8olidity - Price oracle could get a stale price

[github-actions]

8olidity

medium

Price oracle could get a stale price

Summary

getOraclePrice() will get signedPrice and timeStamp from Chainlink oracle. But it doesn't check round id ,leading to it may get a stale price from Chainlink oracle.

Vulnerability Detail

getOraclePrice() will get signedPrice and timeStamp from Chainlink oracle. But it doesn't check round id ,leading to it may get a stale price from Chainlink oracle.

    function getOraclePrice(IAggregatorV3 _priceFeed, int192 _maxPrice, int192 _minPrice) public view returns (uint256 ) {
        (
            /*uint80 roundID*/,
            int signedPrice,
            /*uint startedAt*/,
            uint timeStamp,
            /*uint80 answeredInRound*/
        ) = _priceFeed.latestRoundData();
        //check for Chainlink oracle deviancies, force a revert if any are present. Helps prevent a LUNA like issue
        require(signedPrice > 0, "Negative Oracle Price");
        require(timeStamp >= block.timestamp - HEARTBEAT_TIME , "Stale pricefeed");
        require(signedPrice < _maxPrice, "Upper price bound breached");
        require(signedPrice > _minPrice, "Lower price bound breached");
        uint256 price = uint256(signedPrice);
        return price;


    }

ref:https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-09-notional-judging/tree/7a9f89b45f7a49c21941b3eebe13251a326d75bf#issue-m-2-price-oracle-could-get-a-stale-price

Impact

Price oracle could get a stale price without checking roundId.

Code Snippet

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-11-isomorph/blob/main/contracts/Velo-Deposit-Tokens/contracts/DepositReceipt_Base.sol#L164-L178

Tool used

Manual Review

Recommendation

Check  roundId when getting price

    function getOraclePrice(IAggregatorV3 _priceFeed, int192 _maxPrice, int192 _minPrice) public view returns (uint256 ) {
        (
            uint80 roundID,
            int signedPrice,
            /*uint startedAt*/,
            uint timeStamp,
            /*uint80 answeredInRound*/
        ) = _priceFeed.latestRoundData();
        //check for Chainlink oracle deviancies, force a revert if any are present. Helps prevent a LUNA like issue
        require(signedPrice > 0, "Negative Oracle Price");
        require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Stale price");
        require(timeStamp >= block.timestamp - HEARTBEAT_TIME , "Stale pricefeed");
        require(signedPrice < _maxPrice, "Upper price bound breached");
        require(signedPrice > _minPrice, "Lower price bound breached");
        uint256 price = uint256(signedPrice);
        return price;


    }

Duplicate of #200