mantle/qemu: neuter virtiofsd seccomp filtering #3636
Merged
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By default,
virtiofsd
uses seccomp to allow only some syscalls to be proxied from the guest. In the theme of--sandbox=none
, let's also neuter seccomp filtering for our virtiofs usage; the workloads we run in the supermin/dev VMs are trusted.Incidentally, this avoids issues like #3635, where some syscalls were accidentally missing from the allow list. In this case, new libostree code[1] running in the supermin VM when building the legacy oscontainer calls out to
fstatfs
over virtiofs, which maps to the blockedfstatfs64
syscall on ppc64le. (I've opened an upstream patch[2] to fix this, but we don't strictly need it.)Closes: #3635