transfer timed out
        kern  :err   : [  +0.000173] spi_master spi1: failed to transfer one message from queue

I found on an affected system (Arch Linux kernel, etc.), the touchscreen
driver uses DMA mode by default. Then, we found some kernels with different
kernel config (5.1 kernel config from Jakeday [1] or Chromium OS kernel
chromeos-4.19 [2]) will use PIO mode by default and no such issues there.

So, this commit disables DMA mode on the touchscreen driver side as a quick
workaround to avoid touch input crash.
We may need to properly set up DMA mode to use the touchscreen driver with
DMA mode.

You can still switch DMA/PIO mode if you want:

  switch to DMA mode (maybe broken)
        echo 1 | sudo tee /sys/module/surface3_spi/parameters/use_dma
  back to PIO mode
        echo 0 | sudo tee /sys/module/surface3_spi/parameters/use_dma

Link to issue: jakeday/linux-surface#596

References:
[1] https://github.com/jakeday/linux-surface/blob/master/configs/5.1/config
[2] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/refs/heads/chromeos-4.19

Tested on Arch Linux 5.4.1 with Surface 3, which will use DMA by default.
This commit made the driver use PIO by default and no touch input crash.
Also tested on chromeos-4.19 4.19.90 with Surface 3, which will use PIO by default
even without this commit. After this commit, it still uses PIO and confirmed
no functional changes regarding touch input.

More details:
  We can confirm which mode the touchscreen driver uses; first, enable
  debug output:

        echo "file drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c +p" | sudo tee /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control
        echo "file drivers/input/touchscreen/surface3_spi.c +p" | sudo tee /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control

  Then, try to make a touch input and see dmesg log

        (On Arch Linux kernel, uses DMA)
        kern  :debug : [  +0.006383] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: 7692307 Hz actual, DMA
        kern  :debug : [  +0.000495] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: surface3_spi_irq_handler received
	-> ff ff ff ff a5 5a e7 7e 01 d2 00 80 01 03 03 18 00 e4 01 00 04 1a 04 1a e3 0c e3 0c b0 00
	c5 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

        (On the kernels I referenced above, uses PIO)
        kern  :debug : [  +0.009260] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: 7692307 Hz actual, PIO
        kern  :debug : [  +0.001105] Surface3-spi spi-MSHW0037:00: surface3_spi_irq_handler received
	-> ff ff ff ff a5 5a e7 7e 01 d2 00 80 01 03 03 24 00 e4 01 00 58 0b 58 0b 83 12 83 12 26 01
	95 01 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
@andy-shev
Copy link
Contributor

These patches are hacks. They are not going to be upstreamed. Sorry for this news, but we need to understand the root cause before going forward.

@kitakar5525
Copy link
Member Author

These patches are hacks. They are not going to be upstreamed.

I see. Yes, it's a hack. It can't be helped that they are not going to be upstreamed.
I hope there were a way to override DMI table, like overriding osi string (acpi_osi parameter). I understand there is no demand to do such a thing, though.

we need to understand the root cause before going forward.

I can't say for sure, but it might be caused by force power-off by long-pressing power button.

@qzed
Copy link
Member

qzed commented Jan 18, 2020

@andy-shev Any idea what could cause this? Also if it's broken in/by firmware, what can we do in kernel to fix/avoid this?

@abondis
Copy link

abondis commented Jan 20, 2020

I am affected by this issue. I tried many ways with my limited knowledge of DMI and tools related, but could not fix the values... I'm not sure how or why it changed and since I can't go back to the original status, I can't even try to reproduce.

Something like that seems like it would have been great https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9591817/ but from the discussion it seems this kind of hack is not acceptable for the kernel either ...

qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 6, 2020
Loading the driver on a system with W83627DHG-P crashes as follows.

w83627ehf: Found W83627DHG-P chip at 0x290
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 604 Comm: sensors Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-00055-gca7e1fd1026c #29
Hardware name:  /D425KT, BIOS MWPNT10N.86A.0132.2013.0726.1534 07/26/2013
RIP: 0010:w83627ehf_read_string+0x27/0x70 [w83627ehf]
Code: [... ]
RSP: 0018:ffffb95980657df8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96caaa7f5218 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000015 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff96caa736ec08
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffb95980657e20 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff96caaa635cc0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff96caa9f7cf00
R13: ffff96caa9ec3d00 R14: ffff96caa9ec3d28 R15: ffff96caa9ec3d40
FS:  00007fbc7c4e2740(0000) GS:ffff96caabc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000129d58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 ? cp_new_stat+0x12d/0x160
 hwmon_attr_show_string+0x37/0x70 [hwmon]
 dev_attr_show+0x14/0x50
 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xb5/0x1b0
 seq_read+0xcf/0x460
 vfs_read+0x9b/0x150
 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
...

Temperature labels are not always present. Adjust sysfs attribute
visibility accordingly.

Reported-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Meelis Roos <[email protected]>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
Fixes: 266cd58 ("hwmon: (w83627ehf) convert to with_info interface")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2020
In case devlink reload failed, it is possible to trigger a
use-after-free when querying the kernel for device info via 'devlink dev
info' [1].

