Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW #7

dscho · 2014-10-08T13:49:09Z

On Windows, we need to care a little bit more about certain things like line endings. Therefore it makes sense to run some tests by default that would otherwise require the EXPENSIVE flag. This topic branch does that and also incorporates more regression tests relevant for Windows.

Add test cases for core.eol "native" and "" (unset). (MINGW uses CRLF, all other systems LF as native line endings) Add test cases for the attributes "eol=lf" and "eol=crlf" Other minor changes: - Use the more portable 'tr' instead of 'od -c' to convert '\n' into 'Q' and '\0' into 'N' - Style fixes for shell functions according to the coding guide lines - Replace "txtbin" with "attr" Signed-off-by: Torsten Bögershausen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

t0027 is marked expensive, but really, for MinGW we want to run these tests always. Suggested by Thomas Braun. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

We turn off ASan's leak detection by default in the test suite because it's too noisy. But we don't do so until part-way through test-lib. This is before we've run any tests, but after we do our initial "./git" to see if the binary has even been built. When built with clang, this seems to work fine. However, using "gcc -fsanitize=address", the leak checker seems to complain more aggressively: $ ./git ... ==5352==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f120e7afcf8 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.3+0xc1cf8) #1 0x559fc2a3ce41 in do_xmalloc /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:60 #2 0x559fc2a3cf1a in do_xmallocz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:100 #3 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xmallocz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:108 #4 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xmemdupz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:124 #5 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xstrndup /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:130 #6 0x559fc274535a in main /home/peff/compile/git/common-main.c:39 #7 0x7f120dabd2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0) This is a leak in the sense that we never free it, but it's in a global that is meant to last the whole program. So it's not really interesting or in need of fixing. And at any rate, mentioning leaks outside of the test_expect blocks is certainly unwelcome, as it pollutes stderr. Let's bump the setting of ASAN_OPTIONS higher in test-lib.sh to catch our initial "can we even run git?" test. While we're at it, we can add a comment to make it a bit less inscrutable. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

This is to address concerns raised by ThreadSanitizer on the mailing list about threaded unprotected R/W access to map.size with my previous "disallow rehash" change (0607e10). See: https://public-inbox.org/git/adb37b70139fd1e2bac18bfd22c8b96683ae18eb.1502780344.git.martin.agren@gmail.com/ Add API to hashmap to disable item counting and thus automatic rehashing. Also include API to later re-enable them. When item counting is disabled, the map.size field is invalid. So to prevent accidents, the field has been renamed and an accessor function hashmap_get_size() has been added. All direct references to this field have been been updated. And the name of the field changed to map.private_size to communicate this. Here is the relevant output from ThreadSanitizer showing the problem: WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: data race (pid=10554) Read of size 4 at 0x00000082d488 by thread T2 (mutexes: write M16): #0 hashmap_add hashmap.c:209 #1 hash_dir_entry_with_parent_and_prefix name-hash.c:302 #2 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:347 #3 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #4 lazy_dir_thread_proc name-hash.c:471 #5 <null> <null> Previous write of size 4 at 0x00000082d488 by thread T1 (mutexes: write M31): #0 hashmap_add hashmap.c:209 #1 hash_dir_entry_with_parent_and_prefix name-hash.c:302 #2 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:347 #3 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #4 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:380 #5 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #6 lazy_dir_thread_proc name-hash.c:471 #7 <null> <null> Martin gives instructions for running TSan on test t3008 in this post: https://public-inbox.org/git/CAN0heSoJDL9pWELD6ciLTmWf-a=oyxe4EXXOmCKvsG5MSuzxsA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

Completely convert the pathname expoted in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression #7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]>

Completely convert the pathname expoted in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression git-for-windows#7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]>

Completely convert the pathname expoted in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression #7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]>

Completely convert the pathname expoted in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression git-for-windows#7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]>

Completely convert the pathname expoted in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression #7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]>

