Add indiedroid specific overlays for SPI0 with SCK on M1 instead of M2. #1

MorgothCreator · 2023-07-23T19:33:14Z

No description provided.

Joshua-Riek · 2023-07-23T23:55:36Z

I'd like to have all reasonable kernel changes done via a PR sent to Armbian's repo with the mindset of an Armbian user, as it is their kernel repo for their distro. It's better to contribute to one centralized repo instead of having a whole bunch of forks, but I also want to respect that the kernel is for Armbian and its users.

The changes that I will not submit a PR to Armbian's kernel are for wifi driver imports and changes to the kernel config, as they are both handled differently on their end.

For a good reason, they are generally critical and careful of the code they allow into the kernel.

This PR needs a bit of cleanup, and I see some clashing names for your overlays; I can provide more information later when I have the time.

MorgothCreator · 2023-07-24T00:01:42Z

👍

…

On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 2:55 AM Joshua Riek ***@***.***> wrote: I'd like to have all reasonable kernel changes done via a PR sent to Armbian's repo with the mindset of an Armbian user, as it is their kernel repo for their distro. It's better to contribute to one centralized repo instead of having a whole bunch of forks, but I also want to respect that the kernel is for Armbian and its users. The changes that I will not submit a PR to Armbian's kernel are for wifi driver imports and changes to the kernel config, as they are both handled differently on their end. For a good reason, they are generally critical and careful of the code they allow into the kernel. This PR needs a bit of cleanup, and I see some clashing names for your overlays; I can provide more information later when I have the time. — Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub <#1 (comment)>, or unsubscribe <https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/AA7B6H6YZSQFKOCNJCLAY4DXRW2YFANCNFSM6AAAAAA2UWNPII> . You are receiving this because you authored the thread.Message ID: ***@***.***>

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MorgothCreator · 2023-07-26T20:12:36Z

Push them to you wishing to cherry pick only the overlays and eventually edit them and push them up the stream, I'm not very deep into git, I maintain only my repo's no collaboration, write them cuz someone needed to do it and test them :), they are tested, about the clashing names???

Example: RK3588 Use I2S2_2CH as Clk-Gen to serve TDM_MULTI_LANES I2S2_2CH ----> BCLK,I2S_LRCK --------> I2S0_8CH_TX (Slave TRCM-TXONLY) | |--------> BCLK,TDM_SYNC --------> TDM Device (Slave) Note: I2S2_2CH_MCLK: BCLK I2S2_2CH_SCLK: I2S_LRCK (GPIO2_B7) I2S2_2CH_LRCK: TDM_SYNC (GPIO2_C0) DT: &i2s0_8ch { status = "okay"; assigned-clocks = <&cru I2S0_8CH_MCLKOUT>; assigned-clock-parents = <&cru MCLK_I2S0_8CH_TX>; i2s-lrck-gpio = <&gpio1 RK_PC5 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; tdm-fsync-gpio = <&gpio1 RK_PC2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; rockchip,tdm-multi-lanes; rockchip,tdm-tx-lanes = <2>; //e.g. TDM16 x 2 rockchip,tdm-rx-lanes = <2>; //e.g. TDM16 x 2 rockchip,clk-src = <&i2s2_2ch>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&i2s0_lrck &i2s0_sclk &i2s0_sdi0 &i2s0_sdi1 &i2s0_sdo0 &i2s0_sdo1>; }; &i2s2_2ch { status = "okay"; assigned-clocks = <&cru I2S2_2CH_MCLKOUT>; assigned-clock-parents = <&cru MCLK_I2S2_2CH>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&i2s2m0_mclk &i2s2m0_lrck &i2s2m0_sclk>; }; Usage: TDM16 x 2 Playback amixer contents numid=3,iface=MIXER,name='Receive SDIx Select' ; type=ENUMERATED,access=rw------,values=1,items=5 ; Item #0 'Auto' ; Item #1 'SDIx1' ; Item #2 'SDIx2' ; Item #3 'SDIx3' ; Item #4 'SDIx4' : values=0 numid=2,iface=MIXER,name='Transmit SDOx Select' ; type=ENUMERATED,access=rw------,values=1,items=5 ; Item #0 'Auto' ; Item #1 'SDOx1' ; Item #2 'SDOx2' ; Item #3 'SDOx3' ; Item #4 'SDOx4' : values=0 /# amixer sset "Transmit SDOx Select" "SDOx2" Simple mixer control 'Transmit SDOx Select',0 Capabilities: enum Items: 'Auto' 'SDOx1' 'SDOx2' 'SDOx3' 'SDOx4' Item0: 'SDOx2' /# aplay -D hw:0,0 --period-size=1024 --buffer-size=4096 -r 48000 \ -c 32 -f s32_le /dev/zero Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <[email protected]> Change-Id: I6996e05c73a9d68bbeb9562eb6e68e4c99b52d85

Arm has introduced a new v10 GPU architecture that replaces the Job Manager interface with a new Command Stream Frontend. It adds firmware driven command stream queues that can be used by kernel and user space to submit jobs to the GPU. Add the initial schema for the device tree that is based on support for RK3588 SoC. The minimum number of clocks is one for the IP, but on Rockchip platforms they will tend to expose the semi-independent clocks for better power management. v5: - Move the opp-table node under the gpu node v4: - Fix formatting issue v3: - Cleanup commit message to remove redundant text - Added opp-table property and re-ordered entries - Clarified power-domains and power-domain-names requirements for RK3588. - Cleaned up example Note: power-domains and power-domain-names requirements for other platforms are still work in progress, hence the bindings are left incomplete here. v2: - New commit Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau <[email protected]> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Cc: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Cc: Conor Dooley <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]> drm: execution context for GEM buffers v7 This adds the infrastructure for an execution context for GEM buffers which is similar to the existing TTMs execbuf util and intended to replace it in the long term. The basic functionality is that we abstracts the necessary loop to lock many different GEM buffers with automated deadlock and duplicate handling. v2: drop xarray and use dynamic resized array instead, the locking overhead is unnecessary and measurable. v3: drop duplicate tracking, radeon is really the only one needing that. v4: fixes issues pointed out by Danilo, some typos in comments and a helper for lock arrays of GEM objects. v5: some suggestions by Boris Brezillon, especially just use one retry macro, drop loop in prepare_array, use flags instead of bool v6: minor changes suggested by Thomas, Boris and Danilo v7: minor typos pointed out by checkpatch.pl fixed Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings Add infrastructure to keep track of GPU virtual address (VA) mappings with a decicated VA space manager implementation. New UAPIs, motivated by Vulkan sparse memory bindings graphics drivers start implementing, allow userspace applications to request multiple and arbitrary GPU VA mappings of buffer objects. The DRM GPU VA manager is intended to serve the following purposes in this context. 1) Provide infrastructure to track GPU VA allocations and mappings, using an interval tree (RB-tree). 2) Generically connect GPU VA mappings to their backing buffers, in particular DRM GEM objects. 3) Provide a common implementation to perform more complex mapping operations on the GPU VA space. In particular splitting and merging of GPU VA mappings, e.g. for intersecting mapping requests or partial unmap requests. Acked-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Acked-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Tested-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Tested-by: Donald Robson <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm: manager: Fix printk format for size_t sizeof() returns a size_t which may be different to an unsigned long. Use the correct format specifier of '%zu' to prevent compiler warnings. Fixes: e6303f323b1a ("drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings") Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuva_mgr: remove unused prev pointer in __drm_gpuva_sm_map() The prev pointer in __drm_gpuva_sm_map() was used to implement automatic merging of mappings. Since automatic merging did not make its way upstream, remove this leftover. Fixes: e6303f323b1a ("drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings") Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: rename struct drm_gpuva_manager to struct drm_gpuvm Rename struct drm_gpuva_manager to struct drm_gpuvm including corresponding functions. This way the GPUVA manager's structures align very well with the documentation of VM_BIND [1] and VM_BIND locking [2]. It also provides a better foundation for the naming of data structures and functions introduced for implementing a common dma-resv per GPU-VM including tracking of external and evicted objects in subsequent patches. [1] Documentation/gpu/drm-vm-bind-async.rst [2] Documentation/gpu/drm-vm-bind-locking.rst Cc: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: allow building as module HB: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/Kconfig skipped because there is no gpuvm support of nouveau in 6.1 Currently, the DRM GPUVM does not have any core dependencies preventing a module build. Also, new features from subsequent patches require helpers (namely drm_exec) which can be built as module. Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: convert WARN() to drm_WARN() variants HB: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c skipped since 6.1 does not support gpuvm on nv Use drm_WARN() and drm_WARN_ON() variants to indicate drivers the context the failing VM resides in. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: don't always WARN in drm_gpuvm_check_overflow() Don't always WARN in drm_gpuvm_check_overflow() and separate it into a drm_gpuvm_check_overflow() and a dedicated drm_gpuvm_warn_check_overflow() variant. This avoids printing warnings due to invalid userspace requests. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: export drm_gpuvm_range_valid() Drivers may use this function to validate userspace requests in advance, hence export it. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: add common dma-resv per struct drm_gpuvm hb: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c skipped Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of this GPU-VM. This is used in a subsequent patch to generalize dma-resv, external and evicted object handling and GEM validation. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: add drm_gpuvm_flags to drm_gpuvm HB: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c skipped Introduce flags for struct drm_gpuvm, this required by subsequent commits. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: reference count drm_gpuvm structures HB: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c skipped Implement reference counting for struct drm_gpuvm. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: add an abstraction for a VM / BO combination HB: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c skipped Add an abstraction layer between the drm_gpuva mappings of a particular drm_gem_object and this GEM object itself. The abstraction represents a combination of a drm_gem_object and drm_gpuvm. The drm_gem_object holds a list of drm_gpuvm_bo structures (the structure representing this abstraction), while each drm_gpuvm_bo contains list of mappings of this GEM object. This has multiple advantages: 1) We can use the drm_gpuvm_bo structure to attach it to various lists of the drm_gpuvm. This is useful for tracking external and evicted objects per VM, which is introduced in subsequent patches. 2) Finding mappings of a certain drm_gem_object mapped in a certain drm_gpuvm becomes much cheaper. 3) Drivers can derive and extend the structure to easily represent driver specific states of a BO for a certain GPUVM. The idea of this abstraction was taken from amdgpu, hence the credit for this idea goes to the developers of amdgpu. Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: track/lock/validate external/evicted objects Currently the DRM GPUVM offers common infrastructure to track GPU VA allocations and mappings, generically connect GPU VA mappings to their backing buffers and perform more complex mapping operations on the GPU VA space. However, there are more design patterns commonly used by drivers, which can potentially be generalized in order to make the DRM GPUVM represent a basis for GPU-VM implementations. In this context, this patch aims at generalizing the following elements. 1) Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of this GPU-VM. 2) Provide tracking of external GEM objects (GEM objects which are shared with other GPU-VMs). 3) Provide functions to efficiently lock all GEM objects dma-resv the GPU-VM contains mappings of. 4) Provide tracking of evicted GEM objects the GPU-VM contains mappings of, such that validation of evicted GEM objects is accelerated. 5) Provide some convinience functions for common patterns. Big thanks to Boris Brezillon for his help to figure out locking for drivers updating the GPU VA space within the fence signalling path. Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: fall back to drm_exec_lock_obj() Fall back to drm_exec_lock_obj() if num_fences is zero for the drm_gpuvm_prepare_* function family. Otherwise dma_resv_reserve_fences() would actually allocate slots even though num_fences is zero. Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Acked-by: Donald Robson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/gpuvm: Let drm_gpuvm_bo_put() report when the vm_bo object is destroyed Some users need to release resources attached to the vm_bo object when it's destroyed. In Panthor's case, we need to release the pin ref so BO pages can be returned to the system when all GPU mappings are gone. This could be done through a custom drm_gpuvm::vm_bo_free() hook, but this has all sort of locking implications that would force us to expose a drm_gem_shmem_unpin_locked() helper, not to mention the fact that having a ::vm_bo_free() implementation without a ::vm_bo_alloc() one seems odd. So let's keep things simple, and extend drm_gpuvm_bo_put() to report when the object is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/exec: Pass in initial # of objects HB: skipped drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_csa.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_mes.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_umsch_mm.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_job.c drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c In cases where the # is known ahead of time, it is silly to do the table resize dance. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/568338/ drm/gem-shmem: When drm_gem_object_init failed, should release object when goto err_free, the object had init, so it should be release when fail. Signed-off-by: ChunyouTang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm: Remove usage of deprecated DRM_DEBUG_PRIME drm_print.h says DRM_DEBUG_PRIME is deprecated in favor of drm_dbg_prime(). Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Simon Ser <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/cd663b1bc42189e55898cddecdb3b73c591b341a.1673269059.git.code@siddh.me drm/shmem: Cleanup drm_gem_shmem_create_with_handle() Once we create the handle, the handle owns the reference. Currently nothing was doing anything with the shmem ptr after the handle was created, but let's change drm_gem_shmem_create_with_handle() to not return the pointer, so-as to not encourage problematic use of this function in the future. As a bonus, it makes the code a bit cleaner. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Price <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/shmem-helper: Fix locking for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt() Other functions touching shmem->sgt take the pages lock, so do that here too. drm_gem_shmem_get_pages() & co take the same lock, so move to the _locked() variants to avoid recursive locking. Discovered while auditing locking to write the Rust abstractions. Fixes: 2194a63a818d ("drm: Add library for shmem backed GEM objects") Fixes: 4fa3d66f132b ("drm/shmem: Do dma_unmap_sg before purging pages") Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/shmem-helper: Switch to use drm_* debug helpers Ease debugging of a multi-GPU system by using drm_WARN_*() and drm_dbg_kms() helpers that print out DRM device name corresponding to shmem GEM. Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ drm/shmem-helper: Don't use vmap_use_count for dma-bufs DMA-buf core has its own refcounting of vmaps, use it instead of drm-shmem counting. This change prepares drm-shmem for addition of memory shrinker support where drm-shmem will use a single dma-buf reservation lock for all operations performed over dma-bufs. Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock Replace all drm-shmem locks with a GEM reservation lock. This makes locks consistent with dma-buf locking convention where importers are responsible for holding reservation lock for all operations performed over dma-bufs, preventing deadlock between dma-buf importers and exporters. Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ drm/shmem-helper: Revert accidental non-GPL export The referenced commit added a wrapper for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt(), but in the process it accidentally changed the export type from GPL to non-GPL. Switch it back to GPL. Reported-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Fixes: ddddedaa0db9 ("drm/shmem-helper: Fix locking for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt()") Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Revert "drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock" This reverts commit 67b7836d4458790f1261e31fe0ce3250989784f0. The locking appears incomplete. A caller of SHMEM helper's pin function never acquires the dma-buf reservation lock. So we get WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 967 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:243 drm_gem_shmem_pin+0x42/0x90 [drm_shmem_helper] Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock Replace all drm-shmem locks with a GEM reservation lock. This makes locks consistent with dma-buf locking convention where importers are responsible for holding reservation lock for all operations performed over dma-bufs, preventing deadlock between dma-buf importers and exporters. Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/shmem-helper: Reset vma->vm_ops before calling dma_buf_mmap() The dma-buf backend is supposed to provide its own vm_ops, but some implementation just have nothing special to do and leave vm_ops untouched, probably expecting this field to be zero initialized (this is the case with the system_heap implementation for instance). Let's reset vma->vm_ops to NULL to keep things working with these implementations. Fixes: 26d3ac3cb04d ("drm/shmem-helpers: Redirect mmap for imported dma-buf") Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Reported-by: Roman Stratiienko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Tested-by: Roman Stratiienko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] iommu: Allow passing custom allocators to pgtable drivers This will be useful for GPU drivers who want to keep page tables in a pool so they can: - keep freed page tables in a free pool and speed-up upcoming page table allocations - batch page table allocation instead of allocating one page at a time - pre-reserve pages for page tables needed for map/unmap operations, to ensure map/unmap operations don't try to allocate memory in paths they're allowed to block or fail It might also be valuable for other aspects of GPU and similar use-cases, like fine-grained memory accounting and resource limiting. We will extend the Arm LPAE format to support custom allocators in a separate commit. Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Price <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> iommu: Extend LPAE page table format to support custom allocators We need that in order to implement the VM_BIND ioctl in the GPU driver targeting new Mali GPUs. VM_BIND is about executing MMU map/unmap requests asynchronously, possibly after waiting for external dependencies encoded as dma_fences. We intend to use the drm_sched framework to automate the dependency tracking and VM job dequeuing logic, but this comes with its own set of constraints, one of them being the fact we are not allowed to allocate memory in the drm_gpu_scheduler_ops::run_job() to avoid this sort of deadlocks: - VM_BIND map job needs to allocate a page table to map some memory to the VM. No memory available, so kswapd is kicked - GPU driver shrinker backend ends up waiting on the fence attached to the VM map job or any other job fence depending on this VM operation. With custom allocators, we will be able to pre-reserve enough pages to guarantee the map/unmap operations we queued will take place without going through the system allocator. But we can also optimize allocation/reservation by not free-ing pages immediately, so any upcoming page table allocation requests can be serviced by some free page table pool kept at the driver level. I might also be valuable for other aspects of GPU and similar use-cases, like fine-grained memory accounting and resource limiting. Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Price <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> drm/sched: Add FIFO sched policy to run queue When many entities are competing for the same run queue on the same scheduler, we observe an unusually long wait times and some jobs get starved. This has been observed on GPUVis. The issue is due to the Round Robin policy used by schedulers to pick up the next entity's job queue for execution. Under stress of many entities and long job queues within entity some jobs could be stuck for very long time in it's entity's queue before being popped from the queue and executed while for other entities with smaller job queues a job might execute earlier even though that job arrived later then the job in the long queue. Fix: Add FIFO selection policy to entities in run queue, chose next entity on run queue in such order that if job on one entity arrived earlier then job on another entity the first job will start executing earlier regardless of the length of the entity's job queue. v2: Switch to rb tree structure for entities based on TS of oldest job waiting in the job queue of an entity. Improves next entity extraction to O(1). Entity TS update O(log N) where N is the number of entities in the run-queue Drop default option in module control parameter. v3: Various cosmetical fixes and minor refactoring of fifo update function. (Luben) v4: Switch drm_sched_rq_select_entity_fifo to in order search (Luben) v5: Fix up drm_sched_rq_select_entity_fifo loop (Luben) v6: Add missing drm_sched_rq_remove_fifo_locked v7: Fix ts sampling bug and more cosmetic stuff (Luben) v8: Fix module parameter string (Luben) Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development <[email protected]> Cc: AMD Graphics <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yunxiang Li (Teddy) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: Set the FIFO scheduling policy as the default The currently default Round-Robin GPU scheduling can result in starvation of entities which have a large number of jobs, over entities which have a very small number of jobs (single digit). This can be illustrated in the following diagram, where jobs are alphabetized to show their chronological order of arrival, where job A is the oldest, B is the second oldest, and so on, to J, the most recent job to arrive. ---> entities j | H-F-----A--E--I-- o | --G-----B-----J-- b | --------C-------- s\/ --------D-------- WLOG, assuming all jobs are "ready", then a R-R scheduling will execute them in the following order (a slice off of the top of the entities' list), H, F, A, E, I, G, B, J, C, D. However, to mitigate job starvation, we'd rather execute C and D before E, and so on, given, of course, that they're all ready to be executed. So, if all jobs are ready at this instant, the order of execution for this and the next 9 instances of picking the next job to execute, should really be, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, which is their chronological order. The only reason for this order to be broken, is if an older job is not yet ready, but a younger job is ready, at an instant of picking a new job to execute. For instance if job C wasn't ready at time 2, but job D was ready, then we'd pick job D, like this: 0 +1 +2 ... A, B, D, ... And from then on, C would be preferred before all other jobs, if it is ready at the time when a new job for execution is picked. So, if C became ready two steps later, the execution order would look like this: ......0 +1 +2 ... A, B, D, E, C, F, G, H, I, J This is what the FIFO GPU scheduling algorithm achieves. It uses a Red-Black tree to keep jobs sorted in chronological order, where picking the oldest job is O(1) (we use the "cached" structure), and balancing the tree is O(log n). IOW, it picks the *oldest ready* job to execute now. The implementation is already in the kernel, and this commit only changes the default GPU scheduling algorithm to use. This was tested and achieves about 1% faster performance over the Round Robin algorithm. Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: add drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies Add a new function to update job dependencies from a resv obj. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: remove drm_sched_dependency_optimized Not used any more. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini This was buggy because when we had to wait for entities which were killed as well we would just deadlock. Instead move all the dependency handling into the callbacks so that will all happen asynchronously. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: rename dependency callback into prepare_job This now matches much better what this is doing. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/amdgpu: revert "implement tdr advanced mode" This reverts commit e6c6338f393b74ac0b303d567bb918b44ae7ad75. This feature basically re-submits one job after another to figure out which one was the one causing a hang. This is obviously incompatible with gang-submit which requires that multiple jobs run at the same time. It's also absolutely not helpful to crash the hardware multiple times if a clean recovery is desired. For testing and debugging environments we should rather disable recovery alltogether to be able to inspect the state with a hw debugger. Additional to that the sw implementation is clearly buggy and causes reference count issues for the hardware fence. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: Fix lockup in drm_sched_entity_kill() The drm_sched_entity_kill() is invoked twice by drm_sched_entity_destroy() while userspace process is exiting or being killed. First time it's invoked when sched entity is flushed and second time when entity is released. This causes a lockup within wait_for_completion(entity_idle) due to how completion API works. Calling wait_for_completion() more times than complete() was invoked is a error condition that causes lockup because completion internally uses counter for complete/wait calls. The complete_all() must be used instead in such cases. This patch fixes lockup of Panfrost driver that is reproducible by killing any application in a middle of 3d drawing operation. Fixes: 2fdb8a8f07c2 ("drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: deprecate drm_sched_resubmit_jobs This interface is not working as it should. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: track GPU active time per entity Track the accumulated time that jobs from this entity were active on the GPU. This allows drivers using the scheduler to trivially implement the DRM fdinfo when the hardware doesn't provide more specific information than signalling job completion anyways. [Bagas: Append missing colon to @elapsed_ns] Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <[email protected]> drm/sched: Create wrapper to add a syncobj dependency to job In order to add a syncobj's fence as a dependency to a job, it is necessary to call drm_syncobj_find_fence() to find the fence and then add the dependency with drm_sched_job_add_dependency(). So, wrap these steps in one single function, drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency(). Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: Fix variable name in function description Compiling AMD GPU drivers displays two warnings: drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:738: warning: Function parameter or member 'file' not described in 'drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency' drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:738: warning: Excess function parameter 'file_private' description in 'drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency' Get rid of them by renaming the variable name on the function description Signed-off-by: Caio Novais <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: Add fence deadline support As the finished fence is the one that is exposed to userspace, and therefore the one that other operations, like atomic update, would block on, we need to propagate the deadline from from the finished fence to the actual hw fence. v2: Split into drm_sched_fence_set_parent() (ckoenig) v3: Ensure a thread calling drm_sched_fence_set_deadline_finished() sees fence->parent set before drm_sched_fence_set_parent() does this test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_HAS_DEADLINE_BIT). Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Acked-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Revert "drm/scheduler: track GPU active time per entity" This reverts commit df622729ddbf as it introduces a use-after-free, which isn't easy to fix without going back to the design drawing board. Reported-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: Fix UAF race in drm_sched_entity_push_job() After a job is pushed into the queue, it is owned by the scheduler core and may be freed at any time, so we can't write nor read the submit timestamp after that point. Fixes oopses observed with the drm/asahi driver, found with kASAN. Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling During an IGT GPU reset test we see the following oops, [ +0.000003] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:1656 __queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0 [ +0.000004] Modules linked in: iptable_filter bpfilter amdgpu(OE) nls_iso8859_1 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic intel_rapl_msr ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl_common snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core iommu_v2 gpu_sched(OE) kvm_amd drm_buddy snd_hwdep kvm video drm_ttm_helper snd_pcm ttm snd_seq_midi drm_display_helper snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi cec crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_seq aesni_intel rc_core crypto_simd cryptd binfmt_misc drm_kms_helper rapl snd_seq_device input_leds joydev snd_timer i2c_algo_bit syscopyarea snd ccp sysfillrect sysimgblt wmi_bmof k10temp soundcore mac_hid sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev drm lp parport ramoops reed_solomon pstore_blk pstore_zone efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid r8169 ahci xhci_pci gpio_amdpt realtek i2c_piix4 wmi crc32_pclmul xhci_pci_renesas libahci gpio_generic [ +0.000070] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017 [ +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0 [ +0.000003] Code: 7a 50 48 01 c1 48 89 4a 30 81 ff 00 20 00 00 75 38 4c 89 cf e8 64 3e 0a 00 5d e9 1e c5 11 01 e8 99 f7 ff ff 5d e9 13 c5 11 01 <0f> 0b eb c1 0f 0b 48 81 7a 38 70 5c 0e 81 74 9f 0f 0b 48 8b 42 28 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000398d60 EFLAGS: 00010007 [ +0.000002] RAX: ffff88810d589c60 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] RDX: ffff88810d589c58 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000002000 [ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc90000398d60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810d589c78 [ +0.000002] R10: 72705f305f39765f R11: 7866673a6d72645b R12: ffff88810d589c58 [ +0.000001] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8887fee40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000002] CR2: 00005562c4797fa0 CR3: 0000000110da0000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ +0.000002] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <IRQ> [ +0.000001] mod_delayed_work_on+0x5e/0xa0 [ +0.000004] drm_sched_fault+0x23/0x30 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000007] gfx_v9_0_fault.isra.0+0xa6/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000258] gfx_v9_0_priv_reg_irq+0x29/0x40 [amdgpu] [ +0.000254] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x1ac/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000243] amdgpu_ih_process+0x89/0x130 [amdgpu] [ +0.000245] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x24/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000165] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4f/0x1a0 [ +0.000003] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x15/0x50 [ +0.000001] handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60 [ +0.000002] handle_edge_irq+0xa8/0x250 [ +0.000003] __common_interrupt+0x7b/0x150 [ +0.000002] common_interrupt+0xc1/0xe0 [ +0.000003] </IRQ> [ +0.000000] <TASK> [ +0.000001] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ +0.000002] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10 [ +0.000003] Code: 46 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc eb 07 0f 00 2d 69 f2 5e 00 f4 e9 f1 3b 3e 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 59 f2 5e 00 fb f4 <e9> e0 3b 3e 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 e8 b1 d4 fe ff 66 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018fdc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: 000000000002e5a8 RCX: 000000000000001f [ +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888101298800 RDI: ffff888101298864 [ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc9000018fdd0 R08: 000000527f64bd8b R09: 000000000001dc90 [ +0.000001] R10: 000000000001dc90 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff888101298864 R14: ffffffff832d9e20 R15: ffff888193aa8c00 [ +0.000003] ? acpi_idle_do_entry+0x5e/0x70 [ +0.000002] acpi_idle_enter+0xd1/0x160 [ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter_state+0x9a/0x6e0 [ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 [ +0.000003] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000002] do_idle+0x1de/0x260 [ +0.000002] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 [ +0.000002] start_secondary+0x120/0x150 [ +0.000003] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb [ +0.000004] </TASK> [ +0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ +0.000003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000102 [ +0.006233] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* ring gfx_low timeout, signaled seq=3, emitted seq=4 [ +0.000734] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.009670] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* Process information: process amd_deadlock pid 2002 thread amd_deadlock pid 2002 [ +0.005135] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000002] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000002] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000002] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2 [ +0.000002] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017 [ +0.012101] amdgpu 0000:0c:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset begin! [ +0.005136] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x1f/0x4e0 [ +0.000004] Code: 87 cd 11 01 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 f4 53 48 83 ec 10 89 7d d4 <f6> 86 02 01 00 00 01 0f 85 6c 03 00 00 e8 7f 36 08 00 8b 45 d4 48 For gfx_rings the schedulers may not be initialized by amdgpu_device_init_schedulers() due to ring->no_scheduler flag being set to true and thus the timeout_wq is NULL. As a result, since all ASICs call drm_sched_fault() unconditionally even for schedulers which have not been initialized, it is simpler to use the ready condition which indicates whether the given scheduler worker thread runs and whether the timeout_wq of the reset domain has been initialized. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Prosyak <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] drm/scheduler: set entity to NULL in drm_sched_entity_pop_job() It already happend a few times that patches slipped through which implemented access to an entity through a job that was already removed from the entities queue. Since jobs and entities might have different lifecycles, this can potentially cause UAF bugs. In order to make it obvious that a jobs entity pointer shouldn't be accessed after drm_sched_entity_pop_job() was called successfully, set the jobs entity pointer to NULL once the job is removed from the entity queue. Moreover, debugging a potential NULL pointer dereference is way easier than potentially corrupted memory through a UAF. Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: properly forward fence errors When a hw fence is signaled with an error properly forward that to the finished fence. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: add drm_sched_entity_error and use rcu for last_scheduled Switch to using RCU handling for the last scheduled job and add a function to return the error code of it. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/scheduler: mark jobs without fence as canceled When no hw fence is provided for a job that means that the job didn't executed. Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/sched: Check scheduler work queue before calling timeout handling During an IGT GPU reset test we see again oops despite of commit 0c8c901aaaebc9 (drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling). It uses ready condition whether to call drm_sched_fault which unwind the TDR leads to GPU reset. However it looks the ready condition is overloaded with other meanings, for example, for the following stack is related GPU reset : 0 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start 1 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_resume 2 gfx_v9_0_cp_resume 3 gfx_v9_0_hw_init 4 gfx_v9_0_resume 5 amdgpu_device_ip_resume_phase2 does the following: /* start the ring */ gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start(adev); ring->sched.ready = true; The same approach is for other ASICs as well : gfx_v8_0_cp_gfx_resume gfx_v10_0_kiq_resume, etc... As a result, our GPU reset test causes GPU fault which calls unconditionally gfx_v9_0_fault and then drm_sched_fault. However now it depends on whether the interrupt service routine drm_sched_fault is executed after gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start is completed which sets the ready field of the scheduler to true even for uninitialized schedulers and causes oops vs no fault or when ISR drm_sched_fault is completed prior gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start and NULL pointer dereference does not occur. Use the field timeout_wq to prevent oops for uninitialized schedulers. The field could be initialized by the work queue of resetting the domain. v1: Corrections to commit message (Luben) Fixes: 11b3b9f461c5c4 ("drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Prosyak <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Remove redundant check The rq pointer points inside the drm_gpu_scheduler structure. Thus it can't be NULL. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: c61cdbdbffc1 ("drm/scheduler: Fix hang when sched_entity released") Signed-off-by: Vladislav Efanov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Rename to drm_sched_can_queue() Rename drm_sched_ready() to drm_sched_can_queue(). "ready" can mean many things and is thus meaningless in this context. Instead, rename to a name which precisely conveys what is being checked. Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] drm/sched: Rename to drm_sched_wakeup_if_can_queue() Rename drm_sched_wakeup() to drm_sched_wakeup_if_canqueue() since the former is misleading, as it wakes up the GPU scheduler _only if_ more jobs can be queued to the underlying hardware. This distinction is important to make, since the wake conditional in the GPU scheduler thread wakes up when other conditions are also true, e.g. when there are jobs to be cleaned. For instance, a user might want to wake up the scheduler only because there are more jobs to clean, but whether we can queue more jobs is irrelevant. v2: Separate "canqueue" to "can_queue". (Alex D.) Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> drm/scheduler: avoid infinite loop if entity's dependency is a scheduled error fence [Why] drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb ignores the scheduled fence and return false. If entity's dependency is a scheduler error fence and drm_sched_stop is called due to TDR, drm_sched_entity_pop_job will wait for the dependency infinitely. [How] Do not wait or ignore the scheduled error fence, add drm_sched_entity_wakeup callback for the dependency with scheduled error fence. Signed-off-by: ZhenGuo Yin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> drm/sched: Make sure we wait for all dependencies in kill_jobs_cb() drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() logic is omitting the last fence popped from the dependency array that was waited upon before drm_sched_entity_kill() was called (drm_sched_entity::dependency field), so we're basically waiting for all dependencies except one. In theory, this wait shouldn't be needed because resources should have their users registered to the dma_resv object, thus guaranteeing that future jobs wanting to access these resources wait on all the previous users (depending on the access type, of course). But we want to keep these explicit waits in the kill entity path just in case. Let's make sure we keep all dependencies in the array in drm_sched_job_dependency(), so we can iterate over the array and wait in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(). We also make sure we wait on drm_sched_fence::finished if we were originally asked to wait on drm_sched_fence::scheduled. In that case, we assume the intent was to delegate the wait to the firmware/GPU or rely on the pipelining done at the entity/scheduler level, but when killing jobs, we really want to wait for completion not just scheduling. v2: - Don't evict deps in drm_sched_job_dependency() v3: - Always wait for drm_sched_fence::finished fences in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() when we see a sched_fence v4: - Fix commit message - Fix a use-after-free bug v5: - Flag deps on which we should only wait for the scheduled event at insertion time v6: - Back to v4 implementation - Add Christian's R-b Cc: Frank Binns <[email protected]> Cc: Sarah Walker <[email protected]> Cc: Donald Robson <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: David Airlie <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: Sumit Semwal <[email protected]> Cc: "Christian König" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Suggested-by: "Christian König" <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: "Christian König" <[email protected]> Acked-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/sched: Call drm_sched_fence_set_parent() from drm_sched_fence_scheduled() Drivers that can delegate waits to the firmware/GPU pass the scheduled fence to drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), and issue wait commands to the firmware/GPU at job submission time. For this to be possible, they need all their 'native' dependencies to have a valid parent since this is where the actual HW fence information are encoded. In drm_sched_main(), we currently call drm_sched_fence_set_parent() after drm_sched_fence_scheduled(), leaving a short period of time during which the job depending on this fence can be submitted. Since setting parent and signaling the fence are two things that are kinda related (you can't have a parent if the job hasn't been scheduled), it probably makes sense to pass the parent fence to drm_sched_fence_scheduled() and let it call drm_sched_fence_set_parent() before it signals the scheduled fence. Here is a detailed description of the race we are fixing here: Thread A Thread B - calls drm_sched_fence_scheduled() - signals s_fence->scheduled which wakes up thread B - entity dep signaled, checking the next dep - no more deps waiting - entity is picked for job submission by drm_gpu_scheduler - run_job() is called - run_job() tries to collect native fence info from s_fence->parent, but it's NULL => BOOM, we can't do our native wait - calls drm_sched_fence_set_parent() v2: * Fix commit message v3: * Add a detailed description of the race to the commit message * Add Luben's R-b Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Cc: Frank Binns <[email protected]> Cc: Sarah Walker <[email protected]> Cc: Donald Robson <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: David Airlie <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: Sumit Semwal <[email protected]> Cc: "Christian König" <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] dma-buf: add dma_fence_timestamp helper When a fence signals there is a very small race window where the timestamp isn't updated yet. sync_file solves this by busy waiting for the timestamp to appear, but on other ocassions didn't handled this correctly. Provide a dma_fence_timestamp() helper function for this and use it in all appropriate cases. Another alternative would be to grab the spinlock when that happens. v2 by teddy: add a wait parameter to wait for the timestamp to show up, in case the accurate timestamp is needed and/or the timestamp is not based on ktime (e.g. hw timestamp) v3 chk: drop the parameter again for unified handling Signed-off-by: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Fixes: 1774baa64f93 ("drm/scheduler: Change scheduled fence track v2") Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/sched: Convert the GPU scheduler to variable number of run-queues The GPU scheduler has now a variable number of run-queues, which are set up at drm_sched_init() time. This way, each driver announces how many run-queues it requires (supports) per each GPU scheduler it creates. Note, that run-queues correspond to scheduler "priorities", thus if the number of run-queues is set to 1 at drm_sched_init(), then that scheduler supports a single run-queue, i.e. single "priority". If a driver further sets a single entity per run-queue, then this creates a 1-to-1 correspondence between a scheduler and a scheduled entity. Cc: Lucas Stach <[email protected]> Cc: Russell King <[email protected]> Cc: Qiang Yu <[email protected]> Cc: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Abhinav Kumar <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Emma Anholt <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] drm/sched: Add drm_sched_wqueue_* helpers Add scheduler wqueue ready, stop, and start helpers to hide the implementation details of the scheduler from the drivers. v2: - s/sched_wqueue/sched_wqueue (Luben) - Remove the extra white line after the return-statement (Luben) - update drm_sched_wqueue_ready comment (Luben) Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Convert drm scheduler to use a work queue rather than kthread In Xe, the new Intel GPU driver, a choice has made to have a 1 to 1 mapping between a drm_gpu_scheduler and drm_sched_entity. At first this seems a bit odd but let us explain the reasoning below. 1. In Xe the submission order from multiple drm_sched_entity is not guaranteed to be the same completion even if targeting the same hardware engine. This is because in Xe we have a firmware scheduler, the GuC, which allowed to reorder, timeslice, and preempt submissions. If a using shared drm_gpu_scheduler across multiple drm_sched_entity, the TDR falls apart as the TDR expects submission order == completion order. Using a dedicated drm_gpu_scheduler per drm_sched_entity solve this problem. 2. In Xe submissions are done via programming a ring buffer (circular buffer), a drm_gpu_scheduler provides a limit on number of jobs, if the limit of number jobs is set to RING_SIZE / MAX_SIZE_PER_JOB we get flow control on the ring for free. A problem with this design is currently a drm_gpu_scheduler uses a kthread for submission / job cleanup. This doesn't scale if a large number of drm_gpu_scheduler are used. To work around the scaling issue, use a worker rather than kthread for submission / job cleanup. v2: - (Rob Clark) Fix msm build - Pass in run work queue v3: - (Boris) don't have loop in worker v4: - (Tvrtko) break out submit ready, stop, start helpers into own patch v5: - (Boris) default to ordered work queue v6: - (Luben / checkpatch) fix alignment in msm_ringbuffer.c - (Luben) s/drm_sched_submit_queue/drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue - (Luben) Update comment for drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue - (Luben) Positive check for submit_wq in drm_sched_init - (Luben) s/alloc_submit_wq/own_submit_wq v7: - (Luben) s/drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue/drm_sched_run_job_queue v8: - (Luben) Adjust var names / comments Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Split free_job into own work item Rather than call free_job and run_job in same work item have a dedicated work item for each. This aligns with the design and intended use of work queues. v2: - Test for DMA_FENCE_FLAG_TIMESTAMP_BIT before setting timestamp in free_job() work item (Danilo) v3: - Drop forward dec of drm_sched_select_entity (Boris) - Return in drm_sched_run_job_work if entity NULL (Boris) v4: - Replace dequeue with peek and invert logic (Luben) - Wrap to 100 lines (Luben) - Update comments for *_queue / *_queue_if_ready functions (Luben) v5: - Drop peek argument, blindly reinit idle (Luben) - s/drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_ready/drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_done (Luben) - Update work_run_job & work_free_job kernel doc (Luben) v6: - Do not move drm_sched_select_entity in file (Luben) Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Add drm_sched_start_timeout_unlocked helper Also add a lockdep assert to drm_sched_start_timeout. Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Add a helper to queue TDR immediately Add a helper whereby a driver can invoke TDR immediately. v2: - Drop timeout args, rename function, use mod delayed work (Luben) v3: - s/XE/Xe (Luben) - present tense in commit message (Luben) - Adjust comment for drm_sched_tdr_queue_imm (Luben) v4: - Adjust commit message (Luben) Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_get_cleanup_job to be more descriptive "Get cleanup job" makes it sound like helper is returning a job which will execute some cleanup, or something, while the kerneldoc itself accurately says "fetch the next _finished_ job". So lets rename the helper to be self documenting. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Move free worker re-queuing out of the if block Whether or not there are more jobs to clean up does not depend on the existance of the current job, given both drm_sched_get_finished_job and drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_done take and drop the job list lock. Therefore it is confusing to make it read like there is a dependency. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_free_job_queue to be more descriptive The current name makes it sound like helper will free a queue, while what it does is it enqueues the free job worker. Rename it to drm_sched_run_free_queue to align with existing drm_sched_run_job_queue. Despite that creating an illusion there are two queues, while in reality there is only one, at least it creates a consistent naming for the two enqueuing helpers. At the same time simplify the "if done" helper by dropping the suffix and adding a double underscore prefix to the one which just enqueues. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_run_job_queue_if_ready and clarify kerneldoc "If ready" is not immediately clear what it means - is the scheduler ready or something else? Drop the suffix, clarify kerneldoc, and employ the same naming scheme as in drm_sched_run_free_queue: - drm_sched_run_job_queue - enqueues if there is something to enqueue *and* scheduler is ready (can queue) - __drm_sched_run_job_queue - low-level helper to simply queue the job Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Drop suffix from drm_sched_wakeup_if_can_queue Because a) helper is exported to other parts of the scheduler and b) there isn't a plain drm_sched_wakeup to begin with, I think we can drop the suffix and by doing so separate the intimiate knowledge between the scheduler components a bit better. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> drm/sched: Don't disturb the entity when in RR-mode scheduling Don't call drm_sched_select_entity() in drm_sched_run_job_queue(). In fact, rename __drm_sched_run_job_queue() to just drm_sched_run_job_queue(), and let it do just that, schedule the work item for execution. The problem is that drm_sched_run_job_queue() calls drm_sched_select_entity() to determine if the scheduler has an entity ready in one of its run-queues, and in the case of the Round-Robin (RR) scheduling, the function drm_sched_rq_select_entity_rr() does just that, selects the _next_ entity which is ready, sets up the run-queue and completion and returns that entity. The FIFO scheduling algorithm is unaffected. Now, since drm_sched_run_job_work() also calls drm_sched_select_entity(), then in the case of RR scheduling, that would result in drm_sched_select_entity() having been called twice, which may result in skipping a ready entity if more than one entity is ready. This commit fixes this by eliminating the call to drm_sched_select_entity() from drm_sched_run_job_queue(), and leaves it only in drm_sched_run_job_work(). v2: Rebased on top of Tvrtko's renames series of patches. (Luben) Add fixes-tag. (Tvrtko) Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Fixes: f7fe64ad0f22ff ("drm/sched: Split free_job into own work item") Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/sched: Qualify drm_sched_wakeup() by drm_sched_entity_is_ready() Don't "wake up" the GPU scheduler unless the entity is ready, as well as we can queue to the scheduler, i.e. there is no point in waking up the scheduler for the entity unless the entity is ready. Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <[email protected]> Fixes: bc8d6a9df99038 ("drm/sched: Don't disturb the entity when in RR-mode scheduling") Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] drm/sched: implement dynamic job-flow control Currently, job flow control is implemented simply by limiting the number of jobs in flight. Therefore, a scheduler is initialized with a credit limit that corresponds to the number of jobs w…

commit 3061b64 upstream. For ARM processor, unaligned access to device memory is not allowed. Method memcpy does not take care of alignment. USB detection failure with the unalingned address of memory, with below kernel crash. To fix the unalingned address kernel panic, replace memcpy with memcpy_toio method. Kernel crash: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80000c05008a Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000061 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000061 CM = 0, WnR = 1 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000143b000 [ffff80000c05008a] pgd=100000087ffff003, p4d=100000087ffff003, pud=100000087fffe003, pmd=1000000800bcc003, pte=00680000a0010713 Internal error: Oops: 96000061 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.19-xilinx-v2022.1 #1 Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT) pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __memcpy+0x30/0x260 lr : __xudc_ep0_queue+0xf0/0x110 sp : ffff800008003d00 x29: ffff800008003d00 x28: ffff800009474e80 x27: 00000000000000a0 x26: 0000000000000100 x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff000800bc8080 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000012 x21: ffff000800bc8080 x20: 0000000000000012 x19: ffff000800bc8080 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: ffff800876482000 x16: ffff800008004000 x15: 0000000000004000 x14: 00001f09785d0400 x13: 0103020101005567 x12: 0781400000000200 x11: 00000000c5672a10 x10: 00000000000008d0 x9 : ffff800009463cf0 x8 : ffff8000094757b0 x7 : 0201010055670781 x6 : 4000000002000112 x5 : ffff80000c05009a x4 : ffff000800a15012 x3 : ffff00080362ad80 x2 : 0000000000000012 x1 : ffff000800a15000 x0 : ffff80000c050088 Call trace: __memcpy+0x30/0x260 xudc_ep0_queue+0x3c/0x60 usb_ep_queue+0x38/0x44 composite_ep0_queue.constprop.0+0x2c/0xc0 composite_setup+0x8d0/0x185c configfs_composite_setup+0x74/0xb0 xudc_irq+0x570/0xa40 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x170 handle_irq_event+0x60/0x120 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc0/0x220 handle_domain_irq+0x60/0x90 gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xa0 call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x60 do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x60 el1_interrupt+0x30/0x50 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x78/0x7c arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x2c do_idle+0xdc/0x15c cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x60 rest_init+0xc8/0xe0 arch_call_rest_init+0x10/0x1c start_kernel+0x694/0x6d4 __primary_switched+0xa4/0xac Fixes: 1f7c516 ("usb: gadget: Add xilinx usb2 device support") Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Piyush Mehta <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b502c87 upstream. If an UNDEFINED exception is taken from EL1, and do_undefinstr() doesn't find any suitable undef_hook, it will call: BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)) ... and the kernel will report a failure witin do_undefinstr() rather than reporting the original context that the UNDEFINED exception was taken from. The pt_regs and ESR value reported within the BUG() handler will be from within do_undefinstr() and the code dump will be for the BRK in BUG_ON(), which isn't sufficient to debug the cause of the original exception. This patch makes the reporting better by having do_undefinstr() call die() directly in this case to report the original context from which the UNDEFINED exception was taken. Prior to this patch, an undefined instruction is reported as: | kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:497! | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00127-geff044f1b04e-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 000000c5 (nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : do_undefinstr+0x28c/0x2ac | lr : do_undefinstr+0x298/0x2ac | sp : ffff800009f63bc0 | x29: ffff800009f63bc0 x28: ffff800009f73c00 x27: ffff800009644a70 | x26: ffff8000096778a8 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 00000000800000c5 x22: ffff800009894060 x21: ffff800009f63d90 | x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800009f63c40 x18: 0000000000000006 | x17: 0000000000403000 x16: 00000000bfbfd000 x15: ffff800009f63830 | x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000019 | x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 0000000000161b98 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : ffff800009f761d0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000a2b80f8 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff800009f73c00 x0 : 00000000800000c5 | Call trace: | do_undefinstr+0x28c/0x2ac | el1_undef+0x2c/0x4c | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xd0 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | start_kernel+0x88/0x6ac | __primary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 | Code: 17ffff95 a9425bf5 17ffffb8 a9025bf5 (d4210000) With this patch applied, an undefined instruction is reported as: | Internal error: Oops - Undefined instruction: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00128-gf27cfcc80e52-dirty #5 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 800000c5 (Nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | lr : setup_arch+0x50c/0x598 | sp : ffff800009f63d90 | x29: ffff800009f63d90 x28: 0000000081000200 x27: ffff800009644a70 | x26: ffff8000096778c8 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 0000000000000100 x22: ffff800009f69a58 x21: ffff80000a2b80b8 | x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000006 | x17: 0000000000403000 x16: 00000000bfbfd000 x15: ffff800009f63830 | x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000019 | x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 0000000000161b98 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : 0000000000000008 x4 : 0000000000000010 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | start_kernel+0x88/0x6ac | __primary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 | Code: b4000080 90ffed80 912ac000 97db745f (00000000) Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]> Cc: Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a1fafa3 upstream. If an FPAC exception is taken from EL1, the entry code will call do_ptrauth_fault(), where due to: BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)) ... the kernel will report a problem within do_ptrauth_fault() rather than reporting the original context the FPAC exception was taken from. The pt_regs and ESR value reported will be from within do_ptrauth_fault() and the code dump will be for the BRK in BUG_ON(), which isn't sufficient to debug the cause of the original exception. This patch makes the reporting better by having separate EL0 and EL1 FPAC exception handlers, with the latter calling die() directly to report the original context the FPAC exception was taken from. Note that we only need to prevent kprobes of the EL1 FPAC handler, since the EL0 FPAC handler cannot be called recursively. For consistency with do_el0_svc*(), I've named the split functions do_el{0,1}_fpac() rather than do_el{0,1}_ptrauth_fault(). I've also clarified the comment to not imply there are casues other than FPAC exceptions. Prior to this patch FPAC exceptions are reported as: | kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:517! | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00130-g9c8a180a1cdf-dirty #12 | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT) | pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : do_ptrauth_fault+0x3c/0x40 | lr : el1_fpac+0x34/0x54 | sp : ffff80000a3bbc80 | x29: ffff80000a3bbc80 x28: ffff0008001d8000 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 0000000020400009 x22: ffff800008f70fa4 x21: ffff80000a3bbe00 | x20: 0000000072000000 x19: ffff80000a3bbcb0 x18: fffffbfffda37000 | x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000081a90000 | x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000 | x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000080000000 | x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000783 | x5 : ffff80000a3bbcb0 x4 : ffff0008001d8000 x3 : 0000000072000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000020400009 x0 : ffff80000a3bbcb0 | Call trace: | do_ptrauth_fault+0x3c/0x40 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0xc4/0xd0 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | test_pac+0x8/0x10 | smp_init+0x7c/0x8c | kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c | kernel_init+0x28/0x13c | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: 97fffe5e a8c17bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (d4210000) With this patch applied FPAC exceptions are reported as: | Internal error: Oops - FPAC: 0000000072000000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00132-g78846e1c4757-dirty #11 | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT) | pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : test_pac+0x8/0x10 | lr : 0x0 | sp : ffff80000a3bbe00 | x29: ffff80000a3bbe00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: ffff80000a2c8000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 | x20: ffff8000099fa5b0 x19: ffff80000a007000 x18: fffffbfffda37000 | x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000081a90000 | x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000 | x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000080000000 | x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000783 | x5 : ffff80000a2c6000 x4 : ffff0008001d8000 x3 : ffff800009f88378 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000080210000 x0 : ffff000001a90000 | Call trace: | test_pac+0x8/0x10 | smp_init+0x7c/0x8c | kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c | kernel_init+0x28/0x13c | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: d50323bf d65f03c0 d503233f aa1f03fe (d50323bf) Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]> Cc: Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 830a2a4 upstream. If a BTI exception is taken from EL1, the entry code will treat this as an unhandled exception and will panic() the kernel. This is inconsistent with the way we handle FPAC exceptions, which have a dedicated handler and only necessarily kill the thread from which the exception was taken from, and we don't log all the information that could be relevant to debug the issue. The code in do_bti() has: BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)); ... and it seems like the intent was to call this for EL1 BTI exceptions, as with FPAC, but this was omitted due to an oversight. This patch adds separate EL0 and EL1 BTI exception handlers, with the latter calling die() directly to report the original context the BTI exception was taken from. This matches our handling of FPAC exceptions. Prior to this patch, a BTI failure is reported as: | Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00131-g7d937ff0221d-dirty #9 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 20400809 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c) | pc : test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10 | lr : test_bti_caller+0x1c/0x28 | sp : ffff80000800bdf0 | x29: ffff80000800bdf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: ffff80000a2b8000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 | x20: ffff8000099fa5b0 x19: ffff800009ff7000 x18: fffffbfffda37000 | x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000041a90000 | x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000 | x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000040000000 | x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000f83 | x5 : ffff80000a2b6000 x4 : ffff0000028d0000 x3 : ffff800009f78378 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000040210000 x0 : ffff8000080257e4 | Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00131-g7d937ff0221d-dirty #9 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 | show_stack+0x18/0x5c | dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80 | dump_stack+0x18/0x34 | panic+0x170/0x360 | arm64_exit_nmi.isra.0+0x0/0x80 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x64/0xd0 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10 | smp_cpus_done+0xb0/0xbc | smp_init+0x7c/0x8c | kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c | kernel_init+0x28/0x13c | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 With this patch applied, a BTI failure is reported as: | Internal error: Oops - BTI: 0000000034000002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00132-g0ad98265d582-dirty #8 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 20400809 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c) | pc : test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10 | lr : test_bti_caller+0x1c/0x28 | sp : ffff80000800bdf0 | x29: ffff80000800bdf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: ffff80000a2b8000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 | x20: ffff8000099fa5b0 x19: ffff800009ff7000 x18: fffffbfffda37000 | x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000041a90000 | x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000 | x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000040000000 | x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000f83 | x5 : ffff80000a2b6000 x4 : ffff0000028d0000 x3 : ffff800009f78378 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000040210000 x0 : ffff800008025804 | Call trace: | test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10 | smp_cpus_done+0xb0/0xbc | smp_init+0x7c/0x8c | kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c | kernel_init+0x28/0x13c | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: d50323bf d53cd040 d65f03c0 d503233f (d50323bf) Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]> Cc: Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 12f3519 upstream. This change fixes the following kernel NULL pointer dereference which is reproduced by blktests srp/007 occasionally. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000170 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1H Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1+ #37 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-29-g6a62e0cb0dfe-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: 0x0 (kblockd) RIP: 0010:srp_recv_done+0x176/0x500 [ib_srp] Code: 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 52 02 00 00 48 c7 82 80 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 89 df 4c 89 14 24 e8 53 d3 4a f6 4c 8b 14 24 41 0f b6 42 13 <41> 89 87 70 01 00 00 41 0f b6 52 12 f6 c2 02 74 44 41 8b 42 1c b9 RSP: 0018:ffffaef7c0003e28 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9bc9486dea60 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000102 RSI: ffffffffb76bbd0e RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff9bc980099a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff9bca53ef0000 R11: ffff9bc980099a10 R12: ffff9bc956e14000 R13: ffff9bc9836b9cb0 R14: ffff9bc9557b4480 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9bc97ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000170 CR3: 0000000007e04000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __ib_process_cq+0xb7/0x280 [ib_core] ib_poll_handler+0x2b/0x130 [ib_core] irq_poll_softirq+0x93/0x150 __do_softirq+0xee/0x4b8 irq_exit_rcu+0xf7/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0 </IRQ> Fixes: ad215aa ("RDMA/srp: Make struct scsi_cmnd and struct srp_request adjacent") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f74a7af upstream. Many functions in drivers/usb/core/hub.c and drivers/usb/core/hub.h access fields inside udev->bos without checking if it was allocated and initialized. If usb_get_bos_descriptor() fails for whatever reason, udev->bos will be NULL and those accesses will result in a crash: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 17818 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G W 5.15.108-18910-gab0e1cb584e1 #1 <HASH:1f9e 1> Hardware name: Google Kindred/Kindred, BIOS Google_Kindred.12672.413.0 02/03/2021 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event RIP: 0010:hub_port_reset+0x193/0x788 Code: 89 f7 e8 20 f7 15 00 48 8b 43 08 80 b8 96 03 00 00 03 75 36 0f b7 88 92 03 00 00 81 f9 10 03 00 00 72 27 48 8b 80 a8 03 00 00 <48> 83 78 18 00 74 19 48 89 df 48 8b 75 b0 ba 02 00 00 00 4c 89 e9 RSP: 0018:ffffab740c53fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa1bc5f678000 RCX: 0000000000000310 RDX: fffffffffffffdff RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa1be9655b840 RBP: ffffab740c53fd70 R08: 00001b7d5edaa20c R09: ffffffffb005e060 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffab740c53fd3e R14: 0000000000000032 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa1be96540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000022e80c005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 Call Trace: hub_event+0x73f/0x156e ? hub_activate+0x5b7/0x68f process_one_work+0x1a2/0x487 worker_thread+0x11a/0x288 kthread+0x13a/0x152 ? process_one_work+0x487/0x487 ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fall back to a default behavior if the BOS descriptor isn't accessible and skip all the functionalities that depend on it: LPM support checks, Super Speed capabilitiy checks, U1/U2 states setup. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d887d5 ] As drm_dp_get_mst_branch_device_by_guid() is called from drm_dp_get_mst_branch_device_by_guid(), mstb parameter has to be checked, otherwise NULL dereference may occur in the call to the memcpy() and cause following: [12579.365869] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000049 [12579.365878] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [12579.365880] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [12579.365882] PGD 0 P4D 0 [12579.365887] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI ... [12579.365895] Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_up_req_work [12579.365899] RIP: 0010:memcmp+0xb/0x29 [12579.365921] Call Trace: [12579.365927] get_mst_branch_device_by_guid_helper+0x22/0x64 [12579.365930] drm_dp_mst_up_req_work+0x137/0x416 [12579.365933] process_one_work+0x1d0/0x419 [12579.365935] worker_thread+0x11a/0x289 [12579.365938] kthread+0x13e/0x14f [12579.365941] ? process_one_work+0x419/0x419 [12579.365943] ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31 [12579.365946] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 As get_mst_branch_device_by_guid_helper() is recursive, moving condition to the first line allow to remove a similar one for step over of NULL elements inside a loop. Fixes: 5e93b82 ("drm/dp/mst: move GUID storage from mgr, port to only mst branch") Cc: <[email protected]> # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Lukasz Majczak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Radoslaw Biernacki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manasi Navare <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit babddbf upstream. when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table. Access such shadow address causes kernel oops. Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA 39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on: [ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003, pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty armbian#43 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90 lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110 ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa. The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range. The generic kasan also has similar oops. It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not the original address. Commit 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP") introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE. This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP") Signed-off-by: Haibo Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Haibo Li <[email protected]> Cc: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit bc056e7 upstream. When we calculate the end position of ext4_free_extent, this position may be exactly where ext4_lblk_t (i.e. uint) overflows. For example, if ac_g_ex.fe_logical is 4294965248 and ac_orig_goal_len is 2048, then the computed end is 0x100000000, which is 0. If ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical is not the first case of adjusting the best extent, that is, new_bex_end > 0, the following BUG_ON will be triggered: ========================================================= kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5116! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 673 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G E 6.5.0-rc1+ #279 RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_new_inode_pa+0xc5/0x430 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_mb_use_best_found+0x203/0x2f0 ext4_mb_try_best_found+0x163/0x240 ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x158/0x1550 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x86a/0xe10 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xb0c/0x13a0 ext4_map_blocks+0x2cd/0x8f0 ext4_iomap_begin+0x27b/0x400 iomap_iter+0x222/0x3d0 __iomap_dio_rw+0x243/0xcb0 iomap_dio_rw+0x16/0x80 ========================================================= A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda -b 4096 100M mount /dev/sda /tmp/test fallocate -l1M /tmp/test/tmp fallocate -l10M /tmp/test/file fallocate -i -o 1M -l16777203M /tmp/test/file fsstress -d /tmp/test -l 0 -n 100000 -p 8 & sleep 10 && killall -9 fsstress rm -f /tmp/test/tmp xfs_io -c "open -ad /tmp/test/file" -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 8192" We simply refactor the logic for adjusting the best extent by adding a temporary ext4_free_extent ex and use extent_logical_end() to avoid overflow, which also simplifies the code. Cc: [email protected] # 6.4 Fixes: 93cdf49 ("ext4: Fix best extent lstart adjustment logic in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa()") Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 6c2f421 upstream. Several core drivers and buses expect that driver_override is a dynamically allocated memory thus later they can kfree() it. However such assumption is not documented, there were in the past and there are already users setting it to a string literal. This leads to kfree() of static memory during device release (e.g. in error paths or during unbind): kernel BUG at ../mm/slub.c:3960! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM ... (kfree) from [<c058da50>] (platform_device_release+0x88/0xb4) (platform_device_release) from [<c0585be0>] (device_release+0x2c/0x90) (device_release) from [<c0a69050>] (kobject_put+0xec/0x20c) (kobject_put) from [<c0f2f120>] (exynos5_clk_probe+0x154/0x18c) (exynos5_clk_probe) from [<c058de70>] (platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xa4) (platform_drv_probe) from [<c058b7ac>] (really_probe+0x280/0x414) (really_probe) from [<c058baf4>] (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1c4) (driver_probe_device) from [<c0589854>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x74/0xb8) (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c058b48c>] (__device_attach+0xd4/0x16c) (__device_attach) from [<c058a638>] (bus_probe_device+0x88/0x90) (bus_probe_device) from [<c05871fc>] (device_add+0x3dc/0x62c) (device_add) from [<c075ff10>] (of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xbc) (of_platform_device_create_pdata) from [<c07600ec>] (of_platform_bus_create+0x1a8/0x4fc) (of_platform_bus_create) from [<c0760150>] (of_platform_bus_create+0x20c/0x4fc) (of_platform_bus_create) from [<c07605f0>] (of_platform_populate+0x84/0x118) (of_platform_populate) from [<c0f3c964>] (of_platform_default_populate_init+0xa0/0xb8) (of_platform_default_populate_init) from [<c01031f8>] (do_one_initcall+0x8c/0x404) Provide a helper which clearly documents the usage of driver_override. This will allow later to reuse the helper and reduce the amount of duplicated code. Convert the platform driver to use a new helper and make the driver_override field const char (it is not modified by the core). Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit daa9ada ] Erhard reported that his G5 was crashing with v6.6-rc kernels: mpic: Setting up HT PICs workarounds for U3/U4 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xfeffbb62ffec65fe Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000005dc40 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2 PowerMac Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G T 6.6.0-rc3-PMacGS #1 Hardware name: PowerMac11,2 PPC970MP 0x440101 PowerMac NIP: c00000000005dc40 LR: c000000000066660 CTR: c000000000007730 REGS: c0000000022bf510 TRAP: 0380 Tainted: G T (6.6.0-rc3-PMacGS) MSR: 9000000000001032 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 44004242 XER: 00000000 IRQMASK: 3 GPR00: 0000000000000000 c0000000022bf7b0 c0000000010c0b00 00000000000001ac GPR04: 0000000003c80000 0000000000000300 c0000000f20001ae 0000000000000300 GPR08: 0000000000000006 feffbb62ffec65ff 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 GPR12: 9000000000001032 c000000002362000 c000000000f76b80 000000000349ecd8 GPR16: 0000000002367ba8 0000000002367f08 0000000000000006 0000000000000000 GPR20: 00000000000001ac c000000000f6f920 c0000000022cd985 000000000000000c GPR24: 0000000000000300 00000003b0a3691d c0003e008030000e 0000000000000000 GPR28: c00000000000000c c0000000f20001ee feffbb62ffec65fe 00000000000001ac NIP hash_page_do_lazy_icache+0x50/0x100 LR __hash_page_4K+0x420/0x590 Call Trace: hash_page_mm+0x364/0x6f0 do_hash_fault+0x114/0x2b0 data_access_common_virt+0x198/0x1f0 --- interrupt: 300 at mpic_init+0x4bc/0x10c4 NIP: c000000002020a5c LR: c000000002020a04 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000000022bf9f0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G T (6.6.0-rc3-PMacGS) MSR: 9000000000001032 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004248 XER: 00000000 DAR: c0003e008030000e DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1 ... NIP mpic_init+0x4bc/0x10c4 LR mpic_init+0x464/0x10c4 --- interrupt: 300 pmac_setup_one_mpic+0x258/0x2dc pmac_pic_init+0x28c/0x3d8 init_IRQ+0x90/0x140 start_kernel+0x57c/0x78c start_here_common+0x1c/0x20 A bisect pointed to the breakage beginning with commit 9fee28b ("powerpc: implement the new page table range API"). Analysis of the oops pointed to a struct page with a corrupted compound_head being loaded via page_folio() -> _compound_head() in hash_page_do_lazy_icache(). The access by the mpic code is to an MMIO address, so the expectation is that the struct page for that address would be initialised by init_unavailable_range(), as pointed out by Aneesh. Instrumentation showed that was not the case, which eventually lead to the realisation that pfn_valid() was returning false for that address, causing the struct page to not be initialised. Because the system is using FLATMEM, the version of pfn_valid() in memory_model.h is used: static inline int pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn) { ... return pfn >= pfn_offset && (pfn - pfn_offset) < max_mapnr; } Which relies on max_mapnr being initialised. Early in boot max_mapnr is zero meaning no PFNs are valid. max_mapnr is initialised in mem_init() called via: start_kernel() mm_core_init() # init/main.c:928 mem_init() But that is too late for the usage in init_unavailable_range() called via: start_kernel() setup_arch() # init/main.c:893 paging_init() free_area_init() init_unavailable_range() Although max_mapnr is currently set in mem_init(), the value is actually already available much earlier, as soon as mem_topology_setup() has completed, which is also before paging_init() is called. So move the initialisation there, which causes paging_init() to correctly initialise the struct page and fixes the bug. This bug seems to have been lurking for years, but went unnoticed because the pre-folio code was inspecting the uninitialised page->flags but not dereferencing it. Thanks to Erhard and Aneesh for help debugging. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230929132750.3cd98452@yea/ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 170c75d ] As talked about in commit d66d24a ("ath10k: Keep track of which interrupts fired, don't poll them"), if we access the copy engine register at a bad time then ath10k can go boom. However, it's not necessarily easy to know when it's safe to access them. The ChromeOS test labs saw a crash that looked like this at shutdown/reboot time (on a chromeos-5.15 kernel, but likely the problem could also reproduce upstream): Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... CPU: 4 PID: 6168 Comm: reboot Not tainted 5.15.111-lockdep-19350-g1d624fe6758f #1 010b9b233ab055c27c6dc88efb0be2f4e9e86f51 Hardware name: Google Kingoftown (DT) ... pc : ath10k_snoc_read32+0x50/0x74 [ath10k_snoc] lr : ath10k_snoc_read32+0x24/0x74 [ath10k_snoc] ... Call trace: ath10k_snoc_read32+0x50/0x74 [ath10k_snoc ...] ath10k_ce_disable_interrupt+0x190/0x65c [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_ce_disable_interrupts+0x8c/0x120 [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_snoc_hif_stop+0x78/0x660 [ath10k_snoc ...] ath10k_core_stop+0x13c/0x1ec [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_halt+0x398/0x5b0 [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_stop+0xfc/0x1a8 [ath10k_core ...] drv_stop+0x148/0x6b4 [mac80211 ...] ieee80211_stop_device+0x70/0x80 [mac80211 ...] ieee80211_do_stop+0x10d8/0x15b0 [mac80211 ...] ieee80211_stop+0x144/0x1a0 [mac80211 ...] __dev_close_many+0x1e8/0x2c0 dev_close_many+0x198/0x33c dev_close+0x140/0x210 cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0xc8/0x1e0 [cfg80211 ...] ieee80211_remove_interfaces+0x118/0x5c4 [mac80211 ...] ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x64/0x1f4 [mac80211 ...] ath10k_mac_unregister+0x4c/0xf0 [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_core_unregister+0x80/0xb0 [ath10k_core ...] ath10k_snoc_free_resources+0xb8/0x1ec [ath10k_snoc ...] ath10k_snoc_shutdown+0x98/0xd0 [ath10k_snoc ...] platform_shutdown+0x7c/0xa0 device_shutdown+0x3e0/0x58c kernel_restart_prepare+0x68/0xa0 kernel_restart+0x28/0x7c Though there's no known way to reproduce the problem, it makes sense that it would be the same issue where we're trying to access copy engine registers when it's not allowed. Let's fix this by changing how we "disable" the interrupts. Instead of tweaking the copy engine registers we'll just use disable_irq() and enable_irq(). Then we'll configure the interrupts once at power up time. Tested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.3.2.2.c10-00754-QCAHLSWMTPL-1 Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230630151842.1.If764ede23c4e09a43a842771c2ddf99608f25f8e@changeid Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 624820f ] fix crash because of null pointers [ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8 [ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb] [ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0 [ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90 [ 6104.969697] FS: 00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000 [ 6104.969699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0 [ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6104.969702] Call Trace: [ 6104.969708] btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb] [ 6104.969732] hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 6104.969748] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth] [ 6104.969753] rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160 [ 6104.969755] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0 [ 6104.969759] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40 [ 6104.969761] vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0 [ 6104.969763] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0 [ 6104.969765] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20 [ 6104.969769] do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180 [ 6104.969771] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef [ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef [ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012 [ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017 [ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0 Signed-off-by: youwan Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5104fdf ] In certain types of chips, such as VEGA20, reading the amdgpu_regs_smc file could result in an abnormal null pointer access when the smc_rreg pointer is NULL. Below are the steps to reproduce this issue and the corresponding exception log: 1. Navigate to the directory: /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0 2. Execute command: cat amdgpu_regs_smc 3. Exception Log:: [4005007.702554] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [4005007.702562] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [4005007.702567] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [4005007.702570] PGD 0 P4D 0 [4005007.702576] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI [4005007.702581] CPU: 4 PID: 62563 Comm: cat Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-43-generic armbian#46-Ubunt u [4005007.702590] RIP: 0010:0x0 [4005007.702598] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. [4005007.702600] RSP: 0018:ffffa82b46d27da0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [4005007.702605] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffa82b46d27e68 [4005007.702609] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9940656e0000 [4005007.702612] RBP: ffffa82b46d27dd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff994060c07980 [4005007.702615] R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e06753000 [4005007.702618] R13: ffff9940656e0000 R14: ffffa82b46d27e68 R15: 00007f5e06753000 [4005007.702622] FS: 00007f5e0755b740(0000) GS:ffff99479d300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [4005007.702626] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [4005007.702629] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000003253fc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [4005007.702633] Call Trace: [4005007.702636] <TASK> [4005007.702640] amdgpu_debugfs_regs_smc_read+0xb0/0x120 [amdgpu] [4005007.703002] full_proxy_read+0x5c/0x80 [4005007.703011] vfs_read+0x9f/0x1a0 [4005007.703019] ksys_read+0x67/0xe0 [4005007.703023] __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x20 [4005007.703028] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [4005007.703034] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1e3/0x670 [4005007.703040] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0 [4005007.703047] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20 [4005007.703052] ? irqentry_exit+0x19/0x30 [4005007.703057] ? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x160 [4005007.703062] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [4005007.703068] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [4005007.703075] RIP: 0033:0x7f5e07672992 [4005007.703079] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d fa b2 0c 00 e8 c5 1d 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 e c 28 48 89 54 24 [4005007.703083] RSP: 002b:00007ffe03097898 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [4005007.703088] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5e07672992 [4005007.703091] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5e06753000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [4005007.703094] RBP: 00007f5e06753000 R08: 00007f5e06752010 R09: 00007f5e06752010 [4005007.703096] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000022000 [4005007.703099] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 [4005007.703105] </TASK> [4005007.703107] Modules linked in: nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink algif_hash af_alg binfmt_misc nls_ iso8859_1 ipmi_ssif ast intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper amd64_edac t tm edac_mce_amd kvm_amd ccp mac_hid k10temp kvm acpi_ipmi ipmi_si rapl sch_fq_codel ipmi_devintf ipm i_msghandler msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport mtd pstore_blk efi_pstore ramoops pstore_zone reed_solo mon ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ib_uverbs ib_core amdgpu(OE) amddrm_ttm_helper(OE) amdttm(OE) iommu_v 2 amd_sched(OE) amdkcl(OE) drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec rc_core drm igb ahci xhci_pci libahci i2c_piix4 i2c_algo_bit xhci_pci_renesas dca [4005007.703184] CR2: 0000000000000000 [4005007.703188] ---[ end trace ac65a538d240da39 ]--- [4005007.800865] RIP: 0010:0x0 [4005007.800871] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. [4005007.800874] RSP: 0018:ffffa82b46d27da0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [4005007.800878] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffa82b46d27e68 [4005007.800881] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9940656e0000 [4005007.800883] RBP: ffffa82b46d27dd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff994060c07980 [4005007.800886] R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e06753000 [4005007.800888] R13: ffff9940656e0000 R14: ffffa82b46d27e68 R15: 00007f5e06753000 [4005007.800891] FS: 00007f5e0755b740(0000) GS:ffff99479d300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [4005007.800895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [4005007.800898] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000003253fc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 Signed-off-by: Qu Huang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18f0394 ] Inspired by syzbot reports using a stack of multiple ipvlan devices. Reduce stack size needed in ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() by moving the flowi6 struct used for the route lookup in an non inlined helper. ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() needs 120 bytes on the stack, immediately reclaimed. Also make sure ipvlan_process_v4_outbound() is not inlined. We might also have to lower MAX_NEST_DEV, because only syzbot uses setups with more than four stacked devices. BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000e803ff8 (stack is ffffc9000e804000..ffffc9000e808000) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 13442 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.52-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x4/0x2a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:188 Code: 48 01 c6 48 89 c7 e8 db 4e c1 03 31 c0 5d c3 cc 0f 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 cc 00 00 cc cc 00 00 cc cc 55 48 89 e5 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 b0 01 48 85 f6 0f 84 a4 01 00 00 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e804000 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817e5bf2 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff887c6568 RBP: ffffc9000e804000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 1ffff92001d0080c R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff87e6b100 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd0c55826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881f6800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000e803ff8 CR3: 0000000170ef7000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> [<ffffffff81f281d1>] __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31 [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:72 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpumask_test_cpu include/linux/cpumask.h:506 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpu_online include/linux/cpumask.h:1092 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] lock_acquire+0xe2/0x590 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5632 [<ffffffff8563221e>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x2e/0x40 include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [<ffffffff8561464d>] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] [<ffffffff8561464d>] ip6_pol_route+0x15d/0x1440 net/ipv6/route.c:2221 [<ffffffff85618120>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x50/0x80 net/ipv6/route.c:2606 [<ffffffff856f65b5>] pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:584 [inline] [<ffffffff856f65b5>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x265/0x620 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:116 [<ffffffff85618009>] ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2d9/0x3a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2638 [<ffffffff8561821a>] ip6_route_output_flags+0xca/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2651 [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:100 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:473 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xc33/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:543 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] ip6_finish_output2+0x160d/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff8575d27f>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff8575d27f>] ip6_local_out+0x10f/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161 [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:483 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bdae4>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0x1174/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff84d4a65e>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff84d4a65e>] neigh_resolve_output+0x64e/0x750 net/core/neighbour.c:1560 [<ffffffff855ce503>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:545 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce503>] ip6_finish_output2+0x1643/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:139 [<ffffffff855b8616>] __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:200 [inline] [<ffffffff855b8616>] ip6_finish_output+0x6c6/0xb10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:211 [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline] [<ffffffff855b7e3c>] ip6_output+0x2bc/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:232 [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:309 [inline] [<ffffffff855b9ce4>] ip6_xmit+0x11a4/0x1b20 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:352 [<ffffffff8597984e>] sctp_v6_xmit+0x9ae/0x1230 net/sctp/ipv6.c:250 [<ffffffff8594623e>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x25de/0x2bc0 net/sctp/output.c:653 [<ffffffff858f5142>] sctp_packet_singleton+0x202/0x310 net/sctp/outqueue.c:783 [<ffffffff858ea411>] sctp_outq_flush_ctrl net/sctp/outqueue.c:914 [inline] [<ffffffff858ea411>] sctp_outq_flush+0x661/0x3d40 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1212 [<ffffffff858f02f9>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x79/0xb0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:764 [<ffffffff8589f060>] sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1199 [inline] [<ffffffff8589f060>] sctp_do_sm+0x55c0/0x5c30 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1170 [<ffffffff85941567>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x97/0xc0 net/sctp/primitive.c:73 [<ffffffff859408b2>] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0xf62/0x17b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1839 [<ffffffff85910b5e>] sctp_sendmsg+0x212e/0x33b0 net/sctp/socket.c:2029 [<ffffffff8544d559>] inet_sendmsg+0x149/0x310 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:849 [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6c4d2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x572/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2504 [<ffffffff84c6ca91>] ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6ca91>] __sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x360 net/socket.c:2587 [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2596 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2594 [inline] [<ffffffff84c6cbff>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7f/0x90 net/socket.c:2594 [<ffffffff85b32553>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] [<ffffffff85b32553>] do_syscall_64+0x53/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:84 [<ffffffff85c00087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: 2ad7bf3 ("ipvlan: Initial check-in of the IPVLAN driver.") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3cffa2d ] Commit 9eed321 ("net: lapbether: only support ethernet devices") has been able to keep syzbot away from net/lapb, until today. In the following splat [1], the issue is that a lapbether device has been created on a bonding device without members. Then adding a non ARPHRD_ETHER member forced the bonding master to change its type. The fix is to make sure we call dev_close() in bond_setup_by_slave() so that the potential linked lapbether devices (or any other devices having assumptions on the physical device) are removed. A similar bug has been addressed in commit 40baec2 ("bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure") [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800089508810 len:44 put:40 head:ffff0000c78e7c00 data:ffff0000c78e7bea tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6007 Comm: syz-executor383 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller-gbf6547d8715b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 sp : ffff800096a06aa0 x29: ffff800096a06ab0 x28: ffff800096a06ba0 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000ce9b9b50 x25: 0000000000000016 x24: ffff0000c78e7bea x23: ffff0000c78e7c00 x22: 000000000000002c x21: 0000000000000140 x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffff800089508810 x18: ffff800096a06100 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008a629a3c x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1fffe00036837a32 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000201 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : cb50b496c519aa00 x8 : cb50b496c519aa00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800096a063b8 x4 : ffff80008e280f80 x3 : ffff8000805ad11c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000201 x0 : 0000000000000086 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:188 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:202 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2446 ip6gre_header+0xbc/0x738 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1384 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3136 [inline] lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1c4/0x298 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257 lapb_data_transmit+0x8c/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447 lapb_transmit_buffer+0x178/0x204 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149 lapb_send_control+0x220/0x320 net/lapb/lapb_subr.c:251 __lapb_disconnect_request+0x9c/0x17c net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:326 lapb_device_event+0x288/0x4e0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:492 notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461 call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline] __dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508 dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559 dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585 lapbeth_device_event+0x2e4/0x958 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:466 notifier_call_chain+0x1a4/0x510 kernel/notifier.c:93 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x3c/0x50 kernel/notifier.c:461 call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1970 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2008 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2022 [inline] __dev_close_many+0x1b8/0x3c4 net/core/dev.c:1508 dev_close_many+0x1e0/0x470 net/core/dev.c:1559 dev_close+0x174/0x250 net/core/dev.c:1585 bond_enslave+0x2298/0x30cc drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2332 bond_do_ioctl+0x268/0xc64 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4539 dev_ifsioc+0x754/0x9ac dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd34 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:786 sock_do_ioctl+0x1d4/0x2d0 net/socket.c:1217 sock_ioctl+0x4e8/0x834 net/socket.c:1322 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:857 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x58/0x16c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94785b8b (d4210000) Fixes: 872254d ("net/bonding: Enable bonding to enslave non ARPHRD_ETHER") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 146a15b upstream. Prior to LLVM 15.0.0, LLVM's integrated assembler would incorrectly byte-swap NOP when compiling for big-endian, and the resulting series of bytes happened to match the encoding of FNMADD S21, S30, S0, S0. This went unnoticed until commit: 34f66c4 ("arm64: Use a positive cpucap for FP/SIMD") Prior to that commit, the kernel would always enable the use of FPSIMD early in boot when __cpu_setup() initialized CPACR_EL1, and so usage of FNMADD within the kernel was not detected, but could result in the corruption of user or kernel FPSIMD state. After that commit, the instructions happen to trap during boot prior to FPSIMD being detected and enabled, e.g. | Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x000000001fe00000 -- ASIMD | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 400000c9 (nZcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150 | lr : populate_properties+0xe4/0x254 | sp : ffffd014173d3ad0 | x29: ffffd014173d3af0 x28: fffffbfffddffcb8 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000058 x25: fffffbfffddfe054 x24: 0000000000000008 | x23: fffffbfffddfe000 x22: fffffbfffddfe000 x21: fffffbfffddfe044 | x20: ffffd014173d3b70 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000005 | x17: 0000000000000010 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000413e7000 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000001bcc x12: 0000000000000000 | x11: 00000000d00dfeed x10: ffffd414193f2cd0 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : ffffffffffffffc0 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0101010101010101 x3 : 000000000000002a | x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffd014171f2988 x0 : fffffbfffddffcb8 | Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0xec/0x108 | show_stack+0x18/0x2c | dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68 | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | panic+0x13c/0x340 | el1t_64_irq_handler+0x0/0x1c | el1_abort+0x0/0x5c | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150 | unflatten_dt_nodes+0x1e8/0x2d8 | __unflatten_device_tree+0x5c/0x15c | unflatten_device_tree+0x38/0x50 | setup_arch+0x164/0x1e0 | start_kernel+0x64/0x38c | __primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4 Restrict CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN to a known good assembler, which is either GNU as or LLVM's IAS 15.0.0 and newer, which contains the linked commit. Closes: ClangBuiltLinux/linux#1948 Link: llvm/llvm-project@1379b15 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025-disable-arm64-be-ias-b4-llvm-15-v1-1-b25263ed8b23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit bb32500 upstream. The following can crash the kernel: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'p:sched schedule' > kprobe_events # exec 5>>events/kprobes/sched/enable # > kprobe_events # exec 5>&- The above commands: 1. Change directory to the tracefs directory 2. Create a kprobe event (doesn't matter what one) 3. Open bash file descriptor 5 on the enable file of the kprobe event 4. Delete the kprobe event (removes the files too) 5. Close the bash file descriptor 5 The above causes a crash! BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 877 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.5.0-rc4-test-00008-g2c6b6b1029d4-dirty armbian#186 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tracing_release_file_tr+0xc/0x50 What happens here is that the kprobe event creates a trace_event_file "file" descriptor that represents the file in tracefs to the event. It maintains state of the event (is it enabled for the given instance?). Opening the "enable" file gets a reference to the event "file" descriptor via the open file descriptor. When the kprobe event is deleted, the file is also deleted from the tracefs system which also frees the event "file" descriptor. But as the tracefs file is still opened by user space, it will not be totally removed until the final dput() is called on it. But this is not true with the event "file" descriptor that is already freed. If the user does a write to or simply closes the file descriptor it will reference the event "file" descriptor that was just freed, causing a use-after-free bug. To solve this, add a ref count to the event "file" descriptor as well as a new flag called "FREED". The "file" will not be freed until the last reference is released. But the FREE flag will be set when the event is removed to prevent any more modifications to that event from happening, even if there's still a reference to the event "file" descriptor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Fixes: f5ca233 ("tracing: Increase trace array ref count on enable and filter files") Reported-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]> Tested-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc43e9c ] hid_debug_events_release releases resources bound to the HID device instance. hid_device_release releases the underlying HID device instance potentially before hid_debug_events_release has completed releasing debug resources bound to the same HID device instance. Reference count to prevent the HID device instance from being torn down preemptively when HID debugging support is used. When count reaches zero, release core resources of HID device instance using hiddev_free. The crash: [ 120.728477][ T4396] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53! [ 120.728505][ T4396] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 120.739806][ T4396] Modules linked in: bcmdhd dhd_static_buf 8822cu pcie_mhi r8168 [ 120.747386][ T4396] CPU: 1 PID: 4396 Comm: hidt_bridge Not tainted 5.10.110 armbian#257 [ 120.754771][ T4396] Hardware name: Rockchip RK3588 EVB4 LP4 V10 Board (DT) [ 120.761643][ T4396] pstate: 60400089 (nZCv daIf +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 120.768338][ T4396] pc : __list_del_entry_valid+0x98/0xac [ 120.773730][ T4396] lr : __list_del_entry_valid+0x98/0xac [ 120.779120][ T4396] sp : ffffffc01e62bb60 [ 120.783126][ T4396] x29: ffffffc01e62bb60 x28: ffffff818ce3a200 [ 120.789126][ T4396] x27: 0000000000000009 x26: 0000000000980000 [ 120.795126][ T4396] x25: ffffffc012431000 x24: ffffff802c6d4e00 [ 120.801125][ T4396] x23: ffffff8005c66f00 x22: ffffffc01183b5b8 [ 120.807125][ T4396] x21: ffffff819df2f100 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 120.813124][ T4396] x19: ffffff802c3f0700 x18: ffffffc01d2cd058 [ 120.819124][ T4396] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 120.825124][ T4396] x15: 0000000000000004 x14: 0000000000003fff [ 120.831123][ T4396] x13: ffffffc012085588 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 120.837123][ T4396] x11: 00000000ffffbfff x10: 0000000000000003 [ 120.843123][ T4396] x9 : 455103d46b329300 x8 : 455103d46b329300 [ 120.849124][ T4396] x7 : 74707572726f6320 x6 : ffffffc0124b8cb5 [ 120.855124][ T4396] x5 : ffffffffffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 120.861123][ T4396] x3 : ffffffc011cf4f90 x2 : ffffff81fee7b948 [ 120.867122][ T4396] x1 : ffffffc011cf4f90 x0 : 0000000000000054 [ 120.873122][ T4396] Call trace: [ 120.876259][ T4396] __list_del_entry_valid+0x98/0xac [ 120.881304][ T4396] hid_debug_events_release+0x48/0x12c [ 120.886617][ T4396] full_proxy_release+0x50/0xbc [ 120.891323][ T4396] __fput+0xdc/0x238 [ 120.895075][ T4396] ____fput+0x14/0x24 [ 120.898911][ T4396] task_work_run+0x90/0x148 [ 120.903268][ T4396] do_exit+0x1bc/0x8a4 [ 120.907193][ T4396] do_group_exit+0x8c/0xa4 [ 120.911458][ T4396] get_signal+0x468/0x744 [ 120.915643][ T4396] do_signal+0x84/0x280 [ 120.919650][ T4396] do_notify_resume+0xd0/0x218 [ 120.924262][ T4396] work_pending+0xc/0x3f0 [ Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>: rework changelog ] Fixes: cd667ce ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping") Signed-off-by: Charles Yi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7bf9a6b ] xen_vcpu_info is a percpu area than needs to be mapped by Xen. Currently, it could cross a page boundary resulting in Xen being unable to map it: [ 0.567318] kernel BUG at arch/arm64/xen/../../arm/xen/enlighten.c:164! [ 0.574002] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Fix the issue by using __alloc_percpu and requesting alignment for the memory allocation. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2311221501340.2053963@ubuntu-linux-20-04-desktop Fixes: 24d5373 ("arm/xen: Use alloc_percpu rather than __alloc_percpu") Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 768d612 ] Yikebaer reported an issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888112ecc1a4 by task syz-executor/8438 CPU: 1 PID: 8438 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Call Trace: [...] kasan_report+0xba/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588 ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline] ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721 [...] Allocated by task 8438: [...] kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:693 [inline] __es_alloc_extent fs/ext4/extents_status.c:469 [inline] ext4_es_insert_extent+0x672/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:873 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline] ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721 [...] Freed by task 8438: [...] kmem_cache_free+0xec/0x490 mm/slub.c:3823 ext4_es_try_to_merge_right fs/ext4/extents_status.c:593 [inline] __es_insert_extent+0x9f4/0x1440 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:802 ext4_es_insert_extent+0x2ca/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:882 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline] ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721 [...] ================================================================== The flow of issue triggering is as follows: 1. remove es raw es es removed es1 |-------------------| -> |----|.......|------| 2. insert es es insert es1 merge with es es1 merge with es and free es1 |----|.......|------| -> |------------|------| -> |-------------------| es merges with newes, then merges with es1, frees es1, then determines if es1->es_len is 0 and triggers a UAF. The code flow is as follows: ext4_es_insert_extent es1 = __es_alloc_extent(true); es2 = __es_alloc_extent(true); __es_remove_extent(inode, lblk, end, NULL, es1) __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es1) ---> insert es1 to es tree __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es2) ext4_es_try_to_merge_right ext4_es_free_extent(inode, es1) ---> es1 is freed if (es1 && !es1->es_len) // Trigger UAF by determining if es1 is used. We determine whether es1 or es2 is used immediately after calling __es_remove_extent() or __es_insert_extent() to avoid triggering a UAF if es1 or es2 is freed. Reported-by: Yikebaer Aizezi <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALcu4raD4h9coiyEBL4Bm0zjDwxC2CyPiTwsP3zFuhot6y9Beg@mail.gmail.com Fixes: 2a69c45 ("ext4: using nofail preallocation in ext4_es_insert_extent()") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 8e387c8 ("ext4: make sure allocate pending entry not fail") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

