#2110 - update refresh token replay requirement

5.0/en/0x51-V51-OAuth2.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ There are various different personas in the OAuth process, described in more det
 | **51.2.1** | [ADDED] Verify that, if the authorization server returns the authorization code, it can be used only once for a token request and it is only valid for up to 10 minutes. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.2** | [ADDED] Verify that the replay of authorization codes into the authorization response is prevented either by using the PKCE flow or alternatively the OpenID Connect "nonce" parameter and the respective Claim in the ID Token. The PKCE challenge or OpenID Connect "nonce" must be transaction-specific and securely bound to the client and the user agent in which the transaction was started. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.3** | [ADDED] Verify that, if the code grant is used, the authorization server mitigates authorization code interception attacks by requiring PKCE. For authorization requests, the authorization server must require a valid code_challenge value and must not accept code_challenge_method 'plain'. For a token request, it must require validation of the "code_verifier" parameter. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
-| **51.2.4** | [ADDED] Verify that refresh tokens are sender-constrained or use refresh token rotation to prevent token replay attacks. Refresh token rotation prevents usage in the event of a compromised refresh token. Sender-constrained refresh tokens cryptographically binds the refresh token to a particular Client. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| **51.2.4** | [ADDED] Verify that the authorization server mitigates refresh token replay attacks for public clients by using (L1, L2) refresh token rotation or (L1, L2, L3) sender-constrained refresh tokens using Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) or Certificate-Bound Access Tokens (mTLS). | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.5** | [ADDED] Verify that for a given client, the authorization server only allows the usage of grants that this client needs to use. Note that the grants 'token' (Implicit flow) and 'password' (Resource Owner Password Credentials flow) should no longer be used. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.6** | [ADDED] Verify that the authorization server validates redirect URIs based on a client-specific allowlist of pre-registered URIs using exact string comparison. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
 | **51.2.7** | [ADDED] Verify that confidential client is authenticated for client-to-authorized server backchannel requests such as token requests, PAR requests, token revocation requests, and token introspection requests. | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |