chore(deps): update ⬆️ gomod google.golang.org/grpc to v1.56.3 #59
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
![mend-for-github.aaakk.us.kg[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/30796?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
mend-for-github.aaakk.us.kg
bot
requested a review
from a team
as a code owner
![renovate-approve[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/7394?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
mend-for-github.aaakk.us.kg
bot
force-pushed
the
whitesource-remediate/go-google.golang.org/grpc-vulnerability
branch
from
1f3a68f to
6397c18
Compare
mend-for-github.aaakk.us.kg
bot
changed the title
mend-for-github.aaakk.us.kg
bot
force-pushed
the
whitesource-remediate/go-google.golang.org/grpc-vulnerability
branch
from
6397c18 to
43dfeb2
Compare
auto-merge was automatically disabled
January 23, 2024 21:51
Pull request was closed
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This PR contains the following updates:
v1.50.1->v1.56.3GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
GHSA-m425-mq94-257g
Impact
In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.
Patches
This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.
Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the
grpc.MaxConcurrentStreamsserver option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.Workarounds
None.
References
#6703
CVE-2023-44487
HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack
The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.
Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.
The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.
The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.
In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.
Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the
swift-nio-http2repo advisory and their original conent follows.swift-nio-http2 specific advisory
swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new
Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm anEventLoopand prevent it from making forward progress.swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.
Denial of service from HTTP/2 Rapid Reset in google.golang.org/grpc
GHSA-m425-mq94-257g / GO-2023-2153
More information
Details
An attacker can send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests. This is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit, grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams. This results in a denial of service due to resource consumption.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
HTTP/2 Stream Cancellation Attack
BIT-apisix-2023-44487 / BIT-aspnet-core-2023-44487 / BIT-contour-2023-44487 / BIT-dotnet-2023-44487 / BIT-dotnet-sdk-2023-44487 / BIT-envoy-2023-44487 / BIT-golang-2023-44487 / BIT-jenkins-2023-44487 / BIT-kong-2023-44487 / BIT-nginx-2023-44487 / BIT-nginx-ingress-controller-2023-44487 / BIT-node-2023-44487 / BIT-solr-2023-44487 / BIT-tomcat-2023-44487 / BIT-varnish-2023-44487 / CVE-2023-44487 / GHSA-2m7v-gc89-fjqf / GHSA-qppj-fm5r-hxr3 / GHSA-vx74-f528-fxqg / GHSA-xpw8-rcwv-8f8p
More information
Details
HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack
The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.
Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.
The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.
The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.
In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.
Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the
swift-nio-http2repo advisory and their original conent follows.swift-nio-http2 specific advisory
swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new
Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm anEventLoopand prevent it from making forward progress.swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
gRPC-Go HTTP/2 Rapid Reset vulnerability
GHSA-m425-mq94-257g / GO-2023-2153
More information
Details
Impact
In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.
Patches
This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.
Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the
grpc.MaxConcurrentStreamsserver option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.Workarounds
None.
References
#6703
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
grpc/grpc-go (google.golang.org/grpc)
v1.56.3: Release 1.56.3Compare Source
Security
server: prohibit more than MaxConcurrentStreams handlers from running at once (CVE-2023-44487)
In addition to this change, applications should ensure they do not leave running tasks behind related to the RPC before returning from method handlers, or should enforce appropriate limits on any such work.
v1.56.2: Release 1.56.2Compare Source
status.FromErrornow returns an error withcodes.Unknownwhen the error implements theGRPCStatus()method, and callingGRPCStatus()returnsnil. (#6374)v1.56.1: Release 1.56.1Compare Source
v1.56.0: Release 1.56.0Compare Source
New Features
WithIdleTimeoutdial option (#6263)Bug Fixes
API Changes
v1.55.1: Release 1.55.1Compare Source
status.FromErrornow returns an error withcodes.Unknownwhen the error implements theGRPCStatus()method, and callingGRPCStatus()returnsnil. (#6374)v1.55.0: Release 1.55.0Compare Source
Behavior Changes
status.Codeandstatus.FromErrorhandle wrapped errors (#6031 and #6150)New Features
ignore_resource_deletionserver feature as per gRFC A53 (#6035)Bug Fixes
Performance Improvements
NumStreamWorkersis used (#6004)v1.54.1: Release 1.54.1Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v1.54.0: Release 1.54.0Compare Source
Behavior Changes
New Features
SetSendCompressorAPI to set send compressor name (#5744)Nodeproto only in the first discovery request message, to improve performance (#6078)Bug Fixes
AppendToOutgoingContext(#6001)Documentation
Resolver.Scheme()docstring to mention requirement of lowercase scheme names (#6014)UpdateStateerrors (#6002)v1.53.0: Release 1.53.0Compare Source
API Changes
resolver.Target.Endpointand replace withresolver.Target.Endpoint()(#5852)New Features
GRPC_RING_HASH_CAPenvironment variable to override the maximum ring size. (#5884)Bug Fixes
Documentation
NewOauthAccessas deprecated (#5882)v1.52.3: Release 1.52.3Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v1.52.1: Release 1.52.1Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v1.52.0: Release 1.52.0Compare Source
New Features
max_ring_sizeto reduce possibility of OOMs (#5801)Behavior Changes
Dialif an empty target is passed and no custom dialer is present; the ClientConn would otherwise be unable to connect and perform RPCs (#5732)Bug Fixes
:authorityheader matches server name used in TLS handshake when the latter is overridden by the name resolver (#5748)Documentation
v1.51.0: Release 1.51.0Compare Source
Behavior Changes
New Features
TRANSIENT_FAILURE(#5711)Bug Fixes
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
👻 Immortal: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get config help if that's undesired.