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Wiki issues #3
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The web hook does not trigger on 'gollum' events. |
I think 'gollum' events are not supported, after all. |
Probably the neither all others except for push, pull_request, issues and issue_comment. |
We had one gollum event, but that was probably by mistake. Closing the issue |
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Aug 6, 2014
In 41c21f2 (branch.c: Validate tracking branches with refspecs instead of refs/remotes/*), we changed the rules for what is considered a valid tracking branch (a.k.a. upstream branch). We now use the configured remotes and their refspecs to determine whether a proposed tracking branch is in fact within the domain of a remote, and we then use that information to deduce the upstream configuration (branch.<name>.remote and branch.<name>.merge). However, with that change, we also check that - in addition to a matching refspec - the result of mapping the tracking branch through that refspec (i.e. the corresponding ref name in the remote repo) happens to start with "refs/heads/". In other words, we require that a tracking branch refers to a _branch_ in the remote repo. Now, consider that you are e.g. setting up an automated building/testing infrastructure for a group of similar "source" repositories. The build/test infrastructure consists of a central scheduler, and a number of build/test "slave" machines that perform the actual build/test work. The scheduler monitors the group of similar repos for changes (e.g. with a periodic "git fetch"), and triggers builds/tests to be run on one or more slaves. Graphically the changes flow between the repos like this: Source #1 -------v ----> Slave #1 / Source #2 -----> Scheduler -----> Slave #2 \ Source #3 -------^ ----> Slave #3 ... ... The scheduler maintains a single Git repo with each of the source repos set up as distinct remotes. The slaves also need access to all the changes from all of the source repos, so they pull from the scheduler repo, but using the following custom refspec: remote.origin.fetch = "+refs/remotes/*:refs/remotes/*" This makes all of the scheduler's remote-tracking branches automatically available as identical remote-tracking branches in each of the slaves. Now, consider what happens if a slave tries to create a local branch with one of the remote-tracking branches as upstream: git branch local_branch --track refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch Git now looks at the configured remotes (in this case there is only "origin", pointing to the scheduler's repo) and sees refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch matching origin's refspec. Mapping through that refspec we find that the corresponding remote ref name is "refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch". However, since this remote ref name does not start with "refs/heads/", we discard it as a suitable upstream, and the whole command fails. This patch adds a testcase demonstrating this failure by creating two source repos ("a" and "b") that are forwarded through a scheduler ("c") to a slave repo ("d"), that then tries create a local branch with an upstream. See the next patch in this series for the exciting conclusion to this story... Reported-by: Per Cederqvist <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johan Herland <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Suppose a fetch or push is requested between two shallow repositories (with no history deepening or shortening). A pack that contains necessary objects is transferred over together with .git/shallow of the sender. The receiver has to determine whether it needs to update .git/shallow if new refs needs new shallow comits. The rule here is avoid updating .git/shallow by default. But we don't want to waste the received pack. If the pack contains two refs, one needs new shallow commits installed in .git/shallow and one does not, we keep the latter and reject/warn about the former. Even if .git/shallow update is allowed, we only add shallow commits strictly necessary for the former ref (remember the sender can send more shallow commits than necessary) and pay attention not to accidentally cut the receiver history short (no history shortening is asked for) So the steps to figure out what ref need what new shallow commits are: 1. Split the sender shallow commit list into "ours" and "theirs" list by has_sha1_file. Those that exist in current repo in "ours", the remaining in "theirs". 2. Check the receiver .git/shallow, remove from "ours" the ones that also exist in .git/shallow. 3. Fetch the new pack. Either install or unpack it. 4. Do has_sha1_file on "theirs" list again. Drop the ones that fail has_sha1_file. Obviously the new pack does not need them. 5. If the pack is kept, remove from "ours" the ones that do not exist in the new pack. 6. Walk the new refs to answer the question "what shallow commits, both ours and theirs, are required in .git/shallow in order to add this ref?". Shallow commits not associated to any refs are removed from their respective list. 7. (*) Check reachability (from the current refs) of all remaining commits in "ours". Those reachable are removed. We do not want to cut any part of our (reachable) history. We only check up commits. True reachability test is done by check_everything_connected() at the end as usual. 8. Combine the final "ours" and "theirs" and add them all to .git/shallow. Install new refs. The case where some hook rejects some refs on a push is explained in more detail in the push patches. Of these steps, #6 and #7 are expensive. Both require walking through some commits, or in the worst case all commits. And we rather avoid them in at least common case, where the transferred pack does not contain any shallow commits that the sender advertises. Let's look at each scenario: 1) the sender has longer history than the receiver All shallow commits from the sender will be put into "theirs" list at step 1 because none of them exists in current repo. In the common case, "theirs" becomes empty at step 4 and exit early. 2) the sender has shorter history than the receiver All shallow commits from the sender are likely in "ours" list at step 1. In the common case, if the new pack is kept, we could empty "ours" and exit early at step 5. If the pack is not kept, we hit the expensive step 6 then exit after "ours" is emptied. There'll be only a handful of objects to walk in fast-forward case. If it's forced update, we may need to walk to the bottom. 3) the sender has same .git/shallow as the receiver This is similar to case 2 except that "ours" should be emptied at step 2 and exit early. A fetch after "clone --depth=X" is case 1. A fetch after "clone" (from a shallow repo) is case 3. Luckily they're cheap for the common case. A push from "clone --depth=X" falls into case 2, which is expensive. Some more work may be done at the sender/client side to avoid more work on the server side: if the transferred pack does not contain any shallow commits, send-pack should not send any shallow commits to the receive-pack, effectively turning it into a normal push and avoid all steps. This patch implements all steps except #3, already handled by fetch-pack and receive-pack, #6 and #7, which has their own patch due to their size. (*) in previous versions step 7 was put before step 3. I reorder it so that the common case that keeps the pack does not need to walk commits at all. In future if we implement faster commit reachability check (maybe with the help of pack bitmaps or commit cache), step 7 could become cheap and be moved up before 6 again. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Use write_script. The resulting patch makes it a lot easier to understand what the written script is doing. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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The collect_parents() function now is responsible for 1. parsing the commits given on the command line into a list of commits to be merged; 2. filtering these parents into independent ones; and 3. optionally calling fmt_merge_msg() via prepare_merge_message() to prepare an auto-generated merge log message, using fake contents that FETCH_HEAD would have had if these commits were fetched from the current repository with "git pull . $args..." Make "git merge FETCH_HEAD" to be the same as the traditional git merge "$(git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD)" $commits invocation of the command in "git pull", where $commits are the ones that appear in FETCH_HEAD that are not marked as not-for-merge, by making it do a bit more, specifically: - noticing "FETCH_HEAD" is the only "commit" on the command line and picking the commits that are not marked as not-for-merge as the list of commits to be merged (substitute for step #1 above); - letting the resulting list fed to step #2 above; - doing the step #3 above, using the contents of the FETCH_HEAD instead of fake contents crafted from the list of commits parsed in the step #1 above. Note that this changes the semantics. "git merge FETCH_HEAD" has always behaved as if the first commit in the FETCH_HEAD file were directly specified on the command line, creating a two-way merge whose auto-generated merge log said "merge commit xyz". With this change, if the previous fetch was to grab multiple branches (e.g. "git fetch $there topic-a topic-b"), the new world order is to create an octopus, behaving as if "git pull $there topic-a topic-b" were run. This is a deliberate change to make that happen, and can be seen in the changes to t3033 tests. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Aug 17, 2015
A "rebase" replays changes of the local branch on top of something else, as such they are placed in stage #3 and referred to as "theirs", while the changes in the new base, typically a foreign work, are placed in stage #2 and referred to as "ours". Clarify the "checkout --ours/--theirs". * se/doc-checkout-ours-theirs: checkout: document subtlety around --ours/--theirs