re-enumerating full-speed devices after a failed address device command can trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Full-speed devices may need to reconfigure the endpoint 0 Max Packet Size value during enumeration. Usb core calls usb_ep0_reinit() in this case, which ends up calling xhci_configure_endpoint(). On Panther point xHC the xhci_configure_endpoint() function will additionally check and reserve bandwidth in software. Other hosts do this in hardware If xHC address device command fails then a new xhci_virt_device structure is allocated as part of re-enabling the slot, but the bandwidth table pointers are not set up properly here. This triggers the NULL pointer dereference the next time usb_ep0_reinit() is called and xhci_configure_endpoint() tries to check and reserve bandwidth [46710.713538] usb 3-1: new full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd [46710.713699] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46710.917684] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46711.125536] usb 3-1: device not accepting address 5, error -71 [46711.125594] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [46711.125600] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [46711.125603] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [46711.125606] PGD 0 P4D 0 [46711.125610] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [46711.125615] CPU: 1 PID: 25760 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.10.3_2 #1 [46711.125620] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. [46711.125623] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [usbcore] [46711.125668] RIP: 0010:xhci_reserve_bandwidth (drivers/usb/host/xhci.c Fix this by making sure bandwidth table pointers are set up correctly after a failed address device command, and additionally by avoiding checking for bandwidth in cases like this where no actual endpoints are added or removed, i.e. only context for default control endpoint 0 is evaluated. Reported-by: Karel Balej <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 651aaf3 ("usb: xhci: Handle USB transaction error on address command") Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6: [ 414.344659] ================================ [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.356863] scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610 [ 414.357379] scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260 [ 414.357856] blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0 [ 414.358338] __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 [ 414.358796] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.359262] sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0 [ 414.359828] asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 [ 414.360426] default_idle+0x1e/0x30 [ 414.360873] default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0 [ 414.361390] do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0 [ 414.361819] cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60 [ 414.362314] start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0 [ 414.362809] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b [ 414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794 [ 414.363825] hardirqs last enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200 [ 414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50 [ 414.365629] softirqs last enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2 [ 414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.367425] other info that might help us debug this: [ 414.368194] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 414.368900] CPU0 [ 414.369225] ---- [ 414.369548] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370000] <Interrupt> [ 414.370342] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370802] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152: [ 414.372088] #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0 [ 414.373180] #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0 [ 414.374384] #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.375342] #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.376377] #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0 [ 414.378607] stack backtrace: [ 414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 [ 414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0) [ 414.381805] Call Trace: [ 414.382136] <TASK> [ 414.382429] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [ 414.382884] mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260 [ 414.383367] ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 414.383889] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 [ 414.384373] ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10 [ 414.384903] ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410 [ 414.385350] ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70 [ 414.385808] mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90 [ 414.386317] mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.386791] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.387320] lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.387901] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.388422] trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100 [ 414.388917] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.389422] __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0 [ 414.389920] __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0 [ 414.390899] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0 [ 414.391473] ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10 [ 414.392070] ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450 [ 414.392533] ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0 [ 414.393095] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690 [ 414.393730] ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420 [ 414.394302] ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10 [ 414.394970] ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.395456] ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.395986] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 414.396499] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190 [ 414.397100] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00 [ 414.397616] blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030 [ 414.398244] ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10 [ 414.398897] ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0 [ 414.399429] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80 [ 414.399957] __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530 [ 414.400458] ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10 [ 414.400999] blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0 [ 414.401467] wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920 [ 414.401935] ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10 [ 414.402442] ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.402931] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.403462] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.404062] wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0 [ 414.404500] ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10 [ 414.404989] process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 [ 414.405546] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 414.406139] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0 [ 414.406641] ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240 [ 414.407106] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110 [ 414.407604] worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 [ 414.408075] ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210 [ 414.408572] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.409168] ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210 [ 414.409678] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.410191] kthread+0x33c/0x440 [ 414.410602] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411068] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 414.411526] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411993] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 414.412489] </TASK> When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it throws a warning because of potential deadlock. blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy // failed to get driver tag blk_mq_mark_tag_wait spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait) __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_tag_busy -> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags) spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally -> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock. As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning still need to be fixed. Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq. Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a BUG() on startup, when the iommu is enabled: kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #30 Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019 RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54 24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000 RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508 R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018 FS: 00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x36/0x90 ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau] nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau] ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau] r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0 Fix this by using the non-coherent allocator instead, I think there might be a better answer to this, but it involve ripping up some of APIs using sg lists. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 2541626 ("drm/nouveau/acr: use common falcon HS FW code for ACR FWs") Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

During suspend/resume the following BUG was hit: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc libaes CPU: 1 PID: 1282 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00732-gc8bd1f7f3e61 #15240 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at dql_completed+0x270/0x2cc LR is at __free_old_xmit+0x120/0x198 pc : [<c07ffa54>] lr : [<c0c42bf4>] psr: 80000013 ... Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 43a4406a DAC: 00000051 ... Process rtcwake (pid: 1282, stack limit = 0xfbc21278) Stack: (0xe0805e80 to 0xe0806000) ... Call trace: dql_completed from __free_old_xmit+0x120/0x198 __free_old_xmit from free_old_xmit+0x44/0xe4 free_old_xmit from virtnet_poll_tx+0x88/0x1b4 virtnet_poll_tx from __napi_poll+0x2c/0x1d4 __napi_poll from net_rx_action+0x140/0x2b4 net_rx_action from handle_softirqs+0x11c/0x350 handle_softirqs from call_with_stack+0x18/0x20 call_with_stack from do_softirq+0x48/0x50 do_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4 __local_bh_enable_ip from virtnet_open+0xd4/0x21c virtnet_open from virtnet_restore+0x94/0x120 virtnet_restore from virtio_device_restore+0x110/0x1f4 virtio_device_restore from dpm_run_callback+0x3c/0x100 dpm_run_callback from device_resume+0x12c/0x2a8 device_resume from dpm_resume+0x12c/0x1e0 dpm_resume from dpm_resume_end+0xc/0x18 dpm_resume_end from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1f0/0x72c suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x270/0x2a0 pm_suspend from state_store+0x68/0xc8 state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1cc kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x2b0/0x3dc vfs_write from ksys_write+0x5c/0xd4 ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Exception stack(0xe8bf1fa8 to 0xe8bf1ff0) ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- After virtnet_napi_enable() is called, the following path is hit: __napi_poll() -> virtnet_poll() -> virtnet_poll_cleantx() -> netif_tx_wake_queue() That wakes the TX queue and allows skbs to be submitted and accounted by BQL counters. Then netdev_tx_reset_queue() is called that resets BQL counters and eventually leads to the BUG in dql_completed(). Move virtnet_napi_tx_enable() what does BQL counters reset before RX napi enable to avoid the issue. Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits") Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

