Add EOF newlines in misc section

miscellaneous/index.html

@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ <h2>{{ page.title }}</h2>
 <p><a href="/miscellaneous/googology">Googology</a></p>
 <p><a href="/miscellaneous/simdemocracy">SimDemocracy</a></p>
 <p><a href="/miscellaneous/superintelligence-reference-page">Superintelligence reference page</a></p>
-<p><a href="/miscellaneous/voting-theory">Voting theory</a></p>
+<p><a href="/miscellaneous/voting-theory">Voting theory</a></p>

miscellaneous/simdemocracy/index.html

@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ <h1>{{ site.title }}</h1>
 <h2>{{ page.title }}</h2>
 <p><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/SimDemocracy/">Subreddit link</a></p>
 <p><a href="http://simdemocracy.cf/registered-voters">List of registered voters</a></p>
-<p><a href="/miscellaneous/simdemocracy/tau-analytical-union">Tau Analytical Union</a></p>
+<p><a href="/miscellaneous/simdemocracy/tau-analytical-union">Tau Analytical Union</a></p>

miscellaneous/simdemocracy/tau-analytical-union/index.html

@@ -10,4 +10,4 @@ <h3>TAU publications</h3>
 <ul>
 	<li><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wWaATiyZ5mk1s8nT0tm_x-0j9PF5e7UnwR1QruLN7IU/edit?usp=sharing">SPSV single ballot walkthrough</a></li>
 	<li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/SimDemocracy/comments/gjusvn/spsv_scripts/">SPSV scripts</a></li>
-</ul>
+</ul>

miscellaneous/superintelligence-reference-page.md

@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ The instrumental convergence thesis states that there are instrumental goals tha
 When will superintelligence be created? The answer to this question is important because it determines how long there is to prepare for its arrival. As such, it is worth looking to predictions of when various AI milestones will be reached.
 
 * AI Impacts has a [Guide to pages on AI timeline predictions](https://aiimpacts.org/guide-to-pages-on-ai-timeline-predictions/) which is primarily focused on timelines for pre-superintelligence milestones but also includes some superintelligence timelines.
-* [Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion](https://nickbostrom.com/papers/survey.pdf) by Vincent C. Müller and Nick Bostrom includes questions about timelines for "high–level machine intelligence" and superintelligence.
+* [Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion](https://nickbostrom.com/papers/survey.pdf) by Vincent C. Müller and Nick Bostrom includes questions about timelines for "high–level machine intelligence" and superintelligence.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/bar-voting.md

@@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ One commonly cited problem with Borda is its [susceptibility to teaming](https:/
 
 Another potential problem is the [DH3 pathology](https://rangevoting.org/DH3Summ.html). Since two of the three factions rank each frontrunner below the dark horse candidate(s), the dark horse candidate(s) will be able to win a runoff against any of the frontrunners. If two dark horses make the runoff, it doesn't matter which one wins, so the runoff would likely not prevent this pathology.
 
-Overall, BAR voting seems to be roughly as good a voting method as Borda, which is to say, not good at all.
+Overall, BAR voting seems to be roughly as good a voting method as Borda, which is to say, not good at all.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/bogobogosort-voting.md

@@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ Voters cast their ballots by marking a single candidate as their favorite. The c
 
 ### Analysis
 
-This method is almost identical to [plurality voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting). The primary difference is that while plurality runs in O(*n*) time, bogobogosort voting takes O(*n*!<sup>*n*</sup>) time to run in expectation, making it far slower than even the [Kemeny–Young method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemeny%E2%80%93Young_method). This makes it perfect for incumbents who want to hold on to power as long as possible. All they have to do is convince enough people to run and the results will be delayed for an incredibly long period of time, allowing them to keep their position.
+This method is almost identical to [plurality voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting). The primary difference is that while plurality runs in O(*n*) time, bogobogosort voting takes O(*n*!<sup>*n*</sup>) time to run in expectation, making it far slower than even the [Kemeny–Young method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemeny%E2%80%93Young_method). This makes it perfect for incumbents who want to hold on to power as long as possible. All they have to do is convince enough people to run and the results will be delayed for an incredibly long period of time, allowing them to keep their position.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/candidate-balancing-algorithm.md

@@ -58,4 +58,4 @@ function balanceCandidates(List candidates, Set groups, int numSeats) {
 
 ### Applications
 
-One application for the candidate balancing algorithm is electing a gender-balanced list of candidates. To accomplish this, female candidates are placed in one group and male candidates in another, with non-binary candidates remaining uncategorized.
+One application for the candidate balancing algorithm is electing a gender-balanced list of candidates. To accomplish this, female candidates are placed in one group and male candidates in another, with non-binary candidates remaining uncategorized.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/consensus-plurality-voting.md

@@ -17,4 +17,4 @@ Under consensus plurality, voters cast ballots by ranking all candidates. All ca
 
 Because of first-round eliminations, the winning candidate will (barring exact ties) always end up with 100% support. Therefore, this method can be considered to pick the perfect consensus candidate, outperforming all methods which can only pick a candidate with majority support.
 