This happens because as part of the reload error path the PCI command
interface is de-initialized and its mailboxes are freed. When the
devlink '->info_get()' callback is invoked the device is queried via the
command interface and the freed mailboxes are accessed.

Fix this by initializing the command interface once during probe and not
during every reload.

This is consistent with the other bus used by mlxsw (i.e., 'mlxsw_i2c')
and also allows user space to query the running firmware version (for
example) from the device after a failed reload.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff88810ae32000 by task syz-executor.1/2355

CPU: 1 PID: 2355 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xf6/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x14e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:106
 memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
 mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
 mlxsw_cmd_exec+0x249/0x550 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2335
 mlxsw_cmd_access_reg drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/cmd.h:859 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access_cmd drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1938 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access+0x2f6/0x540 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1985
 mlxsw_reg_query drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2000 [inline]
 mlxsw_devlink_info_get+0x17f/0x6e0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1090
 devlink_nl_info_fill.constprop.0+0x13c/0x2d0 net/core/devlink.c:4588
 devlink_nl_cmd_info_get_dumpit+0x246/0x460 net/core/devlink.c:4648
 genl_lock_dumpit+0x85/0xc0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:575
 netlink_dump+0x515/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2245
 __netlink_dump_start+0x53d/0x830 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2353
 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.0+0x296/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:638
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:733 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x78d/0x9d0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:753
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x152/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:764
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
 netlink_sendmsg+0x850/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x150/0x190 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6d8/0x840 net/socket.c:2363
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2417
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2450
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: a9c8336 ("mlxsw: core: Add support for devlink info command")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
kitakar5525 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2020
[ Upstream commit c4317b1 ]

In case devlink reload failed, it is possible to trigger a
use-after-free when querying the kernel for device info via 'devlink dev
info' [1].

This happens because as part of the reload error path the PCI command
interface is de-initialized and its mailboxes are freed. When the
devlink '->info_get()' callback is invoked the device is queried via the
command interface and the freed mailboxes are accessed.

Fix this by initializing the command interface once during probe and not
during every reload.

This is consistent with the other bus used by mlxsw (i.e., 'mlxsw_i2c')
and also allows user space to query the running firmware version (for
example) from the device after a failed reload.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff88810ae32000 by task syz-executor.1/2355

CPU: 1 PID: 2355 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xf6/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x14e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:106
 memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
 mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
 mlxsw_cmd_exec+0x249/0x550 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2335
 mlxsw_cmd_access_reg drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/cmd.h:859 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access_cmd drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1938 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access+0x2f6/0x540 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1985
 mlxsw_reg_query drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2000 [inline]
 mlxsw_devlink_info_get+0x17f/0x6e0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1090
 devlink_nl_info_fill.constprop.0+0x13c/0x2d0 net/core/devlink.c:4588
 devlink_nl_cmd_info_get_dumpit+0x246/0x460 net/core/devlink.c:4648
 genl_lock_dumpit+0x85/0xc0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:575
 netlink_dump+0x515/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2245
 __netlink_dump_start+0x53d/0x830 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2353
 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.0+0x296/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:638
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:733 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x78d/0x9d0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:753
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x152/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:764
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
 netlink_sendmsg+0x850/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x150/0x190 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6d8/0x840 net/socket.c:2363
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2417
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2450
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: a9c8336 ("mlxsw: core: Add support for devlink info command")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
kitakar5525 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2020
[ Upstream commit c4317b1 ]

In case devlink reload failed, it is possible to trigger a
use-after-free when querying the kernel for device info via 'devlink dev
info' [1].

This happens because as part of the reload error path the PCI command
interface is de-initialized and its mailboxes are freed. When the
devlink '->info_get()' callback is invoked the device is queried via the
command interface and the freed mailboxes are accessed.

Fix this by initializing the command interface once during probe and not
during every reload.

This is consistent with the other bus used by mlxsw (i.e., 'mlxsw_i2c')
and also allows user space to query the running firmware version (for
example) from the device after a failed reload.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff88810ae32000 by task syz-executor.1/2355

CPU: 1 PID: 2355 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xf6/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x14e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:106
 memcpy include/linux/string.h:406 [inline]
 mlxsw_pci_cmd_exec+0x177/0xa60 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:1675
 mlxsw_cmd_exec+0x249/0x550 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2335
 mlxsw_cmd_access_reg drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/cmd.h:859 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access_cmd drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1938 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access+0x2f6/0x540 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1985
 mlxsw_reg_query drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2000 [inline]
 mlxsw_devlink_info_get+0x17f/0x6e0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1090
 devlink_nl_info_fill.constprop.0+0x13c/0x2d0 net/core/devlink.c:4588
 devlink_nl_cmd_info_get_dumpit+0x246/0x460 net/core/devlink.c:4648
 genl_lock_dumpit+0x85/0xc0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:575
 netlink_dump+0x515/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2245
 __netlink_dump_start+0x53d/0x830 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2353
 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.0+0x296/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:638
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:733 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x78d/0x9d0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:753
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x152/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:764
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
 netlink_sendmsg+0x850/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x150/0x190 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6d8/0x840 net/socket.c:2363
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2417
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2450
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: a9c8336 ("mlxsw: core: Add support for devlink info command")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2020
The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from
rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked
without RCU protection.

This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which
relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical
section.

Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done
in the bridge driver.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by bridge/166:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0
 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0
 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090
 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0
RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 5e6d243 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit b514191 ]

The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from
rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked
without RCU protection.

This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which
relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical
section.

Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done
in the bridge driver.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by bridge/166:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0
 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0
 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090
 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0
RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 5e6d243 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit b514191 ]

The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from
rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked
without RCU protection.

This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which
relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical
section.

Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done
in the bridge driver.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by bridge/166:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0
 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0
 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090
 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0
RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 5e6d243 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit b514191 ]

The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from
rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked
without RCU protection.

This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which
relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical
section.

Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done
in the bridge driver.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by bridge/166:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0
 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0
 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090
 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0
RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 5e6d243 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 1, 2020
[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ]

According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5,
the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during
OPEN state.

The section below shows the btmon trace when running
L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change.

=== Before ===
...
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12                #22
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16                #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12                #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #25
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #26
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16                #27
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18                #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #29
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14                #30
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20                #31
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                ......
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14                #32
      L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6
        Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002)
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #33
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
...
=== After ===
...
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12               #22
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16               #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #25
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #26
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16               #27
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #29
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14               #30
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20               #31
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                .....
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #32
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #33
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #34
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #35
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
...

Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 1, 2020
[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ]

According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5,
the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during
OPEN state.

The section below shows the btmon trace when running
L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change.

=== Before ===
...
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12                #22
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16                #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12                #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #25
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #26
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16                #27
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18                #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #29
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14                #30
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20                #31
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                ......
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14                #32
      L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6
        Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002)
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5      #33
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
...
=== After ===
...
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12               #22
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16               #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #25
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #26
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16               #27
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #29
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14               #30
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20               #31
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                .....
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #32
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #33
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #34
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5     #35
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 256
        Count: 1
...

Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
kitakar5525 pushed a commit to kitakar5525/linux-kernel that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2020
When more than a single SCMI device are present in the system, the
creation of the notification workqueue with the WQ_SYSFS flag will lead
to the following sysfs duplicate node warning:

 sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/workqueue/scmi_notify'
 CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.9.0-gdf4dd84a3f7d linux-surface#29
 Hardware name: Broadcom STB (Flattened Device Tree)
 Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
 Backtrace:
   show_stack + 0x20/0x24
   dump_stack + 0xbc/0xe0
   sysfs_warn_dup + 0x70/0x80
   sysfs_create_dir_ns + 0x15c/0x1a4
   kobject_add_internal + 0x140/0x4d0
   kobject_add + 0xc8/0x138
   device_add + 0x1dc/0xc20
   device_register + 0x24/0x28
   workqueue_sysfs_register + 0xe4/0x1f0
   alloc_workqueue + 0x448/0x6ac
   scmi_notification_init + 0x78/0x1dc
   scmi_probe + 0x268/0x4fc
   platform_drv_probe + 0x70/0xc8
   really_probe + 0x184/0x728
   driver_probe_device + 0xa4/0x278
   __device_attach_driver + 0xe8/0x148
   bus_for_each_drv + 0x108/0x158
   __device_attach + 0x190/0x234
   device_initial_probe + 0x1c/0x20
   bus_probe_device + 0xdc/0xec
   deferred_probe_work_func + 0xd4/0x11c
   process_one_work + 0x420/0x8f0
   worker_thread + 0x4fc/0x91c
   kthread + 0x21c/0x22c
   ret_from_fork + 0x14/0x20
 kobject_add_internal failed for scmi_notify with -EEXIST, don't try to
 	register things with the same name in the same directory.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Notifications - Initialization Failed.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Notifications NOT available.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Protocol v1.0 'brcm-scmi:' Firmware version 0x1

Fix this by using dev_name(handle->dev) which guarantees that the name is
unique and this also helps correlate which notification workqueue corresponds
to which SCMI device instance.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: bd31b24 ("firmware: arm_scmi: Add notification dispatch and delivery")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
[sudeep.holla: trimmed backtrace to remove all unwanted hexcodes and timestamps]
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 9, 2020
[ Upstream commit b9ceca6 ]

