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Uninitialized bitfields create long origin chaings #47

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ramosian-glider opened this issue Nov 12, 2018 · 5 comments
Closed

Uninitialized bitfields create long origin chaings #47

ramosian-glider opened this issue Nov 12, 2018 · 5 comments

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@ramosian-glider
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Starting from Linux v.4.20-rc2 there're seven 1-bit fields in struct mmu_gather packed into an unsigned int value. One of those fields is updated in a tight loop. On each update, the remaining 25 uninitialized bits receive a new origin generated from the previous one:

u32 values;
for (i = 0; ... ; i++) {
  values |= FIELD_MASK;
  // u32 *origin = get_origin_ptr(&values);
  // *origin = __msan_chain_origin(*origin);
}

This generates a lot of unnecessary origin chains, which may quickly fill the stack depot and start reporting warnings.

@dvyukov
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dvyukov commented Nov 12, 2018

In user-space we limit length of origin chains to some small number (e.g. 5). Perhaps we need the same in kernel.

Also, if it's updated in a loop, we could ignore addition of the same stack to the chain. I.e. if the old chain is (A+B) and we add B again, then we return the current (A+B) stack id. Does it make any sense? Or we already do this?

@eugenis
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eugenis commented Nov 12, 2018 via email

@dvyukov
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dvyukov commented Nov 12, 2018

In kernel stackdepot mapping from id to stack is super fast:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/lib/stackdepot.c#L197-L207
Should do the same in userspace.

@ramosian-glider
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We do have a limit on chaining (7 stacks), and actually in this particular case the problem doesn't lead to stack depot explosion, because the stack traces are always the same (they start from the exit() syscall).
There's a warning in KMSAN that's printed on every 10000 dropped chains, but the case in question is on a hot path, and it renders this warning useless (and also leads to tons of unnecessary accesses to the stack depot).

ramosian-glider pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 8, 2020
When enabling ftrace graph tracer, it gets the tracing clock in
ftrace_push_return_trace().  Eventually, it invokes riscv_sched_clock()
to get the clock value.  If riscv_sched_clock() isn't marked with
'notrace', it will call ftrace_push_return_trace() and cause infinite
loop.

The result of failure as follow:

command: echo function_graph >current_tracer
[   46.176787] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffe04fb38c48
[   46.177309] Oops [#1]
[   46.177478] Modules linked in:
[   46.177770] CPU: 0 PID: 256 Comm: $d Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1 #47
[   46.177981] epc: ffffffe00035e59a ra : ffffffe00035e57e sp : ffffffe03a7569b0
[   46.178216]  gp : ffffffe000d29b90 tp : ffffffe03a756180 t0 : ffffffe03a756968
[   46.178430]  t1 : ffffffe00087f408 t2 : ffffffe03a7569a0 s0 : ffffffe03a7569f0
[   46.178643]  s1 : ffffffe00087f408 a0 : 0000000ac054cda4 a1 : 000000000087f411
[   46.178856]  a2 : 0000000ac054cda4 a3 : 0000000000373ca0 a4 : ffffffe04fb38c48
[   46.179099]  a5 : 00000000153e22a8 a6 : 00000000005522ff a7 : 0000000000000005
[   46.179338]  s2 : ffffffe03a756a90 s3 : ffffffe00032811c s4 : ffffffe03a756a58
[   46.179570]  s5 : ffffffe000d29fe0 s6 : 0000000000000001 s7 : 0000000000000003
[   46.179809]  s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : 0000000000000002 s10: 0000000000000004
[   46.180053]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 0000003fc815749c t4 : 00000000000efc90
[   46.180293]  t5 : ffffffe000d29658 t6 : 0000000000040000
[   46.180482] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ffffffe04fb38c48 cause: 000000000000000f

Signed-off-by: Zong Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: cleaned up patch description]
Fixes: 92e0d14 ("clocksource/drivers/riscv_timer: Provide the sched_clock")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
ramosian-glider pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 9, 2020
Running the eBPF test_verifier leads to random errors looking like this:

