perf(x/staking/keeper): make Slash return early iff zero tokens to burn #18049
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julienrbrt
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lgtm! Can we add a test case here https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/2808e030cf5e167a727caa06792c1542bb95cb71/tests/integration/staking/keeper/slash_test.go ?
atheeshp
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This change makes Keeper.Slash return early if there are no tokens
to burn! This change also skips invoking the
.Hooks().BeforeValidatorSlashed hook because literally there is no
slashing that can happen if there are no tokens to burn.
Given that the result of burning zero tokens SHOULD be a no-operation
(noop) but we go through the whole routine, assuming no zero tokens
would be burnt, one could argue on a protocol implementation/conformation
that with zero tokens to burn, invoking Keeper.RemoveValidatorTokens which
invokes:
Keeper.DeleteValidatorByPowerIndex
-> (Keeper.DeleteValidatorByPowerIndex)
-> validator.RemoveTokens
-> Keeper.SetValidator
-> Keeper.SetValidatorByPowerIndex
was causing a potential self inflicted Byzantine risk because that operation
is non-atomic (it ran through a series of operations that could fail on
their own yet could not be rolled back and not idempotent), will rely
on network operations yet the actual result will have the operations back
to the original: more investigation is needed to examine the risk/impact
of previously letting zero tokens be burnt and run through that process.
Also while here, employed a Go pattern to reuse condition variables just
as a code hygiene improvement and also given that as a Go reviewer, the
unnecessary allocation of variables however small must be avoided.
Fixes #18034
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…rn (backport #18049) (#18126) Co-authored-by: Emmanuel T Odeke <[email protected]>
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This change makes Keeper.Slash return early if there are no tokens to burn! This change also skips invoking the
.Hooks().BeforeValidatorSlashed hook because literally there is no slashing that can happen if there are no tokens to burn.
Given that the result of burning zero tokens SHOULD be a no-operation (noop) but we go through the whole routine, assuming no zero tokens would be burnt, one could argue on a protocol implementation/conformation that with zero tokens to burn, invoking Keeper.RemoveValidatorTokens which invokes:
Keeper.DeleteValidatorByPowerIndex
-> (Keeper.DeleteValidatorByPowerIndex)
-> validator.RemoveTokens
-> Keeper.SetValidator
-> Keeper.SetValidatorByPowerIndex
was causing a potential self inflicted Byzantine risk because that operation is non-atomic (it ran through a series of operations that could fail on their own yet could not be rolled back and not idempotent), will rely on network operations yet the actual result will have the operations back to the original: more investigation is needed to examine the risk/impact of previously letting zero tokens be burnt and run through that process.
Fixes #18034