We recently made GUP's common page table walking code to also walk hugetlb VMAs without most hugetlb special-casing, preparing for the future of having less hugetlb-specific page table walking code in the codebase. Turns out that we missed one page table locking detail: page table locking for hugetlb folios that are not mapped using a single PMD/PUD. Assume we have hugetlb folio that spans multiple PTEs (e.g., 64 KiB hugetlb folios on arm64 with 4 KiB base page size). GUP, as it walks the page tables, will perform a pte_offset_map_lock() to grab the PTE table lock. However, hugetlb that concurrently modifies these page tables would actually grab the mm->page_table_lock: with USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS, the locks would differ. Something similar can happen right now with hugetlb folios that span multiple PMDs when USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS. This issue can be reproduced [1], for example triggering: [ 3105.936100] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3105.939323] WARNING: CPU: 31 PID: 2732 at mm/gup.c:142 try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3105.944634] Modules linked in: [...] [ 3105.974841] CPU: 31 PID: 2732 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0-64.eln141.aarch64 #1 [ 3105.980406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-4.fc40 05/24/2024 [ 3105.986185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 3105.991108] pc : try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3105.994013] lr : follow_page_pte+0xd8/0x430 [ 3105.996986] sp : ffff80008eafb8f0 [ 3105.999346] x29: ffff80008eafb900 x28: ffffffe8d481f380 x27: 00f80001207cff43 [ 3106.004414] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff80008eafba48 [ 3106.009520] x23: 0000ffff9372f000 x22: ffff7a54459e2000 x21: ffff7a546c1aa978 [ 3106.014529] x20: ffffffe8d481f3c0 x19: 0000000000610041 x18: 0000000000000001 [ 3106.019506] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000000 [ 3106.024494] x14: ffffb85477fdfe08 x13: 0000ffff9372ffff x12: 0000000000000000 [ 3106.029469] x11: 1fffef4a88a96be1 x10: ffff7a54454b5f0c x9 : ffffb854771b12f0 [ 3106.034324] x8 : 0008000000000000 x7 : ffff7a546c1aa980 x6 : 0008000000000080 [ 3106.038902] x5 : 00000000001207cf x4 : 0000ffff9372f000 x3 : ffffffe8d481f000 [ 3106.043420] x2 : 0000000000610041 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 3106.047957] Call trace: [ 3106.049522] try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3106.051996] follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x150/0x2e0 [ 3106.055527] follow_page_mask+0x1a0/0x2b8 [ 3106.058118] __get_user_pages+0xf0/0x348 [ 3106.060647] faultin_page_range+0xb0/0x360 [ 3106.063651] do_madvise+0x340/0x598 Let's make huge_pte_lockptr() effectively use the same PT locks as any core-mm page table walker would. Add ptep_lockptr() to obtain the PTE page table lock using a pte pointer -- unfortunately we cannot convert pte_lockptr() because virt_to_page() doesn't work with kmap'ed page tables we can have with CONFIG_HIGHPTE. Handle CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS correctly by checking in reverse order, such that when e.g., CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS==2 with PGDIR_SIZE==P4D_SIZE==PUD_SIZE==PMD_SIZE will work as expected. Document why that works. There is one ugly case: powerpc 8xx, whereby we have an 8 MiB hugetlb folio being mapped using two PTE page tables. While hugetlb wants to take the PMD table lock, core-mm would grab the PTE table lock of one of both PTE page tables. In such corner cases, we have to make sure that both locks match, which is (fortunately!) currently guaranteed for 8xx as it does not support SMP and consequently doesn't use split PT locks. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Fix invalid access to pgdat during hot-remove operation: ndctl users reported a GPF when trying to destroy a namespace: $ ndctl destroy-namespace all -r all -f Segmentation fault dmesg: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000005650: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x000000000002b280-0x000000000002b287] CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 1868 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.11.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/08HT8T, BIOS 2.20.1 09/13/2023 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x2a/0x110 cxl-test users report a GPF when trying to unload the test module: $ modrpobe -r cxl-test dmesg BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000004200 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1076 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O N 6.11.0-rc1 armbian#197 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/15 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x6/0x90 Currently, when memory is hot-plugged or hot-removed the accounting is done based on the assumption that memmap is allocated from the same node as the hot-plugged/hot-removed memory, which is not always the case. In addition, there are challenges with keeping the node id of the memory that is being remove to the time when memmap accounting is actually performed: since this is done after remove_pfn_range_from_zone(), and also after remove_memory_block_devices(). Meaning that we cannot use pgdat nor walking though memblocks to get the nid. Given all of that, account the memmap overhead system wide instead. For this we are going to be using global atomic counters, but given that memmap size is rarely modified, and normally is only modified either during early boot when there is only one CPU, or under a hotplug global mutex lock, therefore there is no need for per-cpu optimizations. Also, while we are here rename nr_memmap to nr_memmap_pages, and nr_memmap_boot to nr_memmap_boot_pages to be self explanatory that the units are in page count. [[email protected]: address a few nits from David Hildenbrand] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 15995a3 ("mm: report per-page metadata information") Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/CAHj4cs9Ax1=CoJkgBGP_+sNu6-6=6v=_L-ZBZY0bVLD3wUWZQg@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Zq0tPd2h6alFz8XF@aschofie-mobl2/#t Tested-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Domenico Cerasuolo <[email protected]> Cc: Fan Ni <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Granados <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Li Zhijian <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: Sourav Panda <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