[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage, while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

commit 7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] differently. Track the
beginning of instruction and account for the extra instruction while
calculating the arm instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
ramosian-glider pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 3, 2021
Normally the zero fill would hide the missing initialization, but an
errant set to desc_size in reg_create() causes a crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000800000000
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 5 PID: 890 Comm: ib_write_bw Not tainted 5.15.0-rc4+ #47
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x14/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
  Code: 48 63 cd 4c 89 f7 48 89 0c 24 e8 37 30 03 e1 48 8b 0c 24 eb a0 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 30 <48> 8b 2f 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 28 31 c0 8b 87 c8
  RSP: 0018:ffff88811afa3a60 EFLAGS: 00010286
  RAX: 000000000000001c RBX: 0000000800000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000800000000
  RBP: 0000000800000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000fffff7ff
  R10: ffff88811afa38f8 R11: ffff88811afa38f0 R12: ffffffffa02c7ac0
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88811afa3cd8 R15: ffff88810772fa00
  FS:  00007f47b9080740(0000) GS:ffff88852cd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000800000000 CR3: 000000010761e003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   mlx5_ib_free_odp_mr+0x95/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
   mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x128/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
   ib_dereg_mr_user+0x45/0xb0 [ib_core]
   ? xas_load+0x8/0x80
   destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1a/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
   uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x2f/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
   uobj_destroy+0x3c/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
   ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x467/0xb00 [ib_uverbs]
   ? uverbs_finalize_object+0x60/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
   ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xa9/0xe0
   ? pty_write+0x85/0x90
   ? file_tty_write.isra.33+0x214/0x330
   ? process_echoes+0x60/0x60
   ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xa7/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x10d/0x8e0
   ? vfs_write+0x17f/0x260
   do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Add the missing xarray initialization and remove the desc_size set.

Fixes: a639e66 ("RDMA/mlx5: Zero out ODP related items in the mlx5_ib_mr")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a4846a11c9de834663e521770da895007f9f0d30.1634642730.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Aharon Landau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@ramosian-glider
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This shouldn't be a problem anymore.
When an origin chain hits the maximum length, it stops growing, and __msan_chain_origin() will continue assigning the same origin id to every origin created from that chain.
There will be cases when this happens too often - I am planning to introduce a tracepoint to detect such cases, but they won't be hurting us noticeably anyway.

ramosian-glider pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 14, 2022
syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 9 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10096 nf_tables_exit_net+0x71c/0x840
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Tainted: G        W          6.1.0-rc3-00072-g8e5423e991e8 #47
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:nf_tables_exit_net+0x71c/0x840
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __nft_release_table+0xfc0/0xfc0
 ops_exit_list+0xb5/0x180
 cleanup_net+0x506/0xb10
 ? unregister_pernet_device+0x80/0x80
 process_one_work+0xa38/0x1730
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2b0/0x2b0
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x46/0x50
 worker_thread+0x67e/0x10e0
 ? process_one_work+0x1730/0x1730
 kthread+0x2e5/0x3a0
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x40/0x40
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 </TASK>

In nf_tables_exit_net(), there is a case where nft_net->commit_list is
empty but nft_net->module_list is not empty.  Such a case occurs with
the following scenario:

1. nfnetlink_rcv_batch() is called
2. nf_tables_newset() returns -EAGAIN and NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE bit is
   set to status
3. nf_tables_abort() is called with NFNL_ABORT_AUTOLOAD
   (nft_net->commit_list is released, but nft_net->module_list is not
   because of NFNL_ABORT_AUTOLOAD flag)
4. Jump to replay label
5. netlink_skb_clone() fails and returns from the function (this is
   caused by fault injection in the reproducer of syzbot)

This patch fixes this issue by calling __nf_tables_abort() when
nft_net->module_list is not empty in nf_tables_exit_net().

Fixes: eb014de ("netfilter: nf_tables: autoload modules from the abort path")
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=802aba2422de4218ad0c01b46c9525cc9d4e4aa3 [1]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
ramosian-glider pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 20, 2023
syzbot reported a warning[1] where the bond device itself is a slave and
we try to enslave a non-ethernet device as the first slave which fails
but then in the error path when ether_setup() restores the bond device
it also clears all flags. In my previous fix[2] I restored the
IFF_MASTER flag, but I didn't consider the case that the bond device
itself might also be a slave with IFF_SLAVE set, so we need to restore
that flag as well. Use the bond_ether_setup helper which does the right
thing and restores the bond's flags properly.

