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Merge pull request #442 from myENA-feature/route-acl
Fixes #439
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ | ||
| --- | ||
| title: "Access Control" | ||
| since: "1.5.8" | ||
| --- | ||
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| fabio supports basic ip centric access control per route. You may | ||
| specify one of `allow` or `deny` options per route to control access. | ||
| Currently only source ip control is available. | ||
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| <!--more--> | ||
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| To allow access to a route from clients within the `192.168.1.0/24` | ||
| and `fe80::/10` subnet you would add the following option: | ||
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| ``` | ||
| allow=ip:192.168.1.0/24,ip:fe80::/10 | ||
| ``` | ||
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| With this specified only clients sourced from those two subnets will | ||
| be allowed. All other requests to that route will be denied. | ||
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| Inversely, to deny a specific set of clients you can use the | ||
| following option syntax: | ||
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| ``` | ||
| deny=ip:fe80::1234,100.123.0.0/16 | ||
| ``` | ||
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| With this configuration access will be denied to any clients with | ||
| the `fe80::1234` address or coming from the `100.123.0.0/16` network. | ||
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| Single host addresses (addresses without a prefix) will have a | ||
| `/32` prefix, for IPv4, or a `/128` prefix, for IPv6, added automatically. | ||
| That means `1.2.3.4` is equivalent to `1.2.3.4/32` and `fe80::1234` | ||
| is equivalent to `fe80::1234/128` when specifying | ||
| address blocks for `allow` or `deny` rules. | ||
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| The source ip used for validation against the defined ruleset is | ||
| taken from information available in the request. | ||
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| For `HTTP` requests the client `RemoteAddr` is always validated | ||
| followed by the first element of the `X-Forwarded-For` header, if | ||
| present. When either of these elements match an `allow` the request | ||
| will be allowed; similarly when either element matches a `deny` the | ||
| request will be denied. | ||
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| For `TCP` requests the source address of the network socket | ||
| is used as the sole paramater for validation. | ||
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| If the inbound connection uses the [PROXY protocol](https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt) | ||
| to transmit the true source address of the client then it will | ||
| be used for both `HTTP` and `TCP` connections for validating access. | ||
|
|
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ | ||
| package route | ||
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| import ( | ||
| "errors" | ||
| "fmt" | ||
| "log" | ||
| "net" | ||
| "net/http" | ||
| "strings" | ||
| ) | ||
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| const ( | ||
| ipAllowTag = "allow:ip" | ||
| ipDenyTag = "deny:ip" | ||
| ) | ||
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| // AccessDeniedHTTP checks rules on the target for HTTP proxy routes. | ||
| func (t *Target) AccessDeniedHTTP(r *http.Request) bool { | ||
| var ip net.IP | ||
| host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) | ||
|
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||
| if err != nil { | ||
| log.Printf("[ERROR] failed to get host from remote header %s: %s", | ||
| r.RemoteAddr, err.Error()) | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
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| if ip = net.ParseIP(host); ip == nil { | ||
| log.Printf("[WARN] failed to parse remote address %s", host) | ||
| } | ||
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| // check remote source and return if denied | ||
| if t.denyByIP(ip) { | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
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| // check xff source if present | ||
| if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" { | ||
| // only use left-most element (client) | ||
| xff = strings.TrimSpace(strings.SplitN(xff, ",", 2)[0]) | ||
| // only continue if xff differs from host | ||
| if xff != host { | ||
| if ip = net.ParseIP(xff); ip == nil { | ||
| log.Printf("[WARN] failed to parse xff address %s", xff) | ||
| } | ||
| // check xff source and return if denied | ||
| if t.denyByIP(ip) { | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // default allow | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
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| // AccessDeniedTCP checks rules on the target for TCP proxy routes. | ||
| func (t *Target) AccessDeniedTCP(c net.Conn) bool { | ||
| ip := net.ParseIP(c.RemoteAddr().String()) | ||
| if t.denyByIP(ip) { | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
| // default allow | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
|
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| func (t *Target) denyByIP(ip net.IP) bool { | ||
| if ip == nil || t.accessRules == nil { | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // check allow (whitelist) first if it exists | ||
| if _, ok := t.accessRules[ipAllowTag]; ok { | ||
| var block *net.IPNet | ||
| for _, x := range t.accessRules[ipAllowTag] { | ||
| if block, ok = x.(*net.IPNet); !ok { | ||
| log.Print("[ERROR] failed to assert ip block while checking allow rule for ", t.Service) | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| if block.Contains(ip) { | ||
| // specific allow matched - allow this request | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| // we checked all the blocks - deny this request | ||
| log.Printf("[INFO] route rules denied access from %s to %s", | ||
| ip.String(), t.URL.String()) | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
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| // still going - check deny (blacklist) if it exists | ||
| if _, ok := t.accessRules[ipDenyTag]; ok { | ||
| var block *net.IPNet | ||
| for _, x := range t.accessRules[ipDenyTag] { | ||
| if block, ok = x.(*net.IPNet); !ok { | ||
| log.Print("[INFO] failed to assert ip block while checking deny rule for ", t.Service) | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| if block.Contains(ip) { | ||
| // specific deny matched - deny this request | ||
| log.Printf("[INFO] route rules denied access from %s to %s", | ||
| ip.String(), t.URL.String()) | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // default - do not deny | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
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| // ProcessAccessRules processes access rules from options specified on the target route | ||
| func (t *Target) ProcessAccessRules() error { | ||
| if t.Opts["allow"] != "" && t.Opts["deny"] != "" { | ||
| return errors.New("specifying allow and deny on the same route is not supported") | ||
| } | ||
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| for _, allowDeny := range []string{"allow", "deny"} { | ||
| if t.Opts[allowDeny] != "" { | ||
| if err := t.parseAccessRule(allowDeny); err != nil { | ||
| return err | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| return nil | ||
| } | ||
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| func (t *Target) parseAccessRule(allowDeny string) error { | ||
| var accessTag string | ||
| var temps []string | ||
| var value string | ||
| var ip net.IP | ||
|
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| // init rules if needed | ||
| if t.accessRules == nil { | ||
| t.accessRules = make(map[string][]interface{}) | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // loop over rule elements | ||
| for _, c := range strings.Split(t.Opts[allowDeny], ",") { | ||
| if temps = strings.SplitN(c, ":", 2); len(temps) != 2 { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("invalid access item, expected <type>:<data>, got %s", temps) | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // form access type tag | ||
| accessTag = allowDeny + ":" + strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(temps[0])) | ||
|
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| // switch on formed access tag - currently only ip types are implemented | ||
| switch accessTag { | ||
| case ipAllowTag, ipDenyTag: | ||
| if value = strings.TrimSpace(temps[1]); !strings.Contains(value, "/") { | ||
| if ip = net.ParseIP(value); ip == nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse IP %s", value) | ||
| } | ||
| if ip.To4() != nil { | ||
| value = ip.String() + "/32" | ||
| } else { | ||
| value = ip.String() + "/128" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| _, net, err := net.ParseCIDR(value) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse CIDR %s with error: %s", | ||
| c, err.Error()) | ||
| } | ||
| // add element to rule map | ||
| t.accessRules[accessTag] = append(t.accessRules[accessTag], net) | ||
| default: | ||
| return fmt.Errorf("unknown access item type: %s", temps[0]) | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| return nil | ||
| } |
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