Dependencies such as cURL and OpenSSL are necessary to build and run Git. Previously, we obtained those dependencies by fetching NuGet packages. However, it is notoriously hard to keep NuGet packages of C/C++ libraries up-to-date, as the toolsets for different Visual Studio versions are different, and the NuGet packages would have to ship them all. That is the reason why the NuGet packages we use are quite old, and even insecure in the case of cURL and OpenSSL (the versions contain known security flaws that have been addressed by later versions for which no NuGet packages are available). The better way to handle this situation is to use the vcpkg system: https://github.com/Microsoft/vcpkg The idea is that a single Git repository contains enough supporting files to build up-to-date versions of a large number of Open Source libraries on demand, including cURL and OpenSSL. We integrate this system via four new .bat files to 1) initialize the vcpkg system, 2) build the packages, 4) set up Git's Makefile system to find the build artifacts, and 3) copy the artifacts into the top-level directory We now also completely convert the pathname exported in the %msvc_bin_dir_msys% variable to MSYS format with forward slashes rather than a mixture of forward and back slashes. This solves an obscure problem observed by some developers: [...] http-push.c CC remote-curl.o remote-curl.c * new script parameters GEN git-instaweb sed: -e expression #7, char 155: invalid reference \2 on `s' command's RHS make: *** [Makefile:2023: git-instaweb] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>

…erialize-wait status: deserialization wait

status: deserialization wait

In some setups, old-style submodules (i.e. the ones with .git directory within theirs worktrees) with commondir can be of tremendous help. For example, commondir link can be used to avoid duplication of objects and also to keep branches in sync with multiple copies of the repo's worktree, while keeping the .git directory inside the worktree can be (ab?-)used to exploit the sharing of the same submodule worktree across different projects (this at least works on Windows with submodule directory being a directory junction, but having a junction is not relevant for reproducing the bug described below). Unfortunately, at the moment, when `git status` is run in the root repo of such a setup, it gives an output akin to this: ```sh fatal: unable to access '�??\1?/config': Invalid argument fatal: 'git status --porcelain=2' failed in submodule commonlibs ``` where `�??\1?` part of '�??\1?/config' varies from run to run, and `commonlibs` is the name of submodule's directory. Currently, when Git discovers old-style submodule , it spawns subprocess to get its status, like this one: ```sh cd commonlibs; unset GIT_PREFIX; GIT_DIR=.git git status --porcelain=2 ``` Unsurprisingly, the following output is also quite unexpected: ``` fatal: unable to access '`??L&?/config': Invalid argument ``` The core reason for these is that global repository field for commondir is not being cleared to `NULL` after being `free()`'d in `repo_set_commondir()`, which is precisely what this commit fixes. Regarding the further details of the case of investigation, this value of struct pointed by the global `the_repository` pointer is checked for being not-NULL down in the callstack in compatibility layer for MinGW in a function that is called by `repo_set_commondir()` before the `free()`'d value gets assigned in its body (i.e. the body of `repo_set_commondir()`). Backtrace from the check is: ``` #0 mingw_open (filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:784 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Backtrace from the death is: ``` #0 die_errno (fmt=0x<address-42> <result_type+2002> "unable to access '%s'") at usage.c:210 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-41> in access_or_die ( path=0x<address-40> "`\001\r��\004/config", mode=4, flag=0) at wrapper.c:667 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-39> in do_git_config_sequence (opts=0x<address-35>, fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>) at config.c:2142 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-38> in config_with_options ( fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>, config_source=0x0, opts=0x<address-35>) at config.c:2198 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-34> in repo_read_config (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2524 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-33> in git_config_check_init ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2543 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-32> in repo_config_get_bool ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2612 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-31> in git_config_get_bool ( key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2714 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-28> in mingw_open ( filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:785 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#15 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#16 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#17 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#18 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#19 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#20 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#21 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#22 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Signed-off-by: Andrey Zabavnikov <[email protected]>