Steps to reproduce using a nlmon dev:
 $ ip l add nlmon0 type nlmon
 $ ip l add bond1 type bond
 $ ip l add bond2 type bond
 $ ip l set bond1 master bond2
 $ ip l set dev nlmon0 master bond1
 $ ip -d l sh dev bond1
 22: bond1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,MASTER> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue master bond2 state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
 (now bond1's IFF_SLAVE flag is gone and we'll hit a warning[3] if we
  try to delete it)

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391c7b1f6522182899efba27d891f1743e8eb3ef
[2] commit 7d5cd2c ("bonding: correctly handle bonding type change on enslave failure")
[3] example warning:
 [   27.008664] bond1: (slave nlmon0): The slave device specified does not support setting the MAC address
 [   27.008692] bond1: (slave nlmon0): Error -95 calling set_mac_address
 [   32.464639] bond1 (unregistering): Released all slaves
 [   32.464685] ------------[ cut here ]------------
 [   32.464686] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2004 at net/core/dev.c:10829 unregister_netdevice_many+0x72a/0x780
 [   32.464694] Modules linked in: br_netfilter bridge bonding virtio_net
 [   32.464699] CPU: 1 PID: 2004 Comm: ip Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3+ #47
 [   32.464703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
 [   32.464704] RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x72a/0x780
 [   32.464707] Code: 99 fd ff ff ba 90 1a 00 00 48 c7 c6 f4 02 66 96 48 c7 c7 20 4d 35 96 c6 05 fa c7 2b 02 01 e8 be 6f 4a 00 0f 0b e9 73 fd ff ff <0f> 0b e9 5f fd ff ff 80 3d e3 c7 2b 02 00 0f 85 3b fd ff ff ba 59
 [   32.464710] RSP: 0018:ffffa006422d7820 EFLAGS: 00010206
 [   32.464712] RAX: ffff8f6e077140a0 RBX: ffffa006422d7888 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [   32.464714] RDX: ffff8f6e12edbe58 RSI: 0000000000000296 RDI: ffffffff96d4a520
 [   32.464716] RBP: ffff8f6e07714000 R08: ffffffff96d63600 R09: ffffa006422d7728
 [   32.464717] R10: 0000000000000ec0 R11: ffffffff9698c988 R12: ffff8f6e12edb140
 [   32.464719] R13: dead000000000122 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff8f6e12edb140
 [   32.464723] FS:  00007f297c2f1740(0000) GS:ffff8f6e5d900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [   32.464725] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [   32.464726] CR2: 00007f297bf1c800 CR3: 00000000115e8000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
 [   32.464730] Call Trace:
 [   32.464763]  <TASK>
 [   32.464767]  rtnl_dellink+0x13e/0x380
 [   32.464776]  ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x68/0x100
 [   32.464780]  ? __rtnl_unlock+0x33/0x60
 [   32.464783]  ? bpf_lsm_capset+0x10/0x10
 [   32.464786]  ? security_capable+0x36/0x50
 [   32.464790]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14e/0x3b0
 [   32.464792]  ? _copy_to_iter+0xb1/0x790
 [   32.464796]  ? post_alloc_hook+0xa0/0x160
 [   32.464799]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x110/0x110
 [   32.464802]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0
 [   32.464806]  netlink_unicast+0x216/0x340
 [   32.464809]  netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x480
 [   32.464812]  sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
 [   32.464815]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x22c/0x270
 [   32.464818]  ? import_iovec+0x17/0x20
 [   32.464821]  ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x59/0x90
 [   32.464823]  ? do_set_pte+0xa0/0xe0
 [   32.464828]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
 [   32.464832]  ? mod_objcg_state+0xc6/0x300
 [   32.464835]  ? refill_obj_stock+0xa9/0x160
 [   32.464838]  ? memcg_slab_free_hook+0x1a5/0x1f0
 [   32.464842]  __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x80
 [   32.464847]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
 [   32.464851]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 [   32.464865] RIP: 0033:0x7f297bf2e5e7
 [   32.464868] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
 [   32.464869] RSP: 002b:00007ffd96c824c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 [   32.464872] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f297bf2e5e7
 [   32.464874] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd96c82540 RDI: 0000000000000003
 [   32.464875] RBP: 00000000640f19de R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000000007c
 [   32.464876] R10: 00007f297bffabe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
 [   32.464877] R13: 00007ffd96c82d20 R14: 00007ffd96c82610 R15: 000055bfe38a7020
 [   32.464881]  </TASK>
 [   32.464882] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 7d5cd2c ("bonding: correctly handle bonding type change on enslave failure")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391c7b1f6522182899efba27d891f1743e8eb3ef
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jonathan Toppins <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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