it compiles

daemon/crypto/BUILD

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ cc_library(
     visibility = ["//daemon:__subpackages__"],
     deps = [
         "@asphr//asphr:asphr_lib",
+        "@asphr//schema:asyncinvitation_proto_cc",
         "@asphr//schema:daemon_cc_grpc",
         "@asphr//schema:message_proto_cc",
         "@asphr//schema:server_cc_grpc",

daemon/crypto/constants.hpp

@@ -36,7 +36,12 @@ constexpr int MAX_ASYNC_FRIEND_REQUESTS = 500;
 constexpr int ASYNC_FRIEND_REQUEST_BATCH_SIZE = 1000;
 // TODO: figure out a reasonable limit here...
 constexpr size_t ASYNC_INVITATION_SIZE = MESSAGE_SIZE;  // arbitrary
-constexpr int INVITATION_MESSAGE_MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE = ASYNC_INVITATION_SIZE;
+// TODO: optimize this size. we have a protobuf in asyncinvitation.proto
+// it also contains the public ID. the public ID should never be bigger than
+// 190, and the protobuf should never add more than 10 extra bytes, so 200 is
+// very safe.
+constexpr int INVITATION_MESSAGE_MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE =
+    ASYNC_INVITATION_SIZE - 200;
 static_assert(
     INVITATION_MESSAGE_MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE < ASYNC_INVITATION_SIZE,
     "INVITATION_MESSAGE_MAX_PLAINTEXT_SIZE must be < "

daemon/crypto/crypto.cc

@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ auto decrypt_async_invitation(const string& self_invitation_private_key,
   // TODO: specifically, we need to verify that the public_id in the body
   // corresponds to the public_id that the message was authenticated with
   // otherwise, someone might impersonate the real receiver
-  return make_pair(async_invitation.public_id(),
-                   async_invitation.invitation_id());
+  return make_pair(async_invitation.my_public_id(), async_invitation.message());
 }
 }  // namespace crypto

daemon/crypto/crypto.hpp

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 #include <string>
 
 #include "constants.hpp"
-#include "schema/asyncinvitation.proto"
+#include "schema/asyncinvitation.pb.h"
 #include "schema/message.pb.h"
 
 /* Crypto implements an IND-CCA2 secure scheme.