We shouldn't set real_dev to NULL because packets can be in transit and xfrm might call xdo_dev_offload_ok() in parallel. All callbacks assume real_dev is set. Example trace: kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0 kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ #12 kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 kernel: RIP: 0010:nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 <83> 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA kernel: kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60 kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014 kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000 kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000 kernel: FS: 00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: ? __die+0x1f/0x60 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x142/0x4c0 kernel: ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x670 kernel: ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 kernel: ? nsim_bpf_uninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA kernel: ? nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: bond_ipsec_offload_ok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding] kernel: xfrm_output+0x61/0x3b0 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA kernel: ip_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x80 Fixes: 18cb261 ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

Kolbjørn and Jonáš reported that their 32-bit PowerMacs were crashing in pata-macio since commit 09fe2bf ("ata: pata_macio: Fix max_segment_size with PAGE_SIZE == 64K"). For example: kernel BUG at drivers/ata/pata_macio.c:544! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2 DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PowerMac ... NIP pata_macio_qc_prep+0xf4/0x190 LR pata_macio_qc_prep+0xfc/0x190 Call Trace: 0xc1421660 (unreliable) ata_qc_issue+0x14c/0x2d4 __ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x200/0x53c ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x50/0xe0 scsi_queue_rq+0x788/0xb1c __blk_mq_issue_directly+0x58/0xf4 blk_mq_plug_issue_direct+0x8c/0x1b4 blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0x584/0x5e0 __blk_flush_plug+0xf8/0x194 __submit_bio+0x1b8/0x2e0 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x230/0x304 btrfs_work_helper+0x200/0x338 process_one_work+0x1a8/0x338 worker_thread+0x364/0x4c0 kthread+0x100/0x104 start_kernel_thread+0x10/0x14 That commit increased max_segment_size to 64KB, with the justification that the SCSI core was already using that size when PAGE_SIZE == 64KB, and that there was existing logic to split over-sized requests. However with a sufficiently large request, the splitting logic causes each sg to be split into two commands in the DMA table, leading to overflow of the DMA table, triggering the BUG_ON(). With default settings the bug doesn't trigger, because the request size is limited by max_sectors_kb == 1280, however max_sectors_kb can be increased, and apparently some distros do that by default using udev rules. Fix the bug for 4KB kernels by reverting to the old max_segment_size. For 64KB kernels the sg_tablesize needs to be halved, to allow for the possibility that each sg will be split into two. Fixes: 09fe2bf ("ata: pata_macio: Fix max_segment_size with PAGE_SIZE == 64K") Cc: [email protected] # v6.10+ Reported-by: Kolbjørn Barmen <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Jonáš Vidra <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Tested-by: Kolbjørn Barmen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 disable BH when collecting stats via hardware offload to ensure concurrent updates from packet path do not result in losing stats. From Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #2 uses write seqcount to reset counters serialize against reader. Also from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #3 ensures vlan header is in place before accessing its fields, according to KMSAN splat triggered by syzbot. * tag 'nf-24-08-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against reader. netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats(). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

This fixes the random kernel crash seen while removing the driver, when running the load/unload test over multiple iterations. 1) modprobe btnxpuart 2) hciconfig hci0 reset 3) hciconfig (check hci0 interface up with valid BD address) 4) modprobe -r btnxpuart Repeat steps 1 to 4 The ps_wakeup() call in btnxpuart_close() schedules the psdata->work(), which gets scheduled after module is removed, causing a kernel crash. This hidden issue got highlighted after enabling Power Save by default in 4183a7b (Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Enable Power Save feature on startup) The new ps_cleanup() deasserts UART break immediately while closing serdev device, cancels any scheduled ps_work and destroys the ps_lock mutex. [ 85.884604] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.884624] Mem abort info: [ 85.884625] ESR = 0x0000000086000007 [ 85.884628] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 85.884633] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 85.884636] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 85.884638] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [ 85.884642] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000041dd0000 [ 85.884646] [ffffd4a61638f258] pgd=1000000095fff003, p4d=1000000095fff003, pud=100000004823d003, pmd=100000004823e003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 85.884662] Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 85.890932] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils gpio_ir_recv rc_core fuse [last unloaded: btnxpuart(O)] [ 85.927297] CPU: 1 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/1:3 Tainted: G O 6.1.36+g937b1be4345a #1 [ 85.936176] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT) [ 85.936182] Workqueue: events 0xffffd4a61638f380 [ 85.936198] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 85.952817] pc : 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.952823] lr : 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.952827] sp : ffff8000084fbd70 [ 85.952829] x29: ffff8000084fbd70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 85.963112] x26: ffffd4a69133f000 x25: ffff4bf1c8540990 x24: ffff4bf215b87305 [ 85.963119] x23: ffff4bf215b87300 x22: ffff4bf1c85409d0 x21: ffff4bf1c8540970 [ 85.977382] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff4bf1c8540880 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 85.977391] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000133 x15: 0000ffffe2217090 [ 85.977399] x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000133 x12: 0000000000000139 [ 85.977407] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff8000084fbc50 [ 85.977417] x8 : ffff4bf215b7d000 x7 : ffff4bf215b83b40 x6 : 00000000000003e8 [ 85.977424] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 85.977432] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff4bf1c4265880 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 85.977443] Call trace: [ 85.977446] 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.977451] 0xffffd4a61638f3e8 [ 85.977455] process_one_work+0x1d4/0x330 [ 85.977464] worker_thread+0x6c/0x430 [ 85.977471] kthread+0x108/0x10c [ 85.977476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 85.977488] Code: bad PC value [ 85.977491] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Preset since v6.9.11 Fixes: 86d55f1 ("Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Deasset UART break before closing serdev device") Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

In the cited commit, bond->ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list, hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep, "scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's active slave. [ 101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200 [ 101.055726] Modules linked in: [ 101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 [ 101.058760] Hardware name: [ 101.059434] Call Trace: [ 101.059436] <TASK> [ 101.060873] dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 [ 101.061275] __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60 [ 101.061682] __schedule+0x612/0x7c0 [ 101.062078] ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370 [ 101.062486] schedule+0x25/0xd0 [ 101.062845] schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0 [ 101.063265] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [ 101.063724] ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10 [ 101.064215] __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190 [ 101.064648] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90 [ 101.065091] cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core] [ 101.065569] mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 101.066051] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 101.066552] mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core] [ 101.067163] ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding] [ 101.067738] ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350 [ 101.068156] mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core] [ 101.068747] mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core] [ 101.069312] bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding] [ 101.069868] bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding] [ 101.070454] __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding] [ 101.070935] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding] [ 101.071453] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding] [ 101.071965] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding] [ 101.072567] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0 [ 101.073033] vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400 [ 101.073416] ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180 [ 101.073798] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 [ 101.074175] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110 [ 101.074576] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock. And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved. Fixes: 9a56055 ("bonding: Add struct bond_ipesc to manage SA") Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 sets on NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO for UDP packets less than 4 bytes payload from netdev/egress by subtracting skb_network_offset() when validating IPv4 packet length, otherwise 'meta l4proto udp' never matches. Patch #2 subtracts skb_network_offset() when validating IPv6 packet length for netdev/egress. netfilter pull request 24-08-28 * tag 'nf-24-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables_ipv6: consider network offset in netdev/egress validation netfilter: nf_tables: restore IP sanity checks for netdev/egress ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

Error out if kvm_mmu_reload() fails when pre-faulting memory, as trying to fault-in SPTEs will fail miserably due to root.hpa pointing at garbage. Note, kvm_mmu_reload() can return -EIO and thus trigger the WARN on -EIO in kvm_vcpu_pre_fault_memory(), but all such paths also WARN, i.e. the WARN isn't user-triggerable and won't run afoul of warn-on-panic because the kernel would already be panicking. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000029ffffffffe8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 22 PID: 1069 Comm: pre_fault_memor Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #548 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:is_page_fault_stale+0x3e/0xe0 [kvm] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000114bd48 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 00003fffffffffc0 RBX: ffff88810a07c080 RCX: ffffc9000114bd78 RDX: ffff88810a07c080 RSI: ffffea0000000000 RDI: ffff88810a07c080 RBP: ffffc9000114bd78 R08: 00007fa3c8c00000 R09: 8000000000000225 R10: ffffea00043d7d80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810a07c080 R13: 0000000100000000 R14: ffffc9000114be58 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa3c9da0740(0000) GS:ffff888277d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000029ffffffffe8 CR3: 000000011d698000 CR4: 0000000000352eb0 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_tdp_page_fault+0xcc/0x160 [kvm] kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xfb/0x1f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory+0xd0/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x761/0x8c0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm CR2: 000029ffffffffe8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 6e01b76 ("KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Tested-by: xingwei lee <[email protected]> Tested-by: yuxin wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib. cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection. If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL. It is used as a material to create an encryption key in ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer dereference error from crypto_shash_update(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39 Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 ) Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __die+0x24/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] _sha256_update+0x77/0xa0 [sha256_ssse3] sha256_avx2_update+0x15/0x30 [sha256_ssse3] crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 hmac_update+0x12/0x20 crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 generate_key+0x234/0x380 [ksmbd] generate_smb3encryptionkey+0x40/0x1c0 [ksmbd] ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey+0x72/0xa0 [ksmbd] ntlm_authenticate.isra.0+0x423/0x5d0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0x952/0xaa0 [ksmbd] __process_request+0xa3/0x1d0 [ksmbd] __handle_ksmbd_work+0x1c4/0x2f0 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x2d/0xa0 [ksmbd] process_one_work+0x16c/0x350 worker_thread+0x306/0x440 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xef/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: f5a544e ("ksmbd: add support for SMB3 multichannel") Cc: [email protected] # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes negative at least in the following case: 468 case __SK_DROP: 469 default: 470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend); 471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend); 472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE 473 return -EACCES; Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of 'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a return value here. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline] pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745 sp : ffff800088ea3b30 x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90 x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef Call trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651 __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4f738ad ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data") Reported-by: [email protected] Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed. If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module, the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows: ================================================================== BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 #855 Tainted: [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810 __walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140 tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 default_idle_call+0x38/0x60 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60 start_secondary+0x20d/0x280 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs] ================================================================== Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

Commit 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") extended the 'vmap_block' structure to contain a 'cpu' field which is set at allocation time to the id of the initialising CPU. When a new 'vmap_block' is being instantiated by new_vmap_block(), the partially initialised structure is added to the local 'vmap_block_queue' xarray before the 'cpu' field has been initialised. If another CPU is concurrently walking the xarray (e.g. via vm_unmap_aliases()), then it may perform an out-of-bounds access to the remote queue thanks to an uninitialised index. This has been observed as UBSAN errors in Android: | Internal error: UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | | Call trace: | purge_fragmented_block+0x204/0x21c | _vm_unmap_aliases+0x170/0x378 | vm_unmap_aliases+0x1c/0x28 | change_memory_common+0x1dc/0x26c | set_memory_ro+0x18/0x24 | module_enable_ro+0x98/0x238 | do_init_module+0x1b0/0x310 Move the initialisation of 'vb->cpu' in new_vmap_block() ahead of the addition to the xarray. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]> Cc: Zhaoyang Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Hailong.Liu <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