Add config option `windows.appendAtomically` Atomic append on windows is only supported on local disk files, and it may cause errors in other situations, e.g. network file system. If that is the case, this config option should be used to turn atomic append off. With these edits, status for old-style submodules with commondir needs to be fixed, due to the following. In some setups, old-style submodules (i.e. the ones with .git directory within theirs worktrees) with commondir can be of tremendous help. For example, commondir link can be used to avoid duplication of objects and also to keep branches in sync with multiple copies of the repo's worktree, while keeping the .git directory inside the worktree can be (ab?-)used to exploit the sharing of the same submodule worktree across different projects (this at least works on Windows with submodule directory being a directory junction, but having a junction is not relevant for reproducing the bug described below). Unfortunately, at the moment, when `git status` is run in the root repo of such a setup, it gives an output akin to this: ```sh fatal: unable to access '�??\1?/config': Invalid argument fatal: 'git status --porcelain=2' failed in submodule commonlibs ``` where `�??\1?` part of '�??\1?/config' varies from run to run, and `commonlibs` is the name of submodule's directory. Currently, when Git discovers old-style submodule , it spawns subprocess to get its status, like this one: ```sh cd commonlibs; unset GIT_PREFIX; GIT_DIR=.git git status --porcelain=2 ``` Unsurprisingly, the following output is also quite unexpected: ``` fatal: unable to access '`??L&?/config': Invalid argument ``` The core reason for these is that global repository field for commondir is not being cleared to `NULL` after being `free()`'d in `repo_set_commondir()`, which is precisely what this commit fixes. Regarding the further details of the case of investigation, this value of struct pointed by the global `the_repository` pointer is checked for being not-NULL down in the callstack in compatibility layer for MinGW in a function that is called by `repo_set_commondir()` before the `free()`'d value gets assigned in its body (i.e. the body of `repo_set_commondir()`). Backtrace from the check is: ``` #0 mingw_open (filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:784 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Backtrace from the death is: ``` #0 die_errno (fmt=0x<address-42> <result_type+2002> "unable to access '%s'") at usage.c:210 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-41> in access_or_die ( path=0x<address-40> "`\001\r��\004/config", mode=4, flag=0) at wrapper.c:667 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-39> in do_git_config_sequence (opts=0x<address-35>, fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>) at config.c:2142 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-38> in config_with_options ( fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>, config_source=0x0, opts=0x<address-35>) at config.c:2198 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-34> in repo_read_config (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2524 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-33> in git_config_check_init ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2543 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-32> in repo_config_get_bool ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2612 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-31> in git_config_get_bool ( key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2714 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-28> in mingw_open ( filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:785 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#15 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#16 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#17 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#18 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#19 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#20 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#21 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#22 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Co-Authored-By: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: 孙卓识 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrey Zabavnikov <[email protected]>

Add config option `windows.appendAtomically` Atomic append on windows is only supported on local disk files, and it may cause errors in other situations, e.g. network file system. If that is the case, this config option should be used to turn atomic append off. With these edits, the status command for old-style submodules with commondir needs to be fixed, due to the following. In some setups, old-style submodules (i.e. the ones with .git directory within theirs worktrees) with commondir can be of tremendous help. For example, commondir link can be used to avoid duplication of objects and also to keep branches in sync with multiple copies of the repo's worktree, while keeping the .git directory inside the worktree can be (ab?-)used to exploit the sharing of the same submodule worktree across different projects (this at least works on Windows with submodule directory being a directory junction, but having a junction is not relevant for reproducing the bug described below). Unfortunately, after the addition of the new config option, when `git status` is run in the root repo of such a setup, it gives an output akin to this: ```sh $ git status fatal: unable to access '�??\1?/config': Invalid argument fatal: 'git status --porcelain=2' failed in submodule commonlibs ``` where `�??\1?` part of '�??\1?/config' varies from run to run, and `commonlibs` is the name of submodule's directory. Currently, when Git discovers old-style submodule , it spawns subprocess to get its status, like this one: ```sh cd commonlibs; unset GIT_PREFIX; GIT_DIR=.git git status --porcelain=2 ``` Unsurprisingly, the following output is also quite unexpected: ``` $ GIT_DIR=.git git -C commonlibs/ status --porcelain=2 fatal: unable to access '`??L&?/config': Invalid argument ``` The core reason for these is that global repository field for commondir is not being cleared to `NULL` after being `free()`'d in `repo_set_commondir()`, which is precisely what this commit fixes. Regarding the further details of the case of investigation, this value of struct pointed by the global `the_repository` pointer is checked for being not-NULL down in the callstack in compatibility layer for MinGW in a function that is called by `repo_set_commondir()` before the `free()`'d value gets assigned in its body (i.e. the body of `repo_set_commondir()`). Backtrace from the check is: ``` #0 mingw_open (filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:784 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Backtrace from the death is: ``` #0 die_errno (fmt=0x<address-42> <result_type+2002> "unable to access '%s'") at usage.c:210 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-41> in access_or_die ( path=0x<address-40> "`\001\r��\004/config", mode=4, flag=0) at wrapper.c:667 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-39> in do_git_config_sequence (opts=0x<address-35>, fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>) at config.c:2142 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-38> in config_with_options ( fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>, config_source=0x0, opts=0x<address-35>) at config.c:2198 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-34> in repo_read_config (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2524 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-33> in git_config_check_init ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2543 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-32> in repo_config_get_bool ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2612 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-31> in git_config_get_bool ( key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2714 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-28> in mingw_open ( filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:785 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#15 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#16 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#17 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#18 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#19 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#20 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#21 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#22 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 ``` Co-Authored-By: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]> Co-Authored-By: Andrey Zabavnikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: 孙卓识 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrey Zabavnikov <[email protected]>

In some setups, old-style submodules (i.e. the ones with .git directory within theirs worktrees) with commondir can be of tremendous help. For example, commondir link can be used to avoid duplication of objects and also to keep branches in sync with multiple copies of the repo's worktree, while keeping the .git directory inside the worktree can be (ab?-)used to exploit the sharing of the same submodule worktree across different projects (this at least works on Windows with submodule directory being a directory junction, but having a junction is not relevant for reproducing the bug described below). Unfortunately, at the moment, when `git status` is run in the root repo of such a setup, it gives an output akin to this: ```sh fatal: unable to access '�??\1?/config': Invalid argument fatal: 'git status --porcelain=2' failed in submodule commonlibs ``` where `�??\1?` part of '�??\1?/config' varies from run to run, and `commonlibs` is the name of submodule's directory. Currently, when Git discovers old-style submodule , it spawns subprocess to get its status, like this one: ```sh cd commonlibs; unset GIT_PREFIX; GIT_DIR=.git git status --porcelain=2 ``` Unsurprisingly, the following output is also quite unexpected: ``` fatal: unable to access '`??L&?/config': Invalid argument ``` The core reason for these is that global repository field for commondir is not being cleared to `NULL` after being `free()`'d in `repo_set_commondir()`, which is precisely what this commit fixes. Regarding the further details of the case of investigation, this value of struct pointed by the global `the_repository` pointer is checked for being not-NULL down in the callstack in compatibility layer for MinGW in a function that is called by `repo_set_commondir()` before the `free()`'d value gets assigned in its body (i.e. the body of `repo_set_commondir()`). Backtrace from the check is: #0 mingw_open (filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:784 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 Backtrace from the death is: #0 die_errno (fmt=0x<address-42> <result_type+2002> "unable to access '%s'") at usage.c:210 git-for-windows#1 0x<address-41> in access_or_die ( path=0x<address-40> "`\001\r��\004/config", mode=4, flag=0) at wrapper.c:667 git-for-windows#2 0x<address-39> in do_git_config_sequence (opts=0x<address-35>, fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>) at config.c:2142 git-for-windows#3 0x<address-38> in config_with_options ( fn=0x<address-37> <git_config_include>, data=0x<address-36>, config_source=0x0, opts=0x<address-35>) at config.c:2198 git-for-windows#4 0x<address-34> in repo_read_config (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2524 git-for-windows#5 0x<address-33> in git_config_check_init ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>) at config.c:2543 git-for-windows#6 0x<address-32> in repo_config_get_bool ( repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2612 git-for-windows#7 0x<address-31> in git_config_get_bool ( key=0x<address-30> <pad+3116> "windows.appendatomically", dest=0x<address-29> <append_atomically>) at config.c:2714 git-for-windows#8 0x<address-28> in mingw_open ( filename=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", oflags=0) at compat/mingw.c:785 git-for-windows#9 0x<address-27> in strbuf_read_file (sb=0x<address-26>, path=0x<address-25> ".git/commondir", hint=0) at strbuf.c:758 git-for-windows#10 0x<address-24> in get_common_dir_noenv (sb=0x<address-23>, gitdir=0x<address-22> ".git") at setup.c:313 git-for-windows#11 0x<address-21> in repo_set_commondir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, commondir=0x0) at repository.c:57 git-for-windows#12 0x<address-20> in repo_set_gitdir (repo=0x<address-19> <the_repo>, root=0x<address-15> ".git", o=0x<address-18>) at repository.c:76 git-for-windows#13 0x<address-17> in setup_git_env (git_dir=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:179 git-for-windows#14 0x<address-16> in set_git_dir_1 (path=0x<address-15> ".git") at environment.c:334 git-for-windows#15 0x<address-14> in update_relative_gitdir (name=0x0, old_cwd=0x<address-13> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs", data=0x0) at environment.c:348 git-for-windows#16 0x<address-12> in chdir_notify ( new_cwd=0x<address-11> "C:/Users/%username%/<root-repo-name>/commonlibs") at chdir-notify.c:72 git-for-windows#17 0x<address-10> in setup_work_tree () at setup.c:428 git-for-windows#18 0x<address-9> in run_builtin (p=0x<address-8> <commands+2856>, argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:458 git-for-windows#19 0x<address-7> in handle_builtin (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:721 git-for-windows#20 0x<address-6> in run_argv (argcp=0x<address-5>, argv=0x<address-4>) at git.c:788 git-for-windows#21 0x<address-3> in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x<address-2>) at git.c:921 git-for-windows#22 0x<address-1> in main (argc=6, argv=0x<address-0>) at common-main.c:56 Signed-off-by: Andrey Zabavnikov <[email protected]>

