Update term_specification_matrix.md

term_specification_matrix.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ This matrix provides an overview of key terms related to Confidential Computing,
 | **TEE** (Trusted Execution Environment) | An environment that provides a level of assurance of data confidentiality, integrity, and code integrity by preventing unauthorized entities from viewing, altering, or tampering with data and code in use within the TEE. | [CCC](https://confidentialcomputing.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2023/03/CCC-A-Technical-Analysis-of-Confidential-Computing-v1.3_unlocked.pdf)                                      | No                                                                                                                              |
 | **TCB** (Trusted Computing Base)      | A set of components that can be known and defined, evaluated and verified by a trusting party or its agents, expected to continue in the same state, and used as the foundation for other services or systems. This represents the critical security components including hardware, firmware, and software. | [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base), [Bursell, Mike (2021) Trust in Computer Systems and the Cloud](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119695158), [NIST](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/trusted_computing_base), [Microsoft Azure](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/confidential-computing/trusted-compute-base) | Yes, broad in tech, with variations in trust relationships and confidential computing contexts.                                   |
 | **Memory Isolation**                  | Security feature preventing unauthorized access to data in memory.                                                                         | [Microsoft Azure](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/confidential-computing/choose-confidential-containers-offerings)                                                           | Yes, common in computing                                                                                                         |
-| **Measurements**                      | Process of assessing the state of a system or components to ensure integrity.                                                              | [NIST on Root of Trust](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/roots_of_trust)                                                    | Yes, varies in context                                                                                                           |
+| **Measurements**                      | Process of assessing the state of a system or components to ensure integrity.                                                              | [NIST](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/roots_of_trust)                                                    | Yes, varies in context                                                                                                           |
 | **Root of Trust**                     | A static component in a system whereby an endorsing authority allows trustors to assume trust in the system in which the anchor is contained. Trust in the root of trust is assumed, based on the endorsing authority, rather than derived. | [Wikipedia on Trust Anchor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_anchor), [Bursell, Mike (2021) Trust in Computer Systems and the Cloud](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119695158)                      | No, but distinct from a trust anchor.                                                                                            |
 | **Attestation Verification Service**  | Services that verify the integrity and authenticity of attestations in secure computing environments, playing a critical role in establishing trust. | [Azure Attestation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/attestation/overview), [Red Hat on Confidential Computing](https://www.redhat.com), [Veraison Project on GitHub](https://github.com/veraison) | Yes, application varies across technology stacks (e.g., Azure Confidential Computing, TPM-based systems, and broader confidential computing scenarios). |