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SHIM 15.4 for AmZetta Technologies, LLC #211
Comments
This submission is inappropriate, it hijacks the ubuntu namespace. Surely you are aware that there already is an ubuntu vendor? It probably should use a The repositories are not forks of the main ones, but hand-stitched together, so to speak. Please rebase the repositories on top of the official ones, so that any changes can be clearly identified. There is no tag as required. I do not know if linux 5.10 contains all necessary fixes. |
I'm confused because this just seems a copy-paste job of #206 |
We are different company, Our product is thin client solution. We are planning to provide secure boot option to our next generation products. Product Info. |
Thank you, We will fix all mentioned issues. Linux 5.10 kernel has the fix for |
We have updated the needed changes, please review the updated files. Thank you. |
0001-Fix-handling-of-ignore_db-and-user_insecure_mode.patch( 822d07ad4f07ef66fe447a130e1027c88d02a394 )
Could you please review the updated files. If anything wrong in the submission please let me know. Thank you. |
Hi, I have tried to confirm your shim is reproducible. Please make sure your shim build is replayable from Dockerfile. Sample Cases:
Debian 10(docker)
Ubuntu 20.04.2(docker)
|
@amzdev0401
According to build.log in your repository, latest build did above mistakes probably. I think better just use |
I have noticed the same issue while testing in different operating systems and I have fixed the issue. I will update the modified files after testing is completed. |
Following files have been modified and uploaded for different checksums for different OSes issue.
Once again, thank you for the Shim review process. |
I am trying cross-review while refferring reviewer-guidelines:
Corresponding line in new build log is https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/blob/a9bd5d4daa44d23f897dfeb739ac479cda5b5fce/build.log#L1438
Could someone(has authority to accept) review this submission? |
|
Thank you for the update, I have updated the requested info, please let me know If I need to do anything in this SHIM submission.
|
While I can't speak for other reviewers, if you want a review from me, you need to adhere to the guidelines, which strongly suggest it to be an actual fork. Note that this is about your shim-review tree, not your shim tree. |
Thank you for your quick response. We appreciate the attention you are giving to this review process.
Please let us know if we need to anything. Thank you once again. |
While PGP key fingerprints have been provided and a keyserver is mentioned, keys do not appear to have been pushed to said keyserver. Your two security contacts are an Engineering Manager and a Sales Director. Since neither of those are typically technical roles, I need to check: are both of these contacts able to handle security updates? And: which one is you @amzdev0401 ? |
Thank you for the update.
[email protected] [email protected]
Please let me know, If I need to do anything from my side. |
About security contacts : Yes we will handle security updates, that is not a problem for us. |
We are planning to add the secure boot feature in the upcoming product release, we are waiting for the SHIM approval. Can you please review the SHIM. Thank you. |
I am going to send you some words. When you receive them, please post them here. |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 spartanerer |
Thank you for the update. Do I need to do anything from my end ?. Please let me know. |
You don't, but your other contact does - I emailed you both. |
Hi, I have check my secondary contact, he said he didn't get any mail, he is waiting for the mail to reply. Name: Justine Bagby
|
Mail was sent to ***@***.*** from ***@***.*** on Thu, 03
Feb 2022 19:05:03 -0500 with subject "shim words" and encrypted body.
It was sent with Message-id of ***@***.*** . Delivery
appears successful from my end - I have no indication otherwise.