When "read_strategy_opts()" is called we may have populated the "opts->strategy" before, so we'll need to free() it to avoid leaking memory. We populate it before because we cal get_replay_opts() from within "rebase.c" with an already populated "opts", which we then copy. Then if we're doing a "rebase -i" the sequencer API itself will promptly clobber our alloc'd version of it with its own. If this code is changed to do, instead of the added free() here a: if (opts->strategy) opts->strategy = xstrdup("another leak"); We get a couple of stacktraces from -fsanitize=leak showing how we ended up clobbering the already allocated value, i.e.: Direct leak of 6 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x66bcb8 in read_strategy_opts sequencer.c:2902 #4 0x66bf7b in read_populate_opts sequencer.c:2969 #5 0x6723f9 in sequencer_continue sequencer.c:5063 #6 0x4a4f74 in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:348 #7 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #8 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #9 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #15 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #16 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x4a3c31 in xstrdup_or_null git-compat-util.h:1169 #4 0x4a447a in get_replay_opts builtin/rebase.c:163 #5 0x4a4f5b in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:346 #6 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #7 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #8 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #9 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #10 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #11 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #12 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #13 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #15 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) This can be seen in e.g. the 4th test of "t3404-rebase-interactive.sh". In the larger picture the ownership of the "struct replay_opts" is quite a mess, e.g. in this case rebase.c's static "get_replay_opts()" function partially creates it, but nothing in rebase.c will free() it. The structure is "mostly owned" by the sequencer API, but it also expects to get these partially populated versions of it. It would be better to have rebase keep track of what it allocated, and free() that, and to pass that as a "const" to the sequencer API, which would copy what it needs to its own version, and to free() that. But doing so is a much larger change, and however messy the ownership boundary is here is consistent with what we're doing already, so let's just free() this to fix the leak. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>

There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`, where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue: blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all file AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0) ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752 #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375 #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) ==8451==ABORTING Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes: blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git attr-check --all file ================================================================= ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc ==1022==ABORTING Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array: perl -e ' print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n" ' >.gitattributes git add .gitattributes git commit -am "evil attributes" $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo ================================================================= ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58 WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0 #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393 #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39) 0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03 =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==15062==ABORTING Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of memory before already. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <[email protected]> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <[email protected]> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

