Pod utilities are small, focused Go programs used by plank
to decorate user-provided PodSpec
s
in order to increase the ease of integration for new jobs into the entire CI infrastructure. The
utilities today wrap the execution of the test code to ensure that the tests run against correct
versions of the source code, that test commands run in the appropriate environment and that output
from the test (in the form of status, logs and artifacts) is correctly uploaded to the cloud.
These utilities are integrated into a test run by adding InitContainer
s and sidecar Container
s
to the user-provided PodSpec
, as well as by overwriting the Container
entrypoint for the test
Container
provided by the user. The following utilities exist today:
clonerefs
: clones source code under testinitupload
: records the beginning of a test in cloud storage and reports the status of the clone operationsentrypoint
: is injected into the testContainer
, wraps the test code to capture logs and exit statussidecar
: runs alongside the testContainer
, uploads status, logs and test artifacts to cloud storage once the test is finished
Writing a ProwJob that uses the Pod Utilities is much easier than writing one that doesn't because the Pod Utilities will transparently handle many of the tasks the job would otherwise need to do in order to prepare its environment and output more than pass/fail. Historically, this was achieved by wrapping every job with a bootstrap.py script that handled cloning source code, preparing the test environment, and uploading job metadata, logs, and artifacts. This was cumbersome to configure and required every job to be wrapped with the script in the job image. The pod utilities achieve the same goals with less configuration and much simpler job images that are easier to develop and less coupled to Prow.
Example test container script:
pwd # my repo root
ls path/to/file/in/my/repo.txt # access repo file
ls ../other-repo # access repo file in another repo
echo success > ${ARTIFACTS}/results.txt # result info that will be uploaded to GCS.
# logs, and job metadata are automatically uploaded.
More specifically, a ProwJob using the Pod Utilities can expect the following:
- Source Code - Jobs can expect to begin execution with their working
directory set as the root of the checked out repo. The commit that is checked
out depends on the type of job:
presubmit
jobs will have the relevant PR checked out and merged with the base branch.postsubmit
jobs will have the upstream commit that triggered the job checked out.periodic
jobs will have the working directory set to the root of the repo specified by the first ref inextra_refs
(if specified). See theextra_refs
field if you need to clone more than one repo.
- Metadata and Logs - Jobs can expect metadata about the job to be uploaded before the job starts, and additional metadata and logs to be uploaded when the job completes.
- Artifact Directory - Jobs can expect an
$ARTIFACTS
environment variable to be specified. It indicates an existent directory where job artifacts can be dumped for automatic upload to GCS upon job completion.
In order to use the pod utilities, you will need to configure plank with some settings first. See plank's README for reference.
ProwJobs may request Pod Utility decoration by setting decorate: true
in their config.
Example ProwJob configuration:
- name: pull-job
always_run: true
decorate: true
spec:
containers:
- image: alpine
command:
- "echo"
args:
- "The artifacts dir is $(ARTIFACTS)"
In addition to normal ProwJob configuration, ProwJobs using the Pod Utilities
must specify the command
field in the container specification instead of using
the Dockerfile's ENTRYPOINT directive. Note that the command
field is a string
array not just a string. It should point to the test binary location in the container.
Additional fields may be required for some use cases:
- Private repos need to do two things:
- Add an ssh secret that gives the bot access to the repo to the build cluster
and specify the secret name in the
ssh_key_secrets
field of the job decoration config. - Set the
clone_uri
field of the job spec to[email protected]:{{.Org}}/{{.Repo}}.git
.
- Add an ssh secret that gives the bot access to the repo to the build cluster
and specify the secret name in the
- Repos requiring a non-standard clone path can use the
path_alias
field to clone the repo to different go import path than the default of/home/prow/go/src/github.com/{{.Org}}/{{.Repo}}/
(e.g.path_alias: k8s.io/test-infra
->/home/prow/go/src/k8s.io/test-infra
). - Jobs that require additional repos to be checked out can arrange for that with
the
exta_refs
field. If the cloned path of this repo must be used as a default working dir theworkdir: true
must be specified. - Jobs that do not want submodules to be cloned should set
skip_submodules
totrue
- Jobs that want to perform shallow cloning can use
clone_depth
field. It can be set to desired clone depth. By default, clone_depth get set to 0 which results in full clone of repo.
- name: post-job
decorate: true
decoration_config:
ssh_key_secrets:
- ssh-secret
clone_uri: "[email protected]:<YOUR_ORG>/<YOUR_REPO>.git"
extra_refs:
- org: kubernetes
repo: other-repo
base_ref: master
workdir: false
skip_submodules: true
clone_depth: 0
spec:
containers:
- image: alpine
command:
- "echo"
args:
- "The artifacts dir is $(ARTIFACTS)"
Jobs using the deprecated bootstrap.py should switch to the Pod Utilities at their earliest convenience. @dims has created a handy migration guide.
Many jobs exist that must touch third-party systems in order to be productive. Whether the job provisions
resources in a cloud IaaS like GCP, reports results to an aggregation service like coveralls.io, or simply
clones private repositories, jobs require sensitive credentials to achieve their goals. Even with the best
intentions, it is possible for end-user code running in a test Pod
for a ProwJob
to accidentally leak
the content of those credentials. If Prow is configured to push job logs and artifacts to a public cloud
storage bucket, that leak is immediately immortalized in plain text for the world to read. The sidecar
utility can infer what secrets a job has access to and censor those secrets from the output. The following
job turns on censoring:
- name: censored-job
decorate: true
decoration_config:
censor_secrets: true
The automatic censoring process is written to be as useful as possible while having a bounded impact on the
execution cost in resources and time for the job. In order to censor every possible leak, all keys in all
Secrets
that are mounted into the test Pod
are treated as sensitive data. For each of these keys, the
value of the key as well as the base-64 encoded value are censored from the job's log as well as any
artifacts the job produces. If any archives (e.g. .tar.gz
) are found in the output artifacts for a job,
they are unarchived in order to censor their contents on the fly before being re-archived and pushed up to
cloud storage.
In order to bound the impact in runtime and resource cost for censoring on the job, both the concurrency and buffer size of the censoring algorithm are tunable. The overall steady-state memory footprint of the censoring algorithm is simply the buffer size times the maximum concurrency. The buffer must be as large as twice the length of the largest secret to be censored, but may be tuned to very small values in order to decrease the memory footprint. Keep mind that this will increase overall disk I/O and therefore increase the runtime of censoring. Therefore, in order to decrease censoring runtime the buffer should be increased.
A number of aspects of the censoring algorithm are tunable with configuration option at the per-job level
or for entire repositories or organizations. Under the decoration_config
stanza, the following options
are available to tune censoring:
decoration_config:
censoring_options:
censoring_concurrency: 0 # the number of files to censor concurrently; each allocates a buffer
censoring_buffer_size: 0 # the size of the censoring buffer, in bytes
include_directories:
- path/**/to/*something.txt # globs relative to $ARTIFACTS that should be censored; everything censored if unset
exclude_directories:
- path/**/to/*other.txt # globs relative to $ARTIFACTS that should not be censored