When enable CONFIG_MEMCG & CONFIG_KFENCE & CONFIG_KMEMLEAK, the following warning always occurs,This is because the following call stack occurred: mem_pool_alloc kmem_cache_alloc_noprof slab_alloc_node kfence_alloc Once the kfence allocation is successful,slab->obj_exts will not be empty, because it has already been assigned a value in kfence_init_pool. Since in the prepare_slab_obj_exts_hook function,we perform a check for s->flags & (SLAB_NO_OBJ_EXT | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE),the alloc_tag_add function will not be called as a result.Therefore,ref->ct remains NULL. However,when we call mem_pool_free,since obj_ext is not empty, it eventually leads to the alloc_tag_sub scenario being invoked. This is where the warning occurs. So we should add corresponding checks in the alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook. For __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT case,I didn't see the specific case where it's using kfence,so I won't add the corresponding check in alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook for now. [ 3.734349] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3.734807] alloc_tag was not set [ 3.735129] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 40 at ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:130 kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574 [ 3.735866] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 3.736211] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 40 Comm: ksoftirqd/4 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3-dirty #1 [ 3.736969] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3.737258] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 3.737875] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 3.738501] pc : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574 [ 3.738951] lr : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574 [ 3.739361] sp : ffff80008357bb60 [ 3.739693] x29: ffff80008357bb70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 3.740338] x26: ffff80008207f000 x25: ffff000b2eb2fd60 x24: ffff0000c0005700 [ 3.740982] x23: ffff8000804229e4 x22: ffff800082080000 x21: ffff800081756000 [ 3.741630] x20: fffffd7ff8253360 x19: 00000000000000a8 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 3.742274] x17: ffff800ab327f000 x16: ffff800083398000 x15: ffff800081756df0 [ 3.742919] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d344320202020 x12: 5b5d373038343337 [ 3.743560] x11: ffff80008357b650 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 [ 3.744231] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008237bad0 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff [ 3.744907] x5 : ffff80008237ba78 x4 : ffff8000820bbad0 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.745580] x2 : 68d66547c09f7800 x1 : 68d66547c09f7800 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.746255] Call trace: [ 3.746530] kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574 [ 3.746931] mem_pool_free+0x44/0xf4 [ 3.747306] free_object_rcu+0xc8/0xdc [ 3.747693] rcu_do_batch+0x234/0x8a4 [ 3.748075] rcu_core+0x230/0x3e4 [ 3.748424] rcu_core_si+0x14/0x1c [ 3.748780] handle_softirqs+0x134/0x378 [ 3.749189] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0x9c [ 3.749560] smpboot_thread_fn+0x148/0x22c [ 3.749978] kthread+0x10c/0x118 [ 3.750323] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 3.750696] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 4b87369 ("mm/slab: add allocation accounting into slab allocation and free paths") Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted. Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434 binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Allocated by task 743: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270 binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8 binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Freed by task 745: kfree+0xbc/0x208 binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c [...] ================================================================== To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the boundaries of the data section. Fixes: 6d98eb9 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn") Cc: Todd Kjos <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_xdp() can just hot-swap the program. Also, as ice_vsi_rebuild() flow is touched in this patch, make it more consistent by deconfiguring VSI when coalesce allocation fails. Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Fixes: efc2214 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict result. This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by two users in the Link tags below. Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL. The following C program triggers the issue: $ cat repro.c /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <pthread.h> static int fd; static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) { while (count > 0) { ssize_t ret; ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset); if (ret < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return ret; } count -= ret; buf += ret; } return 0; } static void *fsync_loop(void *arg) { while (1) { int ret; ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { perror("Fsync failed"); exit(6); } } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long pagesize; void *write_buf; pthread_t fsyncer; int ret; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { perror("Failed to open/create file"); return 1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); if (pagesize == -1) { perror("Failed to get page size"); return 2; } ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize); if (ret) { perror("Failed to allocate buffer"); return 3; } ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret); return 4; } while (1) { ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0); if (ret != 0) { perror("Write failed"); exit(5); } } return 0; } $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Paulo Dias <[email protected]> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187 Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <[email protected]> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199 Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 939b656 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write") CC: [email protected] # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Fix circular locking dependency on runtime suspend. <4> [74.952215] ====================================================== <4> [74.952217] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [74.952219] 6.10.0-rc7-xe #1 Not tainted <4> [74.952221] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [74.952223] kworker/7:1/82 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [74.952226] ffff888120548488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x1e0 [drm] <4> [74.952260] but task is already holding lock: <4> [74.952262] ffffffffa0ae59c0 (xe_pm_runtime_lockdep_map){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_pm_runtime_suspend+0x2f/0x340 [xe] <4> [74.952322] which lock already depends on the new lock. The commit 'b1d90a86 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver")' didn't do anything wrong. It actually fixed a critical bug, because the encoder_suspend was never getting actually called because it was returning if (has_display(xe)) instead of if (!has_display(xe)). However, this ended up introducing the encoder suspend calls in the runtime routines as well, causing the circular locking dependency. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2304 Fixes: b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") Cc: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cavitt <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8da19441d0a02b53e362df81843bb20db3a8006a) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>

We observed a null-ptr-deref in fou_gro_receive() while shutting down a host. [0] The NULL pointer is sk->sk_user_data, and the offset 8 is of protocol in struct fou. When fou_release() is called due to netns dismantle or explicit tunnel teardown, udp_tunnel_sock_release() sets NULL to sk->sk_user_data. Then, the tunnel socket is destroyed after a single RCU grace period. So, in-flight udp4_gro_receive() could find the socket and execute the FOU GRO handler, where sk->sk_user_data could be NULL. Let's use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in fou_from_sock() and add NULL checks in FOU GRO handlers. [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 80000001032f4067 P4D 80000001032f4067 PUD 103240067 PMD 0 SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.216-204.855.amzn2.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5.large/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] Code: 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc e8 e7 2e 69 f4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f8 41 54 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 49 8b 80 88 02 00 00 <0f> b6 48 08 0f b7 42 4a 66 25 fd fd 80 cc 02 66 89 42 4a 0f b6 42 RSP: 0018:ffffa330c0003d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RSI: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RDI: ffff93dac2e24d08 RBP: ffff93d9e3a6b900 R08: ffff93dacbce6400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb5f369b0 R12: ffff93dacbce6400 R13: ffff93dac2e24d08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffb4edd1c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93daee800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000102140001 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? no_context (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:752) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1435 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1483) ? asm_exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:571) ? fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] udp_gro_receive (include/linux/netdevice.h:2552 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:559) udp4_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:604) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1549 (discriminator 7)) dev_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6035 (discriminator 4)) napi_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6170) ena_clean_rx_irq (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1558) [ena] ena_io_poll (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1742) [ena] napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6847) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6917) __do_softirq (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:25 include/linux/jump_label.h:200 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:299) asm_call_irq_on_stack (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:809) </IRQ> do_softirq_own_stack (arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:27 arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:393 kernel/softirq.c:423 kernel/softirq.c:435) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:239) asm_common_interrupt (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:626) RIP: 0010:acpi_idle_do_entry (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:114 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:575) Code: 8b 15 d1 3c c4 02 ed c3 cc cc cc cc 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 eb 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d d5 09 55 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc e9 be fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffffffb5603e58 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff93dac0929c00 RCX: ffff93daee833900 RDX: ffff93daee800000 RSI: ffff93daee87dc00 RDI: ffff93daee87dc64 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffb5e7b6c0 R09: 0000000000000044 R10: ffff93daee831b04 R11: 00000000000001cd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffb5e7b740 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 ? sched_clock_cpu (kernel/sched/clock.c:371) acpi_idle_enter (drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:712 (discriminator 3)) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:237) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:353) cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:158 kernel/sched/idle.c:239) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:302) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:395 (discriminator 1)) start_kernel (init/main.c:1048) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:310) Modules linked in: udp_diag tcp_diag inet_diag nft_nat ipip tunnel4 dummy fou ip_tunnel nft_masq nft_chain_nat nf_nat wireguard nft_ct curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic nf_conntrack libchacha20poly1305 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_objref chacha_x86_64 nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink poly1305_x86_64 ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel libchacha crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper mousedev psmouse button ena ptp pps_core crc32c_intel CR2: 0000000000000008 Fixes: d92283e ("fou: change to use UDP socket GRO") Reported-by: Alphonse Kurian <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Chi Zhiling reported: We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the panic triggered. by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic loop1 (){ while true do echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events done } loop2 (){ while true do tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/ done } loop1 & loop2 [1]: [ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150 [ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info: [ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info: [ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls] [ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2 [ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650 [ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020 [ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398 [ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0 [ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100 [ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10 [ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0 [ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0 [ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862 [ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068 [ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001 [ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace: [ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398 [ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188 [ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160 [ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108 [ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 [ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168 [ 1148.232798][T17331] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 [ 1148.237836][T17331] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [ 1148.242182][T17331] Code: 54ffff6c f9400676 910006d6 f9000676 (b9405300) [ 1148.248955][T17331] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The issue is that list_del() is used on an SRCU protected list variable before the synchronization occurs. This can poison the list pointers while there is a reader iterating the list. This is simply fixed by using list_del_rcu() that is specifically made for this purpose. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 43aa6f9 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts") Reported-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it should not have been, leading to: while true; do rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!; sleep 5; kill -INT $PID; sleep 0.001; kill -TERM $PID; wait $PID; done Causing the following OOPS: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty armbian#125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60 R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10 hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40 timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0 ? security_file_release+0x43/0x80 __fput+0x372/0xb10 task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170 ? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0 do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0 ? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x64/0x140 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0 do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220 get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0 ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570 ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72. RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0 R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008 </TASK> Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space thread making it "exit" before it actually exits. Since kthreads are created based on global behavior, use a cpumask to know when kthreads are running and that they need to be shutdown before proceeding to do new work. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ This was debugged by using the persistent ring buffer: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Note, locking was originally used to fix this, but that proved to cause too many deadlocks to work around: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: e88ed22 ("tracing/timerlat: Add user-space interface") Reported-by: Tomas Glozar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

Buffer 'card->dai_link' is reallocated in 'meson_card_reallocate_links()', so move 'pad' pointer initialization after this function when memory is already reallocated. Kasan bug report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc Read of size 8 at addr ffff000000e8b260 by task modprobe/356 CPU: 0 PID: 356 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 6.9.12-sdkernel #1 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 print_report+0xfc/0x5c0 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] meson_card_probe+0x344/0x3b8 [snd_soc_meson_card_utils] platform_probe+0x8c/0xf4 really_probe+0x110/0x39c __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x18c driver_probe_device+0x108/0x1d8 __driver_attach+0xd0/0x25c bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x154 driver_attach+0x34/0x44 bus_add_driver+0x134/0x294 driver_register+0xa8/0x1e8 __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x54 axg_card_pdrv_init+0x20/0x1000 [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x25c do_init_module+0x10c/0x334 load_module+0x24c4/0x26cc init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1f4/0x41c invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x13c do_el0_svc+0x30/0x40 el0_svc+0x38/0x78 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: 7864a79 ("ASoC: meson: add axg sound card support") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jerome Brunet <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

Marc Hartmayer reported: [ 23.133876] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space [ 23.133950] Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483 [ 23.133954] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. [ 23.133957] AS:000000001b8f0007 R3:0000000056cf4007 S:0000000056cf3800 P:000000000000003d [ 23.134207] Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] SMP (snip) [ 23.134516] Call Trace: [ 23.134520] [<0000024e326caf28>] worker_thread+0x48/0x430 [ 23.134525] ([<0000024e326caf18>] worker_thread+0x38/0x430) [ 23.134528] [<0000024e326d3a3e>] kthread+0x11e/0x130 [ 23.134533] [<0000024e3264b0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 23.134536] [<0000024e333fb37a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38 [ 23.134552] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 23.134553] [<0000024e333f4c04>] mutex_unlock+0x24/0x30 [ 23.134562] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops With debuging and analysis, worker_thread() accesses to the nullified worker->pool when the newly created worker is destroyed before being waken-up, in which case worker_thread() can see the result detach_worker() reseting worker->pool to NULL at the begining. Move the code "worker->pool = NULL;" out from detach_worker() to fix the problem. worker->pool had been designed to be constant for regular workers and changeable for rescuer. To share attaching/detaching code for regular and rescuer workers and to avoid worker->pool being accessed inadvertently when the worker has been detached, worker->pool is reset to NULL when detached no matter the worker is rescuer or not. To maintain worker->pool being reset after detached, move the code "worker->pool = NULL;" in the worker thread context after detached. It is either be in the regular worker thread context after PF_WQ_WORKER is cleared or in rescuer worker thread context with wq_pool_attach_mutex held. So it is safe to do so. Cc: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]> Fixes: f4b7b53 ("workqueue: Detach workers directly in idle_cull_fn()") Cc: [email protected] # v6.11+ Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following batch contains two fixes from Florian Westphal: Patch #1 fixes a sk refcount leak in nft_socket on mismatch. Patch #2 fixes cgroupsv2 matching from containers due to incorrect level in subtree. netfilter pull request 24-09-12 * tag 'nf-24-09-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nft_socket: make cgroupsv2 matching work with namespaces netfilter: nft_socket: fix sk refcount leaks ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

…_module_init() Move nf flowtable bpf initialization in nf_flow_table module load routine since nf_flow_table_bpf is part of nf_flow_table module and not nf_flow_table_inet one. This patch allows to avoid the following kernel warning running the reproducer below: $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet $rmmod nf_flow_table_inet $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'nf_flow_table_inet': Invalid argument [ 184.081501] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 184.081527] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1362 at kernel/bpf/btf.c:8206 btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081550] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1362 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-0.rc5.22.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 184.081553] Hardware name: Red Hat OpenStack Compute, BIOS 1.14.0-1.module+el8.4.0+8855+a9e237a9 04/01/2014 [ 184.081554] RIP: 0010:btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081558] RSP: 0018:ff22cfb38071fc90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 184.081559] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081560] RDX: 000000000000006e RSI: ffffffff95c00000 RDI: ff13805543436350 [ 184.081561] RBP: ffffffffc0e22180 R08: ff13805543410808 R09: 000000000001ec00 [ 184.081562] R10: ff13805541c8113c R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ff13805541b83c00 [ 184.081563] R13: ff13805543410800 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffffffc0e2259a [ 184.081564] FS: 00007fa436c46740(0000) GS:ff1380557ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 184.081569] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 184.081570] CR2: 000055e7b3187000 CR3: 0000000100c48003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [ 184.081571] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081572] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 184.081572] PKRU: 55555554 [ 184.081574] Call Trace: [ 184.081575] <TASK> [ 184.081578] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081582] ? __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081585] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081586] ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xed [ 184.081590] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081592] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 184.081594] ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70 [ 184.081596] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 184.081597] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 184.081601] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081602] __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081605] ? __pfx_nf_flow_inet_module_init+0x10/0x10 [nf_flow_table_inet] [ 184.081607] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 [ 184.081611] do_init_module+0x60/0x230 [ 184.081614] __do_sys_init_module+0x17a/0x1b0 [ 184.081617] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 [ 184.081620] ? __count_memcg_events+0x58/0xf0 [ 184.081623] ? handle_mm_fault+0x234/0x350 [ 184.081626] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x347/0x640 [ 184.081630] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081633] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081634] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 184.081639] RIP: 0033:0x7fa43652e4ce [ 184.081647] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8213be18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af [ 184.081649] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e7b3176c20 RCX: 00007fa43652e4ce [ 184.081650] RDX: 000055e7737fde79 RSI: 0000000000003990 RDI: 000055e7b3185380 [ 184.081651] RBP: 000055e7737fde79 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 000055e7b3179bd0 [ 184.081651] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 [ 184.081652] R13: 000055e7b3176fa0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e7b3179b80 Fixes: 391bb65 ("netfilter: Add bpf_xdp_flow_lookup kfunc") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911-nf-flowtable-bpf-modprob-fix-v1-1-f9fc075aafc3@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

Joshua-Riek force-pushed the linux-5.10-gen-rkr4 branch from b6885ee to 67fd283 Compare July 30, 2023 03:24

MorgothCreator closed this Aug 1, 2023

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Add indiedroid specific overlays for SPI0 with SCK on M1 instead of M2. #1

Add indiedroid specific overlays for SPI0 with SCK on M1 instead of M2. #1

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Add indiedroid specific overlays for SPI0 with SCK on M1 instead of M2. #1

Add indiedroid specific overlays for SPI0 with SCK on M1 instead of M2. #1

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