This repository has been archived by the owner on Feb 26, 2020. It is now read-only.
Remove misguided HAVE_MUTEX_OWNER check, take 2 #639
Closed
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
It is just plain unsafe to peek inside in-kernel
mutex structure and make assumptions about what kernel
does with those internal fields like owner.
Kernel is all too happy to stop doing the expected things
like tracing lock owner once you load a tainted module
like spl/zfs that is not GPL.
As such you will get instant assertion failures like this:
VERIFY3(((*(volatile typeof((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner) *)&
((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner))) ==
((void *)0)) failed (ffff88030be28500 == (null))
PANIC at zfs_onexit.c:104:zfs_onexit_destroy()
Showing stack for process 3626
CPU: 0 PID: 3626 Comm: mkfs.lustre Tainted: P OE ------------ 3.10.0-debug openzfs#1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
spl_dumpstack+0x44/0x50 [spl]
spl_panic+0xbf/0xf0 [spl]
zfs_onexit_destroy+0x17c/0x280 [zfs]
zfsdev_release+0x48/0xd0 [zfs]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#632
verygreen
added a commit
to verygreen/zfs
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 2, 2017
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]> Requires-spl:refs/pull/639/head
|
Test results look good. Merged. |
tonyhutter
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 3, 2017
It is just plain unsafe to peek inside in-kernel
mutex structure and make assumptions about what kernel
does with those internal fields like owner.
Kernel is all too happy to stop doing the expected things
like tracing lock owner once you load a tainted module
like spl/zfs that is not GPL.
As such you will get instant assertion failures like this:
VERIFY3(((*(volatile typeof((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner) *)&
((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner))) ==
((void *)0)) failed (ffff88030be28500 == (null))
PANIC at zfs_onexit.c:104:zfs_onexit_destroy()
Showing stack for process 3626
CPU: 0 PID: 3626 Comm: mkfs.lustre Tainted: P OE ------------ 3.10.0-debug #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
spl_dumpstack+0x44/0x50 [spl]
spl_panic+0xbf/0xf0 [spl]
zfs_onexit_destroy+0x17c/0x280 [zfs]
zfsdev_release+0x48/0xd0 [zfs]
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chunwei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gvozden Neskovic <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]>
Closes #639
Closes #632
Fabian-Gruenbichler
pushed a commit
to Fabian-Gruenbichler/spl
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 6, 2017
It is just plain unsafe to peek inside in-kernel
mutex structure and make assumptions about what kernel
does with those internal fields like owner.
Kernel is all too happy to stop doing the expected things
like tracing lock owner once you load a tainted module
like spl/zfs that is not GPL.
As such you will get instant assertion failures like this:
VERIFY3(((*(volatile typeof((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner) *)&
((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner))) ==
((void *)0)) failed (ffff88030be28500 == (null))
PANIC at zfs_onexit.c:104:zfs_onexit_destroy()
Showing stack for process 3626
CPU: 0 PID: 3626 Comm: mkfs.lustre Tainted: P OE ------------ 3.10.0-debug openzfs#1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
spl_dumpstack+0x44/0x50 [spl]
spl_panic+0xbf/0xf0 [spl]
zfs_onexit_destroy+0x17c/0x280 [zfs]
zfsdev_release+0x48/0xd0 [zfs]
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chunwei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gvozden Neskovic <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]>
Closes openzfs#639
Closes openzfs#632
Sign up for free
to subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
It is just plain unsafe to peek inside in-kernel
mutex structure and make assumptions about what kernel
does with those internal fields like owner.
Kernel is all too happy to stop doing the expected things
like tracing lock owner once you load a tainted module
like spl/zfs that is not GPL.
As such you will get instant assertion failures like this:
VERIFY3(((*(volatile typeof((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner) *)&
((&((&zo->zo_lock)->m_mutex))->owner))) ==
((void *)0)) failed (ffff88030be28500 == (null))
PANIC at zfs_onexit.c:104:zfs_onexit_destroy()
Showing stack for process 3626
CPU: 0 PID: 3626 Comm: mkfs.lustre Tainted: P OE ------------ 3.10.0-debug #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
spl_dumpstack+0x44/0x50 [spl]
spl_panic+0xbf/0xf0 [spl]
zfs_onexit_destroy+0x17c/0x280 [zfs]
zfsdev_release+0x48/0xd0 [zfs]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin [email protected]
Closes #632