diff --git a/app/assets/javascripts/app.ts b/app/assets/javascripts/app.ts index 69869af55d9..05b5dbd3dcf 100644 --- a/app/assets/javascripts/app.ts +++ b/app/assets/javascripts/app.ts @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ const startApplication: StartApplication = async function startApplication( SNLog.onLog = console.log; startErrorReporting(); - angular.module('app', ['ngSanitize']); + angular.module('app', []); // Config angular diff --git a/app/assets/javascripts/components/NotesListItem.tsx b/app/assets/javascripts/components/NotesListItem.tsx index bd3e0598b85..d1da168acea 100644 --- a/app/assets/javascripts/components/NotesListItem.tsx +++ b/app/assets/javascripts/components/NotesListItem.tsx @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ -import { CollectionSort, SNNote } from '@standardnotes/snjs'; +import { + CollectionSort, + sanitizeHtmlString, + SNNote, +} from '@standardnotes/snjs'; import { FunctionComponent } from 'preact'; type Props = { @@ -108,7 +112,9 @@ export const NotesListItem: FunctionComponent = ({ {note.preview_html ? (
) : null} {!note.preview_html && note.preview_plain ? ( diff --git a/app/assets/javascripts/index.ts b/app/assets/javascripts/index.ts index 78abf2bf4d9..ca7714627fb 100644 --- a/app/assets/javascripts/index.ts +++ b/app/assets/javascripts/index.ts @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import '../stylesheets/index.css.scss'; // Vendor import 'angular'; -import '../../../vendor/assets/javascripts/angular-sanitize'; import '../../../vendor/assets/javascripts/zip/deflate'; import '../../../vendor/assets/javascripts/zip/inflate'; import '../../../vendor/assets/javascripts/zip/zip'; diff --git a/vendor/assets/javascripts/angular-sanitize.js b/vendor/assets/javascripts/angular-sanitize.js deleted file mode 100644 index 4b6f6e3052f..00000000000 --- a/vendor/assets/javascripts/angular-sanitize.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,713 +0,0 @@ -/* - This is SN's custom version of angular-sanitize that simply adds 'progress' as permitted block element and 'style' htmlAttrs. - */ - -'use strict'; - -/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * - * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * - * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * - * this file is required. * - * * - * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * - * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * - * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ - -var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); -var bind; -var extend; -var forEach; -var isArray; -var isDefined; -var lowercase; -var noop; -var nodeContains; -var htmlParser; -var htmlSanitizeWriter; - -/** - * @ngdoc module - * @name ngSanitize - * @description - * - * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. - * - * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. - */ - -/** - * @ngdoc service - * @name $sanitize - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. - * - * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are - * then serialized back to a properly escaped HTML string. This means that no unsafe input can make - * it into the returned string. - * - * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions - * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link $compileProvider}. - * - * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. - * - * @param {string} html HTML input. - * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. - * - * @example - - - -
- Snippet: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DirectiveHowSourceRendered
ng-bind-htmlAutomatically uses $sanitize
<div ng-bind-html="snippet">
</div>
ng-bind-htmlBypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value - 
<div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()">
-</div>
-
ng-bindAutomatically escapes
<div ng-bind="snippet">
</div>
-
- - - it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe('

an html\nclick here\nsnippet

'); - }); - - it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe("

an html\n" + - "click here\n" + - "snippet

"); - }); - - it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { - expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + - "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + - "snippet</p>"); - }); - - it('should update', function() { - element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); - element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new text'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). - toBe('new text'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( - 'new text'); - expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( - "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); - }); - - - */ - - -/** - * @ngdoc provider - * @name $sanitizeProvider - * @this - * - * @description - * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. - */ -function $SanitizeProvider() { - var hasBeenInstantiated = false; - var svgEnabled = false; - - this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { - hasBeenInstantiated = true; - if (svgEnabled) { - extend(validElements, svgElements); - } - return function(html) { - var buf = []; - htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { - return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); - })); - return buf.join(''); - }; - }]; - - - /** - * @ngdoc method - * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. - * - *
- *

By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your - * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned - * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login - * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.