|
Thank you. Can you please resend the mail. |
Resent. |
Thank you very much, He send the decrypted data of your mail to me. Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 spredningsevners |
Contact information is verified. You might want to look into whatever's not processing utf-8 in your email stack properly, but that's not related to shim review :) |
Thank you for the quick and prompt response. Greatly appreciated !!. |
I find it problematic that most of this submission is copy-pasted from #206 (as noted before by @julian-klode). If you diff the |
Yes we familiarized with secure boot. Regarding procedure for submission we had some issues but those were corrected based on the suggestions from the reviewer. Sorry for the issues earlier. Please let us know if anything needs to be updated for your review and we will take care of it immediately. |
Could you please let us know anything do we need to do from our end. |
Could you please finish this review, we are waiting for the product release. |
Closing outdated request due to the recent round of CVEs in grub and shim requiring a new submission with fixes for all these CVEs. |
Make sure you have provided the following information:
https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/tree/AmZettaTech-shim-X86_64-shim-15.4
https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/blob/AmZettaTech-shim-X86_64-shim-15.4/shimx64.efi
https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/blob/AmZettaTech-shim-X86_64-shim-15.4/AMZ.cer
no binaries
no patches
no patches
https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/blob/AmZettaTech-shim-X86_64-shim-15.4/build.log
https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim-review/blob/AmZettaTech-shim-X86_64-shim-15.4/Dockerfile
What organization or people are asking to have this signed:
[AmZetta Technologies, LLC, For more info https://amzetta.com/ztc/]
What product or service is this for:
[SnapVDI Thin Client (zTC)-ENDPOINT DEVICES Hardware Thin client product. Powerful hardware components and native compatibility with VMware, Citrix, and Microsoft, as well as Azure and AWS cloud platforms, the AmZetta zTC thin client device seamlessly integrates into virtually any IT environment. Using the included AmZetta Client Manager (SCM) software, administrators can manage, monitor, and secure their entire zTC deployment from a single intuitive interface. More than ever before, businesses today need the ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. Equip your company with the agility to adapt without compromising power, compatibility, or security with the AmZetta zTC thin client. For More info: https://amzetta.com/ztc/]
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Please confirm this as the origin your shim.
[yes, our repo https://github.com/amzdev0401/shim.git, tag Ver-15.4, is copy of https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4]
What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
[Snap OS (TAILORED FOR VIRTUAL SPACES from Linux distribution) for Linux software endpoint solution by AmZetta Technologies. Snap OS is currently used in Hardware thin clients(zTC), It can be used to Repurposing the old laptop and desktops without any hassle. AmZetta Technologies would like customers to be able to run Snap OS Linux endpoint on any x86-64 devices without disabling Secure Boot.]
How do you manage and protect the keys used in your SHIM?
[[Hardware security module]
Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the SHIM?
[yes, Amzetta generated self-signed certificate using OpenSSL embedded into shim]
If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?
[vendor_db is not used]
Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?
[yes, Kernel 5.10 is used in SnapOS. Kernel 5.10 has "ACPI: configfs: Disallow loading ACPI tables when locked down" fix]
if SHIM is loading GRUB2 bootloader, are CVEs CVE-2020-14372,
CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779,
CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308,
CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
fixed ?
[We use upstream GRUB 2.06 with all above CVEs fixed]
"Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata
( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )" to shim review doc ?
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim
[Our SHIM has embedded SBAT section with following 3 lines:]
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
shim,1,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim
shim.amzetta,1,SnapOS,shim,15.4,https://amzetta.com
[Our GRUB2 has embedded SBAT section with following 3 lines:]
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
grub,1,Free Software Foundation,grub,2.06,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/
grub.amzetta,1,SnapOS,grub2,2.06,https://amzetta.com
Were your old SHIM hashes provided to Microsoft ?
[No, this is first time submission, we have no older SHIMs]
Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
grub2 bootloaders can not be verified ?
[We use upstream GRUB 2.06 trusting it's strategy]
What exact implementation of Secureboot in grub2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
* Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
[We use upstream GRUB 2.06 with SBAT section]
What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB or other)?
[GRUB https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/grub/grub-2.06.tar.xz sha256 b79ea44af91b93d17cd3fe80bdae6ed43770678a9a5ae192ccea803ebb657ee1 grub-2.06.tar.xz]
If your SHIM launches any other components, please provide further details on what is launched
[No, shim launches GRUB only]
If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode,
please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown
[GRUB2 launches Kernel only]
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you
will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries
exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent
GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If
you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not
apply. Please describe your strategy.
[This is first time submission, we do not have older GRUB2 binaries]
How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code?
[We use chained loading: shim -> grub2 -> kernel with all components signed]
Does your SHIM load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. GRUB)?
[No]
What kernel are you using? Which patches does it includes to enforce Secure Boot?
[Kernel 5.10]
What changes were made since your SHIM was last signed?
[This is first time submission]
What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?
[f8f35ad9fec3763b45eae7beaab74eb3d006f3eb94f7382dd1290dd488200980]
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