When more than a single SCMI device are present in the system, the
creation of the notification workqueue with the WQ_SYSFS flag will lead
to the following sysfs duplicate node warning:

 sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/workqueue/scmi_notify'
 CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.9.0-gdf4dd84a3f7d #29
 Hardware name: Broadcom STB (Flattened Device Tree)
 Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
 Backtrace:
   show_stack + 0x20/0x24
   dump_stack + 0xbc/0xe0
   sysfs_warn_dup + 0x70/0x80
   sysfs_create_dir_ns + 0x15c/0x1a4
   kobject_add_internal + 0x140/0x4d0
   kobject_add + 0xc8/0x138
   device_add + 0x1dc/0xc20
   device_register + 0x24/0x28
   workqueue_sysfs_register + 0xe4/0x1f0
   alloc_workqueue + 0x448/0x6ac
   scmi_notification_init + 0x78/0x1dc
   scmi_probe + 0x268/0x4fc
   platform_drv_probe + 0x70/0xc8
   really_probe + 0x184/0x728
   driver_probe_device + 0xa4/0x278
   __device_attach_driver + 0xe8/0x148
   bus_for_each_drv + 0x108/0x158
   __device_attach + 0x190/0x234
   device_initial_probe + 0x1c/0x20
   bus_probe_device + 0xdc/0xec
   deferred_probe_work_func + 0xd4/0x11c
   process_one_work + 0x420/0x8f0
   worker_thread + 0x4fc/0x91c
   kthread + 0x21c/0x22c
   ret_from_fork + 0x14/0x20
 kobject_add_internal failed for scmi_notify with -EEXIST, don't try to
 	register things with the same name in the same directory.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Notifications - Initialization Failed.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Notifications NOT available.
 arm-scmi brcm_scmi@1: SCMI Protocol v1.0 'brcm-scmi:' Firmware version 0x1

Fix this by using dev_name(handle->dev) which guarantees that the name is
unique and this also helps correlate which notification workqueue corresponds
to which SCMI device instance.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: bd31b24 ("firmware: arm_scmi: Add notification dispatch and delivery")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
[sudeep.holla: trimmed backtrace to remove all unwanted hexcodes and timestamps]
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2020
This patch fixes issue introduced by a previous commit where iWARP
doorbell address wasn't initialized, causing call trace when any RDMA
application wants to use this interface:

  Illegal doorbell address: 0000000000000000. Legal range for doorbell addresses is [0000000011431e08..00000000ec3799d3]
  WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 11990 at drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dev.c:93 qed_db_rec_sanity.isra.12+0x48/0x70 [qed]
  ...
   hpsa scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: crc8]
  CPU: 11 PID: 11990 Comm: rping Tainted: G S                5.10.0-rc1 #29
  Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 01/22/2018
  RIP: 0010:qed_db_rec_sanity.isra.12+0x48/0x70 [qed]
  ...
  RSP: 0018:ffffafc28458fa88 EFLAGS: 00010286
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8d0d4c620000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: ffff8d10afde7d50 RSI: ffff8d10afdd8b40 RDI: ffff8d10afdd8b40
  RBP: ffffafc28458fe38 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000007fff
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffafc28458f888 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8d0d43ccbbd0 R15: ffff8d0d48dae9c0
  FS:  00007fbd5267e740(0000) GS:ffff8d10afdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fbd4f258fb8 CR3: 0000000108d96003 CR4: 00000000001706e0
  Call Trace:
   qed_db_recovery_add+0x6d/0x1f0 [qed]
   qedr_create_user_qp+0x57e/0xd30 [qedr]
   qedr_create_qp+0x5f3/0xab0 [qedr]
   ? lookup_get_idr_uobject.part.12+0x45/0x90 [ib_uverbs]
   create_qp+0x45d/0xb30 [ib_uverbs]
   ? ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler+0x30/0x30 [ib_uverbs]
   ib_uverbs_create_qp+0xb9/0xe0 [ib_uverbs]
   ib_uverbs_write+0x3f9/0x570 [ib_uverbs]
   ? security_mmap_file+0x62/0xe0
   vfs_write+0xb7/0x200
   ksys_write+0xaf/0xd0
   ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.25+0x152/0x200
   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 06e8d1d ("RDMA/qedr: Add support for user mode XRC-SRQ's")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alok Prasad <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2021
[ Upstream commit d412137 ]

The perf_buffer fails on system with offline cpus:

  # test_progs -t perf_buffer
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_cpus 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_on_cpus 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:attach_kprobe 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buf__new 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:epoll_fd 0 nsec
  skipping offline CPU #24
  skipping offline CPU #25
  skipping offline CPU #26
  skipping offline CPU #27
  skipping offline CPU #28
  skipping offline CPU #29
  skipping offline CPU #30
  skipping offline CPU #31
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buffer__poll 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:seen_cpu_cnt 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:FAIL:buf_cnt got 24, expected 32
  Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED

Changing the test to check online cpus instead of possible.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2021
[ Upstream commit d412137 ]

The perf_buffer fails on system with offline cpus:

  # test_progs -t perf_buffer
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_cpus 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:nr_on_cpus 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:attach_kprobe 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buf__new 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:epoll_fd 0 nsec
  skipping offline CPU #24
  skipping offline CPU #25
  skipping offline CPU #26
  skipping offline CPU #27
  skipping offline CPU #28
  skipping offline CPU #29
  skipping offline CPU #30
  skipping offline CPU #31
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:perf_buffer__poll 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:PASS:seen_cpu_cnt 0 nsec
  test_perf_buffer:FAIL:buf_cnt got 24, expected 32
  Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED

Changing the test to check online cpus instead of possible.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2022
commit 22e2100 upstream.

The trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() require the caller to setup frame pointer
properly. This because these two functions use macro 'CALLER_ADDR1' (aka.
__builtin_return_address(1)) to acquire caller info. If the $fp is used
for other purpose, the code generated this macro (as below) could trigger
memory access fault.

   0xffffffff8011510e <+80>:    ld      a1,-16(s0)
   0xffffffff80115112 <+84>:    ld      s2,-8(a1)  # <-- paging fault here

The oops message during booting if compiled with 'irqoff' tracer enabled:
[    0.039615][    T0] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8
[    0.041925][    T0] Oops [#1]
[    0.042063][    T0] Modules linked in:
[    0.042864][    T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-00233-g9a20c48d1ed2 #29
[    0.043568][    T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[    0.044343][    T0] epc : trace_hardirqs_on+0x56/0xe2
[    0.044601][    T0]  ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e
[    0.044721][    T0] epc : ffffffff80126a5c ra : ffffffff80003b94 sp : ffffffff81403db0
[    0.044801][    T0]  gp : ffffffff8163acd8 tp : ffffffff81414880 t0 : 0000000000000020
[    0.044882][    T0]  t1 : 0098968000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81403de0
[    0.044967][    T0]  s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000001 a1 : 0000000000000100
[    0.045046][    T0]  a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.045124][    T0]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000054494d45
[    0.045210][    T0]  s2 : ffffffff80003b94 s3 : ffffffff81a8f1b0 s4 : ffffffff80e27b50
[    0.045289][    T0]  s5 : ffffffff81414880 s6 : ffffffff8160fa00 s7 : 00000000800120e8
[    0.045389][    T0]  s8 : 0000000080013100 s9 : 000000000000007f s10: 0000000000000000
[    0.045474][    T0]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 7fffffffffffffff t4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.045548][    T0]  t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ffffffff814aa368
[    0.045620][    T0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 00000000000000f8 cause: 000000000000000d
[    0.046402][    T0] [<ffffffff80003b94>] restore_all+0x12/0x6e

This because the $fp(aka. $s0) register is not used as frame pointer in the
assembly entry code.

	resume_kernel:
		REG_L s0, TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT(tp)
		bnez s0, restore_all
		REG_L s0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
                andi s0, s0, _TIF_NEED_RESCHED
                beqz s0, restore_all
                call preempt_schedule_irq
                j restore_all

To fix above issue, here we add one extra level wrapper for function
trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() so they can be safely called by low level entry
code.

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3c46979 ("riscv: Enable LOCKDEP_SUPPORT & fixup TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
kitakar5525 pushed a commit to kitakar5525/linux-kernel that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2022
The trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() require the caller to setup frame pointer
properly. This because these two functions use macro 'CALLER_ADDR1' (aka.
__builtin_return_address(1)) to acquire caller info. If the $fp is used
for other purpose, the code generated this macro (as below) could trigger
memory access fault.

   0xffffffff8011510e <+80>:    ld      a1,-16(s0)
   0xffffffff80115112 <+84>:    ld      s2,-8(a1)  # <-- paging fault here

The oops message during booting if compiled with 'irqoff' tracer enabled:
[    0.039615][    T0] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8
[    0.041925][    T0] Oops [#1]
[    0.042063][    T0] Modules linked in:
[    0.042864][    T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-00233-g9a20c48d1ed2 linux-surface#29
[    0.043568][    T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[    0.044343][    T0] epc : trace_hardirqs_on+0x56/0xe2
[    0.044601][    T0]  ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e
[    0.044721][    T0] epc : ffffffff80126a5c ra : ffffffff80003b94 sp : ffffffff81403db0
[    0.044801][    T0]  gp : ffffffff8163acd8 tp : ffffffff81414880 t0 : 0000000000000020
[    0.044882][    T0]  t1 : 0098968000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81403de0
[    0.044967][    T0]  s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000001 a1 : 0000000000000100
[    0.045046][    T0]  a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.045124][    T0]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000054494d45
[    0.045210][    T0]  s2 : ffffffff80003b94 s3 : ffffffff81a8f1b0 s4 : ffffffff80e27b50
[    0.045289][    T0]  s5 : ffffffff81414880 s6 : ffffffff8160fa00 s7 : 00000000800120e8
[    0.045389][    T0]  s8 : 0000000080013100 s9 : 000000000000007f s10: 0000000000000000
[    0.045474][    T0]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 7fffffffffffffff t4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.045548][    T0]  t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ffffffff814aa368
[    0.045620][    T0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 00000000000000f8 cause: 000000000000000d
[    0.046402][    T0] [<ffffffff80003b94>] restore_all+0x12/0x6e

This because the $fp(aka. $s0) register is not used as frame pointer in the
assembly entry code.

	resume_kernel:
		REG_L s0, TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT(tp)
		bnez s0, restore_all
		REG_L s0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
                andi s0, s0, _TIF_NEED_RESCHED
                beqz s0, restore_all
                call preempt_schedule_irq
                j restore_all

To fix above issue, here we add one extra level wrapper for function
trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() so they can be safely called by low level entry
code.

