Impact
next-auth applications prior to version 4.24.5 that rely on the default Middleware authorization are affected.
A bad actor could create an empty/mock user, by getting hold of a NextAuth.js-issued JWT from an interrupted OAuth sign-in flow (state, PKCE or nonce).
Manually overriding the next-auth.session-token cookie value with this non-related JWT would let the user simulate a logged in user, albeit having no user information associated with it. (The only property on this user is an opaque randomly generated string).
This vulnerability does not give access to other users' data, neither to resources that require proper authorization via scopes or other means. The created mock user has no information associated with it (ie. no name, email, access_token, etc.)
This vulnerability can be exploited by bad actors to peek at logged in user states (e.g. dashboard layout).
Note: Regardless of the vulnerability, the existence of a NextAuth.js session state can provide simple authentication, but not authorization in your applications. For role-based access control, you can check out our guide.
Patches
We patched the vulnerability in next-auth v4.24.5. To upgrade, run one of the following:
npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest
Workarounds
Upgrading to latest is the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using a custom authorization callback for Middleware, developers can manually do a basic authentication:
// middleware.ts
import { withAuth } from "next-auth/middleware"
export default withAuth(/*your middleware function*/, {
// checking the existence of any property - besides `value` which might be a random string - on the `token` object is sufficient to prevent this vulnerability
callbacks: { authorized: ({ token }) => !!token?.email }
})References
References
securing Analyst
dastaj Finder
magnunm Reporter
balazsorban44 Remediation developer
ThangHuuVu Remediation reviewer
Impact
next-authapplications prior to version 4.24.5 that rely on the default Middleware authorization are affected.A bad actor could create an empty/mock user, by getting hold of a NextAuth.js-issued JWT from an interrupted OAuth sign-in flow (state, PKCE or nonce).
Manually overriding the
next-auth.session-tokencookie value with this non-related JWT would let the user simulate a logged in user, albeit having no user information associated with it. (The only property on this user is an opaque randomly generated string).This vulnerability does not give access to other users' data, neither to resources that require proper authorization via scopes or other means. The created mock user has no information associated with it (ie. no name, email, access_token, etc.)
This vulnerability can be exploited by bad actors to peek at logged in user states (e.g. dashboard layout).
Note: Regardless of the vulnerability, the existence of a NextAuth.js session state can provide simple authentication, but not authorization in your applications. For role-based access control, you can check out our guide.
Patches
We patched the vulnerability in
next-authv4.24.5. To upgrade, run one of the following:Workarounds
Upgrading to
latestis the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using a custom authorization callback for Middleware, developers can manually do a basic authentication:References
References