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Aug 27, 2015
A "rebase" replays changes of the local branch on top of something else, as such they are placed in stage #3 and referred to as "theirs", while the changes in the new base, typically a foreign work, are placed in stage #2 and referred to as "ours". Clarify the "checkout --ours/--theirs". * se/doc-checkout-ours-theirs: checkout: document subtlety around --ours/--theirs
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Sep 28, 2015
When ac49f5c (rerere "remaining", 2011-02-16) split out a new helper function check_one_conflict() out of find_conflict() function, so that the latter will use the returned value from the new helper to update the loop control variable that is an index into active_cache[], the new variable incremented the index by one too many when it found a path with only stage #1 entry at the very end of active_cache[]. This "strange" return value does not have any effect on the loop control of two callers of this function, as they all notice that active_nr+2 is larger than active_nr just like active_nr+1 is, but nevertheless it puzzles the readers when they are trying to figure out what the function is trying to do. In fact, there is no need to do an early return. The code that follows after skipping the stage #1 entry is fully prepared to handle a case where the entry is at the very end of active_cache[]. Help future readers from unnecessary confusion by dropping an early return. We skip the stage #1 entry, and if there are stage #2 and stage #3 entries for the same path, we diagnose the path as THREE_STAGED (otherwise we say PUNTED), and then we skip all entries for the same path. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Jul 14, 2017
We turn off ASan's leak detection by default in the test suite because it's too noisy. But we don't do so until part-way through test-lib. This is before we've run any tests, but after we do our initial "./git" to see if the binary has even been built. When built with clang, this seems to work fine. However, using "gcc -fsanitize=address", the leak checker seems to complain more aggressively: $ ./git ... ==5352==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f120e7afcf8 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.3+0xc1cf8) #1 0x559fc2a3ce41 in do_xmalloc /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:60 #2 0x559fc2a3cf1a in do_xmallocz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:100 #3 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xmallocz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:108 #4 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xmemdupz /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:124 #5 0x559fc2a3d0ad in xstrndup /home/peff/compile/git/wrapper.c:130 #6 0x559fc274535a in main /home/peff/compile/git/common-main.c:39 #7 0x7f120dabd2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0) This is a leak in the sense that we never free it, but it's in a global that is meant to last the whole program. So it's not really interesting or in need of fixing. And at any rate, mentioning leaks outside of the test_expect blocks is certainly unwelcome, as it pollutes stderr. Let's bump the setting of ASAN_OPTIONS higher in test-lib.sh to catch our initial "can we even run git?" test. While we're at it, we can add a comment to make it a bit less inscrutable. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Sep 18, 2017
This is to address concerns raised by ThreadSanitizer on the mailing list about threaded unprotected R/W access to map.size with my previous "disallow rehash" change (0607e10). See: https://public-inbox.org/git/adb37b70139fd1e2bac18bfd22c8b96683ae18eb.1502780344.git.martin.agren@gmail.com/ Add API to hashmap to disable item counting and thus automatic rehashing. Also include API to later re-enable them. When item counting is disabled, the map.size field is invalid. So to prevent accidents, the field has been renamed and an accessor function hashmap_get_size() has been added. All direct references to this field have been been updated. And the name of the field changed to map.private_size to communicate this. Here is the relevant output from ThreadSanitizer showing the problem: WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: data race (pid=10554) Read of size 4 at 0x00000082d488 by thread T2 (mutexes: write M16): #0 hashmap_add hashmap.c:209 #1 hash_dir_entry_with_parent_and_prefix name-hash.c:302 #2 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:347 #3 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #4 lazy_dir_thread_proc name-hash.c:471 #5 <null> <null> Previous write of size 4 at 0x00000082d488 by thread T1 (mutexes: write M31): #0 hashmap_add hashmap.c:209 #1 hash_dir_entry_with_parent_and_prefix name-hash.c:302 #2 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:347 #3 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #4 handle_range_dir name-hash.c:380 #5 handle_range_1 name-hash.c:415 #6 lazy_dir_thread_proc name-hash.c:471 #7 <null> <null> Martin gives instructions for running TSan on test t3008 in this post: https://public-inbox.org/git/CAN0heSoJDL9pWELD6ciLTmWf-a=oyxe4EXXOmCKvsG5MSuzxsA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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CONTRIBUTING.md: add guide for first-time contributors
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The function ce_write_entry() uses a 'self-initialised' variable construct, for the symbol 'saved_namelen', to suppress a gcc '-Wmaybe-uninitialized' warning, given that the warning is a false positive. For the purposes of this discussion, the ce_write_entry() function has three code blocks of interest, that look like so: /* block #1 */ if (ce->ce_flags & CE_STRIP_NAME) { saved_namelen = ce_namelen(ce); ce->ce_namelen = 0; } /* block #2 */ /* * several code blocks that contain, among others, calls * to copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk(ondisk, ce); */ /* block #3 */ if (ce->ce_flags & CE_STRIP_NAME) { ce->ce_namelen = saved_namelen; ce->ce_flags &= ~CE_STRIP_NAME; } The warning implies that gcc thinks it is possible that the first block is not entered, the calls to copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk() could toggle the CE_STRIP_NAME flag on, thereby entering block #3 with saved_namelen unset. However, the copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk() function does not write to ce->ce_flags (it only reads). gcc could easily determine this, since that function is local to this file, but it obviously doesn't. In order to suppress this warning, we make it clear to the reader (human and compiler), that block #3 will only be entered when the first block has been entered, by introducing a new 'stripped_name' boolean variable. We also take the opportunity to change the type of 'saved_namelen' to 'unsigned int' to match ce->ce_namelen. Signed-off-by: Ramsay Jones <[email protected]>
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The function ce_write_entry() uses a 'self-initialised' variable construct, for the symbol 'saved_namelen', to suppress a gcc '-Wmaybe-uninitialized' warning, given that the warning is a false positive. For the purposes of this discussion, the ce_write_entry() function has three code blocks of interest, that look like so: /* block #1 */ if (ce->ce_flags & CE_STRIP_NAME) { saved_namelen = ce_namelen(ce); ce->ce_namelen = 0; } /* block #2 */ /* * several code blocks that contain, among others, calls * to copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk(ondisk, ce); */ /* block #3 */ if (ce->ce_flags & CE_STRIP_NAME) { ce->ce_namelen = saved_namelen; ce->ce_flags &= ~CE_STRIP_NAME; } The warning implies that gcc thinks it is possible that the first block is not entered, the calls to copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk() could toggle the CE_STRIP_NAME flag on, thereby entering block #3 with saved_namelen unset. However, the copy_cache_entry_to_ondisk() function does not write to ce->ce_flags (it only reads). gcc could easily determine this, since that function is local to this file, but it obviously doesn't. In order to suppress this warning, we make it clear to the reader (human and compiler), that block #3 will only be entered when the first block has been entered, by introducing a new 'stripped_name' boolean variable. We also take the opportunity to change the type of 'saved_namelen' to 'unsigned int' to match ce->ce_namelen. Signed-off-by: Ramsay Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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…ev() In 'builtin/name-rev.c' in the name_rev() function there is a loop iterating over all parents of the given commit, and the loop body looks like this: if (parent_number > 1) { if (generation > 0) // branch #1 new_name = ... else // branch #2 new_name = ... name_rev(parent, new_name, ...); } else { // branch #3 name_rev(...); } These conditions are not covered properly in the test suite. As far as purely test coverage goes, they are all executed several times over in 't6120-describe.sh'. However, they don't directly influence the command's output, because the repository used in that test script contains several branches and tags pointing somewhere into the middle of the commit DAG, and thus result in a better name for the to-be-named commit. This can hide bugs: e.g. by replacing the 'new_name' parameter of the first recursive name_rev() call with 'tip_name' (effectively making both branch #1 and #2 a noop) 'git name-rev --all' shows thousands of bogus names in the Git repository, but the whole test suite still passes successfully. In an early version of a later patch in this series I managed to mess up all three branches (at once!), but the test suite still passed. So add a new test case that operates on the following history: A--------------master \ / \----------M2 \ / \---M1-C \ / B and names the commit 'B' to make sure that all three branches are crucial to determine 'B's name: - There is only a single ref, so all names are based on 'master', without any undesired interference from other refs. - Each time name_rev() follows the second parent of a merge commit, it appends "^2" to the name. Following 'master's second parent right at the start ensures that all commits on the ancestry path from 'master' to 'B' have a different base name from the original 'tip_name' of the very first name_rev() invocation. Currently, while name_rev() is recursive, it doesn't matter, but it will be necessary to properly cover all three branches after the recursion is eliminated later in this series. - Following 'M2's second parent makes sure that branch #2 (i.e. when 'generation = 0') affects 'B's name. - Following the only parent of the non-merge commit 'C' ensures that branch #3 affects 'B's name, and that it increments 'generation'. - Coming from 'C' 'generation' is 1, thus following 'M1's second parent makes sure that branch #1 affects 'B's name. Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Recent versions of the gcc and clang Address Sanitizer produce test failures related to regexec(). This triggers with gcc-10 and clang-8 (but not gcc-9 nor clang-7). Running: make CC=gcc-10 SANITIZE=address test results in failures in t4018, t3206, and t4062. The cause seems to be that when built with ASan, we use a different version of regexec() than normal. And this version doesn't understand the REG_STARTEND flag. Here's my evidence supporting that. The failure in t4062 is an ASan warning: expecting success of 4062.2 '-G matches': git diff --name-only -G "^(0{64}){64}$" HEAD^ >out && test 4096-zeroes.txt = "$(cat out)" ================================================================= ==672994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fa76f672000 at pc 0x7fa7726f75b6 bp 0x7ffe41bdda70 sp 0x7ffe41bdd220 READ of size 4097 at 0x7fa76f672000 thread T0 #0 0x7fa7726f75b5 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.6+0x4f5b5) #1 0x562ae0c9c40e in regexec_buf /home/peff/compile/git/git-compat-util.h:1117 #2 0x562ae0c9c40e in diff_grep /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:52 #3 0x562ae0c9cc28 in pickaxe_match /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:166 [...] In this case we're looking in a buffer which was mmap'd via reuse_worktree_file(), and whose size is 4096 bytes. But libasan's regex tries to look at byte 4097 anyway! If we tweak Git like this: diff --git a/diff.c b/diff.c index 8e2914c031..cfae60c120 100644 --- a/diff.c +++ b/diff.c @@ -3880,7 +3880,7 @@ static int reuse_worktree_file(struct index_state *istate, */ if (ce_uptodate(ce) || (!lstat(name, &st) && !ie_match_stat(istate, ce, &st, 0))) - return 1; + return 0; return 0; } to use a regular buffer (with a trailing NUL) instead of an mmap, then the complaint goes away. The other failures are actually diff output with an incorrect funcname header. If I instrument xdiff to show the funcname matching like so: diff --git a/xdiff-interface.c b/xdiff-interface.c index 8509f9ea22..f6c3dc1986 100644 --- a/xdiff-interface.c +++ b/xdiff-interface.c @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct ff_regs { struct ff_reg { regex_t re; int negate; + char *printable; } *array; }; @@ -218,7 +219,12 @@ static long ff_regexp(const char *line, long len, for (i = 0; i < regs->nr; i++) { struct ff_reg *reg = regs->array + i; - if (!regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0)) { + int ret = regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0); + warning("regexec %s:\n regex: %s\n buf: %.*s", + ret == 0 ? "matched" : "did not match", + reg->printable, + (int)len, line); + if (!ret) { if (reg->negate) return -1; break; @@ -264,6 +270,7 @@ void xdiff_set_find_func(xdemitconf_t *xecfg, const char *value, int cflags) expression = value; if (regcomp(®->re, expression, cflags)) die("Invalid regexp to look for hunk header: %s", expression); + reg->printable = xstrdup(expression); free(buffer); value = ep + 1; } then when compiling with ASan and gcc-10, running the diff from t4018.66 produces this: $ git diff -U1 cpp-skip-access-specifiers warning: regexec did not match: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: private: diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ private: void DoSomething(); int ChangeMe; }; void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; That first regex should match (and is negated, so it should be telling us _not_ to match "private:"). But it wouldn't if regexec() is looking at the whole buffer, and not just the length-limited line we've fed to regexec_buf(). So this is consistent again with REG_STARTEND being ignored. The correct output (compiling without ASan, or gcc-9 with Asan) looks like this: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: [...more lines that we end up not using...] warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: class RIGHT : public Baseclass diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ class RIGHT : public Baseclass void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; So it really does seem like libasan's regex engine is ignoring REG_STARTEND. We should be able to work around it by compiling with NO_REGEX, which would use our local regexec(). But to make matters even more interesting, this isn't enough by itself. Because ASan has support from the compiler, it doesn't seem to intercept our call to regexec() at the dynamic library level. It actually recognizes when we are compiling a call to regexec() and replaces it with ASan-specific code at that point. And unlike most of our other compat code, where we might have git_mmap() or similar, the actual symbol name in the compiled compat/regex code is regexec(). So just compiling with NO_REGEX isn't enough; we still end up in libasan! We can work around that by having the preprocessor replace regexec with git_regexec (both in the callers and in the actual implementation), and we truly end up with a call to our custom regex code, even when compiling with ASan. That's probably a good thing to do anyway, as it means anybody looking at the symbols later (e.g., in a debugger) would have a better indication of which function is which. So we'll do the same for the other common regex functions (even though just regexec() is enough to fix this ASan problem). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When compiling Git in Visual C, we do not have the luxury of support for `typeof()`, and therefore `OFFSETOF_VAR()` unfortunately has to fall back to pointer arithmetic. When compiling code using the `hashmap_for_each_entry()` macro in Debug mode, this leads to the "run-time check failure #3" because the variable passed as `var` are not initialized, yet we calculate the pointer difference `&(var->member)-var`. This "run-time check failure" causes a scary dialog to pop up. Work around this by initializing the respective variables. Note: according to the C standard, performing pointer arithmetic with `NULL` is not exactly well-defined, but it seems to work here, and it is at least better than performing pointer arithmetic with an uninitialized pointer. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
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When compiling Git in Visual C, we do not have the luxury of support for `typeof()`, and therefore `OFFSETOF_VAR()` unfortunately has to fall back to pointer arithmetic. When compiling code using the `hashmap_for_each_entry()` macro in Debug mode, this leads to the "run-time check failure #3" because the variable passed as `var` are not initialized, yet we calculate the pointer difference `&(var->member)-var`. This "run-time check failure" causes a scary dialog to pop up. Work around this by initializing the respective variables. Note: according to the C standard, performing pointer arithmetic with `NULL` is not exactly well-defined, but it seems to work here, and it is at least better than performing pointer arithmetic with an uninitialized pointer. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
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Sep 26, 2020
The OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member) macro is implemented in terms of offsetof(typeof(*var), member) with compilers that know typeof(), but its fallback implemenation compares &(var->member) and (var) and count the distance in bytes, i.e. ((uintptr_t)&(var)->member - (uintptr_t)(var)) MSVC's runtime check, when fed an uninitialized 'var', flags this as a use of an uninitialized variable (and that is legit---uninitialized contents of 'var' is subtracted) in a debug build. After auditing all 6 uses of OFFSETOF_VAR(), 1 of them does feed a potentially uninitialized 'var' to the macro in the beginning of the for() loop: #define hashmap_for_each_entry(map, iter, var, member) \ for (var = hashmap_iter_first_entry_offset(map, iter, \ OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member)); \ var; \ var = hashmap_iter_next_entry_offset(iter, \ OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member))) We can work around this by making sure that var has _some_ value when OFFSETOF_VAR() is called. Strictly speaking, it invites undefined behaviour to use NULL here if we end up with pointer comparison, but MSVC runtime seems to be happy with it, and most other systems have typeof() and don't even need pointer comparison fallback code. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
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Sep 28, 2020
The OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member) macro is implemented in terms of offsetof(typeof(*var), member) with compilers that know typeof(), but its fallback implemenation compares &(var->member) and (var) and count the distance in bytes, i.e. ((uintptr_t)&(var)->member - (uintptr_t)(var)) MSVC's runtime check, when fed an uninitialized 'var', flags this as a use of an uninitialized variable (and that is legit---uninitialized contents of 'var' is subtracted) in a debug build. After auditing all 6 uses of OFFSETOF_VAR(), 1 of them does feed a potentially uninitialized 'var' to the macro in the beginning of the for() loop: #define hashmap_for_each_entry(map, iter, var, member) \ for (var = hashmap_iter_first_entry_offset(map, iter, \ OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member)); \ var; \ var = hashmap_iter_next_entry_offset(iter, \ OFFSETOF_VAR(var, member))) We can work around this by making sure that var has _some_ value when OFFSETOF_VAR() is called. Strictly speaking, it invites undefined behaviour to use NULL here if we end up with pointer comparison, but MSVC runtime seems to be happy with it, and most other systems have typeof() and don't even need pointer comparison fallback code. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
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Apr 7, 2022
Add a failing test which demonstrates a regression in a18d66c ("diff.c: free "buf" in diff_words_flush()", 2022-03-04), the regression is discussed in detail in the subsequent commit. With it running `git show --word-diff --color-moved` with SANITIZE=address would emit: ==31191==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x617000021100 in thread T0: #0 0x49f0a2 in free (git+0x49f0a2) #1 0x9b0e4d in diff_words_flush diff.c:2153:3 #2 0x9aed5d in fn_out_consume diff.c:2354:3 #3 0xe092ab in consume_one xdiff-interface.c:43:9 #4 0xe072eb in xdiff_outf xdiff-interface.c:76:10 #5 0xec7014 in xdl_emit_diffrec xdiff/xutils.c:53:6 [...] 0x617000021100 is located 0 bytes inside of 768-byte region [0x617000021100,0x617000021400) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x49f0a2 in free (git+0x49f0a2) [...(same stacktrace)...] previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x49f603 in __interceptor_realloc (git+0x49f603) #1 0xde4da4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x995dc5 in append_emitted_diff_symbol diff.c:794:2 #3 0x96c44a in emit_diff_symbol diff.c:1527:3 [...] This was not caught by the test suite because we test `diff --word-diff --color-moved` only so far. Therefore, add a test for `show`, too. Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Apr 7, 2022
In the preceding [1] (pack-objects: move revs out of get_object_list(), 2022-03-22) the "repo_init_revisions()" was moved to cmd_pack_objects() so that it unconditionally took place for all invocations of "git pack-objects". We'd thus start leaking memory, which is easily reproduced in e.g. git.git by feeding e83c516 (Initial revision of "git", the information manager from hell, 2005-04-07) to "git pack-objects"; $ echo e83c516 | ./git pack-objects initial [...] ==19130==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 7120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x455308 in __interceptor_malloc (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x455308) #1 0x75b399 in do_xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x75b356 in xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x5d7609 in prep_parse_options /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:5647:2 #4 0x5d415a in repo_diff_setup /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:4621:2 #5 0x6dffbb in repo_init_revisions /home/avar/g/git/revision.c:1853:2 #6 0x4f599d in cmd_pack_objects /home/avar/g/git/builtin/pack-objects.c:3980:2 #7 0x4592ca in run_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:465:11 #8 0x457d81 in handle_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:718:3 #9 0x458ca5 in run_argv /home/avar/g/git/git.c:785:4 #10 0x457b40 in cmd_main /home/avar/g/git/git.c:916:19 #11 0x562259 in main /home/avar/g/git/common-main.c:56:11 #12 0x7fce792ac7ec in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16 #13 0x4300f9 in _start (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x4300f9) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 7120 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted Narrowly fixing that commit would have been easy, just add call repo_init_revisions() right before get_object_list(), which is effectively what was done before that commit. But an unstated constraint when setting it up early is that it was needed for the subsequent [2] (pack-objects: parse --filter directly into revs.filter, 2022-03-22), i.e. we might have a --filter command-line option, and need to either have the "struct rev_info" setup when we encounter that option, or later. Let's just change the control flow so that we'll instead set up the "struct rev_info" only when we need it. Doing so leads to a bit more verbosity, but it's a lot clearer what we're doing and why. An earlier version of this commit[3] went behind opt_parse_list_objects_filter()'s back by faking up a "struct option" before calling it. Let's avoid that and instead create a blessed API for this pattern. We could furthermore combine the two get_object_list() invocations here by having repo_init_revisions() invoked on &pfd.revs, but I think clearly separating the two makes the flow clearer. Likewise redundantly but explicitly (i.e. redundant v.s. a "{ 0 }") "0" to "have_revs" early in cmd_pack_objects(). While we're at it add parentheses around the arguments to the OPT_* macros in in list-objects-filter-options.h, as we need to change those lines anyway. It doesn't matter in this case, but is good general practice. 1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/619b757d98465dbc4995bdc11a5282fbfcbd3daa.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com 2. https://lore.kernel.org/git/97de926904988b89b5663bd4c59c011a1723a8f5.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com 3. https://lore.kernel.org/git/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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The performance test results are inconclusive (see https://github.com/dscho/git/actions/runs/2857346255): the standard deviation between the runs with a specific allocator seems to be larger than the difference between the allocators: M M2 D N run #1 624.65 638.37 669.96 650.83 run #2 648.46 653.38 655.63 650.52 run #3 643.72 634.63 647.15 650.88 run #4 661.46 657.36 666.27 664.79 run #5 661.02 669.21 666.06 678.14 where M is running with mimalloc, M2 also mimalloc but setting MIMALLOC_RESET_DELAY=1, MIMALLOC_EAGER_COMMIT=0 and MIMALLOC_RESET_DECOMMITS=1, D using the default allocator and N using nedmalloc This is when compiling with gcc. With MSVC, the numbers are consistently larger: M M2 D N run #1 909.93 929.10 869.86 875.60 run #2 842.44 874.36 882.67 882.79 run #3 879.07 858.80 866.01 871.63 run #4 870.59 876.81 900.35 889.55 run #5 891.71 888.66 897.45 891.81 The difference between gcc and MSVC is actually a lot larger than the difference between allocators! The best conclusion I can draw is that the `git repack -q -d -l -A` invocation does not actually exercise the allocators enough. Let's try something different. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
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Aug 29, 2022
Since commit fcc07e9 (is_promisor_object(): free tree buffer after parsing, 2021-04-13), we'll always free the buffers attached to a "struct tree" after searching them for promisor links. But there's an important case where we don't want to do so: if somebody else is already using the tree! This can happen during a "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor" traversal in a partial clone that is missing one or more trees or blobs. The backtrace for the free looks like this: #1 free_tree_buffer tree.c:147 #2 add_promisor_object packfile.c:2250 #3 for_each_object_in_pack packfile.c:2190 #4 for_each_packed_object packfile.c:2215 #5 is_promisor_object packfile.c:2272 #6 finish_object__ma builtin/rev-list.c:245 #7 finish_object builtin/rev-list.c:261 #8 show_object builtin/rev-list.c:274 #9 process_blob list-objects.c:63 #10 process_tree_contents list-objects.c:145 #11 process_tree list-objects.c:201 #12 traverse_trees_and_blobs list-objects.c:344 [...] We're in the middle of walking through the entries of a tree object via process_tree_contents(). We see a blob (or it could even be another tree entry) that we don't have, so we call is_promisor_object() to check it. That function loops over all of the objects in the promisor packfile, including the tree we're currently walking. When we're done with it there, we free the tree buffer. But as we return to the walk in process_tree_contents(), it's still holding on to a pointer to that buffer, via its tree_desc iterator, and it accesses the freed memory. Even a trivial use of "--missing=allow-promisor" triggers this problem, as the included test demonstrates (it's just a vanilla --blob:none clone). We can detect this case by only freeing the tree buffer if it was allocated on our behalf. This is a little tricky since that happens inside parse_object(), and it doesn't tell us whether the object was already parsed, or whether it allocated the buffer itself. But by checking for an already-parsed tree beforehand, we can distinguish the two cases. That feels a little hacky, and does incur an extra lookup in the object-hash table. But that cost is fairly minimal compared to actually loading objects (and since we're iterating the whole pack here, we're likely to be loading most objects, rather than reusing cached results). It may also be a good direction for this function in general, as there are other possible optimizations that rely on doing some analysis before parsing: - we could detect blobs and avoid reading their contents; they can't link to other objects, but parse_object() doesn't know that we don't care about checking their hashes. - we could avoid allocating object structs entirely for most objects (since we really only need them in the oidset), which would save some memory. - promisor commits could use the commit-graph rather than loading the object from disk This commit doesn't do any of those optimizations, but I think it argues that this direction is reasonable, rather than relying on parse_object() and trying to teach it to give us more information about whether it parsed. The included test fails reliably under SANITIZE=address just when running "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor". Checking the output isn't strictly necessary to detect the bug, but it seems like a reasonable addition given the general lack of coverage for "allow-promisor" in the test suite. Reported-by: Andrew Olsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Sep 6, 2022