The t5309 script triggers a racy false positive with SANITIZE=leak on a multi-core system. Running with "--stress --run=6" usually fails within 10 seconds or so for me, complaining with something like: + git index-pack --fix-thin --stdin fatal: REF_DELTA at offset 46 already resolved (duplicate base 01d7713666f4de822776c7622c10f1b07de280dc?) ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted What happens is this: 0. We construct a bogus pack with a duplicate object in it and trigger index-pack. 1. We spawn a bunch of worker threads to resolve deltas (on my system it is 16 threads). 2. One of the threads sees the duplicate object and bails by calling exit(), taking down all of the threads. This is expected and is the point of the test. 3. At the time exit() is called, we may still be spawning threads from the main process via pthread_create(). LSan hooks thread creation to update its book-keeping; it has to know where each thread's stack is (so it can find entry points for reachable memory). So it calls pthread_getattr_np() to get information about the new thread. That may allocate memory that must be freed with a matching call to pthread_attr_destroy(). Probably LSan does that immediately, but if you're unlucky enough, the exit() will happen while it's between those two calls, and the allocated pthread_attr_t appears as a leak. This isn't a real leak. It's not even in our code, but rather in the LSan instrumentation code. So we could just ignore it. But the false positive can cause people to waste time tracking it down. It's possibly something that LSan could protect against (e.g., cover the getattr/destroy pair with a mutex, and then in the final post-exit() check for leaks try to take the same mutex). But I don't know enough about LSan to say if that's a reasonable approach or not (or if my analysis is even completely correct). In the meantime, it's pretty easy to avoid the race by making creation of the worker threads "atomic". That is, we'll spawn all of them before letting any of them start to work. That's easy to do because we already have a work_lock() mutex for handing out that work. If the main process takes it, then all of the threads will immediately block until we've finished spawning and released it. This shouldn't make any practical difference for non-LSan runs. The thread spawning is quick, and could happen before any worker thread gets scheduled anyway. Probably other spots that use threads are subject to the same issues. But since we have to manually insert locking (and since this really is kind of a hack), let's not bother with them unless somebody experiences a similar racy false-positive in practice. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable (`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`: ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11 #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6 #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2 #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2 #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2 #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2 #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2 #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34 #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7 #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7 #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9 #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7 #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18 #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11 #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3 #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4 #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19 #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11 The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from `read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if `read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks `size` before checking `!buf`. Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set. Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads. Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator. The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory, which of course segfaults. One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack traces like the following one: + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0) ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29 #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170 #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194 #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398 #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240 #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355 #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339 #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69 #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123 #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172 #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175 #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464 #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13 #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452 #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623 #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659 #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133 #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432 #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484 #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741 #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805 #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000 #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64 #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27) While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't. The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore. Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted. Reported-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

…xtras was intended

The incremental MIDX bitmap work was done prior to 9d4855e (midx-write: fix leaking buffer, 2024-09-30), and causes test failures in t5334 in a post-9d4855eef3 world. The leak looks like: Direct leak of 264 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f6bcd87eaca in calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:90 #1 0x55ad1428e8a4 in xcalloc wrapper.c:151 #2 0x55ad14199e16 in prepare_midx_bitmap_git pack-bitmap.c:742 #3 0x55ad14199447 in open_midx_bitmap_1 pack-bitmap.c:507 #4 0x55ad14199cca in open_midx_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:704 #5 0x55ad14199d44 in open_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:717 #6 0x55ad14199dc2 in prepare_bitmap_git pack-bitmap.c:733 #7 0x55ad1419e496 in test_bitmap_walk pack-bitmap.c:2698 #8 0x55ad14047b0b in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:629 #9 0x55ad13f71cd6 in run_builtin git.c:487 #10 0x55ad13f72132 in handle_builtin git.c:756 #11 0x55ad13f72380 in run_argv git.c:826 #12 0x55ad13f728f4 in cmd_main git.c:961 #13 0x55ad1407d3ae in main common-main.c:64 #14 0x7f6bcd5f0c89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #15 0x7f6bcd5f0d44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #16 0x55ad13f6ff90 in _start (git+0x1ef90) (BuildId: 3e63cdd415f1d185b21da3035cb48332510dddce) , and is a result of us not freeing the resources corresponding to the bitmap's base layer, if one was present. Rectify that leak by calling the newly-introduced free_bitmap_index() function on the base layer to ensure that its resources are also freed. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the following leak: Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o #1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8 #2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2 #3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2 #4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2 #5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3 #6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3 #7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11 #8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9 #9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11 #10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13 #11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4 #12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19 #13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d) #15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208) #16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064) This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially. In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the reported leak go away. It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>

