Resolve SMS Bypass issue #64
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This prevents issues when multiple SMS second factor verifications are running in a single browser session.
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This PR is constructed of the work that was performed on a private repository to resolve an SMS Bypass security issue. Where two SMS authentication sessions could be intermingled, opening an opportunity for an attacker to use their own SMS verification code in the authentication session of the victim. Note that the attacker needs the victim's browser session to effectively exploit this vulnerability.
The solution to this problem is to register the SMS state based on the SMS token id. Allowing us to ensure an authentication session can only be used by the SMS token (phone number) that is associated to the one used from the start of the authentication.