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3c46979 ("riscv: Enable LOCKDEP_SUPPORT & fixup TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 7, 2022
This commit adds python script to parse CoreSight tracing event and
print out source line and disassembly, it generates readable program
execution flow for easier humans inspecting.

The script receives CoreSight tracing packet with below format:

                +------------+------------+------------+
  packet(n):    |    addr    |    ip      |    cpu     |
                +------------+------------+------------+
  packet(n+1):  |    addr    |    ip      |    cpu     |
                +------------+------------+------------+

packet::addr presents the start address of the coming branch sample, and
packet::ip is the last address of the branch smple.  Therefore, a code
section between branches starts from packet(n)::addr and it stops at
packet(n+1)::ip.  As results we combines the two continuous packets to
generate the address range for instructions:

  [ sample(n)::addr .. sample(n+1)::ip ]

The script supports both objdump or llvm-objdump for disassembly with
specifying option '-d'.  If doesn't specify option '-d', the script
simply outputs source lines and symbols.

Below shows usages with llvm-objdump or objdump to output disassembly.

  # perf script -s scripts/python/arm-cs-trace-disasm.py -- -d llvm-objdump-11 -k ./vmlinux
  ARM CoreSight Trace Data Assembler Dump
  	ffff800008eb3198 <etm4_enable_hw>:
  	ffff800008eb3310: c0 38 00 35  	cbnz	w0, 0xffff800008eb3a28 <etm4_enable_hw+0x890>
  	ffff800008eb3314: 9f 3f 03 d5  	dsb	sy
  	ffff800008eb3318: df 3f 03 d5  	isb
  	ffff800008eb331c: f5 5b 42 a9  	ldp	x21, x22, [sp, #32]
  	ffff800008eb3320: fb 73 45 a9  	ldp	x27, x28, [sp, #80]
  	ffff800008eb3324: e0 82 40 39  	ldrb	w0, [x23, #32]
  	ffff800008eb3328: 60 00 00 34  	cbz	w0, 0xffff800008eb3334 <etm4_enable_hw+0x19c>
  	ffff800008eb332c: e0 03 19 aa  	mov	x0, x25
  	ffff800008eb3330: 8c fe ff 97  	bl	0xffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>
              main  6728/6728  [0004]         0.000000000  etm4_enable_hw+0x198                    [kernel.kallsyms]
  	ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>:
  	ffff800008eb2d60: 1f 20 03 d5  	nop
  	ffff800008eb2d64: 1f 20 03 d5  	nop
  	ffff800008eb2d68: 3f 23 03 d5  	hint	#25
  	ffff800008eb2d6c: 00 00 40 f9  	ldr	x0, [x0]
  	ffff800008eb2d70: 9f 3f 03 d5  	dsb	sy
  	ffff800008eb2d74: 00 c0 3e 91  	add	x0, x0, #4016
  	ffff800008eb2d78: 1f 00 00 b9  	str	wzr, [x0]
  	ffff800008eb2d7c: bf 23 03 d5  	hint	#29
  	ffff800008eb2d80: c0 03 5f d6  	ret
              main  6728/6728  [0004]         0.000000000  etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0+0x20

  # perf script -s scripts/python/arm-cs-trace-disasm.py -- -d objdump -k ./vmlinux
  ARM CoreSight Trace Data Assembler Dump
  	ffff800008eb3310 <etm4_enable_hw+0x178>:
  	ffff800008eb3310:	350038c0 	cbnz	w0, ffff800008eb3a28 <etm4_enable_hw+0x890>
  	ffff800008eb3314:	d5033f9f 	dsb	sy
  	ffff800008eb3318:	d5033fdf 	isb
  	ffff800008eb331c:	a9425bf5 	ldp	x21, x22, [sp, #32]
  	ffff800008eb3320:	a94573fb 	ldp	x27, x28, [sp, #80]
  	ffff800008eb3324:	394082e0 	ldrb	w0, [x23, #32]
  	ffff800008eb3328:	34000060 	cbz	w0, ffff800008eb3334 <etm4_enable_hw+0x19c>
  	ffff800008eb332c:	aa1903e0 	mov	x0, x25
  	ffff800008eb3330:	97fffe8c 	bl	ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>
              main  6728/6728  [0004]         0.000000000  etm4_enable_hw+0x198                    [kernel.kallsyms]
  	ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>:
  	ffff800008eb2d60:	d503201f 	nop
  	ffff800008eb2d64:	d503201f 	nop
  	ffff800008eb2d68:	d503233f 	paciasp
  	ffff800008eb2d6c:	f9400000 	ldr	x0, [x0]
  	ffff800008eb2d70:	d5033f9f 	dsb	sy
  	ffff800008eb2d74:	913ec000 	add	x0, x0, #0xfb0
  	ffff800008eb2d78:	b900001f 	str	wzr, [x0]
  	ffff800008eb2d7c:	d50323bf 	autiasp
  	ffff800008eb2d80:	d65f03c0 	ret
              main  6728/6728  [0004]         0.000000000  etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0+0x20

Signed-off-by: Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Al Grant <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Tor Jeremiassen <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>
Cc: German Gomez <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Brennan <[email protected]>
Cc: Tanmay Jagdale <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: zengshun . wu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2022
commit 71e2d66 upstream.

