Mitigate Host Header cache-poisoning attacks #1397
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Previously, a request such as:
curl -H Host:evil.com http://chef-server.dev
would create a response where the Location was set to the user
provided Host header.
Location: https://evil.com/
If this 301 was erroneously cached, it may then be served to another
user, whose traffic might be redirected to an attacker-controlled
server.
This PR changes the nginx configuration so that we use the server_name
rather than the user-provided Host header when generating redirects.
Signed-off-by: Steven Danna <[email protected]>
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Alternative to #1398 for discussion |
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Gonna close this one. |
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Previously, a request such as:
would create a response where the Location was set to the user
provided Host header.
If this 301 was erroneously cached, it may then be served to another
user, whose traffic might be redirected to an attacker-controlled
server.
This PR changes the nginx configuration so that we use the server_name
rather than the user-provided Host header when generating redirects.
Signed-off-by: Steven Danna [email protected]