- * - *

To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg - * tags within the sanitized content:

- * - *
- * - * 

-   *   .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {
-   *     overflow: hidden !important;
-   *   }
-   *
- *
- * - * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer. - * @returns {boolean|$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called - * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. - */ - this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { - if (isDefined(enableSvg)) { - svgEnabled = enableSvg; - return this; - } else { - return svgEnabled; - } - }; - - - /** - * @ngdoc method - * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidElements - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Extends the built-in lists of valid HTML/SVG elements, i.e. elements that are considered safe - * and are not stripped off during sanitization. You can extend the following lists of elements: - * - * - `htmlElements`: A list of elements (tag names) to extend the current list of safe HTML - * elements. HTML elements considered safe will not be removed during sanitization. All other - * elements will be stripped off. - * - * - `htmlVoidElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but marks the elements as - * "void elements" (similar to HTML - * [void elements](https://rawgit.com/w3c/html/html5.1-2/single-page.html#void-elements)). These - * elements have no end tag and cannot have content. - * - * - `svgElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but for SVG elements. This list is only - * taken into account if SVG is {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for - * `$sanitize`. - * - *
- * This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the - * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. - *
- * - *
- * Keep in mind that extending the built-in lists of elements may expose your app to XSS or - * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the elements you add. - *
- * - * @param {Array|Object} elements - A list of valid HTML elements or an object with one or - * more of the following properties: - * - **htmlElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of - * HTML elements. - * - **htmlVoidElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of - * void HTML elements; i.e. elements that do not have an end tag. - * - **svgElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of SVG - * elements. The list of SVG elements is only taken into account if SVG is - * {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for `$sanitize`. - * - * Passing an array (`[...]`) is equivalent to passing `{htmlElements: [...]}`. - * - * @return {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. - */ - this.addValidElements = function(elements) { - if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { - if (isArray(elements)) { - elements = {htmlElements: elements}; - } - - addElementsTo(svgElements, elements.svgElements); - addElementsTo(voidElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); - addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); - addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlElements); - } - - return this; - }; - - - /** - * @ngdoc method - * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidAttrs - * @kind function - * - * @description - * Extends the built-in list of valid attributes, i.e. attributes that are considered safe and are - * not stripped off during sanitization. - * - * **Note**: - * The new attributes will not be treated as URI attributes, which means their values will not be - * sanitized as URIs using `$compileProvider`'s - * {@link ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist aHrefSanitizationWhitelist} and - * {@link ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist}. - * - *
- * This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the - * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. - *
- * - *
- * Keep in mind that extending the built-in list of attributes may expose your app to XSS or - * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the attributes you add. - *
- * - * @param {Array} attrs - A list of valid attributes. - * - * @returns {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. - */ - this.addValidAttrs = function(attrs) { - if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { - extend(validAttrs, arrayToMap(attrs, true)); - } - return this; - }; - - ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - // Private stuff - ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - - bind = angular.bind; - extend = angular.extend; - forEach = angular.forEach; - isArray = angular.isArray; - isDefined = angular.isDefined; - lowercase = angular.$$lowercase; - noop = angular.noop; - - htmlParser = htmlParserImpl; - htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl; - - nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) { - // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise - return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16); - }; - - // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes - var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, - // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) - NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g; - - - // Good source of info about elements and attributes - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics - // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements - - // Safe Void Elements - HTML5 - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements - var voidElements = stringToMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr'); - - // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) - // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags - var optionalEndTagBlockElements = stringToMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'), - optionalEndTagInlineElements = stringToMap('rp,rt'), - optionalEndTagElements = extend({}, - optionalEndTagInlineElements, - optionalEndTagBlockElements); - - // Safe Block Elements - HTML5 - var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, stringToMap('address,article,' + - 'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' + - 'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul,progress')); - - // Inline Elements - HTML5 - var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, stringToMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' + - 'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' + - 'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var')); - - // SVG Elements - // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements - // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. - // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 - var svgElements = stringToMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' + - 'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' + - 'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan'); - - // Blocked Elements (will be stripped) - var blockedElements = stringToMap('script,style'); - - var validElements = extend({}, - voidElements, - blockElements, - inlineElements, - optionalEndTagElements); - - //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized - var uriAttrs = stringToMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href,xml:base'); - - var htmlAttrs = stringToMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + - 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + - 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + - 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + - 'valign,value,vspace,width,style'); - - // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) - // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes - var svgAttrs = stringToMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + - 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + - 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + - 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + - 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + - 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + - 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + - 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + - 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + - 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + - 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + - 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + - 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + - 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + - 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); - - var validAttrs = extend({}, - uriAttrs, - svgAttrs, - htmlAttrs); - - function stringToMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { - return arrayToMap(str.split(','), lowercaseKeys); - } - - function arrayToMap(items, lowercaseKeys) { - var obj = {}, i; - for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { - obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; - } - return obj; - } - - function addElementsTo(elementsMap, newElements) { - if (newElements && newElements.length) { - extend(elementsMap, arrayToMap(newElements)); - } - } - - /** - * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing - * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this. - * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy - * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy - */ - var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) { - var inertDocument; - if (document && document.implementation) { - inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert'); - } else { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document'); - } - var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body'); - - // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = ''; - if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) { - return getInertBodyElement_XHR; - } else { - // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '

'; - if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) { - return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser; - } else { - return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument; - } - } - - function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) { - // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected - // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `` do not get hoisted to the `` tag. - html = '' + html; - try { - html = encodeURI(html); - } catch (e) { - return undefined; - } - var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest(); - xhr.responseType = 'document'; - xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false); - xhr.send(null); - var body = xhr.response.body; - body.firstChild.remove(); - return body; - } - - function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) { - // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected - // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `` do not get hoisted to the `` tag. - html = '' + html; - try { - var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body; - body.firstChild.remove(); - return body; - } catch (e) { - return undefined; - } - } - - function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) { - inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; - - // Support: IE 9-11 only - // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 - if (document.documentMode) { - stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); - } - - return inertBodyElement; - } - })(window, window.document); - - /** - * @example - * htmlParser(htmlString, { - * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, - * end: function(tag) {}, - * chars: function(text) {}, - * comment: function(text) {} - * }); - * - * @param {string} html string - * @param {object} handler - */ - function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) { - if (html === null || html === undefined) { - html = ''; - } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { - html = '' + html; - } - - var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); - if (!inertBodyElement) return ''; - - //mXSS protection - var mXSSAttempts = 5; - do { - if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable'); - } - mXSSAttempts--; - - // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML - html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; - inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); - } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); - - var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; - while (node) { - switch (node.nodeType) { - case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE - handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); - break; - case 3: // TEXT NODE - handler.chars(node.textContent); - break; - } - - var nextNode; - if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { - if (node.nodeType === 1) { - handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); - } - nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - if (!nextNode) { - while (nextNode == null) { - node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node); - if (node === inertBodyElement) break; - nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - if (node.nodeType === 1) { - handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); - } - } - } - } - node = nextNode; - } - - while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) { - inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); - } - } - - function attrToMap(attrs) { - var map = {}; - for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { - var attr = attrs[i]; - map[attr.name] = attr.value; - } - return map; - } - - - /** - * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the - * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or - * element text. - * @param value - * @returns {string} escaped text - */ - function encodeEntities(value) { - return value. - replace(/&/g, '&'). - replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { - var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); - var low = value.charCodeAt(1); - return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; - }). - replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { - return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; - }). - replace(//g, '>'); - } - - /** - * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer - * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string - * @returns {object} in the form of { - * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, - * end: function(tag) {}, - * chars: function(text) {}, - * comment: function(text) {} - * } - */ - function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) { - var ignoreCurrentElement = false; - var out = bind(buf, buf.push); - return { - start: function(tag, attrs) { - tag = lowercase(tag); - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { - ignoreCurrentElement = tag; - } - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { - out('<'); - out(tag); - forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { - var lkey = lowercase(key); - var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); - if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && - (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { - out(' '); - out(key); - out('="'); - out(encodeEntities(value)); - out('"'); - } - }); - out('>'); - } - }, - end: function(tag) { - tag = lowercase(tag); - if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { - out(''); - } - // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq - if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { - ignoreCurrentElement = false; - } - }, - chars: function(chars) { - if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { - out(encodeEntities(chars)); - } - } - }; - } - - - /** - * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare - * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want - * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. - * - * @param node Root element to process - */ - function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { - while (node) { - if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { - var attrs = node.attributes; - for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { - var attrNode = attrs[i]; - var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); - if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) { - node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); - i--; - l--; - } - } - } - - var nextNode = node.firstChild; - if (nextNode) { - stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); - } - - node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); - } - } - - function getNonDescendant(propName, node) { - // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants - var nextNode = node[propName]; - if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) { - throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText); - } - return nextNode; - } -} - -function sanitizeText(chars) { - var buf = []; - var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop); - writer.chars(chars); - return buf.join(''); -} - - -// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service -angular.module('ngSanitize', []) - .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider) - .info({ angularVersion: '"NG_VERSION_FULL"' });