Fix a memory leak occuring in case of pathspec copy in preload_index. Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0a353ead47 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/11.3.0/libasan.so.6+0xb5d47) #1 0x55750995e840 in do_xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:51 #2 0x55750995e840 in xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:72 #3 0x55750970f824 in copy_pathspec /home/anthony/src/c/git/pathspec.c:684 #4 0x557509717278 in preload_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/preload-index.c:135 #5 0x55750975f21e in refresh_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/read-cache.c:1633 #6 0x55750915b926 in cmd_status builtin/commit.c:1547 #7 0x5575090e1680 in run_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:466 #8 0x5575090e1680 in handle_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:720 #9 0x5575090e284a in run_argv /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:787 #10 0x5575090e284a in cmd_main /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:920 #11 0x5575090dbf82 in main /home/anthony/src/c/git/common-main.c:56 #12 0x7f0a348230ab (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x290ab) Signed-off-by: Anthony Delannoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Oct 17, 2022
In the tmp-objdir api, tmp_objdir_create will create a temporary directory but also register signal handlers responsible for removing the directory's contents and the directory itself. However, the function responsible for recursively removing the contents and directory, remove_dir_recurse() calls opendir(3) and closedir(3). This can be problematic because these functions allocate and free memory, which are not async-signal-safe functions. This can lead to deadlocks. One place we call tmp_objdir_create() is in git-receive-pack, where we create a temporary quarantine directory "incoming". Incoming objects will be written to this directory before they get moved to the object directory. We have observed this code leading to a deadlock: Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f621ba0b200 (LWP 326305)): #0 __lll_lock_wait_private (futex=futex@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>) at ./lowlevellock.c:35 #1 0x00007f621baa635b in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=bytes@entry=32816) at malloc.c:3064 #2 0x00007f621bae9f49 in __alloc_dir (statp=0x7fff2ea7ed60, flags=0, close_fd=true, fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:118 #3 opendir_tail (fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:69 #4 __opendir (name=<optimized out>) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:92 #5 0x0000557c19c77de1 in remove_dir_recurse () git#6 0x0000557c19d81a4f in remove_tmp_objdir_on_signal () #7 <signal handler called> git#8 _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=7160) at malloc.c:4116 git#9 0x00007f621baa62c9 in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=7160) at malloc.c:3066 git#10 0x00007f621bd1e987 in inflateInit2_ () from /opt/gitlab/embedded/lib/libz.so.1 git#11 0x0000557c19dbe5f4 in git_inflate_init () git#12 0x0000557c19cee02a in unpack_compressed_entry () git#13 0x0000557c19cf08cb in unpack_entry () git#14 0x0000557c19cf0f32 in packed_object_info () git#15 0x0000557c19cd68cd in do_oid_object_info_extended () git#16 0x0000557c19cd6e2b in read_object_file_extended () git#17 0x0000557c19cdec2f in parse_object () git#18 0x0000557c19c34977 in lookup_commit_reference_gently () git#19 0x0000557c19d69309 in mark_uninteresting () git#20 0x0000557c19d2d180 in do_for_each_repo_ref_iterator () git#21 0x0000557c19d21678 in for_each_ref () git#22 0x0000557c19d6a94f in assign_shallow_commits_to_refs () git#23 0x0000557c19bc02b2 in cmd_receive_pack () git#24 0x0000557c19b29fdd in handle_builtin () git#25 0x0000557c19b2a526 in cmd_main () git#26 0x0000557c19b28ea2 in main () Since we can't do the cleanup in a portable and signal-safe way, skip the cleanup when we're handling a signal. This means that when signal handling, the temporary directory may not get cleaned up properly. This is mitigated by b3cecf4 (tmp-objdir: new API for creating temporary writable databases, 2021-12-06) which changed the default name and allows gc to clean up these temporary directories. In the event of a normal exit, we should still be cleaning up via the atexit() handler. Helped-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Jan 23, 2023
There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`, where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue: blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all file AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0) ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752 #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375 #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) ==8451==ABORTING Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Jan 23, 2023
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes: blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git attr-check --all file ================================================================= ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc ==1022==ABORTING Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array: perl -e ' print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n" ' >.gitattributes git add .gitattributes git commit -am "evil attributes" $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo ================================================================= ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58 WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0 #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393 #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39) 0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03 =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==15062==ABORTING Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of memory before already. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <[email protected]> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <[email protected]> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When "read_strategy_opts()" is called we may have populated the "opts->strategy" before, so we'll need to free() it to avoid leaking memory. We populate it before because we cal get_replay_opts() from within "rebase.c" with an already populated "opts", which we then copy. Then if we're doing a "rebase -i" the sequencer API itself will promptly clobber our alloc'd version of it with its own. If this code is changed to do, instead of the added free() here a: if (opts->strategy) opts->strategy = xstrdup("another leak"); We get a couple of stacktraces from -fsanitize=leak showing how we ended up clobbering the already allocated value, i.e.: Direct leak of 6 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x66bcb8 in read_strategy_opts sequencer.c:2902 #4 0x66bf7b in read_populate_opts sequencer.c:2969 #5 0x6723f9 in sequencer_continue sequencer.c:5063 #6 0x4a4f74 in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:348 #7 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #8 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #9 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #15 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #16 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x4a3c31 in xstrdup_or_null git-compat-util.h:1169 #4 0x4a447a in get_replay_opts builtin/rebase.c:163 #5 0x4a4f5b in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:346 #6 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #7 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #8 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #9 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #10 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #11 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #12 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #13 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #15 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) This can be seen in e.g. the 4th test of "t3404-rebase-interactive.sh". In the larger picture the ownership of the "struct replay_opts" is quite a mess, e.g. in this case rebase.c's static "get_replay_opts()" function partially creates it, but nothing in rebase.c will free() it. The structure is "mostly owned" by the sequencer API, but it also expects to get these partially populated versions of it. It would be better to have rebase keep track of what it allocated, and free() that, and to pass that as a "const" to the sequencer API, which would copy what it needs to its own version, and to free() that. But doing so is a much larger change, and however messy the ownership boundary is here is consistent with what we're doing already, so let's just free() this to fix the leak. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>