The following has been observed when running stressng mmap since commit
b653db7 ("mm: Clear page->private when splitting or migrating a page")

   watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#75 stuck for 26s! [stress-ng:9546]
   CPU: 75 PID: 9546 Comm: stress-ng Tainted: G            E      6.0.0-revert-b653db77-fix+ #29 0357d79b60fb09775f678e4f3f64ef0579ad1374
   Hardware name: SGI.COM C2112-4GP3/X10DRT-P-Series, BIOS 2.0a 05/09/2016
   RIP: 0010:xas_descend+0x28/0x80
   Code: cc cc 0f b6 0e 48 8b 57 08 48 d3 ea 83 e2 3f 89 d0 48 83 c0 04 48 8b 44 c6 08 48 89 77 18 48 89 c1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 75 08 <48> 3d fd 00 00 00 76 08 88 57 12 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c1 e8 02 89 c2
   RSP: 0018:ffffbbf02a2236a8 EFLAGS: 00000246
   RAX: ffff9cab7d6a0002 RBX: ffffe04b0af88040 RCX: 0000000000000002
   RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: ffff9cab60509b60 RDI: ffffbbf02a2236c0
   RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9cab60509b60 R09: ffffbbf02a2236c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffbbf02a223698 R12: 0000000000000000
   R13: ffff9cab4e28da80 R14: 0000000000039c01 R15: ffff9cab4e28da88
   FS:  00007fab89b85e40(0000) GS:ffff9cea3fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007fab84e00000 CR3: 00000040b73a4003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    xas_load+0x3a/0x50
    __filemap_get_folio+0x80/0x370
    ? put_swap_page+0x163/0x360
    pagecache_get_page+0x13/0x90
    __try_to_reclaim_swap+0x50/0x190
    scan_swap_map_slots+0x31e/0x670
    get_swap_pages+0x226/0x3c0
    folio_alloc_swap+0x1cc/0x240
    add_to_swap+0x14/0x70
    shrink_page_list+0x968/0xbc0
    reclaim_page_list+0x70/0xf0
    reclaim_pages+0xdd/0x120
    madvise_cold_or_pageout_pte_range+0x814/0xf30
    walk_pgd_range+0x637/0xa30
    __walk_page_range+0x142/0x170
    walk_page_range+0x146/0x170
    madvise_pageout+0xb7/0x280
    ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
    madvise_vma_behavior+0x3b7/0xac0
    ? find_vma+0x4a/0x70
    ? find_vma+0x64/0x70
    ? madvise_vma_anon_name+0x40/0x40
    madvise_walk_vmas+0xa6/0x130
    do_madvise+0x2f4/0x360
    __x64_sys_madvise+0x26/0x30
    do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
    ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
    ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
    ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
    ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
    ? common_interrupt+0x8b/0xa0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The problem can be reproduced with the mmtests config
config-workload-stressng-mmap.  It does not always happen and when it
triggers is variable but it has happened on multiple machines.

The intent of commit b653db7 patch was to avoid the case where
PG_private is clear but folio->private is not-NULL.  However, THP tail
pages uses page->private for "swp_entry_t if folio_test_swapcache()" as
stated in the documentation for struct folio.  This patch only clobbers
page->private for tail pages if the head page was not in swapcache and
warns once if page->private had an unexpected value.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: b653db7 ("mm: Clear page->private when splitting or migrating a page")
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Seth Jennings <[email protected]>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 36ac9e7 ]

Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.

DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
 sp : ffffffc0864e3570
 x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
 x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
 x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
 x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
 x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
 x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
 x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
 x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 Call trace:
  __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
  mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
  tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
  stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
  taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c

Fixes: b2aae65 ("net: stmmac: add mutex lock to protect est parameters")
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Halaney <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2024
[ Upstream commit e64746e ]

cpumask_of_node() can be called for NUMA_NO_NODE inside do_map_benchmark()
resulting in the following sanitizer report:

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask [64][1]'
CPU: 1 PID: 990 Comm: dma_map_benchma Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
ubsan_epilogue (lib/ubsan.c:232)
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds (lib/ubsan.c:429)
cpumask_of_node (arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72) [inline]
do_map_benchmark (kernel/dma/map_benchmark.c:104)
map_benchmark_ioctl (kernel/dma/map_benchmark.c:246)
full_proxy_unlocked_ioctl (fs/debugfs/file.c:333)
__x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Use cpumask_of_node() in place when binding a kernel thread to a cpuset
of a particular node.

