Summary
In versions of dawidd6/action-download-artifact
before v6, a repository's forks were also searched by default when attempting to find matching artifacts. This could be exploited by an unprivileged attacker to introduce compromised artifacts (such as malicious executables) into a privileged workflow context, as creating a fork requires no privileges.
Users should immediately upgrade to v6 or newer, which changes the default behavior to avoid searching forks for matching artifacts. Users who cannot upgrade should explicitly set allow_forks: false
to disable searching forks for artifacts.
Details
GitHub's artifact storage for workflows does not natively distinguish between artifacts created by a repository and artifacts created by forks of that repository. As a result, attempting to retrieve the "latest" artifact for a workflow run can return artifacts produced by a fork, rather than its upstream.
Because any GitHub user can create a fork of a public repository, this allows for artifact poisoning in the following scenarios (as well as potentially others):
- Repository
alice/foo
runs build.yml
, producing build.exe
- Repository
alice/foo
runs publish.yml
, which uses action-download-artifact@v5
to retrieve the latest build.exe
from build.yml
To compromise publish.yml
in this scenario, Mallory forks alice/foo
to mallory/foo
, and then modifies build.yml
to produce a compromised build.exe
. Mallory can then repeatedly trigger their copy of build.yml
to ensure that their compromised build.exe
is always the latest artifact, meaning that Alice's publish.yml
will retrieve it.
Additional details on this vulnerability can be found in this blog post from 2022:
Impact
This vulnerability impacts all repositories on GitHub that use action-download-artifacts@v5
or older and do not disable allow_forks: true
, which is the default.
If a repository is affected, the severity ranges from downstream contamination (such as publishing attacker-controlled artifacts) to direct workflow compromise (if the retrieved artifact is then executed in a privileged workflow context, such as push
or pull_request_target
).
References
Summary
In versions of
dawidd6/action-download-artifact
before v6, a repository's forks were also searched by default when attempting to find matching artifacts. This could be exploited by an unprivileged attacker to introduce compromised artifacts (such as malicious executables) into a privileged workflow context, as creating a fork requires no privileges.Users should immediately upgrade to v6 or newer, which changes the default behavior to avoid searching forks for matching artifacts. Users who cannot upgrade should explicitly set
allow_forks: false
to disable searching forks for artifacts.Details
GitHub's artifact storage for workflows does not natively distinguish between artifacts created by a repository and artifacts created by forks of that repository. As a result, attempting to retrieve the "latest" artifact for a workflow run can return artifacts produced by a fork, rather than its upstream.
Because any GitHub user can create a fork of a public repository, this allows for artifact poisoning in the following scenarios (as well as potentially others):
alice/foo
runsbuild.yml
, producingbuild.exe
alice/foo
runspublish.yml
, which usesaction-download-artifact@v5
to retrieve the latestbuild.exe
frombuild.yml
To compromise
publish.yml
in this scenario, Mallory forksalice/foo
tomallory/foo
, and then modifiesbuild.yml
to produce a compromisedbuild.exe
. Mallory can then repeatedly trigger their copy ofbuild.yml
to ensure that their compromisedbuild.exe
is always the latest artifact, meaning that Alice'spublish.yml
will retrieve it.Additional details on this vulnerability can be found in this blog post from 2022:
Impact
This vulnerability impacts all repositories on GitHub that use
action-download-artifacts@v5
or older and do not disableallow_forks: true
, which is the default.If a repository is affected, the severity ranges from downstream contamination (such as publishing attacker-controlled artifacts) to direct workflow compromise (if the retrieved artifact is then executed in a privileged workflow context, such as
push
orpull_request_target
).References