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When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When "update-index --unresolve $path" cannot find the resolve-undo record for the path the user requested to unresolve, it stuffs the blobs from HEAD and MERGE_HEAD to stage #2 and stage #3 as a fallback. For this reason, the operation does not even start unless both "HEAD" and "MERGE_HEAD" exist. This is suboptimal in a few ways: * It does not recreate stage #1. Even though it is a correct design decision not to do so (because it is impossible to recreate in general cases, without knowing how we got there, including what merge strategy was used), it is much less useful not to have that information in the index. * It limits the "unresolve" operation only during a conflicted "git merge" and nothing else. Other operations like "rebase", "cherry-pick", and "switch -m" may result in conflicts, and the user may want to unresolve the conflict that they incorrectly resolved in order to redo the resolution, but the fallback would not kick in. * Most importantly, the entire "unresolve" operation is disabled after a conflicted merge is committed and MERGE_HEAD is removed, even though the index has perfectly usable resolve-undo records. By lazily reading the HEAD and MERGE_HEAD only when we need to go to the fallback codepath, we will allow cases where resolve-undo records are available (which is 100% of the time, unless the user is reading from an index file created by Git more than 10 years ago) to proceed even after a conflicted merge was committed, during other mergy operations that do not use MERGE_HEAD, or after the result of such mergy operations has been committed. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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It is tempting to think of "files and directories" of the current directory as valid inputs to the add and set subcommands of git sparse-checkout. However, in non-cone mode, they often aren't and using them as potential completions leads to *many* forms of confusion: Issue #1. It provides the *wrong* files and directories. For git sparse-checkout add we always want to add files and directories not currently in our sparse checkout, which means we want file and directories not currently present in the current working tree. Providing the files and directories currently present is thus always wrong. For git sparse-checkout set we have a similar problem except in the subset of cases where we are trying to narrow our checkout to a strict subset of what we already have. That is not a very common scenario, especially since it often does not even happen to be true for the first use of the command; for years we required users to create a sparse-checkout via git sparse-checkout init git sparse-checkout set <args...> (or use a clone option that did the init step for you at clone time). The init command creates a minimal sparse-checkout with just the top-level directory present, meaning the set command has to be used to expand the checkout. Thus, only in a special and perhaps unusual cases would any of the suggestions from normal file and directory completion be appropriate. Issue #2: Suggesting patterns that lead to warnings is unfriendly. If the user specifies any regular file and omits the leading '/', then the sparse-checkout command will warn the user that their command is problematic and suggest they use a leading slash instead. Issue #3: Completion gets confused by leading '/', and provides wrong paths. Users often want to anchor their patterns to the toplevel of the repository, especially when listing individual files. There are a number of reasons for this, but notably even sparse-checkout encourages them to do so (as noted above). However, if users do so (via adding a leading '/' to their pattern), then bash completion will interpret the leading slash not as a request for a path at the toplevel of the repository, but as a request for a path at the root of the filesytem. That means at best that completion cannot help with such paths, and if it does find any completions, they are almost guaranteed to be wrong. Issue #4: Suggesting invalid patterns from subdirectories is unfriendly. There is no per-directory equivalent to .gitignore with sparse-checkouts. There is only a single worktree-global $GIT_DIR/info/sparse-checkout file. As such, paths to files must be specified relative to the toplevel of a repository. Providing suggestions of paths that are relative to the current working directory, as bash completion defaults to, is wrong when the current working directory is not the worktree toplevel directory. Issue #5: Paths with special characters will be interpreted incorrectly The entries in the sparse-checkout file are patterns, not paths. While most paths also qualify as patterns (though even in such cases it would be better for users to not use them directly but prefix them with a leading '/'), there are a variety of special characters that would need special escaping beyond the normal shell escaping: '*', '?', '\', '[', ']', and any leading '#' or '!'. If completion suggests any such paths, users will likely expect them to be treated as an exact path rather than as a pattern that might match some number of files other than 1. However, despite the first four issues, we can note that _if_ users are using tab completion, then they are probably trying to specify a path in the index. As such, we transform their argument into a top-level-rooted pattern that matches such a file. For example, if they type: git sparse-checkout add Make<TAB> we could "complete" to git sparse-checkout add /Makefile or, if they ran from the Documentation/technical/ subdirectory: git sparse-checkout add m<TAB> we could "complete" it to: git sparse-checkout add /Documentation/technical/multi-pack-index.txt Note in both cases I use "complete" in quotes, because we actually add characters both before and after the argument in question, so we are kind of abusing "bash completions" to be "bash completions AND beginnings". The fifth issue is a bit stickier, especially when you consider that we not only need to deal with escaping issues because of special meanings of patterns in sparse-checkout & gitignore files, but also that we need to consider escaping issues due to ls-files needing to sometimes quote or escape characters, and because the shell needs to escape some characters. The multiple interacting forms of escaping could get ugly; this patch makes no attempt to do so and simply documents that we decided to not deal with those corner cases for now but at least get the common cases right. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Recent versions of the gcc and clang Address Sanitizer produce test failures related to regexec(). This triggers with gcc-10 and clang-8 (but not gcc-9 nor clang-7). Running: make CC=gcc-10 SANITIZE=address test results in failures in t4018, t3206, and t4062. The cause seems to be that when built with ASan, we use a different version of regexec() than normal. And this version doesn't understand the REG_STARTEND flag. Here's my evidence supporting that. The failure in t4062 is an ASan warning: expecting success of 4062.2 '-G matches': git diff --name-only -G "^(0{64}){64}$" HEAD^ >out && test 4096-zeroes.txt = "$(cat out)" ================================================================= ==672994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fa76f672000 at pc 0x7fa7726f75b6 bp 0x7ffe41bdda70 sp 0x7ffe41bdd220 READ of size 4097 at 0x7fa76f672000 thread T0 #0 0x7fa7726f75b5 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.6+0x4f5b5) #1 0x562ae0c9c40e in regexec_buf /home/peff/compile/git/git-compat-util.h:1117 #2 0x562ae0c9c40e in diff_grep /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:52 #3 0x562ae0c9cc28 in pickaxe_match /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:166 [...] In this case we're looking in a buffer which was mmap'd via reuse_worktree_file(), and whose size is 4096 bytes. But libasan's regex tries to look at byte 4097 anyway! If we tweak Git like this: diff --git a/diff.c b/diff.c index 8e2914c031..cfae60c120 100644 --- a/diff.c +++ b/diff.c @@ -3880,7 +3880,7 @@ static int reuse_worktree_file(struct index_state *istate, */ if (ce_uptodate(ce) || (!lstat(name, &st) && !ie_match_stat(istate, ce, &st, 0))) - return 1; + return 0; return 0; } to use a regular buffer (with a trailing NUL) instead of an mmap, then the complaint goes away. The other failures are actually diff output with an incorrect funcname header. If I instrument xdiff to show the funcname matching like so: diff --git a/xdiff-interface.c b/xdiff-interface.c index 8509f9ea22..f6c3dc1986 100644 --- a/xdiff-interface.c +++ b/xdiff-interface.c @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct ff_regs { struct ff_reg { regex_t re; int negate; + char *printable; } *array; }; @@ -218,7 +219,12 @@ static long ff_regexp(const char *line, long len, for (i = 0; i < regs->nr; i++) { struct ff_reg *reg = regs->array + i; - if (!regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0)) { + int ret = regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0); + warning("regexec %s:\n regex: %s\n buf: %.*s", + ret == 0 ? "matched" : "did not match", + reg->printable, + (int)len, line); + if (!ret) { if (reg->negate) return -1; break; @@ -264,6 +270,7 @@ void xdiff_set_find_func(xdemitconf_t *xecfg, const char *value, int cflags) expression = value; if (regcomp(®->re, expression, cflags)) die("Invalid regexp to look for hunk header: %s", expression); + reg->printable = xstrdup(expression); free(buffer); value = ep + 1; } then when compiling with ASan and gcc-10, running the diff from t4018.66 produces this: $ git diff -U1 cpp-skip-access-specifiers warning: regexec did not match: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: private: diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ private: void DoSomething(); int ChangeMe; }; void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; That first regex should match (and is negated, so it should be telling us _not_ to match "private:"). But it wouldn't if regexec() is looking at the whole buffer, and not just the length-limited line we've fed to regexec_buf(). So this is consistent again with REG_STARTEND being ignored. The correct output (compiling without ASan, or gcc-9 with Asan) looks like this: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: [...more lines that we end up not using...] warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: class RIGHT : public Baseclass diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ class RIGHT : public Baseclass void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; So it really does seem like libasan's regex engine is ignoring REG_STARTEND. We should be able to work around it by compiling with NO_REGEX, which would use our local regexec(). But to make matters even more interesting, this isn't enough by itself. Because ASan has support from the compiler, it doesn't seem to intercept our call to regexec() at the dynamic library level. It actually recognizes when we are compiling a call to regexec() and replaces it with ASan-specific code at that point. And unlike most of our other compat code, where we might have git_mmap() or similar, the actual symbol name in the compiled compat/regex code is regexec(). So just compiling with NO_REGEX isn't enough; we still end up in libasan! We can work around that by having the preprocessor replace regexec with git_regexec (both in the callers and in the actual implementation), and we truly end up with a call to our custom regex code, even when compiling with ASan. That's probably a good thing to do anyway, as it means anybody looking at the symbols later (e.g., in a debugger) would have a better indication of which function is which. So we'll do the same for the other common regex functions (even though just regexec() is enough to fix this ASan problem). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Jan 26, 2024
