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Ongoing specification of RLAs in general, and RLAs for Colorado. #400
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In particular, I'll be focusing on their notion of rounds, or what are called stages in the literature.
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I'm confused about their notion of rounds, as noted here. A phone conversation might help.
% with the most votes received 3,500 votes, the diluted margin of the | ||
% contest is 5% [(4,000 – 3,500) / 10,000] | ||
diluted_margin: TYPE FROM margin | ||
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% @trace struck from RDPR-6-Jul-2017 old Section 25.1.6 |
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Use this description instead of the one below. Just remove the trace.
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Recall that traces are going to turn into margin comments with hyperlinks to other artifacts. So I'm going to leave it in there for now.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% First, one must choose a ``simultaneous risk limit'' ($\alpha$) | ||
%%% to be applied across all contents under audit. This notion is |
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=> "First, one must choose a ``risk limit'' (
I doubt we will ever be interested in simultaneous audits across contests, governed by a single risk limit, and Philip agrees. As discussed several times in slack, that would among other things mean that if there was a problem with one contest, all the contests being simultaneously audited would require a full hand count. A full hand count of multiple contests is far more of a nightmare than just hand counting a single one.
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As just mentioned in Slack, what I have been formalizing here is Stark10's definitions so that I can refine them for Colorado's specific style of "different risk-limits per contest". I'm refactoring now during my responding to @nealmcb's comments here.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% among the contests under audit (which we will call the | ||
%%% \texttt{minimum\_margin}) divided by the total number of ballots | ||
%%% cast across all the contests under audit.\todonealmcb{Is this | ||
%%% true, or is it the smallest margin over all contests under audit?} |
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Use the definition above. No simultaneous audits. Calculated for each contest, each of which is audited independently.
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In my revisions that I'll be committing in a few minutes, I have refactored this definition in the colorado_rlas
theory to the appropriate structures for Colorado's case.
% in an audited contest, and the reported winning candidate with the | ||
% fewest votes received 4,000 votes, and the reported losing candidate | ||
% with the most votes received 3,500 votes, the diluted margin of the | ||
% contest is 5% [(4,000 – 3,500) / 10,000] |
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It's not clear to me that you would want to duplicate the comments for % vs %%%, but I'll leave that to you.
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See above. Those that are currently in %
with a @trace
will be converted into margin comments.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% rules. First, the risk limit for comparison audits must be below | ||
%%% $5\%$. | ||
% @trace RDPR-6-Jul-2017 Section 25.2.2(A) | ||
RDPR_risk_limit: TYPE = {n : nonneg_real | n <= 0.05} |
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We decided to leave out the restriction, given the escape clause. Also, the rule now says 10%, for county-wide contests, and doesn't actually say anything about contests smaller than a county. So I'd leave out this RDPR_escape_claus_risk_limit part - too deep in the weeds. They seem to want flexibility.
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I still need to model what is in the statutes and in the rules. That's doesn't mean that we will implement these dependent types as invariants in the system.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% is set any kind of risk limit they like. | ||
RDPR_escape_clause_risk_limit: TYPE = {n : nonneg_real | n <= 1.0} | ||
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%%% As mentioned above, CDOS wants to be able to run a state-wide |
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"run an audit", since I expect they would do this if they ran just a local audit also.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% counties. | ||
round_size: TYPE = [round_number -> nat] | ||
%%% Eventually we run out of ballot cards to audit, as a full hand | ||
%%% count will count all ballot cards. Thus, for all possible round |
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I don't understand this. Run out?
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I'm proposing a model of stages such that stages eventually terminate because the SOS will decide that the contest(s) in question must be hand-counted. I'll try to clarify.
specs/pvs/corla.pvs
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%%% We propose that, under normal circumstances, the initial round | ||
%%% size for any election in Colorado should be conservative enough | ||
%%% that all counties will meet their risk limits for all contests | ||
%%% under audit. |
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They can't mean that all counties audit the same number of ballots in a round. That would be crazy.
A typo in the docs for the ComparisonAudit class is also included.
In particular, I'll be focusing on their notion of rounds, or what are called stages in the literature.