fix: CompileCommand may return extraneous files #281
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In cases where an argument that is not positional ends with `.go`, the `CompileCommand.GoFiles` function might erroneously return that value as a source file to be compiled. This is for example the case when compiling the `github.com/nats-io/nats.go` package, as the `-p` argument has a value ending in `.go`. To address this, this PR introduces a more reliable arguments parser that uses a generated parser (built using the standard `flag` package) based on the usage documentation found in the output of `go tool <compile|link>`, so that the flags are more clearly identified. This replaces the old arguments parser, which is no longer used.
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| log.Fatalln("Missing value for required -command flag") | ||
| } | ||
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| cmd := exec.Command("go", "tool", command) |
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🟠 Code Vulnerability
Check command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `command` may need to be validated (...read more)
In Go, the exec.Command function is used to run external commands. Using this function carelessly can lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches.
To prevent command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go, follow these coding best practices:
- Sanitize User Input: Always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to
exec.Command. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data. - Avoid using Shell Expansion: If possible, pass the command and arguments as separate strings to
exec.Command. This prevents the shell from interpreting special characters in a potentially malicious way. - Use Absolute Paths: When specifying the command to be executed, use absolute paths for executables whenever possible. This reduces the risk of inadvertently running a similarly named malicious command from the system's PATH.
- Avoid String Concatenation: Refrain from dynamically constructing commands by concatenating strings. Instead, use the
arg ...stringparameter ofexec.Commandto pass arguments safely. - Limit Privileges: Run commands with the least privilege required to carry out the task. Avoid running commands with elevated privileges unnecessarily.
By following these practices, you can reduce the risk of command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go and enhance the security of your application.
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This particular case should be fine ^^
RomainMuller
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For examples things have already changes on my computer: |
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Same diff after I upgraded from go 1.22.6 to 1.23.1: Which basically correspond to the number of cores on the PC who ran it so I am not surprised |
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The generation should be done only with the latest version of the compiler, as this could have more options than a previous one... I'm gonna look at having some meta somewhere that allows to make sure we don't "roll back" to an older compiler version. The defaults being different based on the machine hardware/limits is a little annoying... I wonder what should be done (maybe special-case the known ones that are machine-dependent and just ignore them?) |
| log.Fatalln(err) | ||
| } | ||
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| cmd = exec.Command("go", "tool", command) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Check command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `command` may need to be validated (...read more)
In Go, the exec.Command function is used to run external commands. Using this function carelessly can lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches.
To prevent command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go, follow these coding best practices:
- Sanitize User Input: Always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to
exec.Command. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data. - Avoid using Shell Expansion: If possible, pass the command and arguments as separate strings to
exec.Command. This prevents the shell from interpreting special characters in a potentially malicious way. - Use Absolute Paths: When specifying the command to be executed, use absolute paths for executables whenever possible. This reduces the risk of inadvertently running a similarly named malicious command from the system's PATH.
- Avoid String Concatenation: Refrain from dynamically constructing commands by concatenating strings. Instead, use the
arg ...stringparameter ofexec.Commandto pass arguments safely. - Limit Privileges: Run commands with the least privilege required to carry out the task. Avoid running commands with elevated privileges unnecessarily.
By following these practices, you can reduce the risk of command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go and enhance the security of your application.
| goPackage = requireEnv("GOPACKAGE") | ||
| ) | ||
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| cmd := exec.Command("go", "tool", command, "-V=full") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Check command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `command` may need to be validated (...read more)
In Go, the exec.Command function is used to run external commands. Using this function carelessly can lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches.
To prevent command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go, follow these coding best practices:
- Sanitize User Input: Always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to
exec.Command. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data. - Avoid using Shell Expansion: If possible, pass the command and arguments as separate strings to
exec.Command. This prevents the shell from interpreting special characters in a potentially malicious way. - Use Absolute Paths: When specifying the command to be executed, use absolute paths for executables whenever possible. This reduces the risk of inadvertently running a similarly named malicious command from the system's PATH.
- Avoid String Concatenation: Refrain from dynamically constructing commands by concatenating strings. Instead, use the
arg ...stringparameter ofexec.Commandto pass arguments safely. - Limit Privileges: Run commands with the least privilege required to carry out the task. Avoid running commands with elevated privileges unnecessarily.
By following these practices, you can reduce the risk of command injection vulnerabilities when using exec.Command in Go and enhance the security of your application.
Codecov ReportAttention: Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #281 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 78.53% 73.48% -5.05%
==========================================
Files 140 144 +4
Lines 6359 7861 +1502
==========================================
+ Hits 4994 5777 +783
- Misses 955 1655 +700
- Partials 410 429 +19
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In cases where an argument that is not positional ends with
.go, theCompileCommand.GoFilesfunction might erroneously return that value as a source file to be compiled. This is for example the case when compiling thegithub.aaakk.us.kg/nats-io/nats.gopackage, as the-pargument has a value ending in.go.To address this, this PR introduces a more reliable arguments parser that uses a generated parser (built using the standard
flagpackage) based on the usage documentation found in the output ofgo tool <compile|link>, so that the flags are more clearly identified.This replaces the old arguments parser, which is no longer used.