The t5309 script triggers a racy false positive with SANITIZE=leak on a multi-core system. Running with "--stress --run=6" usually fails within 10 seconds or so for me, complaining with something like: + git index-pack --fix-thin --stdin fatal: REF_DELTA at offset 46 already resolved (duplicate base 01d7713666f4de822776c7622c10f1b07de280dc?) ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted What happens is this: 0. We construct a bogus pack with a duplicate object in it and trigger index-pack. 1. We spawn a bunch of worker threads to resolve deltas (on my system it is 16 threads). 2. One of the threads sees the duplicate object and bails by calling exit(), taking down all of the threads. This is expected and is the point of the test. 3. At the time exit() is called, we may still be spawning threads from the main process via pthread_create(). LSan hooks thread creation to update its book-keeping; it has to know where each thread's stack is (so it can find entry points for reachable memory). So it calls pthread_getattr_np() to get information about the new thread. That may allocate memory that must be freed with a matching call to pthread_attr_destroy(). Probably LSan does that immediately, but if you're unlucky enough, the exit() will happen while it's between those two calls, and the allocated pthread_attr_t appears as a leak. This isn't a real leak. It's not even in our code, but rather in the LSan instrumentation code. So we could just ignore it. But the false positive can cause people to waste time tracking it down. It's possibly something that LSan could protect against (e.g., cover the getattr/destroy pair with a mutex, and then in the final post-exit() check for leaks try to take the same mutex). But I don't know enough about LSan to say if that's a reasonable approach or not (or if my analysis is even completely correct). In the meantime, it's pretty easy to avoid the race by making creation of the worker threads "atomic". That is, we'll spawn all of them before letting any of them start to work. That's easy to do because we already have a work_lock() mutex for handing out that work. If the main process takes it, then all of the threads will immediately block until we've finished spawning and released it. This shouldn't make any practical difference for non-LSan runs. The thread spawning is quick, and could happen before any worker thread gets scheduled anyway. Probably other spots that use threads are subject to the same issues. But since we have to manually insert locking (and since this really is kind of a hack), let's not bother with them unless somebody experiences a similar racy false-positive in practice. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When performing multi-pack reuse, reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() is responsible for generating an array of bitmapped_pack structs from which to perform reuse. In the multi-pack case, we loop over the MIDXs packs and copy the result of calling `nth_bitmapped_pack()` to construct the list of reusable paths. But we may also want to do pack-reuse over a single pack, either because we only had one pack to perform reuse over (in the case of single-pack bitmaps), or because we explicitly asked to do single pack reuse even with a MIDX[^1]. When this is the case, the array we generate of reusable packs contains only a single element, which is either (a) the pack attached to the single-pack bitmap, or (b) the MIDX's preferred pack. In 795006f (pack-bitmap: gracefully handle missing BTMP chunks, 2024-04-15), we refactored the reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() function and stopped assigning the pack_int_id field when reusing only the MIDX's preferred pack. This results in an uninitialized read down in try_partial_reuse() like so: ==7474==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55c5cd191dde in try_partial_reuse pack-bitmap.c:1887:8 #1 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap_1 pack-bitmap.c:2001:8 #2 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:2105:3 #3 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list_from_bitmap builtin/pack-objects.c:4043:3 #4 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list builtin/pack-objects.c:4156:27 #5 0x55c5cce0bd0e in cmd_pack_objects builtin/pack-objects.c:4596:3 #6 0x55c5ccc8fac8 in run_builtin git.c:474:11 which happens when try_partial_reuse() tries to call midx_pair_to_pack_pos() when it tries to reject cross-pack deltas. Avoid the uninitialized read by ensuring that the pack_int_id field is set in the single-pack reuse case by setting it to either the MIDX preferred pack's pack_int_id, or '-1', in the case of single-pack bitmaps. In the latter case, we never read the pack_int_id field, so the choice of '-1' is intentional as a "garbage in, garbage out" measure. Guard against further regressions in this area by adding a test which ensures that we do not throw out deltas from the preferred pack as "cross-pack" due to an uninitialized pack_int_id. [^1]: This can happen for a couple of reasons, either because the repository is configured with 'pack.allowPackReuse=(true|single)', or because the MIDX was generated prior to the introduction of the BTMP chunk, which contains information necessary to perform multi-pack reuse. Reported-by: Kyle Lippincott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable (`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`: ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11 #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6 #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2 #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2 #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2 #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2 #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2 #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34 #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7 #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7 #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9 #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7 #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18 #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11 #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3 #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4 #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19 #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11 The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from `read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if `read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks `size` before checking `!buf`. Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set. Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads. Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator. The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory, which of course segfaults. One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack traces like the following one: + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0) ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29 #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170 #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194 #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398 #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240 #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355 #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339 #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69 #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123 #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172 #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175 #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464 #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13 #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452 #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623 #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659 #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133 #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432 #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484 #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741 #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805 #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000 #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64 #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27) While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't. The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore. Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted. Reported-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
