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Port Donut pattern from old PR #38 into this, so that we can link to …
…the Donut pattern directly, rather than to the PR. Also adapted pattern slightly to fit the current Pattern template better.
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## Title | ||
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Incentive mechanisms to foster voluntary contribution | ||
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## Patlet | ||
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TBD | ||
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## Problem | ||
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In hierarchical and silo-organized organizations, getting voluntary contributions in InnerSource | ||
projects can be challenging. It is crucial to create mechanisms to incentivize managers to foster | ||
voluntary contributions. Consider the following story: | ||
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Company A has started an InnerSource initiative. Their InnerSource concept expected to have | ||
associates voluntarily contributing to InnerSource projects, regardless of topic and regardless of | ||
home-business-unit alignment. | ||
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After some time in activity, the core team realizes that their InnerSource project is not getting | ||
voluntary contributions. While engaging with potential individual contributors, the | ||
core team (pattern link) has consistently learned that the contributors in question were | ||
not allowed to contribute or have their participation in InnerSource projects rejected by | ||
their respective line managers. The reasons presented by management are: | ||
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- the lack of strategic alignment between the InnerSource project goal and the business unit product/service portfolio, | ||
- managers have planned their developer's capacity 100% to the home business units projects. | ||
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So, the management is not motivated to provide their scarce developer capacity to the | ||
InnerSource project. | ||
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As a result, the total number of contributors remained restricted to the core team and the | ||
project cannot build a community of developers. Furthermore, contributions mostly originated | ||
in the same business unit the Dedicated Community Leader (link to Dedicated Community Leader) | ||
belonged to. Innovation did not happen in the expected scale. Top management is no longer | ||
convinced that InnerSource yields the expected benefits and abandons the initiative altogether. | ||
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## Context | ||
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- The InnerSource initiative is sponsored (budget) by top level management. | ||
- The managers (middle-management) have their bonus directly depending | ||
only on business units results under their responsibility | ||
- The capacity of every associate is usually planned by their superiors | ||
and 100% allocated to the home business unit projects | ||
- Cross organizational collaboration is not the norm. | ||
- Contributions to InnerSource projects are expected to be made during working | ||
hours. | ||
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## Forces | ||
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- Managers of business units are held accountable for their results. Reducing | ||
the capacity of an associate contributing to an InnerSource project rather | ||
than the goals of the business unit will make it harder for them to reach or | ||
exceed their goals. | ||
- The more time an associate spends on contributions to an InnerSource project | ||
which does not benefit his day-to-day work, the more will the workload for | ||
his teammates in his business unit increase. | ||
- The individual contributor would like to participate to enhance his | ||
professional network within the company and gain knowledge and experience | ||
with both the InnerSource method and the technical area he makes a | ||
contribution to. | ||
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## (Possible) Solution | ||
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- The top management sets and communicates a corporate strategy where development | ||
capacity are to be planned and committed to a maximum of 85% to home business units projects | ||
- A central funded formal contracting mechanisms, where line managers get | ||
refunded by the percentage of associates work time in InnerSource is in place. | ||
- Managers (middle-management) have a percentage of their bonus associated to | ||
contribution and the results of InnerSource projects not directly related/sponsored | ||
by their business units. | ||
- Utilize any existing engineering-wide bonus that allots some percentage of each employee's | ||
bonus to be aligned with Inner Source interactions. It could be # of commits, or commits + | ||
issues + documentation + chat interaction, etc. Utilize some kind of personally-linked | ||
statistic to fill, for example, 15% of each employees bonus. Note that this encourages | ||
after-hours type work more-so than regular work-week hours, but if combined with other | ||
solutions above, could hit the issue from multiple angles. (used partially @ RedHat) | ||
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## Resulting Context | ||
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- The top management communication of the strategic decision to plan and commit | ||
85% of developers capacity and have 15% buffer for other company initiatives, | ||
for instance InnerSource projects, shows their support and sets a clear sign | ||
that InnerSource is part of the corporate goal and get executive air cover. | ||
- Allocation of corporate funds to business units for reimbursement of | ||
development capacity makes easier for business units to contribute to InnerSource | ||
projects without to commit their cost center budget. | ||
- Setting the bonus of middle-management partially depending on contributions and the success | ||
of InnerSource projects, motivates managers to encourage their developers participate on those | ||
projects | ||
- With a stable group of contributors, it is more likely that some of them will | ||
eventually achieve trusted committer status and the InnerSource project will be able | ||
to establish a healthy community around their project. | ||
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## Status | ||
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* Initial | ||
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## Authors | ||
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* Diogo Fregonese (Robert Bosch GmbH) | ||
* Georg Gruetter (Robert Bosch GmbH) | ||
* Robert Hansel (Robert Bosch GmbH) | ||
* Nick Yeates | ||
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## Acknowledgements |