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feature: add malicious vote monitor (#1597)
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ | ||
| package monitor | ||
|
|
||
| import ( | ||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" | ||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types" | ||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log" | ||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/metrics" | ||
| lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru" | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| // follow define in core/vote | ||
| const ( | ||
| maxSizeOfRecentEntry = 512 | ||
| maliciousVoteSlashScope = 256 | ||
| upperLimitOfVoteBlockNumber = 11 | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| var ( | ||
| violateRule1Counter = metrics.NewRegisteredCounter("monitor/maliciousVote/violateRule1", nil) | ||
| violateRule2Counter = metrics.NewRegisteredCounter("monitor/maliciousVote/violateRule2", nil) | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| // two purposes | ||
| // 1. monitor whether there are bugs in the voting mechanism, so add metrics to observe it. | ||
| // 2. do malicious vote slashing. TODO | ||
| type MaliciousVoteMonitor struct { | ||
| curVotes map[types.BLSPublicKey]*lru.Cache | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| func NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() *MaliciousVoteMonitor { | ||
| return &MaliciousVoteMonitor{ | ||
| curVotes: make(map[types.BLSPublicKey]*lru.Cache, 21), // mainnet config | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| func (m *MaliciousVoteMonitor) ConflictDetect(newVote *types.VoteEnvelope, pendingBlockNumber uint64) bool { | ||
| // get votes for specified VoteAddress | ||
| if _, ok := m.curVotes[newVote.VoteAddress]; !ok { | ||
| voteDataBuffer, err := lru.New(maxSizeOfRecentEntry) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("MaliciousVoteMonitor new lru failed", "err", err) | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
| m.curVotes[newVote.VoteAddress] = voteDataBuffer | ||
| } | ||
| voteDataBuffer := m.curVotes[newVote.VoteAddress] | ||
| sourceNumber, targetNumber := newVote.Data.SourceNumber, newVote.Data.TargetNumber | ||
|
|
||
| //Basic check | ||
| // refer to https://github.com/bnb-chain/bsc-genesis-contract/blob/master/contracts/SlashIndicator.sol#LL207C4-L207C4 | ||
| if !(targetNumber+maliciousVoteSlashScope > pendingBlockNumber) { | ||
| return false | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // UnderRules check | ||
| blockNumber := sourceNumber + 1 | ||
| if !(blockNumber+maliciousVoteSlashScope > pendingBlockNumber) { | ||
| blockNumber = pendingBlockNumber - maliciousVoteSlashScope + 1 | ||
| } | ||
| for ; blockNumber <= pendingBlockNumber+upperLimitOfVoteBlockNumber; blockNumber++ { | ||
| if voteDataBuffer.Contains(blockNumber) { | ||
| voteData, ok := voteDataBuffer.Get(blockNumber) | ||
| if !ok { | ||
| log.Error("Failed to get voteData info from LRU cache.") | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| if blockNumber == targetNumber { | ||
| log.Warn("violate rule1", "VoteAddress", common.Bytes2Hex(newVote.VoteAddress[:]), "voteExisted", voteData.(*types.VoteData), "newVote", newVote.Data) | ||
| violateRule1Counter.Inc(1) | ||
| // prepare message for slashing | ||
| return true | ||
| } else if (blockNumber < targetNumber && voteData.(*types.VoteData).SourceNumber > sourceNumber) || | ||
| (blockNumber > targetNumber && voteData.(*types.VoteData).SourceNumber < sourceNumber) { | ||
| log.Warn("violate rule2", "VoteAddress", common.Bytes2Hex(newVote.VoteAddress[:]), "voteExisted", voteData.(*types.VoteData), "newVote", newVote.Data) | ||
| violateRule2Counter.Inc(1) | ||
| // prepare message for slashing | ||
| return true | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // for simplicity, Just override even if the targetNumber has existed. | ||
| voteDataBuffer.Add(newVote.Data.TargetNumber, newVote.Data) | ||
| return false | ||
| } |
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ | ||
| package monitor | ||
|
|
||
| import ( | ||
| "testing" | ||
|
|
||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" | ||
| "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types" | ||
| "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| func TestMaliciousVoteMonitor(t *testing.T) { | ||
| //log.Root().SetHandler(log.StdoutHandler) | ||
| // case 1, different voteAddress | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - maliciousVoteSlashScope - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| voteAddress[0] = 4 | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - maliciousVoteSlashScope - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // case 2, target number not in maliciousVoteSlashScope | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - maliciousVoteSlashScope - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - maliciousVoteSlashScope - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // case 3, violate rule1 | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: uint64(0), | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, true, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // case 4, violate rule2, vote with smaller range first | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 4, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 2, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 3, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, true, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // case 5, violate rule2, vote with larger range first | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 2, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 3, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 4, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, true, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // case 6, normal case | ||
| { | ||
| maliciousVoteMonitor := NewMaliciousVoteMonitor() | ||
| pendingBlockNumber := uint64(1000) | ||
| voteAddrBytes := common.Hex2BytesFixed("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", types.BLSPublicKeyLength) | ||
| voteAddress := types.BLSPublicKey{} | ||
| copy(voteAddress[:], voteAddrBytes[:]) | ||
| vote1 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 4, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 3, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(1)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote1, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote2 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 3, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 2, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote2, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| vote3 := &types.VoteEnvelope{ | ||
| VoteAddress: voteAddress, | ||
| Signature: types.BLSSignature{}, | ||
| Data: &types.VoteData{ | ||
| SourceNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 2, | ||
| SourceHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(0)))), | ||
| TargetNumber: pendingBlockNumber - 1, | ||
| TargetHash: common.BytesToHash(common.Hex2Bytes(string(rune(2)))), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| assert.Equal(t, false, maliciousVoteMonitor.ConflictDetect(vote3, pendingBlockNumber)) | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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