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This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the following leak: Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o #1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8 #2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2 #3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2 #4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2 #5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3 #6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3 #7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11 #8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9 #9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11 #10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13 #11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4 #12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19 #13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d) #15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208) #16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064) This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially. In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the reported leak go away. It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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When running t5601 with the leak checker enabled we can see a hang in our CI systems. This hang seems to be system-specific, as I cannot reproduce it on my own machine. As it turns out, the issue is in those testcases that exercise cloning of `~repo`-style paths. All of the testcases that hang eventually end up interpreting "repo" as the username and will call getpwnam(3p) with that username. That should of course be fine, and getpwnam(3p) should just return an error. But instead, the leak sanitizer seems to be recursing while handling a call to `free()` in the NSS modules: #0 0x00007ffff7fd98d5 in _dl_update_slotinfo (req_modid=1, new_gen=2) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:720 #1 0x00007ffff7fd9ac4 in update_get_addr (ti=0x7ffff7a91d80, gen=<optimized out>) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:916 #2 0x00007ffff7fdc85c in __tls_get_addr () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/tls_get_addr.S:55 #3 0x00007ffff7a27e04 in __lsan::GetAllocatorCache () at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_linux.cpp:27 #4 0x00007ffff7a2b33a in __lsan::Deallocate (p=0x0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:127 #5 __lsan::lsan_free (p=0x0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:220 ... #261505 0x00007ffff7fd99f2 in free (ptr=<optimized out>) at ../include/rtld-malloc.h:50 #261506 _dl_update_slotinfo (req_modid=1, new_gen=2) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:822 #261507 0x00007ffff7fd9ac4 in update_get_addr (ti=0x7ffff7a91d80, gen=<optimized out>) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:916 #261508 0x00007ffff7fdc85c in __tls_get_addr () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/tls_get_addr.S:55 #261509 0x00007ffff7a27e04 in __lsan::GetAllocatorCache () at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_linux.cpp:27 #261510 0x00007ffff7a2b33a in __lsan::Deallocate (p=0x5020000001e0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:127 #261511 __lsan::lsan_free (p=0x5020000001e0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:220 #261512 0x00007ffff793da25 in module_load (module=0x515000000280) at ./nss/nss_module.c:188 #261513 0x00007ffff793dee5 in __nss_module_load (module=0x515000000280) at ./nss/nss_module.c:302 #261514 __nss_module_get_function (module=0x515000000280, name=name@entry=0x7ffff79b9128 "getpwnam_r") at ./nss/nss_module.c:328 #261515 0x00007ffff793e741 in __GI___nss_lookup_function (fct_name=<optimized out>, ni=<optimized out>) at ./nss/nsswitch.c:137 #261516 __GI___nss_next2 (ni=ni@entry=0x7fffffffa458, fct_name=fct_name@entry=0x7ffff79b9128 "getpwnam_r", fct2_name=fct2_name@entry=0x0, fctp=fctp@entry=0x7fffffffa460, status=status@entry=0, all_values=all_values@entry=0) at ./nss/nsswitch.c:120 #261517 0x00007ffff794c6a7 in __getpwnam_r (name=name@entry=0x501000000060 "repo", resbuf=resbuf@entry=0x7ffff79fb320 <resbuf>, buffer=<optimized out>, buflen=buflen@entry=1024, result=result@entry=0x7fffffffa4b0) at ../nss/getXXbyYY_r.c:343 #261518 0x00007ffff794c4d8 in getpwnam (name=0x501000000060 "repo") at ../nss/getXXbyYY.c:140 #261519 0x00005555557e37ff in getpw_str (username=0x5020000001a1 "repo", len=4) at path.c:613 #261520 0x00005555557e3937 in interpolate_path (path=0x5020000001a0 "~repo", real_home=0) at path.c:654 #261521 0x00005555557e3aea in enter_repo (path=0x501000000040 "~repo", strict=0) at path.c:718 #261522 0x000055555568f0ba in cmd_upload_pack (argc=1, argv=0x502000000100, prefix=0x0, repo=0x0) at builtin/upload-pack.c:57 #261523 0x0000555555575ba8 in run_builtin (p=0x555555a20c98 <commands+3192>, argc=2, argv=0x502000000100, repo=0x555555a53b20 <the_repo>) at git.c:481 #261524 0x0000555555576067 in handle_builtin (args=0x7fffffffaab0) at git.c:742 #261525 0x000055555557678d in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffac58) at git.c:912 #261526 0x00005555556963cd in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffac58) at common-main.c:64 Note that this stack is more than 260000 function calls deep. Run under the debugger this will eventually segfault, but in our CI systems it seems like this just hangs forever. I assume that this is a bug either in the leak sanitizer or in glibc, as I cannot reproduce it on my machine. In any case, let's work around the bug for now by marking those tests with the "!SANITIZE_LEAK" prereq. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Jan 7, 2025
There's a race with LSan when spawning threads and one of the threads calls die(). We worked around one such problem with index-pack in the previous commit, but it exists in git-grep, too. You can see it with: make SANITIZE=leak THREAD_BARRIER_PTHREAD=YesOnLinux cd t ./t0003-attributes.sh --stress which fails pretty quickly with: ==git==4096424==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f906de14556 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7f906dc9d2c1 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7f906de2500d in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7f906de25187 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:614 #4 0x7f906de17d18 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:53 #5 0x7f906de143a9 in ThreadStartFunc<false> ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:431 #6 0x7f906dc9bf51 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:447 #7 0x7f906dd1a677 in __clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78 As with the previous commit, we can fix this by inserting a barrier that makes sure all threads have finished their setup before continuing. But there's one twist in this case: the thread which calls die() is not one of the worker threads, but the main thread itself! So we need the main thread to wait in the barrier, too, until all threads have gotten to it. And thus we initialize the barrier for num_threads+1, to account for all of the worker threads plus the main one. If we then test as above, t0003 should run indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption. As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050: ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0) ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4 #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15 #6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9 #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9 #8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7 #9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7 #10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9 #11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7 #12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18 #13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==1367==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000001080 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x0000507000000db0 rbp = 0x0000507000000db0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==1367==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1023: 1367 Aborted git $config add large1 error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0 Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would use the unsafe variants instead: ++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0) ==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2 #5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3 #6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5 #7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4 #8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4 #9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==577126==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000000cc0 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x00005070000009c0 rbp = 0x00005070000009c0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==577126==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are different from one another. Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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Our CI jobs sometimes see false positive leaks like this: ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 This is not a leak in our code, but appears to be a race between one thread calling exit() while another one is in LSan's stack setup code. You can reproduce it easily by running t0003 or t5309 with --stress (these trigger it because of the threading in git-grep and index-pack respectively). This may be a bug in LSan, but regardless of whether it is eventually fixed, it is useful to work around it so that we stop seeing these false positives. We can recognize it by the mention of the sanitizer functions in the DEDUP_TOKEN line. With this patch, the scripts mentioned above should run with --stress indefinitely. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
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