-Since all eliminations occur in the first round, the strategy for picking who to rank first will be similar to the strategy for voting under plurality. However, there is no strategy for all other rankings, so voters are free to complete them honestly.
+Since all eliminations occur in the first round, the strategy for picking who to rank first will be similar to the strategy for voting under plurality. However, there is no strategy for all other rankings, so voters are free to complete them honestly.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/favorite-betrayal-under-star.md

@@ -106,4 +106,4 @@ In this election, Candidate A receives 36 points, Candidate B receives 31 points
 
 Now Candidate A receives 32 points, Candidate B receives 35 points, and Candidate C receives 36 points, so B and C are the finalists. B is favored over C on 7 ballots while C is favored over B on 3 ballots, so B wins the election. Notice that this voter cannot achieve this result by simply rating A and B the same; A will still have more points than B, preventing B from reaching the runoff.
 
-Importantly, this example lacks a Condorcet cycle. Instead, B is the Condorcet winner, and will always win in the runoff. Thus, this disproves the claim that favorite betrayal is only incentivized under STAR voting when a Condorcet cycle exists.
+Importantly, this example lacks a Condorcet cycle. Instead, B is the Condorcet winner, and will always win in the runoff. Thus, this disproves the claim that favorite betrayal is only incentivized under STAR voting when a Condorcet cycle exists.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/raws-voting.md

@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ Rounds with odd numbers of candidates remaining can be considered to be eliminat
 
 In elections with 3 candidates or less, RAWS voting is equivalent to STAR voting. Eliminating the candidate with the lowest score is equivalent to picking the two candidates with the highest scores, and the IRV variant step is equivalent to an automatic runoff.
 
-In elections with 4 or more candidates, RAWS voting is equivalent to STAR voting if the two highest-rated candidates are never eliminated in the rounds with odd numbers of candidates. If only one of those two candidates is eliminated, it is possible for the STAR winner to still be selected.
+In elections with 4 or more candidates, RAWS voting is equivalent to STAR voting if the two highest-rated candidates are never eliminated in the rounds with odd numbers of candidates. If only one of those two candidates is eliminated, it is possible for the STAR winner to still be selected.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/sequential-proportional-score-voting.md

@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ With the above reweighting formula, SPSV is equivalent to [D'Hondt](https://en.w
 
 SPSV is similar to [Reweighted Range Voting](https://electowiki.org/wiki/Reweighted_Range_Voting) (RRV), but it has the additional benefit of passing [scale invariance](https://electowiki.org/wiki/Scale_invariance).
 
-When voters [min-max vote](https://electowiki.org/wiki/Tactical_voting#Definitions), SPSV reduces to SPAV. Equivalently, SPAV and SPSV with a scale of 0 to 1 are mathematically identical and give the same results.
+When voters [min-max vote](https://electowiki.org/wiki/Tactical_voting#Definitions), SPSV reduces to SPAV. Equivalently, SPAV and SPSV with a scale of 0 to 1 are mathematically identical and give the same results.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/superintelligence-voting.md

@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ Superintelligence voting has a number of desirable properties. Unlike other voti
 
 This can be seen using a simple proof by contradiction. Assume that some voting method X is more accurate than superintelligence voting. Then the superintelligence can simply use X as its algorithm for determining the winner. Because a superintelligence would be far smarter than us, it will surely realize this and use X instead. Thus, superintelligence voting would perform exactly as well as X. This is a contradiction, so no voting method is more accurate than superintelligence voting.
 
-While superintelligence voting may seem perfect, there is one downside. If it is implemented before a solution to the [alignment problem](https://bternarytau.github.io/miscellaneous/superintelligence-reference-page#alignment-problem) is found, it is likely that the consequences will be disastrous for the entirety of humanity. However, as long as this scenario is avoided, superintelligence voting promises to outperform all alternatives.
+While superintelligence voting may seem perfect, there is one downside. If it is implemented before a solution to the [alignment problem](https://bternarytau.github.io/miscellaneous/superintelligence-reference-page#alignment-problem) is found, it is likely that the consequences will be disastrous for the entirety of humanity. However, as long as this scenario is avoided, superintelligence voting promises to outperform all alternatives.

miscellaneous/voting-theory/unified-levels-of-support.md

@@ -136,4 +136,4 @@ There are some ballot types for which it is not always possible to construct an
 
 ### Limitations
 
-One example of a voting method that unified levels of support can't completely handle is the version of score voting that uses average scores [unaffected by blanks](https://rangevoting.org/Blanks.html). In this case, the mapping scheme is incomplete because there is nowhere to map blanks to. For voting methods that count blanks as 0s instead, blanks and 0s can simply be treated as the same rating, enabling the framework to provide complete mappings for those methods.
+One example of a voting method that unified levels of support can't completely handle is the version of score voting that uses average scores [unaffected by blanks](https://rangevoting.org/Blanks.html). In this case, the mapping scheme is incomplete because there is nowhere to map blanks to. For voting methods that count blanks as 0s instead, blanks and 0s can simply be treated as the same rating, enabling the framework to provide complete mappings for those methods.