authorization code - single use and max 10min lifetime, #2041

5.0/en/0x51-V51-OAuth2.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ There are various different personas in the OAuth process, described in more det
 
 | # | Description | L1 | L2 | L3 |
 | :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
-| **51.2.1** | [placeholder] | | | |
+| **51.2.1** | [ADDED] Verify that, if the authorization server returns the authorization code, it can be used only once for a token request and it is only valid for up to 10 minutes. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.2** | [ADDED] Verify that the replay of authorization codes into the authorization response is prevented either by using the PKCE flow or alternatively the OpenID Connect "nonce" parameter and the respective Claim in the ID Token. The PKCE challenge or OpenID Connect "nonce" must be transaction-specific and securely bound to the client and the user agent in which the transaction was started. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.3** | [ADDED] Verify that Authorization Servers are mitigating PKCE Downgrade Attacks by ensuring a token request containing a "code_verifier" parameter is accepted only if a "code_challenge" parameter was present in the authorization request. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.4** | [ADDED] Verify that refresh tokens are sender-constrained or use refresh token rotation to prevent token replay attacks. Refresh token rotation prevents usage in the event of a compromised refresh token. Sender-constrained refresh tokens cryptographically binds the refresh token to a particular Client. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |