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Postmortem for malicious package publishes (#495)
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hzoo authored and btmills committed Jul 12, 2018
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---
layout: post
title: Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th, 2018
tags:
- security
---

# Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th, 2018

## Summary

On July 12th, 2018, an attacker compromised the npm account of an ESLint maintainer and published malicious versions of the [`eslint-scope`](https://github.com/eslint/eslint-scope) and [`eslint-config-eslint`](https://github.com/eslint/eslint/tree/9aaf195ca691d307e8896096cefffe975218c701/packages/eslint-config-eslint) packages to the npm registry. On installation, the malicious packages downloaded and executed code from `pastebin.com` which sent the contents of the user's `.npmrc` file to the attacker. An `.npmrc` file typically contains access tokens for publishing to npm.

The malicious package versions are `[email protected]` and `[email protected]`, both of which have been unpublished from npm. The `pastebin.com` paste linked in these packages has also been taken down.

[npm has revoked](https://status.npmjs.org/incidents/dn7c1fgrr7ng) all access tokens issued before 2018-07-12 12:30 UTC. As a result, all access tokens compromised by this attack should no longer be usable.

The maintainer whose account was compromised had reused their npm password on several other sites and did not have two-factor authentication enabled on their npm account.

> We, the ESLint team, are sorry for allowing this to happen. We hope that other package maintainers can learn from our mistakes and improve the security of the whole npm ecosystem.
## Affected Packages

* [`[email protected]`](https://github.com/eslint/eslint-scope), a scope analysis library, is a dependency of several popular packages, including some older versions of [`eslint`](https://github.com/eslint/eslint) and the latest versions of [`babel-eslint`](https://github.com/babel/babel-eslint) and [`webpack`](https://github.com/webpack/webpack).
* [`[email protected]`](https://github.com/eslint/eslint/tree/9aaf195ca691d307e8896096cefffe975218c701/packages/eslint-config-eslint) is a configuration used internally by the ESLint team, with very little usage elsewhere.

## Attack Method

Further details on the attack can be found [here](https://gist.github.com/hzoo/51cb84afdc50b14bffa6c6dc49826b3e).

## Recommendations

With the hindsight of this incident, we have a few recommendations for npm package maintainers and users in the future:

- Package maintainers and users should avoid reusing the same password across multiple different sites. A password manager like [1Password](https://1password.com/) or [LastPass](https://www.lastpass.com/) can help with this.
- Package maintainers should [enable npm two-factor authentication](https://docs.npmjs.com/getting-started/using-two-factor-authentication). Visit https://www.npmjs.com/settings/~/tfa.
- If you use Lerna, you can follow this [issue](https://github.com/lerna/lerna/issues/1091).
- Package maintainers should audit and limit the number of people who have access to publish on npm.
- Package maintainers should be careful with using any services that auto-merge dependency upgrades.
- Application developers should use a lockfile (`package-lock.json` or `yarn.lock`) to prevent the auto-install of new packages.

## Timeline

* **Before the incident**: The attacker presumably found the maintainer's reused email and password in a third-party breach and used them to log in to the maintainer's npm account.
* **Early morning July 12th, 2018**: The attacker generated an authentication token in the maintainer's npm account.
* **2018-07-12 9:49 UTC**: The attacker used the generated authentication token to publish `[email protected]`, which contained a malicious `postinstall` script that attempts to exfiltrate the local machine's `.npmrc` authentication token.
* **2018-07-12 10:25 UTC**: The attacker unpublished `[email protected]`.
* **2018-07-12 10:40 UTC**: The attacker published `[email protected]`, which contained the same malicious `postinstall` script.
* **2018-07-12 11:17 UTC**: A user posted [eslint/eslint-scope#39](https://github.com/eslint/eslint-scope/issues/39), notifying the ESLint team of the issue.
* **2018-07-12 12:27 UTC**: The pastebin.com link containing malicious code was taken down.
* **2018-07-12 12:37 UTC**: The npm team unpublished `[email protected]` after being contacted by an ESLint maintainer.
* **2018-07-12 17:41 UTC**: The ESLint team published `[email protected]` with the code from `[email protected]` so that caches could pick up the new version.
* **2018-07-12 18:42 UTC**: npm revoked all access tokens generated before 2018-07-12 12:30 UTC.

## Links

- Original report: https://github.com/eslint/eslint-scope/issues/39
- npm Status: https://status.npmjs.org/incidents/dn7c1fgrr7ng

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