Note that the provided node id is checked inside map_benchmark_ioctl().
It's just a NUMA_NO_NODE case which is not handled properly later.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 65789da ("dma-mapping: add benchmark support for streaming DMA APIs")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit eef0532 ]

Run bpf_tcp_ca selftests (./test_progs -t bpf_tcp_ca) on a Loongarch
platform, some "Segmentation fault" errors occur:

'''
 test_dctcp:PASS:bpf_dctcp__open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_dctcp:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/1    bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp:FAIL
 test_cubic:PASS:bpf_cubic__open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_cubic:FAIL:bpf_map__attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/2    bpf_tcp_ca/cubic:FAIL
 test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:dctcp_skel 0 nsec
 test_dctcp_fallback:PASS:bpf_dctcp__load 0 nsec
 test_dctcp_fallback:FAIL:dctcp link unexpected error: -524
 #29/4    bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp_fallback:FAIL
 test_write_sk_pacing:PASS:open_and_load 0 nsec
 test_write_sk_pacing:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 #29/6    bpf_tcp_ca/write_sk_pacing:FAIL
 test_update_ca:PASS:open 0 nsec
 test_update_ca:FAIL:attach_struct_ops unexpected error: -524
 settcpca:FAIL:setsockopt unexpected setsockopt: \
					actual -1 == expected -1
 (network_helpers.c:99: errno: No such file or directory) \
					Failed to call post_socket_cb
 start_test:FAIL:start_server_str unexpected start_server_str: \
					actual -1 == expected -1
 test_update_ca:FAIL:ca1_ca1_cnt unexpected ca1_ca1_cnt: \
					actual 0 <= expected 0
 #29/9    bpf_tcp_ca/update_ca:FAIL
 #29      bpf_tcp_ca:FAIL
 Caught signal #11!
 Stack trace:
 ./test_progs(crash_handler+0x28)[0x5555567ed91c]
 linux-vdso.so.1(__vdso_rt_sigreturn+0x0)[0x7ffffee408b0]
 ./test_progs(bpf_link__update_map+0x80)[0x555556824a78]
 ./test_progs(+0x94d68)[0x5555564c4d68]
 ./test_progs(test_bpf_tcp_ca+0xe8)[0x5555564c6a88]
 ./test_progs(+0x3bde54)[0x5555567ede54]
 ./test_progs(main+0x61c)[0x5555567efd54]
 /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(+0x22208)[0x7ffff2aaa208]
 /usr/lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xac)[0x7ffff2aaa30c]
 ./test_progs(_start+0x48)[0x55555646bca8]
 Segmentation fault
'''

This is because BPF trampoline is not implemented on Loongarch yet,
"link" returned by bpf_map__attach_struct_ops() is NULL. test_progs
crashs when this NULL link passes to bpf_link__update_map(). This
patch adds NULL checks for all links in bpf_tcp_ca to fix these errors.
If "link" is NULL, goto the newly added label "out" to destroy the skel.

v2:
 - use "goto out" instead of "return" as Eduard suggested.

Fixes: 06da9f3 ("selftests/bpf: Test switching TCP Congestion Control algorithms.")
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b4c841492bd4ed97964e4e61e92827ce51bf1dc9.1720615848.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
qzed pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2024
commit 468e329 upstream.

Fix a null pointer dereference induced by DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
Return from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() if the psp_device or the
sev_device structs are not initialized. Without the fix, the driver will
produce the following splat:

   ccp 0000:55:00.5: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: sev enabled
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: psp enabled
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f0
   #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
   CPU: 262 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1+ #29
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    ? __die_body+0x6f/0xb0
    ? __die+0xcc/0xf0
    ? page_fault_oops+0x330/0x3a0
    ? save_trace+0x2a5/0x360
    ? do_user_addr_fault+0x583/0x630
    ? exc_page_fault+0x81/0x120
    ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
    ? __sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
    __sev_firmware_shutdown+0x349/0x5b0
    ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x66/0xe0
    sev_dev_destroy+0x34/0xb0
    psp_dev_destroy+0x27/0x60
    sp_destroy+0x39/0x90
    sp_pci_remove+0x22/0x60
    pci_device_remove+0x4e/0x110
    really_probe+0x271/0x4e0
    __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x160
    driver_probe_device+0x24/0x120
    __driver_attach+0xc7/0x280
    ? driver_attach+0x30/0x30
    bus_for_each_dev+0x10d/0x130
    driver_attach+0x22/0x30
    bus_add_driver+0x171/0x2b0
    ? unaccepted_memory_init_kdump+0x20/0x20
    driver_register+0x67/0x100
    __pci_register_driver+0x83/0x90
    sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
    sp_mod_init+0x13/0x30
    do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x290
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __lock_acquire+0xd90/0xe30
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? parameq+0x1b/0x90
    ? parse_one+0x6d/0x1d0
    ? parse_args+0xd7/0x1f0
    ? do_initcall_level+0x180/0x180
    do_initcall_level+0xb0/0x180
    do_initcalls+0x60/0xa0
    ? kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    do_basic_setup+0x41/0x50
    kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x50
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
    </TASK>
   Modules linked in:
   CR2: 00000000000000f0
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
   Kernel Offset: 0x1fc00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 1ca5614 ("crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

5 participants