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added events for detailed distribution of deposits and payments
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@HristiyanG
HristiyanG committed Nov 5, 2020
1 parent a01203b commit 1918487
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Showing 2 changed files with 47 additions and 17 deletions.
4 changes: 3 additions & 1 deletion .gitignore
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,4 +10,6 @@ node_modules
.secret

.DS_Store
.etherlime-store
.etherlime-store

/localDeploy
60 changes: 44 additions & 16 deletions contracts/Cashier.sol
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@

// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-3.0-or-later

pragma solidity >=0.6.2 <0.7.0;
Expand All @@ -20,6 +21,8 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {

address payable poolAddress; //the account receiving slashed funds

enum PaymentType { PAYMENT, DEPOSIT_SELLER, DEPOSIT_BUYER }

mapping(address => uint256) public escrow; //both types of deposits AND payments >> can be released token-by-token if checks pass
//slashedDepositPool can be obtained through getEscrowAmount(poolAddress)

Expand All @@ -45,7 +48,13 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
address _payee,
uint256 _payment
);


event LogAmountDistribution (
uint256 indexed _tokenIdVoucher,
address _to,
uint256 _payment,
PaymentType _type
);

modifier onlyPoolManager() {
require(msg.sender == poolAddress, "UNAUTHORIZED_P"); //hex"10" FISSION.code(FISSION.Category.Permission, FISSION.Status.Disallowed_Stop)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -74,16 +83,16 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
* @param _quantity Quantity on offer
*/
function requestCreateOrder(
string calldata _assetTitle,
//bytes32 _value,
string calldata _assetTitle,
//bytes32 _value,
uint256 _validFrom,
uint256 _validTo,
uint256 _price,
uint256 _depositSe,
uint256 _depositBu,
//uint256 _complainPeriod,
//uint256 _cancelFaultPeriod,
//bytes32 _promiseId,
//bytes32 _promiseId,
uint256 _quantity
)
external
Expand All @@ -98,7 +107,7 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {

//checks
//(i) this is for separate promise allocation, not in prototype
//uint256 depositSe = voucherKernel.getPromiseDepositSe(promiseId);
//uint256 depositSe = voucherKernel.getPromiseDepositSe(promiseId);
//require(depositSe * _quantity == weiReceived, "INCORRECT_FUNDS"); //hex"54" FISSION.code(FISSION.Category.Finance, FISSION.Status.InsufficientFunds)
//(ii) prototype check
require(_depositSe * _quantity == weiReceived, "INCORRECT_FUNDS"); //hex"54" FISSION.code(FISSION.Category.Finance, FISSION.Status.InsufficientFunds)
Expand All @@ -107,9 +116,9 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
uint256 tokenIdSupply = voucherKernel.createOrder(msg.sender, promiseId, _quantity);

//record funds in escrow ...
escrow[msg.sender] += weiReceived;
escrow[msg.sender] += weiReceived;

emit LogOrderCreated(tokenIdSupply, msg.sender, promiseId, _quantity);
emit LogOrderCreated(tokenIdSupply, msg.sender, promiseId, _quantity);
}


Expand All @@ -119,14 +128,14 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
* @param _issuer Address of the issuer of the supply token
*/
function requestVoucher(uint256 _tokenIdSupply, address _issuer)
external
external
payable
nonReentrant
{
uint256 weiReceived = msg.value;

//checks
(uint256 price, uint256 depositSe, uint256 depositBu) = voucherKernel.getOrderCosts(_tokenIdSupply);
(uint256 price, uint256 depositSe, uint256 depositBu) = voucherKernel.getOrderCosts(_tokenIdSupply);
require(price + depositBu == weiReceived, "INCORRECT_FUNDS"); //hex"54" FISSION.code(FISSION.Category.Finance, FISSION.Status.InsufficientFunds)

//get voucher token - extract ERC721 from _voucherOrderId to msg.sender
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -184,8 +193,10 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
)) {
//release payment to the Seller, because redemption happened
escrow[holder] -= price;
amount2issuer += price;
amount2issuer += price;
voucherKernel.setPaymentReleased(_tokenIdVouchers[i]);

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], issuer, price, PaymentType.PAYMENT);

} else if (!currStatus.isPaymentReleased && (
isStatus(currStatus.status, idxRefund) ||
Expand All @@ -197,14 +208,15 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
escrow[holder] -= price;
amount2holder += price;
voucherKernel.setPaymentReleased(_tokenIdVouchers[i]);

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], holder, price, PaymentType.PAYMENT);
}


//process the RELEASE OF DEPOSITS - only when vouchers are in the FINAL status
if (!currStatus.isDepositsReleased &&
isStatus(currStatus.status, idxFinal)) {


//first, depositSe
if (isStatus(currStatus.status, idxComplain)) {
if (isStatus(currStatus.status, idxCancelFault)) {
Expand All @@ -214,43 +226,60 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
amount2holder += tFraction; //Bu gets, say, a half
amount2issuer += tFraction.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT); //Se gets, say, a quarter
amount2pool += depositSe - tFraction - tFraction.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT); //slashing the rest

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], holder, tFraction, PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);
LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], issuer, tFraction.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT), PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);
LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], poolAddress, depositSe - tFraction - tFraction.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT), PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);

tFraction = 0;

} else {
//slash depositSe
escrow[issuer] -= depositSe;
amount2pool += depositSe;

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], poolAddress, depositSe, PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);
}
} else {
if (isStatus(currStatus.status, idxCancelFault)) {
//part depositSe to Bu, part to Se
escrow[issuer] -= depositSe;
amount2issuer += depositSe.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT);
amount2holder += depositSe - depositSe.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT);

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], issuer, depositSe.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT), PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);
LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], holder, depositSe - depositSe.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT), PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);

//Can't use the code below, because of "Stack Too Deep" Error ... this in real life would be optimized, but kept the code above for readability.
//tPartDepositSe = depositSe.div(CANCELFAULT_SPLIT);
//amount2issuer += tPartDepositSe;
//amount2holder += depositSe.sub(tPartDepositSe);
} else {
//release depositSe
escrow[issuer] -= depositSe;
amount2issuer += depositSe;
amount2issuer += depositSe;

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], issuer, depositSe, PaymentType.DEPOSIT_SELLER);
}
}


//second, depositBu
if (isStatus(currStatus.status, idxRedeem) ||
isStatus(currStatus.status, idxCancelFault)
) {
//release depositBu
escrow[holder] -= depositBu;
amount2holder += depositBu;

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], holder, depositBu, PaymentType.DEPOSIT_BUYER);
} else {
//slash depositBu
escrow[holder] -= depositBu;
amount2pool += depositBu;
amount2pool += depositBu;

LogAmountDistribution(_tokenIdVouchers[i], poolAddress, depositBu, PaymentType.DEPOSIT_BUYER);
}

voucherKernel.setDepositsReleased(_tokenIdVouchers[i]);
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -289,7 +318,6 @@ contract Cashier is usingHelpers, ReentrancyGuard {
}
}


/**
* @notice Internal function for withdrawing.
* As unbelievable as it is, neither .send() nor .transfer() are now secure to use due to EIP-1884
Expand Down

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