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0xbepresent - Rewards will not be distributed to the vault's rewarder due a malfunction in LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() #499

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sherlock-admin2 opened this issue Aug 29, 2023 · 0 comments
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sherlock-admin2 commented Aug 29, 2023

0xbepresent

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Rewards will not be distributed to the vault's rewarder due a malfunction in LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation()

Summary

The LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() function will not distribute the rewards to the vault's rewarder because the function does not transfer the reward tokens to the AsyncSwapper contract causing the staker will not receive rewards.

Vulnerability Detail

The LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() function helps to transfer the collected rewards to the vault's rewarder.

File: LiquidationRow.sol
240:     function _performLiquidation(
241:         uint256 gasBefore,
242:         address fromToken,
243:         address asyncSwapper,
244:         IDestinationVault[] memory vaultsToLiquidate,
245:         SwapParams memory params,
246:         uint256 totalBalanceToLiquidate,
247:         uint256[] memory vaultsBalances
248:     ) private {
...
...
265:         for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
266:             IDestinationVault vaultAddress = vaultsToLiquidate[i];
267:             IMainRewarder mainRewarder = IMainRewarder(vaultAddress.rewarder());
268: 
269:             if (mainRewarder.rewardToken() != params.buyTokenAddress) {
270:                 revert InvalidRewardToken();
271:             }
272: 
273:             uint256 amount = amountReceived * vaultsBalances[i] / totalBalanceToLiquidate;
274: 
275:             // approve main rewarder to pull the tokens
276:             LibAdapter._approve(IERC20(params.buyTokenAddress), address(mainRewarder), amount);
277:             mainRewarder.queueNewRewards(amount);
...
...

At the beginning of the function, it swap the accumulated rewards tokens to the vault's rewards token (code line 251):

File: LiquidationRow.sol
240:     function _performLiquidation(
241:         uint256 gasBefore,
242:         address fromToken,
243:         address asyncSwapper,
244:         IDestinationVault[] memory vaultsToLiquidate,
245:         SwapParams memory params,
246:         uint256 totalBalanceToLiquidate,
247:         uint256[] memory vaultsBalances
248:     ) private {
249:         uint256 length = vaultsToLiquidate.length;
250:         // the swapper checks that the amount received is greater or equal than the params.buyAmount
251:         uint256 amountReceived = IAsyncSwapper(asyncSwapper).swap(params);

The AsyncSwapper.swap() function will check if the desired amount to sell is in the contract (code line 30):

File: BaseAsyncSwapper.sol
19:     function swap(SwapParams memory swapParams) public virtual nonReentrant returns (uint256 buyTokenAmountReceived) {
...
... 
25:         IERC20 sellToken = IERC20(swapParams.sellTokenAddress);
26:         IERC20 buyToken = IERC20(swapParams.buyTokenAddress);
27: 
28:         uint256 sellTokenBalance = sellToken.balanceOf(address(this));
29: 
30:         if (sellTokenBalance < swapParams.sellAmount) {
31:             revert InsufficientBalance(sellTokenBalance, swapParams.sellAmount);
32:         }
...
...

The problem is that the LiquidationRow._performLiquidation() does not transfer the amount to sell to the AsyncSwapper and the AsynSwapper does not make a transferFrom call.

I created a test where LiquidationRow::claimsVaultRewards() will be reverted by a InsufficientBalance in the AsyncSwapper contract:

// File: LiquidationRow.t.sol
// $ forge test --match-test "test_TransferRewardsToMainRewarderWillFaillUsingTheBaseAsynSwapper" -vvv
//
import { IAsyncSwapper, SwapParams } from "src/interfaces/liquidation/IAsyncSwapper.sol";

    function test_TransferRewardsToMainRewarderWillFaillUsingTheBaseAsynSwapper() public {
        // The LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() does not transfer the rewards to the AsyncSwapper causing a revert of
        // the transaction.
        // 
        // Setup the baseAsyncSwapper
        BaseAsyncSwapper baseAsyncSwapper = new BaseAsyncSwapper(vm.addr(100));
        liquidationRow.addToWhitelist(address(baseAsyncSwapper));
        SwapParams memory swapParams =
            SwapParams(address(rewardToken2), 200, address(targetToken), buyAmount, new bytes(0), new bytes(0));
        liquidationRow.setFeeAndReceiver(feeReceiver, feeBps);
        _mockComplexScenario(address(testVault));
        IDestinationVault[] memory vaults = _initArrayOfOneTestVault();
        //
        // Claims rewards
        liquidationRow.claimsVaultRewards(vaults);
        //
        // The liquidateVaultsForToken() will be reverted by InsufficientBalance
        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IAsyncSwapper.InsufficientBalance.selector, 0, 200));
        liquidationRow.liquidateVaultsForToken(address(rewardToken2), address(baseAsyncSwapper), vaults, swapParams);
    }

Impact

The collected rewards will not be received by the vault's rewarders. The collected rewards by the LiquidationRow contract will be stuck in the contract.

Code Snippet

Tool used

Manual review

Recommendation

Transfer the sell amount to the AsyncSwapper contract and make sure the buy token amount is returned to the LiquidationRow contract:

File: LiquidationRow.sol
     function _performLiquidation(
         uint256 gasBefore,
         address fromToken,
         address asyncSwapper,
         IDestinationVault[] memory vaultsToLiquidate,
         SwapParams memory params,
         uint256 totalBalanceToLiquidate,
         uint256[] memory vaultsBalances
     ) private {
         uint256 length = vaultsToLiquidate.length;
         // the swapper checks that the amount received is greater or equal than the params.buyAmount
++       IERC20(fromToken).safeApprove(address(asyncSwapper), params.sellAmount);
         uint256 amountReceived = IAsyncSwapper(asyncSwapper).swap(params);
++       if (IERC20(params.buyTokenAddress).balanceOf(address(this)) < params.buyAmount) revert();
...
File: BaseAsyncSwapper.sol
     function swap(SwapParams memory swapParams) public virtual nonReentrant returns (uint256 buyTokenAmountReceived) {
         if (swapParams.buyTokenAddress == address(0)) revert TokenAddressZero();
         if (swapParams.sellTokenAddress == address(0)) revert TokenAddressZero();
         if (swapParams.sellAmount == 0) revert InsufficientSellAmount();
         if (swapParams.buyAmount == 0) revert InsufficientBuyAmount();
 
         IERC20 sellToken = IERC20(swapParams.sellTokenAddress);
         IERC20 buyToken = IERC20(swapParams.buyTokenAddress);
++       IERC20(sellToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), swapParams.sellAmount);
         uint256 sellTokenBalance = sellToken.balanceOf(address(this));
 
         if (sellTokenBalance < swapParams.sellAmount) {
             revert InsufficientBalance(sellTokenBalance, swapParams.sellAmount);
         }
...

Duplicate of #205

@github-actions github-actions bot added High A valid High severity issue Duplicate A valid issue that is a duplicate of an issue with `Has Duplicates` label labels Sep 11, 2023
@sherlock-admin sherlock-admin changed the title Curved Graphite Marmot - Rewards will not be distributed to the vault's rewarder due a malfunction in LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() 0xbepresent - Rewards will not be distributed to the vault's rewarder due a malfunction in LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation() Oct 3, 2023
@sherlock-admin sherlock-admin added the Reward A payout will be made for this issue label Oct 3, 2023
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