This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the following leak: Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o #1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8 #2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2 #3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2 #4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2 #5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3 #6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3 #7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11 #8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9 #9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11 #10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13 #11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4 #12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19 #13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d) #15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208) #16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064) This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially. In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the reported leak go away. It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

There's a race with LSan when spawning threads and one of the threads calls die(). We worked around one such problem with index-pack in the previous commit, but it exists in git-grep, too. You can see it with: make SANITIZE=leak THREAD_BARRIER_PTHREAD=YesOnLinux cd t ./t0003-attributes.sh --stress which fails pretty quickly with: ==git==4096424==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f906de14556 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7f906dc9d2c1 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7f906de2500d in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7f906de25187 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:614 #4 0x7f906de17d18 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:53 #5 0x7f906de143a9 in ThreadStartFunc<false> ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:431 #6 0x7f906dc9bf51 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:447 #7 0x7f906dd1a677 in __clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78 As with the previous commit, we can fix this by inserting a barrier that makes sure all threads have finished their setup before continuing. But there's one twist in this case: the thread which calls die() is not one of the worker threads, but the main thread itself! So we need the main thread to wait in the barrier, too, until all threads have gotten to it. And thus we initialize the barrier for num_threads+1, to account for all of the worker threads plus the main one. If we then test as above, t0003 should run indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption. As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050: ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0) ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4 #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15 #6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9 #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9 #8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7 #9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7 #10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9 #11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7 #12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18 #13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==1367==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000001080 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x0000507000000db0 rbp = 0x0000507000000db0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==1367==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1023: 1367 Aborted git $config add large1 error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0 Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would use the unsafe variants instead: ++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0) ==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2 #5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3 #6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5 #7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4 #8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4 #9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==577126==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000000cc0 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x00005070000009c0 rbp = 0x00005070000009c0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==577126==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are different from one another. Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

Our CI jobs sometimes see false positive leaks like this: ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 This is not a leak in our code, but appears to be a race between one thread calling exit() while another one is in LSan's stack setup code. You can reproduce it easily by running t0003 or t5309 with --stress (these trigger it because of the threading in git-grep and index-pack respectively). This may be a bug in LSan, but regardless of whether it is eventually fixed, it is useful to work around it so that we stop seeing these false positives. We can recognize it by the mention of the sanitizer functions in the DEDUP_TOKEN line. With this patch, the scripts mentioned above should run with --stress indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 git-for-windows#1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 git-for-windows#2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 git-for-windows#3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 git-for-windows#4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 git-for-windows#5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 git-for-windows#6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 git-for-windows#7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 git-for-windows#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 git-for-windows#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 git-for-windows#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 git-for-windows#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 git-for-windows#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 git-for-windows#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 git-for-windows#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 git-for-windows#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 git-for-windows#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 git-for-windows#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 git-for-windows#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.

tboegi and others added 2 commits October 8, 2014 15:46

Mark t0027-auto-crlf as cheap enough for MinGW

f7ed2f6

t0027 is marked expensive, but really, for MinGW we want to run these tests always. Suggested by Thomas Braun. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>

dscho mentioned this pull request Oct 8, 2014

Enable expensive tests #6

Closed

dscho added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 8, 2014

Merge pull request #7 from dscho/mingw-tests

3c2874a

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW

dscho merged commit 3c2874a into git-for-windows:master Oct 8, 2014

dscho deleted the mingw-tests branch October 8, 2014 13:49

t-b added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2014

Merge pull request #7 from dscho/mingw-tests

d69ba23

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW

dscho pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 6, 2015

Post 2.3 cycle (batch #7)

5135fef

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

jamill pushed a commit to jamill/git that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2018

Merge pull request git-for-windows#7 from jeffhostetler/gvfs-status-s…

0c41f25

…erialize-wait status: deserialization wait

garimasi514 referenced this pull request in garimasi514/git Aug 13, 2019

Merge pull request #7 from jeffhostetler/gvfs-status-serialize-wait

f48f420

status: deserialization wait

williambradley333cnr pushed a commit to williambradley333cnr/git that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024

in git-for-windows#7: git-extra doesn't seem to exist, probably git-e…

eae7324

…xtras was intended

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Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW #7

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW #7

dscho commented Oct 8, 2014

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW #7

Prepare for more thorough testing when building in MinGW #7

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dscho commented Oct 8, 2014